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ii ABSTRACT 
MODEELLINEi  A  NEW  ECONOMIC  EiROWTH  THOUGHT  FOR 
DEVELOPINra  ECONOMIESWITH  PARTICULAR  CE  TO 
ECONOMIES  IN  TRANSITION 
The  objective  of  this  research  work  is  to  model  a  new  economic  growth  thought  for 
developing  economies  by  mainly  taking  into  account  the  complex  structure  of  the 
economies  in  transition.  The  post-war  debate  on  an  age-old  problem  of  growth  and 
development  has  once  again  gained  a  momentum  with  the  demise  of  the  socialist 
system  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  in  the  Eastern  and  Central  European  nations. 
The  dynamism  of  these  economies  in  transition  woulddepend  largely  on  the  working 
of  capitalist-market  mechanism,  to  which  they  have  allied  themselves.  While  designing 
new  economic  growth  strategies,  we  consider  the  economic  variables  which  need  to 
integrate  socio-cultural  phenomena.  The  economic  policy  imperative  is  based  on  the 
conviction  that  the  fusion  of  the  way  of  thinking  of  the  people  and  the  way  of  acting  of 
the  economic  agent  results  either  in  economic  development  or  in  economic  stagnation. 
The  whole  work  is  divided  into  three  main  sections  with  chapters  in  sequence.  The 
opening  chapter  of  every  section  designs  a  composition  of  place.  The  composition  of 
place  examines  the  historical,  geographical  and  the  existential  relevance  of  the  section 
in  analysis.  Once  we  have  placed  ourselves  in  that  particular  scenario,  it  is  easy  for  us 
to  delve  into  the  investigation  proper.  We  conclude  each  section  by  making  a  critical 
assessment  of  the  subject-matter. 
The  Theoretical  Growth  Path 
Our  first  section  deals  with  the  theoretical  growth  path.  Ihe  path  we  tread  in  this 
section  is  the  capitalist-market  economy  oriented  development  path.  The  economic 
growth  models  are  theoretical  in  nature  but  applied  in  varying  degrees  to  enhance  the 
operation  of  market  performance  with  an  objective  of  development.  Therefore  as  we 
ifi outline  the  theoretical  growth  path,  it  is  important  to  capture  the  historical  context  and 
to  visualise  a  composition  of  place  of  growth  economics  in  its  relevant  global  setting, 
as  we  have  done  in  chapter  one.  The  description  of  the  basic  concepts  like  growth, 
development,  sustainable  development  etc.,  is  given  in  the  second  chapter  of  this 
section.  From  chapter  three  to  seven  of  section  one,  we  have  designed  a  particular 
framework  to  determine  the  engines  of  economic  growth  and  their  motivating  forces. 
In  chapter  three,  we  analyse  the  economic  growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  physical 
capital  and  human  labour  by  following  the  Harrod-Domar  model.  We  proceed  to 
analyse  in  chapter  four  the  growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  technological  progress 
as  proposed  by  Solow.  In  chapter  five,  we  concentrate  on  the  economic  growth  model 
with  an  emphasis  on  human  capital.  The  shift  of  emphasis  from  exogenous  technical 
innovation  to  human  capital  accumulation  as  the  key  source  of  growth  and 
development  is  one  of  the  major  themes  of  the  new  economic  development  literature. 
The  new  growth  theories  are  proposed  by  Romer,  Barro  and  others.  We  proceed  to 
analyse  the  economic  growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  the  research  sector  in  chapter 
six.  The  new  direction  given  by  the  endogenous  growth  models  enables  us  to 
understand  better  the  'unexplained  growth'  by  endogenizing  the  determinants  of 
economic  growth.  Following  this  path  of  direction,  we  shall  try  to  introduce  a  noval 
factor  into  the  mechanisms  of  economic  growth.  The  identification  of  a  growth 
influencing  knowledge  sector  is  our  prime  objective  in  chapter  seven.  We  conclude 
section  one  of  our  study  by  introducing  a  dual  knowledge  sector,  namely,  the  macro 
knowledge  sector  and  the  micro  knowledge  sector  and  we  propose  the  idea  that  it  is 
the  integration  of  these  two  sectors  that  would  account  for  any  further  economic 
growth. 
The  Applied  Growth  Path 
The  second  section  of  our  research  deals  with  the  applied  growth  path.  The  path  that 
we  tread  here  is  the  socialist  -  command  economy  oriented  development  path.  We  caH 
this  section  the  applied  growth  path  because  of  the  fact  that  there  have  been  a 
conscious  development  and  application  of  an  ideology  oriented  growth  models.  The 
socialist-planned  economies  developed  their  own  growth  economic  models  for  their 
iv countries'  economic  development.  ne  socialist  ideological  structure  and  dynamism 
have  been  endogenized  in  these  applied  growth  models. 
The  composition  of  place  of  the  socialist  system  within  a  global  framework,  as  we 
have  done  in  chapter  eight,  enables  us  to  delve  into  our  particular  form  of  search, 
namely,  the  motives  and  engines  of  economic  growth  process  in  the  socialist 
economies.  Every  economic  growth  model  has  a  specific  structure  and  a  dynamism  and 
the  application  of  such  a  model  could  either  stagnate  development  or  ignite  the 
economy  forward,  as  we  have  shown  in  chapter  nine.  To  understand  the  nature  of  the 
socialist  system  better,  we  proceed  to  examine  the  features  of  forced  growth  in  the 
light  of  the  diverse  theoretical  literature  on  growth.  We  begin  by  analysing  the  socialist 
economic  growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  primitive  accumulation  in  chapter  ten. 
Primitive  socialist  capital  accumulation  ,  as  described  by  Preobrazhensky,  simply 
cannot  go  on  unobstructed  for  a  long  period.  Since  the  adherents  of  the  socialist  state 
were  convinced  of  the  role  of  capital  formation,  they  decided  to  follow  the  model  of 
investment,  as  we  have  shown  in  chapter  eleven.  Fel'dman's  growth  model  is based  on 
a  Marxist  foundation  and  it  may  be  of  use  in  unravelling  a  few  puzzles  in  Soviet 
economic  development  and  in  achieving  a  better  understanding  of  Soviet  economic 
thinking.  More  investment  coupled  with  less  consumption  raises  the  issue  of  savings. 
The  role  of  savings  in  a  socialist  state  is  a  new  phenomenon  in  the  theory  of  economic 
growth,  as  we  have  shown  in  chapter  twelve.  If  the  socialist  state  has  to  survive,  the 
household  consumption  has  to  be  improved.  The  priority  to  consumption  over 
production  goods  resulted  in  a  new  debate,  as  we  have  described  in  chapter  thirteen. 
Our  analysis  of  the  model  developed  by  Brus  and  Laski,  which  is  based  on  the  works 
of  Kalecki,  shows  not  only  the  interplay  of  consumption  and  production  but  also  the 
inherent  problems  of  a  socialist  system.  In  chapter  fourteen  we  proceed  to  make  a 
critique  of  the  socialist  economic  system  based  on  the  applied  core  economic  growth 
models  which  we  have  analysed  in  our  study.  We  conclude  section  two  of  our 
investigation  by  proposing  the  idea  that  the  applied  model  of  socialism  can  be 
considered  as  a  form  of  micro  knowledge;  but  it  is  the  victory  of  macro  knowledge 
that  led  to  the  demise  of  applied  socialism. 
V The  Transition  Growth  Path 
The  new  thinking  that  an  evolving  transitional  and  developing  economy  assimilates  in 
its  process  of  economic  growth  would  have  far  reaching  developmental  consequences. 
The  third  section  of  our  research  deals  with  the  transition  growth  path.  The  economies 
in  transition  are  simultaneously  engaged  in  dismantling  the  legacies  of  a  socialist  - 
planned  economic  system  and  building  up  a  structure  of  market-oriented  capitalist 
economic  system.  The  economic  Objective  of  growth  and  development  remains  a  top 
priority  during  the  period  of  transition.  This  section  also  begins  with  the  composition 
of  place  of  the  economies  in  transition.  While  in  chapter  fifteen  we  concentrate  on 
central  and  eastern  European  nations,  chapter  sixteen  treads  the  transition  path  of  the 
former  Soviet  Union.  Our  analysis  of  the  transition  process  of  these  economies  unfolds 
the  complexity  of  the  nature  of  the  task  that  is  ahead.  As  we  try  to  have  a  conceptual 
understanding  of  the  term  transition,  we  realize  that  the  economies  in  transition  need 
to  follow  certain  strategies.,  as  we  have  discussed  in  chapter  seventeen,  to  accomplish 
the  desired  economic  objective  of  growth  and  development.  Analysing  the  interlocking 
wheels  of  transition  points  to  the  necessity  of  having  strategies  like  macroeconomic 
stabilization,  liberalization  of  prices,  privatization  of  the  economy,  and  a  market- 
supporting  institutional  infrastructure.  Though  we  cannot  at  this  stage  establish  a 
unique  optimal  path  of  transition,  most  now  argue  that  macroeconomic  stabilization,  if 
not  a  necessary  condition  for  transition,  greatly  facilitates  it,  as  we  have  shown  in 
chapter  eighteen.  We  have  followed  the  case  studies  of  Russia  and  Baltic  states  in  this 
regard.  Our  analysis  outlines  the  relevance  of  macroeconomic  stabilization  as  a  primary 
condition  for  the  emergence  of  capitalism.  At  this  stage,  the  economies  in  transition 
would  be  applying  economic  growth  models  that  would  bring  about  the  desired 
growth.  From  the  ashes  of  historical  socialism  emerges  the  hopes  of  the  economies  in 
transition.  These  hopes  are  to  be  translated  into  reality  by  providing  a  new  vision  to 
their  economic  objective.  We  begin  chapter  nineteen  by  formulating  a  new  vision- 
growth  path  and  we  move  to  design  a  solution-growth  path.  This  is  a  new  vision  of 
economic  growth  and  development  and  its  realization  depends  on  a  new  perspective  of 
the  knowledge  sector  of  a  new  growth  model.  The  economic  modelling  that  we 
undertake  identifies  a  growth  influencing  knowledge  sector  and  we  integrate  into  this 
knowledge  sector  the  hitherto  unintegrated  macro  knowledge  variables,  namely, 
vi -freedom,  democracy  and  human  rights.  We  hope  this  will  also  contribute  to  the  new 
attempts  at  creating  alternate  economic  growth  models. 
We  conclude  this  investigative-research  work  by  placing  the  vision-solution  growth 
path  into  a  global  growth  path. 
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xxii MODEWNG  A  NEW  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  THOUGHT  FOR 
DEVELOPING  ECONOMIESWITH  PARTICULAR  REFERENCE  TO 
ECONOMIES  IN  TRANSITION 
SECTION  A 
. 
INTRODUCTION 
'Me  invisible  hand  that  works  in  any  economic  action  is  the  invisible  thought  that  exists 
among  the  people  of  a  nation.  Since  the  beginning  of  civilization  we  have  been  in  the 
pursuit  of  taming  the  nature.  'Me  technique  of  processing  that  took  place  on  the  face  of 
the  earth  is  termed  as  economic  action.  As  the  civilization  process  is  conscientized,  the 
spirit  of  the  economic  being  emerged  to  be  called  as  culture.  Cultural  development  is  the 
process  of  praxis  civilization.  'Me  moment  the  economic  agent  becomes  aware  of  the 
culture  in  which  he  is  situated,  he  turns  also  to  be  an  agent  who  develops  and  remoulds  the 
culture.  'Me  way  of  thinking  that  exists  in  the  micro-agent  expands  and  spreads  into  the 
macro  level.  The  outcome  would  be  the  birth  of  a  national  philosophy,  which  penetrates 
into  every  comer  of  the  whole  nation  and  its  every  action.  Every  nation  needs  to  become 
aware  of  the  existing  way  of  thinking  -  macro  knowledge  -  that  motivates  its  people  to  act. 
To  a  great  extent,  it  is  this  awareness  that  brings  change  and  in  the  economic  sphere,  this 
conscientized  change  is  termed  as  economic  development.  How  much  a  nation  is  truly 
aware  of  the  existing  philosophy  that  motivates  the  economic  agent  is  very  influential  in 
any  economic  reforms.  It  is  this  consciousness  of  the  nation  that  becomes  the  conscience 
of  the  people.  If  the  existing  thought  is  a  distorting  phenomenon  for  human  progress,  then 
we  need  to  re-evaluate  the  influencing  or  motivating  thought  that  benefits  only  a  few 
citizens  to  develop  and  the  rest  of  the  nation  to  be  at  the  mercy  of  these  chosen  few.  But, 
if  the  existing  thought  helps  a  large  majority  of  the  nation  to  achieve  its  designed  goal,  it  is 
still  important  to  focus  on  the  way  of  thinking  that  did  influence  the  outcome  and  it  is 
necessary  to  recharge  the  same  with  a  conscious-push  and  try  to  eliminate  the  national 
1 energy  wasting  element,  that  subsists  in  it  with  a  conscious-pull.  Thus,  we  can  safely  state 
that  economic  development  is  greatly  influenced  by  the  way  of  thinking  Of  the  people  or 
the  national  philosophy.  As  any  person  is  motivated  to  act  because  of  his/her  deep-rooted 
convictions,  a  nation  will  act  according  to  its  convictions. 
The  following  research  mainly  takes  into  account  the  complex  structure  of  the 
economies  in  transition  (and  of  developing  economies  in  general)  and  their  need  for 
modelling  a  new  economic  growth  thought.  This  research  attempts  to  shed  a  new  light  on 
an  age-old  problem  of  economic  inquiry:  the  problem  of  growth  and  development.  We 
shall  particularly  consider  the  economic  variables  which  need  to  integrate  socio-cultural 
phenomena  while  framing  economic  policies.  The  fusion  of  the  way  of  thinking  of  the 
people  and  the  way  of  acting  of  the  economic  agent  results  either  in  economic 
development  or  in  economic  stagnation.  '111us  this  research  will  also  be  an  attempt  at 
creating  a  philosophy  of  political  economy  as  we  design  an  alternate  model  of  economic 
growth. 
Ad. 
'Me  methodology  that  we  employ  in  this  research  is  more  of  a  descriptive  nature  than  of 
an  analytical  one.  In  the  theoretical  growth  path  we  have  used  some  analytical  tools.  In  the 
applied  growth  path  and  in  the  transition  growth  path,  the  method  of  description  is  more 
applicable.  The  descriptive  method  is  followed  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  regimes  and 
portfolios  and  events  described  are  existential  in  nature.  Economics,  as  a  social  science, 
when  trying  to  explain  the  raw  events  of  economic  mechanisms  of  birth,  growth,  decay, 
collapse  and  transition-evolution,  descriptive  method  is  more  suitable  to  explain  the 
economic  behaviour.  'Me  economic  agent  to  whom  it  is  addressed  would  find  it  easy  to 
identify  oneself  with  this  scenario  of  events. 
2 A.  H.  Executive  Summaa 
In  the  introductory  chapter  we  outline  the  objective  of  this  research  work  and  the 
executive  summary  of  its  content.  The  whole  work  is  divided  into  three  main  sections  with 
chapters  in  sequence.  The  opening  chapter  of  every  section  designs  a  composition  of 
place.  The  composition  of  place  examines  the  historical,  geographical  and  the  existential 
relevance  of  the  section  in  analysis.  Once  we  have  placed  ourselves  in  that  particular 
scenario,  it  is  easy  for  us  to  delve  into  the  investigation  proper. 
A.  iii.  The  Theoretical  Growth  Path 
Our  first  section  deals  with  the  theoretical  growth  path.  The  path  we  tread  in  this  section 
is  the  capitalist-market  economy  oriented  development  path.  The  economic  growth 
models  are  theoretical  in  nature  but  applied  in  varying  degrees  to  enhance  the  operation  of 
market  performance  with  an  objective  of  development.  Therefore  as  we  outline  the 
theoretical  growth  path,  it  is  important  to  capture  the  historical  context  and  to  visualise  a 
composition  of  place  of  growth  economics  in  its  relevant  global  setting,  as  we  have  done 
in  chapter  one.  The  composition  of  place  of  growth  economics  in  its  global  framework 
raises  certain  inevitable  questions.  Which  were  the  economic  growth  models  that  the 
developed  and  developing  economies  followed  thus  far?  What  are  the  determinants  on 
which  these  models  were  grounded?  But  before  we  answer  such  questions,  we  need  to 
clarify  certain  basic  concepts  of  our  study.  The  description  of  the  basic  concepts  like 
growth,  development,  sustainable  development  etc.,  is  given  in  the  second  chapter  of  this 
section.  From  chapter  three  to  seven  of  section  one,  we  have  designed  a  particular 
framework  to  determine  the  engines  of  economic  growth  and  their  motivating  forces.  In 
chapter  three,  we  begin  analysing  the  economic  growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on 
physical  capital  and  human  labour  by  following  the  Harrod-Domar  model.  We  proceed  to 
analyse  in  chapter  four  the  growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  technological  progress  as 
proposed  by  Solow  and  Swan.  A  new  wave  of  research  on  economic  growth  was 
stimulated  by  Romer  and  Lucas.  Their  work  relies  on  Arrow's  mechanism  of  learning  -by- 
doing.  But,  more  importantly,  by  following  Uzawa  [1965],  Romer  and  Lucas  have 
3 redirected  its  application  to  the  accumulation  of  knowledge  and  human  capital  rather  than 
the  accumulation  of  plant  and  equipment.  In  chapter  five,  we  concentrate  on  the  economic 
growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  human  capital.  The  shift  of  emphasis  from  exogenous 
technical  innovation  to  human  capital  accumulation  as  the  key  source  of  growth  and 
development  is  one  of  the  major  themes  of  the  new  economic  development  literature.  We 
proceed  to  analyse  the  economic  growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  the  research  sector  in 
chapter  six.  The  new  direction  given  by  the  endogenous  growth  models  enables  us  to 
understand  better  the  'unexplained  growth'  by  endogenizing  the  determinants  of  economic 
growth.  Following  this  path  of  direction,  we  shall  try  to  introduce  a  noval  factor  into  the 
mechanisms  of  economic  growth.  The  identification  of  a  growth  influencing  knowledge 
sector  is  our  prime  objective  in  chapter  seven.  We  conclude  section  one  of  our  study  by 
introducing  a  dual  knowledge  sector,  namely,  the  macro  knowledge  sector  and  micro 
knowledge  sector  and  we  propose  the  idea  that  it  is  the  integration  of  these  two  sectors 
that  would  account  for  any  further  economic  growth. 
A.  iv.  The  Applied  Growth  Path 
The  second  section  of  our  research  deals  with  the  applied  growth  path.  The  path  that  we 
tread  here  is  the  socialist  -  command  economy  oriented  development  path.  We  call  this 
section  the  applied  growth  path  because  of  the  fact  that  there  have  been  a  conscious 
development  and  application  of  an  ideology  oriented  growth  models.  The  socialist-planned 
economies  developed  their  own  growth  economic  models  for  their  countries'  economic 
development.  r1lie  socialist  ideological  structure  and  dynamism  have  been  endogenized  in 
these  applied  growth  models. 
The  composition  of  place  of  the  socialist  system  within  a  global  framework,  as  we  have 
done  in  chapter  eight,  enables  us  to  delve  into  our  particular  form  of  search,  namely,  the 
motives  and  engines  of  economic  growth  process  in  the  socialist  economies.  Every 
economic  growth  model  has  a  specific  structure  and  a  dynamism  and  the  application  of 
such  a  model  could  either  stagnate  development  or  ignite  the  economy  forward,  as  we 
have  shown  in  chapter  nine.  Our  survey  of  the  structure  and  dynamics  of  the  socialist  state 
4 unveils  the  nature  of  a  veiled  economic  system.  To  understand  the  nature  of  the  socialist 
system  better,  we  proceed  to  examine  the  features  of  forced  growth  in  the  light  of  the 
diverse  theoretical  literature  on  growth.  We  begin  by  analysing  the  socialist  economic 
growth  model  with  an  emphasis  on  primitive  accumulation  in  chapter  ten.  Primitive 
socialist  capital  accumulation  ,  as  described  by  Preobrazhensky,  simply  cannot  go  on 
unobstructed  for  a  long  period.  There  is  neither  unlimited  supply  of  labour  nor  is  it 
advisable  to  follow  an  unbalanced  growth  path.  Therefore,  new  devices  had  to  be 
formulated  to  fulfil  the  economic  objectives.  Since  the  adherents  of  the  socialist  state  were 
convinced  of  the  role  of  capital  formation,  they  decided  to  follow  the  model  of  investment 
as  we  have  shown  in  chapter  eleven.  Fel'dman's  growth  model  is  based  on  a  Marxist 
foundation  and  it  may  be  of  use  in  unravelling  a  few  puzzles  in  Soviet  economic 
development  and  in  achieving  a  better  understanding  of  Soviet  economic  thinking.  More 
investment  coupled  with  less  consumption  raises  the  issue  of  savings.  The  role  of  savings 
in  a  socialist  state  is  a  new  phenomenon  in  the  theory  of  economic  growth,  as  we  have 
shown  in  chapter  twelve.  Savings  in  a  centrally  planned  economic  system  is  a  non-existent 
phenomenon.  In  a  literal  sense,  there  is  no  savings.  Since  planned  investment  is  the 
controlling  force,  the  role  of  savings  is  irrelevant  as  far  as  economic  decisions  are 
concerned.  The  decision  of  the  central  planners  to  reduce  the  consumption  of  the 
households  is  no  alternative  mechanism  for  savings  mechanism.  It  is  -this  misunderstanding 
among  the  socialist  planners  that  derailed  the  investment  in  the  long-run  and  thereby 
stagnated  the  growth  of  the  economy.  If  the  socialist  state  has  to  survive,  the  household 
consumption  has  to  be  improved.  The  priority  to  consumption  over  production  goods 
resulted  in  a  new  debate,  as  we  have  described  in  chapter  thirteen.  Our  analysis  of  the 
model  developed  by  Brus  and  Laski,  which  is  based  on  the  works  of  Kalecki,  shows  not 
only  the  interplay  of  consumption  and  production  but  also  the  inherent  problems  of  a 
socialist  system.  In  chapter  fourteen  we  proceed  to  make  a  critique  of  the  socialist 
economic  system  based  on  the  applied  core  economic  growth  models  which  we  have 
analysed  in  our  study.  We  conclude  section  two  of  our  investigation  by  proposing  the  idea 
that  the  applied  model  of  socialism  can  be  considered  as  a  form  of  micro  knowledge;  but  it 
is  the  victory  of  macro  knowledge  that  led  to  the  demise  of  applied  socialism. 
5 A.  v.  The  Transition  Growth  Path 
The  new  thinking  that  an  evolving  transitional  and  developing  economy  assimilates  in  its 
process  of  economic  growth  would  have  far  reaching  developmental  consequences.  The 
third  section  of  our  research  deals  with  the  transition  growth  path.  The  economies  in 
transition  are  simultaneously  engaged  in  dismantling  the  legacies  of  a  socialist  -  planned 
economic  system  and  building  up  a  structure  of  market-oriented  capitalist  economic 
system.  The  economic  objective  of  growth  and  development  remains  a  top  priority  during 
the  period  of  transition.  This  section  also  begins  with  the  composition  of  place  of  the 
economies  in  transition.  While  in  chapter  fifteen  we  concentrate  on  central  and  eastern 
European  nations,  chapter  sixteen  treads  the  transition  path  of  the  former  Soviet  Union. 
Our  analysis  of  the  transition  process  of  these  economies  unfolds  the  complexity  of  the 
nature  of  the  task  that  is  ahead.  As  we  try  to  have  a  conceptual  understanding  of  the  term 
transition,  we  realize  that  the  economies  in  transition  need  to  follow  certain  strategies.,  as 
we  have  discussed  in  chapter  seventeen,  to  accomplish  the  desired  economic  objective  of 
growth  and  development.  Analysing  the  interlocking  wheels  of  transition  points  to  the 
necessity  of  having  strategies  like  macroeconomic  stabilization,  liberalization  of  prices, 
privatization  of  the  economy,  and  a  market-supporting  institutional  infrastructure.  Though 
we  cannot  at  this  stage  establish  a  unique  optimal  path  of  transition,  most  now  argue  that 
macroeconomic  stabilization,  if  not  a  necessary  condition  for  transition,  greatly  facilitates 
it,  as  we  have  shown  in  chapter  eighteen.  We  have  followed  the  case  studies  of  Russia  and 
Baltic  states  in  this  regard.  Our  analysis  outlines  the  relevance  of  macroeconomic 
stabilization  as  a  primary  condition  for  the  emergence  of  capitalism.  At  this  stage,  the 
economies  in  transition  would  be  applying  economic  growth  models  that  would  bring 
about  the  desired  growth.  From  the  ashes  of  historical  socialism  emerges  the  hopes  of  the 
economies  in  transition.  These  hopes  are  to  be  translated  into  reality  by  providing  a  new 
vision  to  their  economic  objective.  We  begin  chapter  nineteen  by  formulating  a  new 
vision-growth  path  and  we  move  to  design  a  solution-growth  path.  This  is  a  new  vision  of 
economic  growth  and  development  and  its  realization  depends  on  a  new  perspective  of  the 
6 knowledge  sector  of  a  new  growth  model.  'Me  economic  modelling  that  we  undertake 
identifies  a  growth  influencing  knowledge  sector  and  we  integrate  into  this  knowledge 
sector  the  hitherto  unintegrated  macro  knowledge  variables,  namely,  freedom,  democracy 
and  human  rights.  We  hope  this  will  also  contribute  to  the  new  attempts  at  creating 
alternate  economic  growth  models. 
We  conclude  this  investigative-research  work  by  placing  the  vision-solution  growth  path 
into  a  global  growth  path.  'Me  economic  convergence  on  a  global  scale  is  possible  only  if 
we  dare  to  face  future  challenges  and  reap  opportunities  with  a  desire  for  further  and 
deeper  integration  between  developed  and  developing  nations. 
7 SECTION  ONE 
THE  THEORETICAL  GROWTH  PATH 
The  economies  in  transition  aim  to  transform  their  societies  into  a  more  humane  one  by 
reinterpreting  the  political  ideologies,  economic  institutions,  and  social  values.  They  aim  to 
transform  their  politics  into  a  more  freer  and  democratic-oriented  scenario,  which 
promotes  a  new  set  of  social  values.  They  aim  to  transform  their  economies  into  a 
capitalist  one  based  on  the  market  mechanism  of  the  developed  world.  The  fulfilment  of 
these  objectives  involves  a  thorough  designing  of  a  theoretical  framework  and  its  concrete 
application  to  the  economies  in  transition.  It  has  to  be  a  praxis  approach  of  designing, 
applying,  and  re-designing  the  objectives  and  the  re-formulation  of  their  necessary  theory. 
In  this  section,  we  shall  analyse  a  few  relevant  theoretical  models  that  have  been  followed 
in  the  market-oriented  economies,  and  we  propose  the  integration  of  these  models  of 
economic  growth  with  certain  specific  modifications,  during  the  period  of  transition  to  a 
new  world. 
8 CHAPTER  ONE 
EVOLUTION  OF  THE  THEORETICAL  GROWTH  MODELS 
The  new  thinking  that  an  evolving  transitional  and  developing  economy  assimilates  in  its 
process  of  economic  growth  would  have  far  reaching  developmental  consequences. 
History  of  economies  shows  that  all  the  growth  process  need  not  necessarily  lead  to 
permanent  development.  Our  perspectives  on  growth  would  be  an  indication  of  our  desire 
for  development.  Our  frame  of  reference  would  be  the  blueprint  on  which  national 
economic  policies  would  be  drawn.  Therefore  as  we  outline  the  theoretical  growth  path,  it 
is  important  to  capture  the  historical  context  and  to  visugise  a  composition  of  place  of 
growth  economics  in  its  relevant  global  setting.  We  shall  begin  with  history. 
I.  l.  i.  The  ffistorical  Setting 
The  big  increase  in  trade  between  the  countries  of  Western  Europe  and  North  America 
and  the  rest  of  the  world  dates  from  the  second  half,  and  more  precisely  the  last  quarter,  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Trade  links  existed  before  then,  but  were  quantitatively  less 
important.  Nineteenth-century  innovations  led  to  increased  demand  for  materials  such  as 
rubber,  copper  and  other  minerals,  while  the  spread  of  railways  after  the  1850s  and  the 
rapid  drop  in  ocean  freight  costs  after  1870  opened  up  new  areas  to  trade  by  reducing 
transport  costs.  Exports  from  tropical  countries  grew  by  4  per  cent  a  year  from  the  1880s 
to  1914,  establishing  an  interdependent  world  economy.  The  economies  of  the  exporting 
regions  were  transformed,  but  economists  showed  little  interest  in  these  changes.  The 
tropical  regions  were  participating  in  a  global  division  of  labour  and  sharing  the  gains  from 
trade,  just  as  the  classical  economists  predicted.  Lack  of  interest  in  issues  of  growth  and 
development  also  reflected  the  dominance  since  the  1870s  of  neo-classical  economics, 
with  its  emphasis  on  resource  allocation  rather  than  on  macroeconomic  or  dynamic 
issues.  '  We  note  that  the  classical  economists  such  as  Adam  Smith,  Ricardo,  Malthus,  J.  S. 
9 Mill  and  Marx  had  written  about  long-term  economic  change,  but  they  limited  their 
analysis  almost  exclusively  to  European  economies. 
Several  influences  during  the  1930s  stimulated  thought  on  economic  development.  First, 
the  economic  depression  hit  some  less  developed  countries  (LDCs)  very  hard  as  the  drop 
in  commodity  prices  from  their  1928  peak  was  more  severe  than  the  fall  in  price  of 
manufactured  goods  (Cuba,  for  example,  is  estimated  to  have  suffered  a  loss  in  per  capita 
income  of  at  least  a  third).  The  benefits  from  entering  the  international  division  of  labour 
were  reversed,  and  disillusionment  with  the  market  mechanism  and  with  free-trade  policies 
set  in.  This  effect  was  strongest  in  Latin  America,  where  most  independent  LDCs  were  at 
the  time.  A  particularly  influential  individual  was  Raul  Prebisch,  who  had  pursued  laissez- 
jaire  policies  as  the  Argentinean  Under-Secretary  of  Finance  during  the  1920s  but  around 
1930  shifted  to  advocating  shielding  domestic  industry  by  trade  barriers.  Meanwhile, 
Western  economics  was  experiencing  the  Keynesian  Revolution.  Keynes  challenged  the 
neo-classical  orthodoxy  by  advocating  more  interventionist  policies  to  cope  with  the 
economic  depression.  Also,  his  mode  of  analysis  encouraged  ad  hoc  theorising  as  opposed 
to  the  universal  theories  of  classical  and  neo-classical  economists.  Western  economics 
could  be  seen  as  appropriate  to  the  special  case  of  the  Western  economies,  while  different 
assumptions  would  be  needed  for  development  economics.  Finally,  there  was  a  common 
sentiment  that  economic  forces  had  contributed  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War 
and  that  a  better  post-war  economic  order  could  be  designed.  Among  the  Anglo-American 
architects  of  the  post-war  economic  order,  most  of  the  discussion  had  little  to  do  with 
LDCs.  Rosenstein-Rodan's  paper  (1943)  was  the  first  to  analyse  'underdeveloped 
countries'  and  it  focused  on  East  and  South-East  Europe,  but  the  rapid  move  to  political 
independence  of  former  colonies  in  Asia  spread  interest  in  development  economics  across 
the  world.  2 
These  simultaneous  threads  in  world  economic  history  and  in  economic  theory  created 
the  background  for  the  emergence  of  development  economics  as  a  distinct  subject.  'Me 
revulsion  of  many  Latin  Americans  with  the  workings  of  the  market  system  after  1928,  the 
inevitability  of  Indian  independence  and  the  break-up  of  the  colonial  empires,  and  the 
10 coming  to  power  in  Turkey,  China,  Egypt  and  else-where  of  modernizing  rulers,  all 
created  an  environment  in  which  policy-makers  were  eager  for  ideas  on  how  to  achieve 
economic  development.  In  such  an  intellectual  and  political  ferment,  with  both  analysts 
and  policy-makers  reacting  to  the  same  world  background,  it  is  difficult  to  identify  how 
much  the  theorists  influenced  the  practical  people  and  how  much  they  were  simply 
rationalizing  the  policies  which  would  have  been  adopted  anyway.  The  writings  of  the 
pioneers  in  development  economics,  do,  however,  capture  most  clearly  the  central 
themes. 
3 
The  dominant  economic  systems  of  our  century  resulted  in  the  creation  of  super-powers 
and  the  epicentres  of  economic  activity.  The  1990s  witnessed  the  collapse  of  the  socialist 
planned  model  and  the  strength  of  market  economy  models.  The  collapse  of  an  economic 
system  necessitated  the  shift  of  developmental  activity  to  a  new  world,  hitherto,  hidden  in 
the  bosom  of  socialist  paternalism.  Any  application  of  capitalist  growth  models  to  these 
transitional  economies  which  are  now  part  of  the  developing  world,  and  have  undertaken 
their  own  developmental  paths,  has  to  be  carefully  designed  within  the  framework  of  a 
global  economy. 
MAL  The  Composition  of  Place  of  Growth  Economics 
Macroeconomics  theories  of  economic  growth  explain  the  determinants  of  the  wealth  of 
nations  and  try  to  analyse  why  the  fortunes  of  nations  change  over  time.  Various  economic 
growth  theories  developed  as  a  response  to  the  historical  events  that  unfolded  on  our 
planet.  The  new  realisation  of  a  wounded  and  divided  world  of  South  and  North  or  of 
developing  and  developed  or  of  centrally  planned  or  transitional  or  of  poor  and  rich  had  a 
shattering  economic  effect.  Effective  ways  of  integrating  the  world  economy  has  become 
the  concern  of  economists.  Interest  in  growth  economics  revived  as  a  result  of  an  immense 
practical  concern  with  development  after  the  Second  World  War.  We  could  state  that  the 
real  motivating  power  behind  the  establishment  of  the  present  international  economic 
system  arose  due  to  the  following  factors.  "The  war-damaged  economies  were  trying  hard 
to  reconstruct  fast,  the  underdeveloped  countries  were  attempting  to  initiate  economic 
11 development,  the  advanced  capitalist  countries  being  relatively  free  from  periodic  slumps 
were  trying  to  concentrate  on  raising  the  long-run  rate  of  growth,  and  the  socialist 
countries  were  determined  to  overtake  the  richer  capitalist  economies  by  fast  economic 
expansion.  A  Piecemeal  responses  of  the  international  community  to  the  under- 
development  issues  of  the  planet  threaten  the  partial  growth  of  the  developed  nations.  As 
it  is  said,  poverty  anywhere  is  a  threat  to  prosperity  everywhere.  "The  challenge  of  finding 
sustainable  development  paths  ought  to  provide  the  impetus--  -indeed  the  imperative  ---  for 
a  renewed  search  for  multilateral  solutions  and  a  restructured  international  economic 
system  of  co-operation.  These  challenges  cut  across  the  divides  of  national  sovereignty,  of 
limited  strategies  for  economic  gain,  and  of  separated  disciplines  of  science.  v,  5  The  new 
challenges  posed  by  the  quest  for  growth  and  development  need  to  be  viewed 
wholistically.  We  can  no  more  measure  development  by  a  single  economic  indicator  as 
growth.  The  human  family  is  becoming  more  and  deeply  aware  of  its  need  for  creating 
sustainable  survival  strategies  within  the  framework  of  development. 
We  are  concerned  not  just  with  socio-economic  dimensions  of  development  alone  but 
with  the  historical  and  political  and  cultural  implications  and  above  all  very  much  worried 
about  the  sustainability  of  our  planetary  system  itself.  "In  the  middle  of  the  twentieth 
century,  we  saw  our  planet  from  space  for  the  first  time.  Historians  may  eventually  find 
that  this  vision  had  a  great  impact  on  thought  than  did  the  Copernican  revolution  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  which  upset  the  human  self-image  by  revealing  that  the  Earth  is  not  the 
centre  of  the  universe.  From  space,  we  see  a  small  and  fragile  ball  dominated  not  by 
human  activity  and  edifice  but  by  a  pattern  of  clouds,  oceans,  greenery,  and  soils. 
Humanity's  inability  to  fit  its  doings  into  that  pattern  is  changing  planetary  systems, 
fundamentally.  Many  such  changes  are  accompanied  by  life-threatening  hazards.  This  new 
reality,  from  which  there  is  no  escape,  must  be  recognised  -  and  managed.  9)6  This  new 
vision  of  the  world  is,  fortunately,  coincided  with  more  positive  developments  new  to  this 
century.  "We  can  move  information  and  goods  faster  around  the  globe  than  ever  before; 
we  can  produce  more  food  and  more  goods  with  less  investment  of  resources;  our 
technology  and  science  gives  us  at  least  the  potential  to  look  deeper  into  and  better 
understand  natural  systems.  From  space,  we  can  see  and  study  the  Earth  as  an  organism 
12 whose  health  depends  on  the  health  of  all  its  parts.  We  have  the  power  to  reconcile  human 
affairs  with  natural  laws  and  to  thrive  in  the  process.  In  this  our  cultural  and  spiritual 
,,  7  heritages  can  reinforce  our  economic  interests  and  survival  imperatives.  We  see  the 
possibility  for  a  new  era  of  economic  growth  which  is  more  prosperous,  more  just,  and 
more  secure  and  this  form  of  growth  is  essential  to  relieve  the  great  poverty  that  is 
deepening  in  much  of  the  developing  world. 
I.  l.  iii.  Growth  Policies:  Stories  of  Success  and  Shadow  of  Failures 
To  ensure  both  sustainable  human  progress  and  human  survival,  we  need  to  understand 
the  global  challenges  in  the  light  of  successes  and  in  the  shadow  of  failures.  Our  growth 
policies  which  led  to  success  are  signs  of  hope  and  they  are  many:  infant  mortality  is 
falling;  human  life  expectancy  is  increasing;  the  proportion  of  the  world's  adults  who  can 
read  and  write  is  climbing;  the  proportion  of  children  starting  school  is  rising;  and  global 
food  production  increases  faster  than  the  population  grows.  But  the  same  processes  that 
have  produced  these  gains,  have  led  to  failures  of  'development'.  On  the  development 
side,  in  terms  of  absolute  numbers  there  are  more  hungry  people  in  the  world  than  ever 
before,  and  their  numbers  are  increasing.  So  are  the  numbers  who  can-not  read  or  write, 
the  numbers  without  safe  water,  or  safe  and  sound  homes,  and  the  numbers  short  of 
woodfuel  with  which  to  cook  and  warm  themselves.  The  gap  between  the  rich  and  poor 
nations  is  widening-not  shrinking-and  there  is  little  prospect,  given  present  trends  and 
institutional  arrangements,  that  this  process  will  be  reversed. 
According  to  the  report  of  The  World  Commission  on  Environment  and  Development, 
there  are  also  environmental  trends  that  threaten  to  radically  alter  the  planet,  that  threaten 
the  lives  of  many  species  upon  it,  including  the  human  species.  Each  year  another  6  million 
hectares  of  productive  dryland  turns  into  worthless  desert;  more  than  11  million  hectares 
of  forests  are  destroyed  yearly,  and  much  of  this  forest  is  converted  to  low-grade  farmland 
unable  to  support  the  farmers  who  settle  it.  In  Europe,  acid  precipitation  kills  forests  and 
lakes  and  damages  the  artistic  and  architectural  heritage  of  nations;  it  may  have  acidified 
vast  tracts  of  soil  beyond  reasonable  hope  of  repair.  The  burning  of  fossil  fuels  puts  into 
13 the  atmosphere  carbon  dioxide,  which  is  causing  gradual  global  warming.  This 
'greenhouse  effect'  may  by  early  next  century  have  increased  average  global  temperatures 
enough  to  shift  agricultural  production  areas,  raise  sea  levels  to  flood  coastal  cities,  and 
disrupt  national  economies.  Other  industrial  gases  threaten  to  deplete  the  planet's 
protective  ozone  shield  to  such  an  extent  that  the  number  of  human  and  animal  cancers 
would  rise  sharply  and  the  ocean's  food  chain  would  be  disrupted.  Industry  and 
agriculture  put  toxic  substances  into  the  human  food  chain  and  into  underground  water 
tables  beyond  reach  of  cleansing. 
There  has  been  a  growing  realisation  in  national  governments  and  multilateral 
institutions  that  it  is  impossible  to  separate  economic  development  issues  from 
environment  issues;  many  forms  of  development  erode  the  environmental  resources  upon 
which  they  must  be  based,  and  environmental  degradation  can  undermine  economic 
development.  Poverty  is  a  major  cause  and  effect  of  global  environmental  problems.  It  is 
therefore  futile  to  attempt  to  deal  with  environmental  problems  without  a  broader 
perspective  that  encompasses  the  factors  underlying  world  poverty  and  international 
inequality.  "Many  present  development  trends  leave  increasing  numbers  of  people  poor 
and  vulnerable,  while  at  the  same  time  degrading  the  environment.  How  can  such 
development  serve  next  century's  world  of  twice  as  many  people  relying  on  the  same 
environment?  This  realisation  broadened  our  view  of  development.  We  came  to  see  it  not 
in  its  restricted  context  of  economic  growth  in  developing  countries.  We  came  to  see  that 
a  new  development  path  was  required,  one  that  sustained  human  progress  not  just  in  a  few 
places  for  a  few  years,  but  for  the  entire  planet  into  the  distant  future.  Thus  'sustainable 
development'  becomes  a  goal  not  just  for  the  'developing'  nations,  but  for  industrial  ones 
as  well.  ý.,  8 
14 I.  Liv.  Global  Economy  versus  Global  Ecolo 
Until  recently,  the  planet  was  a  large  world  in  which  human  activities  and  their  effects 
were  neatly  compartmentalised  within  nations,  within  sectors  (energy,  agriculture,  trade), 
and  within  broad  areas  of  concern  (environmental,  economic,  social).  These  compartments 
have  begun  to  dissolve.  This  applies  in  particular  to  the  various  global  'crises'  that  have 
seized  public  concern,  particularly  over  the  past  decade.  These  are  not  separate  crises:  a 
development  crisis,  an  environmental  crisis,  an  energy  crisis.  They  are  all  one.  The 
question  is  how  are  we  going  to  deal  with  all  these  interlocking  crises.  The  planet  is 
passing  through  a  period  of  dramatic  growth  and  fundamental  change.  Our  human  world 
of  5  billion  must  make  room  in  a  finite  environment  for  another  human  world.  The 
population  could  stabilise  at  between  8  billion  and  14  billion  sometime  next  century, 
according  to  UN  projections.  More  than  90  per  cent  of  the  increase  will  occur  in  the 
poorest  countries,  and  90  per  cent  of  the  growth  in  already  bursting  cities. 
Uonomic  activity  has  multiplied  to  create  a  $13  trillion  world  economy,  and  this  could 
grow  five-or  tenfold  in  the  coming  half-century.  industrial  production  has  grown  more 
than  fiftyfold  over  the  past  century,  four-fifths  of  this  growth  since  1950.  Such  figures 
reflect  and  presage  profound  impacts  upon  the  biosphere,  as  the  world  invests  in  houses, 
transport,  farrns,  and  industries.  Much  of  the  economic  growth  pulls  raw  material  from 
forests,  soils,  seas,  and  waterways.  A  mainspring  of  economic  growth  is  new  technology., 
and  while  this  technology  offers  the  potential  for  slowing  the  dangerously  rapid 
consumption  of  finite  resources,  it  also  entails  high  risks,  including  new  forms  of  pollution 
and  the  introduction  to  the  planet  of  new  variations  of  life  forms  that  could  change 
evolutionary  pathways.  Meanwhile,  the  industries  most  heavily  reliant  on  environmental 
resources  and  most  heavily  polluting  are  growing  most  rapidly  in  the  developing  world, 
where  there  is  both  more  urgency  for  growth  and  less  capacity  to  minimise  damaging  side 
effects.  These  related  changes  have  locked  the  global  economy  and  global  ecology 
together  in  new  ways.  We  have  in  the  past  been  concerned  about  the  impacts  of  economic 
growth  upon  the  environment.  We  are  now  forced  to  concern  ourselves  with  the  impacts 
of  ecological  stress  -  degradation  of  soils,  water  regimes,  atmosphere,  and  forests  -  upon 
15 our  economic  prospects.  Ecology  and  economy  are  becoming  ever  more  interwoven  - 
locally,  regionally,  nationally,  and  globally  -  into  a  seamless  net  of  causes  and  effects.  9 
All  the  recent  research  has  shown  the  inter-relationship  between  development  of  an 
economy  and  ecology.  Flourishing  the  economy  at  the  expense  of  perishing  the  ecology  is 
disastrous.  It  is  time  to  realize  that  impoverishing  the  local  resource  base  can  impoverish 
wider  areas.  Studies  again  proved  beyond  doubt  that  deforestation  in  Latin  America  and 
Asia  is  causing  more  floods  and  more  destructive  floods,  in  downhill,  downstream  nations. 
Acid  precipitation  and  nuclear  fallout  have  spread  across  the  borders  of  Europe.  Similar 
phenomena  are  emerging  on  a  global  scale,  such  as  global  warming  and  loss  of  ozone.  The 
1986  discovery  of  a  hole  in  the  ozone  layer  above  the  Antarctic  suggests  the  possibility  of 
a  more  rapid  depletion  than  previously  suspected.  10  Countrysides  are  coming  under 
pressure  from  increasing  numbers  of  farmers  and  the  landless.  Cities  are  filling  with 
people,  cars,  and  factories.  Developing  countries  are  operating  in  a  world  in  which  the 
resources  gap  between  most  developing  and  industrial  nations  is  widening,  in  which  the 
industrial  world  dominates  in  the  rule-making  of  some  key  international  bodies,  and  in 
which  the  industrial  world  has  already  used  much  of  the  planet's  ecological  capital.  This 
inequality  is  the  planet's  main  developmental  as  well  as  environmental  problem. 
Most  of  the  poor  countries  face  enormous  economic  pressures,  both  international  and 
domestic,  to  overexploit  their  environmental  resource  base.  The  recent  crisis  in  Africa  best 
and  most  tragically  illustrates  the  ways  in  which  economies  and  ecology  can  interact 
destructively  and  trip  into  disaster.  Their  roots  extend  to  a  global  economic  system  that 
takes  more  out  of  a  poor  continent  than  it  puts  in.  Debts  that  they  cannot  pay  force 
African  nations  relying  on  commodity  sales  to  overuse  their  fragile  soils,  thus  tuming  good 
land  to  desert.  Aid  from  donor  nations  has  not  only  been  inadequate  in  scale,  but  too  often 
has  reflected  the  priorities  of  the  nations  giving  the  aid,  rather  than  the  needs  of  the 
recipients.  As  a  consequence  of  the  'debt  crisis'  of  Latin  America,  that  region's  natural 
resources  are  now  being  used  not  for  development  but  to  meet  financial  obligations  to 
creditors  abroad.  This  approach  to  the  debt  problem  is  short-sighted  from  an  economic, 
political  and  environmental  standpoints.  "During  the  1970s,  twice  as  many  people  suffered 
16 each  year  from  'natural'  disasters  as  during  the  1960s.  The  d&asters  most  directýy 
associated  with  environmentldevelopment  mismanagement  -  droughts  and  floods  - 
affected  the  most  people  and  increased  most  sharpýy  in  terms  of  numbers  affected.  Some 
18.5  million  people  were  affected  by  drought  annualýy  in  the  1960s,  24  4  million  in  the 
1970s,  and  we  have  seen  35  million  afflicted  b  drought  in  Africa  alone  during  the 
1980s.  There  were  5.2  million  flood  victims  yearýy  in  the  1960s,  15.4  million  in  the 
1970s.  Numbers  of  victims  of  cyclones  and  earthquakes  also  shot  up  as  growing  numbers 
of  poor  people  built  unsafe  houses  on  dangerous  ground.  Floods  have  poured  off  the 
deforested  Andes  and  Himalayas  with  increasing  force.  The  1980s  seem  destined  to 
sweep  this  dire  trend  on  into  a  crisis-filled  1990s.  ""  Overexploitation  of  the  natural 
resources  coupled  with  the  negative  public  spending  impel  the  countries  concerned  to  re- 
evaluate  their  strategies  for  development,  if  any.  A  majority  of  developing  countries  now 
have  lower  per  capita  incomes  than  when  the  1980  decade  began.  Yet  most  of  the  affected 
governments  still  spend  far  more  to  protect  their  people  from  invading  armies  than  from 
the  invading  desert.  Globally,  military  expenditures  total  about  $1  trillion  a  year  and 
continue  to  grow.  In  many  countries,  military  spending  consumes  such  a  high  proportion 
of  gross  national  product  that  it  itself  does  great  damage  to  these  societies'  development 
efforts.  Studies  suggest  that  the  cold  and  dark  nuclear  winter  following  even  a  limited 
nuclear  war  could  destroy  plant  and  animal  ecosystems  and  leave  any  human  survivors 
occupying  a  devastated  planet  very  different  from  the  one  they  inherited. 
The  composition  of  place  of  growth  economics  in  a  global  framework  brings  before  us  a 
reality  as  well  as  a  conviction  that  the  security,  well-being,  and  very  survival  of  the  planet 
would  depend  on  a  conscious  action.  Over  the  course  of  this  century,  the  relationship 
between  the  human  world  and  the  planet  that  sustains  it  has  undergone  a  profound  change. 
When  the  twentieth  century  began,  neither  human  numbers  nor  technology  had  the  power 
radically  to  alter  planetary  systems.  As  the  century  closes,  not  only  do  vastly  increased 
human  numbers  and  their  activities  have  that  power,  but  major  unintended  changes  are 
occurring  in  the  atmosphere,  in  soils,  in  waters,  among  plants  and  animals,  and  in 
relationships  among  all  of  these.  The  rate  of  change  is  outstripping  the  ability  of  scientific 
disciplines  and  our  current  capabilities  to  assess  and  advise.  It  is  frustrating  the  attempts  of 
17 political  and  economic  institutions,  which  evolved  in  a  different,  more  fragmented  world, 
to  adapt  and  cope.  It  deeply  worries  many  people  who  are  seeking  ways  to  place  those 
concerns  on  the  political  agendas.  The  onus  fies  with  no  one  group  of  nations.  All  nations 
will  have  a  role  to  play  in  changing  trends,  and  in  righting  an  international  economic 
system  that  increases  rather  than  decreases  inequality,  that  increases  rather  than  decreases 
numbers  of  poor  and  hungry.  The  time  has  come  to  break  out  of  past  patterns.  The 
changes  in  human  attitudes  that  we  call  for  depend  on  a  vast  campaign  of  education, 
debate,  and  public  participation.  12 
I.  Lv.  PoveEjj  as  a  Result  of  Prosperi 
The  failures  that  we  need  to  correct  arise  both  from  poverty  and  from  the  short-sighted 
way  in  which  we  have  often  pursued  prosperity.  The  prosperity  attained  in  some  parts  of 
the  world  is  often  precarious,  as  it  has  been  secured  through  farming,  forestry,  and 
industrial  practices  that  bring  profit  and  progress  only  over  the  short  term.  Our  hope  is 
grounded  on  the  fact  that  people  can  cooperate  to  build  a  future  that  is  more  prosperous, 
more  just,  and  more  secure;  that  a  new  era  of  economic  growth  can  be  attained,  one  based 
on  policies  that  sustain  and  expand  the  Earth's  resource  base.  But  for  this  to  happen,  we 
must  understand  better  the  symptoms  of  stress  that  confront  us,  we  must  identify  the 
causes,  and  we  must  design  new  approaches  to  managing  environmental  resources  and  to 
sustaining  human  development.  13  Environmental  stress  has  often  been  seen  as  the  result  of 
the  growing  demand  on  scarce  resources  and  the  pollution  generated  by  the  rising  living 
standards  of  the  relatively  affluent.  But  poverty  itself  pollutes  the  environment,  creating 
environmental  stress  in  a  different  way.  Those  who  are  poor  and  hungry  will  often  destroy 
their  immediate  envirom-nent  in  order  to  survive:  They  will  cut  down  forests;  their 
livestock  will  overgraze  grasslands;  they  will  overuse  marginal  land;  and  in  growing 
numbers  they  will  crowd  into  congested  cities.  The  cumulative  effect  of  these  changes  is 
so  far-reaching  as  to  make  poverty  itself  a  major  global  scourge.  There  are  more  hungry 
people  in  the  world  today  than  ever  before  in  human  history,  and  their  numbers  are 
growing.  In  1980,  there  were  340  million  people  in  87  developing  countries  not  getting 
18 enough  calories  to  prevent  stunted  growth  and  serious  health  risks.  The  World  Bank 
predicts  that  these  numbers  are  likely  to  go  on  growing.  14  ,  The  number  of  people  living  in 
slums  and  shanty  towns  is  rising,  not  falling.  A  growing  number  lack  access  to  clean  water 
and  sanitation  and  hence  are  prey  to  the  diseases  that  arise  from  this  lack.  There  is  some 
progress,  impressive  in  places.  But,  on  balance,  poverty  persists  and  its  victims  multiply, 
as  shown  in  UNDP  reports.  The  comparative  indicators  of  economic  development  based 
on  1994  UNDP  Report  is  given  in  Appendix  1.1.1.  The  pressure  of  poverty  has  to  be  seen 
in  a  broader  context.  At  the  international  level  there  are  large  differences  in  per  capita 
income,  which  ranged  in  1984  from  $190  in  low-income  countries  (other  than  China  and 
India)  to  $11,430  in  the  industrial  market  economies,  as  shown  in  Table  1.1.1.  The  global 
disparity  in  economic  development  remains  the  same  in  1994. 
TABLE  1.1.1 
Population  Size  and  Per  Capita  GNP  by  Groups  of  Countries 
Country  Group  Population  Per  Capita  GNP  Average  Annual  Growth 
(million)  (1984  dollars)  Rate  of  Per  Capita  GNP, 
1965-84(per  cent) 
Low-income  Economies  611  190  0.9 
(excl.  China,  India) 
China  and  India  1,778  290  3.3 
Lower  Middle-income  691  740  3.0 
Economies 
Upper  Middle-income  497  1,950  3.3 
Economies 
High-income  Oil  Exporters  19  11,250  3.2 
Industrial  Market  733  11,430  2.4 
Economies 
Source:  Based  on  data  in  World  Bank,  World  Development  Report  1986  (New  York: 
Oxford  University  Press,  1986).  (See  also,  Appendix  1.1.1.  ) 
Such  inequalities  represent  great  differences  not  merely  in  the  quality  of  life  today,  but 
also  in  the  capacity  of  societies  to  improve  their  quality  of  life  in  the  future.  Most  of  the 
world's  poorest  countries  depend  for  increasing  export  earnings  on  tropical  agricultural 
19 products  that  are  vulnerable  to  fluctuating  or  declining  ten-ns  of  trade.  Within  countries, 
poverty  has  been  exacerbated  by  the  unequal  distribution  of  land  and  other  assets.  The 
rapid  rise  in  population  has  compromised  the  ability  to  raise  living  standards. 
I.  Lvi.  Improvements  in  Living  Standards 
In  some  parts  of  the  world,  particularly  since  the  mid-1950s,  growth  and  development 
have  vastly  improved  living  standards  and  the  quality  of  life.  Many  of  the  products  and 
technologies  that  have  gone  into  this  improvement  are  raw  material-  and  energy-intensive 
and  entail  a  substantial  amount  of  pollution.  Where  economic  growth  has  led  to 
improvements  in  living  standards,  it  has  sometimes  been  achieved  in  ways  that  are  globally 
damaging  in  the  longer  term.  Much  of  the  improvement  in  the  past  has  been  based  on  the 
use  of  increasing  amounts  of  raw  materials,  energy,  chemicals,  and  synthetics  and  on  the 
creation  of  pollution  that  is  not  adequately  accounted  for  in  figuring  the  costs  of 
production  processes.  "If  people  destroy  vegetation  in  order  to  get  land,  food,  fodder, 
fuel,  or  timber,  the  soil  is  no  longer  protected.  Rain  creates  surface  runoff,  and  the  soil 
erodes.  When  the  soil  is  gone,  no  water  is  retained  and  the  land  can  no  longer  produce 
food,  fodder,  fuel,  or  timber,  so  people  need  to  turn  to  new  land  and  start  the  process  all 
over  again.  All  major  disaster  problems  in  the  Third  World  are  essentiall  unsolved  ýy 
development  problems.  Disaster  prevention  is  thus  primariýy  an  aspect  of  development, 
and  this  must  be  a  development  that  takes  place  within  the  sustainable  limits. 
TABLE  1.1.2 
Distribution  of  World  Consumption.  Averages  for  1980-82. 
Developed  Developing 
countries  (26  countries  (74 
percent  Of  per  cent  of 
population)  population) 
Commodity  Units  of  Per  Share  in  Per  Capita  Share  in  Per  Capita 
Capita  World  World 
Consumption  Consumption  Consumption 
I 
(per  cent)  (per  cent) 
20 Food: 
Calories  Kcal/day  34  3,395  66  2,389 
Protein  gms/day  38  99  62  58 
Fat  gms/day  53  127  47  40 
Paper  kg/year  85  123  15  8 
Steel  kg/year  79  455  21  43 
Other  Metals  kg/year  86  26  14  2 
Commercial 
Energy 
mtce/year  80  5.8  20  0.5 
Source:  WCED  estimates  based  on  country-level  data  from  FAO,  UN  Statistical  Office, 
UNCTAD,  and  American  Metal  Association. 
Over  the  past  century,  the  use  of  fossil  fuels  has  grown  nearly  thirtyfold,  and  industrial 
production  has  increased  more  than  fiftyfold.  The  bulk  of  this  increase,  about  three- 
quarters  in  the  case  of  fossil  fuels  and  a  little  over  four-fifths  in  the  case  of  industrial 
production,  has  taken  place  since  1950.  The  annual  increase  in  industrial  production  today 
is  perhaps  as  large  as  the  total  production  in  Europe  around  the  end  of  1930s.  16  The 
impact  of  growth  and  rising  income  levels  can  be  seen  in  the  distribution  of  world 
consumption  of  a  variety  of  resource-intensive  products.  The  more  affluent  industrialized. 
countries  use  most  of  the  world's  metals  and  fossil  fuels.  Even  in  the  case  of  food 
products  a  sharp  difference  exists,  particularly  in  the  products  that  are  more  resource- 
intensive,  as  shown  in  Table  1.1.2.  The  Human  Development  Report  of  the  UNDP  1994 
also  points  to  the  same  trend  as  it  is  in  1980-82. 
In  recent  years,  industrial  countries  have  been  able  to  achieve  economic  growth  using 
less  energy  and  raw  materials  per  unit  of  output.  This,  along  with  the  efforts  to  reduce  the 
emission  of  poRutants,  wifl  help  to  contain  the  pressure  on  the  biosphere.  But  with  the 
increase  in  population  and  the  rise  in  incomes,  per  capita  consumption  of  energy  and 
materials  will  go  up  in  the  developing  countries,  as  it  has  to  if  essential  needs  are  to  be 
met.  Sustainable  development  seeks  to  meet  the  needs  and  aspirations  of  the  present 
without  compromising  the  ability  to  meet  those  of  the  future.  Far  from  requiring  the 
cessation  of  economic  growth,  it  recognizes  that  the  problems  of  poverty  and 
21 underdevelopment  cannot  be  solved  unless  we  have  a  new  era  of  growth  in  which 
developing  countries  play  a  role  and  reap  large  benefits. 
The  composition  of  place  of  growth  economics  in  its  global  framework  raises  certain 
inevitable  questions.  Which  were  the  economic  growth  models  that  the  developed  and 
developing  economies  followed  thus  far?  What  are  the  determinants  on  which  these 
models  were  grounded?  Before  we  answer  these  questions,  we  shall  clarify  certain  basic 
concepts  of  this  study. 
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23 CHAPTER  TWO 
DESCRIPTION  OF  BASIC  CONCEPTS 
Only  in  designing  a  world  economic  order  to  follow  the  Second  World  War  and  in 
considering  the  situation  of  countries  which  would  be  making  their  own  economic  policies 
for  the  first  time,  did  expressions  like  the  under-developed  countries  and  the  Third  World 
come  into  use.  Once  the  subject  was  identified,  there  arose  a  separate  field  of  economics 
known  as  'development  economics'.  The  ideas  of  the  first  development  economists  were 
tremendously  influential  and  are  crucial  to  understanding  actual  policies  adopted  by  LDCs 
in  the  1950s,  many  of  which  remain  in  place  today.  'Their  main  concern  was  to  understand 
the  economies  of  the  less-developed  countries  and  to  stimulate  the  process  of  economic 
development  by  which  these  countries  could  be  transformed  from  LDCs  into  'developed' 
countries.  Semantics  aside,  there  remains  a  real  definitional  problem  of  the  various 
concepts,  which  we  shall  try  to  assimilate. 
I.  2.  i.  Economic  Growth  and  Development 
rl- 
F-A;  onomics  is  about  'What?  How?  and  For  Whom?  '  Development  economics  is 
especially  about  for  whom.  What  is  the  relationship  between  growth  and  development? 
Economic  growth  takes  place  when  there  is  either  an  increase  in  the  national  income  of  a 
country,  or  in  the  country's  productive  capacity,  (this  productive  capacity  being  a 
country's  ability  to  generate  national  income).  Economists  have  a  theoretical  tool  known 
as  a  production  possibility  curve  (PPQ  which  can  be  used  to  analyse  these  concepts  of 
2  growth.  (See  Appendix  1.2.1). 
A  country  which  chooses  a  higher  level  of  investment  in  the  short  run  can  expect,  if  the 
new  capital  is  effective  and  productive,  to  experience  a  more  rapid  shift  of  the  PPC  than  a 
country  which  prefers  immediate  consumption.  This  leads  us  to  one  definition  of  economic 
growth,  which  is  sometimes  described  as  the  process  of  increasing  the  productive  capacity 
of  a  country.  This  type  of  growth  would  be  shown  by  a  rightward  shift  of  the  PPC,  and  is 
24 sometimes  called  potential  groWth.  3  Potential  growth  is  the  rate  at  which  a  country's 
economy  could  grow,  if  all  its  resources  (workers,  machines,  factories,  etc.  )  were  fully 
employed.  Potential  economic  growth  can  be  increased  by  such  methods  as  increasing  or 
discovering  new  resources:  by  increasing  population,  or  by  mining  for  newly  discovered 
minerals,  for  instance.  It  can  also  be  increased  by  improving  the  productivity  of  existing 
resources:  by  training  workers,  inventing  new  technology,  improving  organization,  or 
adopting  better  production  methods. 
Figure:  1.2.1:  A  Production  Possibility  Curve 
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Potential  growth  can  be  distinguished  from  actual  growth.  This  is  the  annual  rate  of 
change  of  national  output;  that  is,  the  growth  of  goods  and  services  actually  produced. 
This  depends  on  the  degree  of  utilisation  of  productive  capacity.  Statistics  referring  to 
growth  rates  refer  to  actual  growth;  when  statistics  are  produced  showing  a  recession  or 
unemployment,  then  these  indicate  a  gap  between  actual  and  potential  growth.  If  growth 
in  the  short  run  is  to  be  sustained  in  the  long  run,  then  both  actual  and  potential  growth 
are  necessary.  Actual  growth  tends  to  fluctuate  in  a  cyclical  fashion.  Market  economies  go 
through  periodic  phases  of  'boom'  and  'recession',  often  referred  to  as  the  'trade  cycle'. 
Keynesian  economists  stress  the  importance  of  short-run  influences  on  aggregate  demand 
25 and  suggests  ways  in  which  governments  can  attempt  to  achieve  steady  actual  growth 
while  also  attempting  to  achieve  other  macro-economic  objectives  such  as  full 
employment,  stable  prices  and  equilibrium  in  the  balance  of  payments.  These  are  known  as 
'demand  management'  policies.  The  growth  of  potential  output  tends  to  be  less  cyclical 
and  more  stable,  and  it  is  this  type  of  growth  which  is  specially  relevant  to  development 
economics.  Attempts  to  achieve  potential  growth  focus  less  on  demand  management  and 
more  on  the  'supply  side'  of  the  economy.  4 
After  distinguishing  between  actual  and  potential  growth,  we  shall  define  'development': 
is  it  the  same  thing  as  growth?  The  word  'development'  signifies  changes  which  are 
permanent.  It  is  true  that  actual  growth  can  sometimes  lead  to  a  'ratchet'  effect,  where  a 
country  continues  to  achieve  a  progressively  higher  level  of  welfare.  However,  it  is  quite 
possible  for  actual  growth  to  be  short-lived:  during  a  war,  for  example,  a  country  might 
achieve  remarkably  high  growth  rates;  but  its  physical  output  would  be  turned  to  dust 
immediately  as  bombs  and  missiles  are  exploded,  and  at  the  end  of  this  growth  period  the 
country  as  a  whole  could  well  be  worse  off  than  before. 
'Development'  signifies  that  growth  in  one  sector  has  substantial  effects  on  other  sectors 
as  well.  As  far  as  Potential  growth  is  concerned,  however,  a  country's  productive  capacity 
might  be  expanded  by  growth  in  just  a  single  sector  -  for  example,  an  oil-producing 
country  which  expands  its  oil-related  industries  and  discovers  new  reserves  will  experience 
potential  growth.  Growth,  whether  actual  or  potential,  is  a  concept  which  centres  on 
'quantity',  whereas  development  also  considers  'quality  9.5  Growth  takes  place  when  there 
is  an  increase  in  the  per  capita  income  or  output  of  a  country;  development  occurs  when 
the  costs  of  growth  are  minimised,  and  when  the  benefits  of  growth  are  distributed  among 
the  whole  population.  Development  cannot  be  said  to  have  taken  place  unless  there  have 
been  improvements  in  the  quality  of  life;  improvements  such  as  better  living  conditions, 
health  care.,  improved  diets,  increased  literacy  and  lower  infant  mortality  rates.  Cultural, 
recreational,  and  social  amenities  are  also  widely  regarded  as  essential  components  of  the 
quality  of  life. 
26 Many  development  economists  today  agree  that  in  the  past  too  much  attention  has  been 
paid  to  economic  growth,  and  not  enough  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  reasons  for 
encouraging  development:  reducing  poverty,  increasing  life  expectancy,  improving  health, 
allowing  people  the  freedom  to  take  part  in  decision-making,  feeding  the  people.  The 
Indian  economist,  Amartya  Sen,  for  example,  has  argued  that  starvation  arises  out  of  a 
lack  of  income  with  which  to  buy  food,  rather  than  a  lack  of  availability  of  food,  and  that 
raising  the  incomes  of  the  poor  is  the  most  efficient  way  of  reducing  undernourishment. 
Sen  refers  to  development  as  the  'expansion  of  people's  capabilities',  6  and  has  encouraged 
economists  to  broaden  their  view  of  development,  to  include  value  judgements  about  what 
ought  to  be  (i.  e.  normative  economics  as  well  as  positive  economics)  and  to  argue  that 
development  policies  should  be  'capabilities-orientated'  as  well  as  'goods-orientated'.  We 
will  consider  two  views  of  development;  they  are  not  incompatible  with  each  other,  but 
one  is  broader  than  the  other,  and  we  shall  refer  to  them  as  economic  development  and 
human  development. 
Economic  development  can  be  regarded  as  a  process  of  growth  and  change  aimed  at 
raising  people's  living  standards.  It  involves  growth  in  total  and  in  per  capita  income;  and 
is  accompanied  by  fundamental  changes  in  the  structure  of  an  economy.  This  corresponds 
closely  to  the  view  of  development  adopted  by  the  World  Bank,  which  charts  development 
progress  each  year  in  the  annual  World  Development  Report,  which  puts  nations  in  order 
of  rank  according  to  their  economic  success.  The  order  is  based  on  GNP  per  head,  and  its 
rate  of  change.  Within  this  ranking  it  is  possible  to  place  a  fairly  arbitrary  dividing  line 
between  countries  which  can  be  regarded  as  more  developed  countries  (MDCs)  and  those 
which  are  less  developed  countries  (LDCs);  and  economists  following  the  World  Bank 
view  would  generally  accept  that  this  line  occurs  at  a  level  of  about  $5000  of  GNP  per 
capita.  But,  not  only  there  remains  disputes  over  where  exactly  to  draw  the  line  between 
rich  and  poor  nations,  but  also  there  is  widespread  scepticism  over  whether  average 
7 
income  adequately  captures  the  level  of  economic  development.  (Ref.  Appendix  1.2.2) 
Yet,  the  commonest,  the  most  convenient,  measuring  rod  of  economic  development  is  per 
capita  income. 
27 1.2.  ii.  Three  Percgpfions  of  Economic  Development 
Three  types  of  approaches  to  this  conflict  between  observed  per  capita  income  levels 
and  perceptions  of  economic  development  can  be  identified  with  the  writings  of  Seers.,  8 
Kuznets9  and  Lewislo.  For  Seers,  development  'means  creating  the  conditions  for  the 
realization  of  human  personality'  (1972),  which  has  three  interrelated  criteria:  reducing 
poverty,  reducing  unemployment  and  reducing  inequality.  Fhgh  income  levels  indicate 
potential  for  development,  but  if  it  is  not  shared  by  all  then  development  has  not  occurred 
-  the  Kuwait  and  South  Africa  inconsistencies  could  be  explained  by  this  reservation.  A 
related  approach  is  to  define  economic  development  in  ten-ns  of  the  satisfaction  of 
universal  basic  needs  for  food,  shelter,  health  care,  education  and  so  forth  just  to  start  a 
list  suggests  the  huge  measurement  problem. 
For  Kuznets,  LDCs  are  countries  which  have  not  experienced  modem  economic  growth 
(MEG),  which  he  defined  in  terms  of  observed  regularities  in  the  economic  history  of 
more-developed  countries.  One  component  of  MEG  is  accelerated  growth  in  per  capita 
income,  but  there  are  also  structural  transformations,  such  as  the  shift  or  production  from 
agriculture  to  other  activities  and  changes  in  the  scale  and  technology  of  production.  Thus, 
oil  or  other  resource-dominated  economies  may  be  rich  but  are  not  necessarily 
economically  developed.  These  contributions  are  important  because  income  distribution 
and  structural  change  are  both  part  of  the  common  understanding  of  economic 
development. 
Lewis  has  provided  the  most  cogent  positive  defence  of  the  use  of  per  capita  gross 
national  product.  He  recognizes  the  limitations  of  any  single  policy  objective,  but  the  case 
for  putting  increased  output  as  the  prime  goal  is  that  'it  gives  man  greater  control  over  his 
environment  and  thereby  increases  his  freedom'  (Lewis,  1955,  p.  421).  Lewis  emphasizes 
the  social  and  environmental  costs  incurred  if  growth  is  too  fast  for  society  to  cope  with 
or  if  it  is  accompanied  by  greater  inequality. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  every  country's  national  accounts  statistics  contain  weaknesses 
and  biases,  GNP  data  represent  the  best  available  (approximate)  measures  of  the  level  of 
economic  activity  and,  using  the  GNP-=GNI  identity,  of  per  capita  income  levels. 
28 Generally,  the  data  quality  has  been  improving  significantly  over  the  last  five  decades,  and 
using  United  Nations  or  World  Bank  sources  gives  the  added  advantage  that  the  best 
available  figures  have  been  selected  for  each  country  and  any  obvious  adjustments  to 
ensure  better  international  comparability  have  been  made. 
In  1990,  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  (UNDP)  launched  a  new  Human 
Development  Index  (HDI)  which  is  published  each  year  in  the  Human  Development 
Report  (HDR)  with  information  about  each  of  160  countries.  The  Human  Development 
Index  represents  a  new  attempt  to  assimilate  into  a  single  measure  Seer's  contention  that 
there  is  more  to  development  than  GNP  alone.  It  is  based  on  the  three  measures  in 
columns  3-5  of  (Appendix  1.2.2)  but  the  specific  weights  used,  by  giving  little  weight  to 
purchasing-power-parity  adjusted  gross  domestic  product  per  capita  above  a  poverty  cut- 
off  (around  $5,000),  produce  some  counter-intuitive  results. 
The  UNDP  defines  human  development  as  a  'process  of  enlarging  people's  choices. 
Three  choices  are  deemed  to  be  critical:  access  to  resources  (purchasing  power,  which  is 
calculated  from  GNP  per  capita  and  a  calculation  of  the  cost  of  living);  a  long  and  healthy 
life  (as  reflected  by  figures  for  life  expectancy);  and  education  (measured  by  the  adult 
literacy  rate).  Figures  are  available  for  each  of  these,  and  they  are  combined  to  give  a 
number  which  varies  between  0  and  1:  the  closer  to  1,  the  higher  the  level  of  human 
development.  "  The  UNDP  intends  to  refine  the  way  in  which  it  calculates  HDI  in  the 
years  ahead.  (Ref.  Appendix  1.2.2).  An  ambitious  aim  is  that  of  finding  ways  to  quantify 
other  social  achievements  which  the  UNDP  sees  as  important  for  the  quality  of  life:  such 
things  as  political  freedom  and  human  rights. 
I.  2.  iii.  The  Concgpt  of  Sustainable  Developmen 
The  old  understanding  of  achieving  economic  welfare  through  the  process  of  growth 
and  development  has  taken  us  to  a  new  challenge  of  opting  for  sustainable  development. 
Sustainable  development  is  development  that  meets  the  needs  of  the  present  without 
29 compromising  the  ability  of  future  generations  to  meet  their  own  needs.  It  contains  within 
it  two  key  concepts: 
*  the  concept  of  'needs',  in  particular  the  essential  needs  of  the  world's  poor,  to  which 
overriding  priority  should  be  given;  and 
9  the  idea  of  limitations  imposed  by  the  state  of  technology  and  social  organization  on 
the  environment's  ability  to  meet  present  and  future  needs. 
Thus  the  goals  of  economic  and  social  development  must  be  defined  in  terms  of 
sustainability  in  all  countries  -  developed  or  developing,  market-oriented  or  centrally 
planned.  Development  involves  a  progressive  transformation  of  economy  and  society.  A 
development  path  that  is  sustainable  in  a  physical  sense  could  theoretically  be  pursued 
even  in  a  rigid  social  and  political  setting.  But  physical  sustainability  cannot  be  secured 
unless  development  policies  pay  attention  to  such  considerations  as  changes  in  access  to 
resources  and  in  the  distribution  of  costs  and  benefits.  Even  the  narrow  notion  of  physical 
sustainability  implies  a  concern  for  social  equity  between  generations,  a  concern  that  must 
logically  be  extended  to  equity  within  each  generation.  In  a  long  term  perspective,  this  is 
the  essence  of  the  concept  of  sustainable  development.  The  satisfaction  of  human  needs 
and  aspirations  is  the  major  objective  of  development.  The  essential  needs  of  vast  numbers 
of  people  in  developing  countries  -  for  food,  clothing,  shelter,  jobs  -  are  not  being  met, 
and  beyond  their  basic  needs  these  people  have  legitimate  aspirations  for  an  improved 
quality  of  life.  A  world  in  which  poverty  and  inequality  are  endemic  will  always  be  prone 
to  ecological  and  other  crises.  Sustainable  development  requires  meeting  the  basic  needs 
of  all  and  extending  to  all  the  opportunity  to  satisfy  their  aspirations  for  a  better  life. 
Living  standards  that  go  beyond  the  basic  minimum  are  sustainable  only  if  consumption 
standards  everywhere  have  regard  for  long-term  sustainability.  Yet  many  of  us  live  beyond 
the  world's  ecological  means,  for  instance  in  our  patterns  of  energy  use.  Perceived  needs 
are  socially  and  culturally  determined,  and  sustainable  development  requires  the  promotion 
of  values  that  encourage  consumption  standards  that  are  within  the  bounds  of  the 
ecological  possible  and  to  which  all  can  reasonably  aspire.  12 
30 Meeting  essential  needs  depends  in  part  on  achieving  full  growth  potential,  and 
sustainable  development  clearly  requires  economic  growth  in  places  where  such  needs  are 
not  being  met.  Hence  sustainable  development  requires  that  societies  meet  human  needs 
both  by  increasing  productive  potential  and  by  ensuring  equitable  opportunities  for  all. 
"We  now  know  that  what  unites  us  is  vastly  more  important  than  what  divides  us.  We 
recognize  that  poverty,  environmental  degradation  and  population  growth  are 
inextricah?  y  related  and  that  none  of  these  fundamental  problems  can  he  successfulýy 
addressed  in  isolation.  We  will  succeed  orfail  together.  Arriving  at  a  commonýy  accepted 
definition  of  'sustainable  development'  remains  a  challenge  for  all  the  actors  in  the 
development  process.  "13  In  essence,  sustainable  development  is  a  process  of  change  in 
which  the  exploitation  of  resources,  the  direction  of  investments,  the  orientation  of 
technological  development,  and  institutional  change  are  all  in  harmony  and  enhance  both 
current  and  future  potential  to  meet  human  needs  and  aspirations.  How  are  individuals  in 
the  real  world  to  be  persuaded  or  made  to  act  in  the  common  interest?  The  answer  hes 
partly  in  education,  institutional  development,  and  law  enforcement.  14 
1.2.  iv.  Reviving  Growth  as  a  StratgWc  Imperative 
The  above  analysis  points  to  the  fact  that  the  world  must  quickly  design  strategies  that 
will  allow  nations  to  move  from  their  present,  often  destructive,  processes  of  growth  and 
development  onto  sustainable  development  paths.  This  will  require  policy  changes  in  all 
countries,  with  respect  both  to  their  own  development  and  to  their  impacts  on  other 
nation's  development  possibilities.  As  indicated  earlier,  development  that  is  sustainable  has 
to  address  the  problem  of  the  large  number  of  people  who  live  in  absolute  poverty  -  that 
is,  who  are  unable  to  satisfy  even  the  most  basic  of  their  needs.  Poverty  reduces  people's 
capacity  to  use  resources  in  a  sustainable  manner,  it  intensifies  pressure  on  the 
environment.  Most  such  absolute  poverty  is  in  developing  countries;  in  many,  it  has  been 
aggravated  by  the  economic  stagnation  of  the  1980s.  A  necessary  but  a  sufficient 
condition  for  the  elimination  of  absolute  poverty  is  a  relatively  rapid  rise  in  per  capita 
incomes  in  the  Third  World.  It  is  therefore  essential  that  the  stagnant  or  declining  growth 
31 trends  of  this  decade  be  reversed.  While  attainable  growth  rates  will  vary,  a  certain 
minimum  is  needed  to  have  any  impact  on  absolute  poverty.  It  seems  unlikely  that,  taking 
developing  countries  as  a  whole,  these  objectives  can  be  accomplished  with  per  capita 
income  growth  of  under  3  per  cent. 
The  poverty  line  is  that  level  of  income  below  which  an  individual  or  household  cannot 
afford  on  a  regular  basis  the  necessities  of  life.  The  percentage  of  the  population  below 
that  line  will  depend  on  per  capita  national  income  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is 
distributed  How  quickýy  can  a  developing  country  expect  to  eliminate  absolute  poverty? 
The  answer  will  vary  from  country  to  country,  but  much  can  be  learned  from  a  typical 
case. 
Consider  a  nation  in  which  hatf  the  population  lives  below  the  poverty  line  and  where  the 
distribution  of  household  incomes  is  asfollows:  The  top  one-ji-fth  of  households  have  50 
per  cent  of  total  income,  the  nextfifth  have  20  per  cent,  the  nextji'fth  have  14per  cent, 
the  next  Jifth  have  9  per  cent,  and  the  bottom  ji'fth  have  just  7  per  cent  This  is  a  fair 
representation  of  the  situation  in  many  low-income  developing  countries. 
In  this  case,  if  the  income  distribution  remains  unchanged,  per  capita  national  income 
would  have  to  double  before  the  poverty  ratio  dropsfrom  50  to  10per  cent.  If  income  is 
redistributed  in  fa  vour  of  the  poor,  this  reduction  can  occur  sooner.  Consider  the  case  in 
which  25  per  cent  of  the  incremental  income  of  the  richest  one-fifth  of  the  population  is 
redistributed  equalýy  to  the  others. 
The  assumptions  here  about  redistribution  reflect  three  judgements.  First,  in  most 
situations  redistributive  policies  can  on?  Y  operate  on  increases  in  income.  Second,  in  low- 
income  developing  countries  the  surplus  that  can  be  skimmed  off  for  redistribution  is 
available  onýy  from  the  wealthier  groups.  Third,  redistributive  policies  cannot  be  so 
preciseýy  targeted  that  they  deliver  benefits  only  to  those  who  are  below  the  poverty  line, 
so  some  of  the  bene/lis  will  accrue  to  those  who  arejust  a  little  above  it. 
The  number  of  years  required  to  bring  the  poverty  ratio  down  fi-om  50  to  10  per  cent 
rangesfrom: 
32 18-24years  ifper  capita  income  grows  at  3per  cent, 
26-36years  ýf  it  grows  at  2  per  cent,  and 
51  -70years  if  it  grows  only  at  I  per  cent. 
In  each  case,  the  shorter  time  is  associated  with  the  redistribution  of  25  per  cent  of  the 
incremental  income  of  the  richest  fifth  of  the  population  and  the  longer  period  with  no 
redistribution. 
So  with  per  capita  national  income  growing  onýy  at  I  per  cent  a  year,  the  time  required 
to  eliminate  absolute  poverty  would  stretch  well  into  the  next  century.  If,  however,  the 
aim  is  to  ensure  that  the  world  is  well  on  its  way  towards  sustainable  development  by  the 
beginning  of  the  next  century,  it  is  necessary  to  aim  at  a  minimum  of  3  per  cent  per 
capita  national  income  growth  and  to  pursue  vigorous  redistributive  policies.  '5 
Given  current  population  growth  rates,  this  would  require  overall  national  income 
growth  of  around  5  per  cent  a  year  in  the  developing  economies  of  Asia,  5.5  per  cent  in 
Latin  America,  and  6  per  cent  in  Africa  and  West  Asia.  Are  these  orders  of  magnitude 
attainable?  The  record  in  South  and  East  Asia  over  the  past  quarter-century  and  especially 
over  the  last  few  years  suggests  that  5  per  cent  annual  growth  can  be  attained  in  most 
countries,  including  the  two  largest,  India  and  China.  In  Latin  America,  average  growth 
rates  on  the  order  of  5  per  cent  were  achieved  during  the  1960s  and  1970s,  but  fell  well 
below  that  during  the  1980s,  mainly  because  of  the  debt  crisis.  16  A  revival  of  Latin 
American  growth  depends  on  the  resolution  of  this  crisis.  In  Africa,  growth  rates  during 
the  1960s  and  1970s  were  around  4-4.5  per  cent,  which  at  current  rates  of  population 
growth  would  mean  per  capita  income  growth  of  only  a  little  over  1  per  cent.  17  Moreover, 
during  the  1980s,  growth  nearly  halted  and  in  two-thirds  of  the  countries  per  capita 
income  declined.  18  Attaining  a  minimum  level  of  growth  in  Africa  requires  the  correction 
of  short-term  imbalances,  and  also  the  removal  of  deep-rooted  constraints  on  the  growth 
process. 
Growth  must  be  revived  in  developing  countries  because  that  is  where  the  links  between 
economic  growth,  the  alleviation  of  poverty,  and  environmental  conditions  operate  most 
33 directly.  Yet  developing  countries  are  part  of  an  interdependent  world  economy;  their 
prospects  also  depend  on  the  levels  and  patterns  of  growth  in  industrialized  nations.  The 
medium  term  prospects  for  industrial  countries  are  for  growth  of  3-4  per  cent,  the 
minimum  that  international  financial  institutions  consider  necessary  if  these  countries  are 
going  to  play  a  part  in  expanding  the  world  economy.  Sustainable  development  requires  a 
change  in  the  content  of  growth,  to  make  it  less  material-and  energy-intensive  and  more 
equitable  in  its  impact.  These  changes  are  required  in  all  countries  as  part  of  a  package  of 
measures  to  maintain  the  stock  of  ecological  capital,  to  improve  the  distribution  of 
income,  and  to  reduce  the  degree  of  vulnerability  to  economic  crises.  "People  have 
acquired,  often  for  the  first  time  in  history,  both  an  idea  of  their  relative  poveny  and  a 
desire  to  emerge  from  it  and  improve  the  quality  of  their  lives.  As  people  advance 
materialbý,  and  eat  and  live  better,  what  were  once  luxuries  tend  to  be  regarded  as 
necessities.  The  net  result  is  that  the  demand  for  food,  raw  materials,  and  power 
increases  to  an  even  greater  degree  than  the  population.  As  demand  increases,  a  greater 
and  greater  strain  is  Put  on  the  finite  area  of  the  world's  land  to  produce  the  products 
needed.  "19  All  the  nations  of  the  world  need  to  take  responsibility  for  redesigning  the 
growth  strategies.  The  growth  strategies  followed  by  the  market-oriented  economies,  both 
developed  and  developing,  resulted  in  certain  growth  and  development.  Our  definitions  of 
the  relevant  terminologies  of  this  section  allow  us  to  proceed  to  analyse  the  determinants 
of  those  growth  models  which  have  brought  about  uneven  results  on  a  global  scale. 
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35 CHAPTER  THREE 
DETERMINANTS  OR  ENGINES  OF  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  AND 
THEIR  MOTIVATING  FORCES 
Each  of  the  following  chapters  in  this  section  is  designed  within  a  particular  framework 
to  determine  the  engines  of  economic  growth.  Macroeconomics  theories  of  economic 
growth  explain  the  determinants  of  the  wealth  of  nations  and  try  to  analyse  why  the 
fortunes  of  nations  change  over  time.  Classical  economists,  such  as  Smith,  Malthus,  and 
Ricardo,  treated  the  problem  of  development  as  part  of  a  general  inquiry  into  the  causes 
and  consequences  of  economic  growth.  They  sought  to  explain  the  basic  forces  that  could 
account  for  an  economy's  dynamic  as  well  as  static  performance  and  thus  explain  the 
observed  pattern  of  wealth  accumulation  and  productivity  growth  across  nations.  The  neo- 
classical  theory  of  economic  growth  has  been  mostly  concerned  with  capital  accumulation. 
Recent  research  has  shown  that  increases  in  the  stock  of  labour  and  capital  could  explain 
only  a  relatively  small  fraction  of  observed  economic  growth  in  industrial  countries.  This 
finding  stimulated  much  research  into  the  factors  determining  the  unexplained  sources  of 
growth.  It  produced  the  conventional  wisdom  that  technological  progress  and  human 
capital  are  the  main  factors  which  account  for  the  historic  gains  in  the  productivity  of 
labour  and  physical  capital.  Neo-classical  growth  theory  allowed  for  technological  change, 
but  did  not  make  it  an  endogenous  outcome  of  profit-maximizing  behaviour  of  agents  who 
invest  in  knowledge  creation.  Extensions  of  the  neo-classical  growth  theory  made 
technological  progress  endogenous.  The  New  Growth  Theory  builds  on  and  changes  these 
existing  theories,  giving  new  orientations  in  areas  of  research  and  revealing  wider  horizons 
of  the  growth  economics.  The  major  objective  of  this  section  is  to  discuss  the  determinants 
or  engines  of  growth  and  their  motivating  forces.  Therefore,  the  following  chapters  focus 
on  one  important  class  of  mechanisms  that  sustain  long-run  growth,  a  small  number  of 
models  that  employ  them,  and  a  limited  number  of  issues  that  demonstrate  the  usefulness 
of  viewing  economic  growth  in  this  particular  way. 
36 1.3.  i  Stages  of  Growth 
The  birth  of  new  nations,  as  an  aftermath  of  a  global  war,  was  heralded  with  joy.  But  the 
joy  did  not  long  last  because  the  new  born  could  not  make  it  to  an  infancy  stage  due  to  the 
economic  malnutrition  into  which  it  was  born.  The  new  realization  of  a  divided  world  of 
South  and  North  or  of  developing  and  developed  or  of  poor  and  rich  had  a  shattering 
economic  effect.  Effective  ways  of  integrating  the  world  economy  has  become  the  concern 
of  economists.  Interest  in  growth  revived  as  a  result  of  an  immense  practical  concern  with 
development  after  the  Second  World  War.  The  war-damaged  economies  were  trying  hard 
to  reconstruct  fast,  the  underdeveloped  countries  were  attempting  to  initiate  economic 
development,  the  advanced  capitalist  countries  being  relatively  free  from  periodic  slumps 
were  trying  to  concentrate  on  raising  the  long-run  rate  of  growth,  and  the  socialist 
countries  were  determined  to  overtake  the  richer  capitalist  economies  by  fast  economic 
expansion!  The  central  idea  that  evolved  at  this  juncture  of  discussion  about  post-war 
development  policies  was  to  stimulate  transfers  of  capital  goods  from  rich  to  poor 
countries.  The  basic  model  that  has  shed  some  light  into  this  way  of  thinking  is  that  of 
Harrod  and  Domar. 
The  economic  historian,  Walt  Rostow  [19601  suggests  that  all  of  the  more  developed 
countries  have  passed  through  the  following  five  stages  of  economic  growth.  In 
traditional  society  land  is  the  basis  of  wealth,  most  of  the  population  works  in  agriculture, 
investment  is  low.  In  the  preconditions  period  increased  agricultural  productivity  permits 
some  economic  diversification,  and  social  and  political  changes  occur.  The  take  off  is  a  20- 
30  year  period  of  accelerated  growth  characterized  by  an  increase  in  BY  from  5%  to  10% 
and  the  development  of  one  or  more  leading  sectors.  In  the  drive  to  maturity,  the  new 
political  and  social  framework  and  the  higher  BY  make  growth  self-sustaining  and  new 
sectors  emerge  to  complement  the  leading  sector.  This  culminates  in  the  age  of  mass 
consumption  when  a  diversified  economy  supports  ever  increasing  per  capita  income.  2 
Rostow's  concept  of  unidirectional  economic  growth  proceeding  in  stages  had  a 
widespread  appeal,  but  also  encountered  criticism.  Lewis  [1954,1958],  Rostow  [1960] 
and  Fei  and  Ranis  [19641  had  pinpointed  the  raising  of  the  savings  ratio  as  the  key  to 
37 understanding  the  process  of  development  and  the  'take-off  '  into  sustained  growth. 
Development  economists  needed  a  more  dynamic  approach,  which  would  also  take  into 
account  the  longer-term  effects  of  increases  in  investment,  which  add  to  the  capital  stock 
and  hence  accelerate  economic  growth.  This  was  provided  by  the  Harrod-Domar  growth 
model.  3  In  response  to  the  basic  question  of  what  determines  the  rate  of  growth  of  an 
economy's  output,  Harrod  and  Domar  came  up  with  a  clear  two-part  answer:  the  savings 
rate  and  the  incremental  capital/output  ratio  .  Harrod-Domar  growth  theory  sanctioned  the 
overriding  importance  of  capital  accumulation  in  the  quest  for  enhanced  growth. 
UAL 
THE  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN  EMPHASIS  ON  PHYSICAL 
CAPITAL  AND  HUMAN  LABOUR 
Growth  Formula  One:  G,  =  f(PK,,  HLd 
Harrod-Domar  Model 
While  analysing  growth  economics,  Harrod  raised  the  following  issues.  First,  the 
possibility  of  steady  growth  in  a  model  of  a  fixed  capital-output  ratio  C  and  a  fixed 
savings-output  ratio  s  is  noted.  A  unit  of  capital  will  produce  unit  of  output,  which  in  its 
turn  will  generate  s1C  units  of  net  savings  (i.  e.  addition  to  capital  stock),  so  that  the  rate  of 
growth  of  the  capital  stock  will  equal  s1C  Since  output  is  proportional  to  capital,  that  will 
be  the  rate  of  growth  of  output  as  well.  This  highly  simple  version  of  the  so-called 
'Harrod-Domar  model'  has  provided  the  theoretical  underpinning  of  an  enormous  volume 
of  literature  including  some  practical  growth  plans  of  developed  and  under-developed 
countries.  Harrod's  second  point  is  concerned  with  showing  the  instability  of  this  path  of 
steady  growth.  In  the  simple  Harrod-Domar  model,  it  is  assumed  that  investment  is 
determined  entirely  by  planned  savings  and  there  is  no  independent  investment  function 
based  on  the  expectations  of  the  future.  Expectations  of  additional  effective  demand 
determines  the  level  of  investment  in  the  Harrod  model  and  that  investment,  through  the 
38 ,  multiplier',  generates  a  certain  level  of  effective  demand  in  a  Keynesian  manner.  4  Harrod's 
questions  in  this  field  are  the  following: 
a)  when  will  the  investor's  expectations  be  realized?  and 
b)  what  will  happen  if  they  are  not  realized? 
Given  the  capital-output  ratio  C  which  is  treated  as  an  'accelerator',  investment  It  in 
period  t  will  equal  C  times  the  expected  additional  flow  of  output.  The  latter  equals  the 
difference  between  the  expected  demand  for  output  Xt  and  the  actual  output  in  the  last 
period  YI.  And  through  the  multiplier  process  the  actual  demand  in  year  t  will  equal  the 
investment  level  It  times the  multiplier,  i.  e.  the  reciprocal  of  the  savings  ratio  s. 
It 
-ý 
(xt 
- 
Yt4)C  (1) 
Yt  =  (I  /S)  it 
It  is  easy  to  check  from  1  and  2  that  the  ratio  of  actual  demand  to  expected  demand  in 
penod  t  wiH  be  given  by  the  following:  i 
Yt1xt  =  CIS  (Xt  -Yt-l  Ixt)  (3) 
The  expression  within  the  brackets  in  the  right-hand  side  is  really  the  expected  rate  of 
growth,  which  we  may  denote  as  gt^  (cap) 
,  as  a  proportion  of  X,  So  that  we  can  also 
write  this  as:  YWX,  =  (Cls)  g,  ^ 
From  4  it  is  obvious  that  expectations  will  be  realized,  LeX,  will  equal  Y,  if  and  onýy  if  the 
expected  growth  rate  g,  ^  equals  the  s1C  This  rate  of  growth  s1C,  which  is  realized  if 
expected  Harrod  called  the  'warranted'  rate  of  growth.  What  if  the  expectation  is  for  some 
rate  of  growth  other  than  sIC?  Defining  the  actual  rate  of  growth  g,  as  (Yt-Yt-,  )IYt, 
analogously  to  gt^,  a  little  manipulation  yields  the  following  functional  relationship 
between  actual  growth  and  expected  growth. 
gt  =I  -(I  -g,  ^)Slc 
It  is  clear  that  gt  gt^  according  as  gt^  ->  s1C 
This  is  the  beginning  of  Harrod's  instability  problem. 
(5) 
(6) 
39 I.  3.  iii  Harrod's  Instabifily  Problem 
Harrod's  instability  problem  can  be  explained  as  follows.  If  the  investors  anticipate  more 
than  the  warranted  rate  of  growth  s1C  then  the  actual  growth  rate  of  demand  will  exceed 
even  the  high  expected  growth  rate,  so  that  instead  of  feeling  that  they  expected  too  much 
they  are  likely  to  feel  that  they  expected  too  little.  Similarly,  if  they  anticipate  a  growth 
rate  lower  than  the  warranted  growth  rate,  then  the  actual  growth  rate  will  fall  short  of 
even  the  expected  growth  rate  and  the  investors  may  decide  that  they  expected  too  much 
rather  than  too  little.  The  market  thus  seems  to  give  a  perverse  signal  to  the  investor,  and 
this  is  the  source  of  Harrod's  problem.  5 
From  the  growth  equation  5,  a  model  of  instability  can  be  generated  by  making  the 
assumption  that  the  expectation  of  growth  in  this  period  be  raised  or  lowered  from  last 
period's  expectation  depending  on  whether  growth  in  the  last  period  was  respectively 
over-fulfilled  or  under-fulfilled. 
gt^  =  gt_l  A+  X  (9t-l  -  gt-,  ^),  with  X>0  (7) 
The  combination  of  5  and  7  is  a  highly  unstable  system.  If  actual  demand  Yt  falls  short 
of  expected  demand  Xt,  there  may  not  be  much  problem,  since  capacity  may  be  under- 
used,  but  should  Y,  exceed  the  expected  demand  for  which  just  enough  capacity  was 
created,  how  would  this  actual  demand  be  met?  One  idea  is  to  assume  that  this  is  done  by 
dehoarding  some  existing  inventory,  but  that  raises  the  question  as  to  what  happens  when 
the  existing  stock  is  exhausted  as  it  surely  will  if  Harrod's  cumulative  divergence  from  the 
warranted  growth  path  continues  indefinitely.  The  model  will  then  need  supplementation 
in  some  way.  An  alternative  is  to  assume  that  any  excess  of  Y,  over  Xt  is  met  by  an 
unforeseen  rise  in  the  price  level.  Then  the  expected  sales  will  always  be  eventually 
realized  except  that  the  price  level  will  be  different  from  the  one  anticipated  unless  the 
growth  expectation  was  warranted.  Then  Harrod's  model  will  be  one  of  a  knife-edge 
balance  between  cumulative  inflation  and  cumulative  deflation.,  and  the  adjustment 
equation  will  have  to  be  interpreted  as  raising  or  lowering  growth  expectations  in  response 
to  prices  being,  respectively,  larger  or  smaller  than  anticipated. 
40 1.3.  iv.  Harrod's  Knife-edge  Problem 
The  problem  of  a  'knife-edge'  balance  between  'warranted'  and  'natural'  rates  of 
growth  that  was  introduced  by  Harrod  and  Domar,  has  attracted  a  number  of  comments  in 
the  recent  years.  Harrods's  'warranted'  rate  was  given  by: 
Gw  =  s1C,  where  s  stood  for  the  saving  propensity  and  C  the  relevant  capital-output  ratio. 
The  'natural'  rate  of  growth  (Gd  was  given  by  population  growth  and  the  progress  of 
technological  knowledge.  What  if  the  two  rates  do  not  coincide?  Briefly,  the  adjustment 
mechanism  suggests  that  if  G,,,  >  G,  an  economy  will  experience  diminishing  returns  to 
capital,  a  relative  rise  in  the  wage  rate  and  a  relative  fall  in  the  profit  rate,  which  will  make 
the  most  profitable  technique  a  more  capital-intensive  one.  This  rise  in  C  will  reduce  G, 
and  this  process  will  continue  until  G-,,  =  G,  A  similar  argument  holds  in  the  case  where 
G,,,  is  less  than  G,,  to  start  with.  'At  any  other  point  [other  than  one  where  the  warranted 
and  natural  rates  of  growth  are  equal]  the  wage  rate  and  the  profit  rate  are  moving  in  such 
a  way  as  to  induce  entrepreneurs  to  adjust  the  capital-output  ratio  in  the  direction  which 
will  bring  the  warranted  and  natural  rates  of  growth  together.  '7 
I.  3.  v.  Accumulation  and  the  Labour  Force 
The  story  told  so  far  has  been  totally  concerned  with  capital  accumulation.  But  there  are 
other  factors  of  production  as  well,  in  particular  labour.  Labour  is  recognized  to  be  an 
integral  requirement  of  production.  Either  one  can  use  a  full-fledged  multifactor 
production  relation  with  specific  substitutability  assumptions,  or  else  one  can  discuss  the 
process  as  one  given  by  the  accumulation  of  capital  subject  to  a  constraint  related  to  the 
supply  of  labour.  While  most  of  the  modem  works  on  growth  have  favoured  the  former 
approach,  Harrod's  analysis  was  expressed  in  terms  of  the  latter.  Growth  proceeds  pari 
passu  with  capital  accumulation  with  a  given  capital-output  ratio  as  long  as  the  labour 
requirement  at  the  current  level  of  productivity  does  not  exceed  the  size  of  the  potential 
labour  force.  This  imposes  a  long  run  ceiling  on  the  rate  of  growth  which  could  be 
exceeded  for  a  while,  but  sooner  or  later  the  economy  would  run  into  the  full  employment 
41 barrier.  Harrod's  'natural'  rate  of  growth  is  the  maximum  sustainable  rate  of  growth  in  the 
long  run  given  by  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  labour  force  n  and  the  rate  of  labour-saving 
technical  progress  M8  IThe  labour-saving  technical  progress  as  visualized  by  Harrod 
(sometimes  referred  to  in  the  literature  as  'Harrod-neutral  technical  progress')  is  much  like 
an  expansion  of  the  labour  force.  When  Y  is  output,  K  capital  and  L  the  labour  force,  the 
production  relation  takes  the  form  of  Y=  f(KA  WL),  where  AW  is  an  increasing  function 
of  time.  For  Harrod-neutral  technical  progress  to  be  steady,  AW  must  take  the  form  B, 
where  B  and  m  are  constants  and  e  is  the  base  of  natural  logarithm.  ) 
Here,  we  encounter  another  problem.  If  the  warranted  rate  of  growth  given  by  s1C  and 
the  natural  rate  of  growth  given  by  n+m  equal  each  other,  people  live  happily  ever  after; 
but  what  if  rates  don't?  If  the  economy  is having  steady  growth  at  the  warranted  rate  and 
if  that  rate  exceeds  the  natural  rate,  the  full-employment  barrier  will  be  encountered  once 
the  initial  slack  is  absorbed  and  the  economy  would  no  longer  be  able  to  grow  at  the 
warranted  rate,  and  this  may  trigger  off  a  cumulative  departure  of  the  kind  that  we 
discussed  earlier.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  warranted  growth  rate  falls  short  of  the  natural 
rate,  then  a  growing  proportion  of  unemployment  will  emerge.  Is  the  world  really  like  this 
or  is  there  something  missing  in  this  picture?  Are  there  any  adjustment  mechanisms  that 
can  bring  the  'natural'  rate  closer  to  the  'warranted'  so  that  the  economy  can  grow  at  full 
employment  (or  at  a  constant  proportion  of  unemployment)?  The  required  condition 
being  s1C  =  n+m,  any  of  the  four  variables  can  individually  or  jointly  serve  the  cause  of 
adjustment.  Many  of  the  later  models  concentrated  on  this  issue  and  developed  the 
adjustment  mechanisms.  An  increase  in  the  growth  rate  can  be  achieved  either  by  saving 
(and  investing)  a  higher  proportion  of  GNP  or  by  using  the  additions  to  the  capital  stock 
more  efficiently. 
42 1.3.  vi.  Critique  of  the  Model 
The  Harrod-Domar  growth  model,  although  underlying  much  thinking  on  economic 
development  during  the  1950s,  had  some  shortcomings.  'o  If  capital  and  labour  have  to  be 
combined  in  technologically  given  fixed  proportions,  then  the  equilibrium  growth  rate 
AY1Y  =  s1C  is  a  'knife-edge'  solution;  if  the  labour  force  grows  faster  than  the  capital 
stock,  then  there  will  be  more  and  more  unemployed  workers,  and  if  the  capital  stock 
grows  faster  than  the  labour  force,  there  will  be  labour  shortages  and  cost-push  inflation. 
Also,  there  is  no  place  in  the  model  for  technical  change.  The  Harrod-Domar  model  did 
not  fit  the  actual  data  in  the  1950's  when  LDCs'  growth  rates  were  more  rapid  than  those 
implied  by  their  savings  rates  and  incremental  capital-output  ratios.  'Me  difficulty  with 
this-classical  model  of  growth  is  the  absence  of  an  investment  function  and  the  consequent 
failure  to  assign  a  major  role  to  entrepreneurial  expectations  about  the  future.  Harrod  was 
concerned  with  the  instability  problem  in  equilibrium  growth  precisely  in  this  context. 
The  emphasis  on  the  role  of  capital  in  determining  the  rate  of  economic  growth 
dominated  the  thinking  on  economic  development  in  the  late  1940s  and  195  Os.  The 
differences  that  this  neo-classical  approach  makes  to  how  one  views  economic  growth 
were  spelt  out  by  Robert  Solow  in  a  simple  macroeconomics  growth  model  ,  which 
contrasts  sharply  with  the  Harrod-Domar  model  in  its  conclusions  and  in  its  policy 
implications,  to  which  we  shall  proceed. 
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44 CHAPTER  FOUR 
THE  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN  EMPHASIS  ON 
TECHNOLOGICAL  PROGRESS 
GROWTH  FORMULA  7WO:  G2=  f(PK2,.  HL2,  TP2) 
I.  4.  i.  The  Solow  Growth  Model 
In  the  previous  chapter,  we  noted  that  the  neo-classical  theory  of  economic  growth  has 
been  mostly  concerned  with  capital  accumulation.  Here,  we  shall  discuss  how  technology 
has  become  a  crucial  determinant  in  the  economic  growth  model.  The  introduction  of  the 
neo-classical  growth  model,  especially  in  the  contributions  of  Solow  [19561  and  Swan 
[19561  provided  the  necessary  antidote  to  the  excessive  claims  made  for  capital 
accumulation.  What  the  early  Harrod-Domar  and  neo-classical  formulations  of  growth 
theory  possessed  in  common  was  the  belief  that  the  third  ingredient  in  growth,  namely 
technical  progress,  was  an  exogenously  determined,  fortuitous  and  costless  occurrence- 
descending  like  manna  from  the  heavens.  The  findings  of  Robert  Solow  [19571  showed 
that  increases  in  the  stock  of  labour  and  capital  could  explain  only  a  relatively  small 
fraction  of  observed  economic  growth.  '  This  finding  led  to  further  research  into  factors 
determining  the  unexplained  sources  of  growth  and  resulted  in  basing  on  technological 
progress  as  the  new  pillar  that  spurs  economic  growth.  Solow  devised  a  framework  for 
distinguishing  the  contributions  of  labour,  capital  and  technical  change  to  economic 
growth.  The  Solow  growth  formula  focused  attention  firmly  upon  the  role  of  technical 
progress.  Advocates  of  technical  progress  pointed  to  the  possible  role  of  education  and 
training  where  government  policy  might  be  expected  to  exert  a  major  impact. 
45 1.4.  ii.  Mathematical  Exposition 
We  shall  begin  with  a  simple  mathematical  exposition  of  Solow's  model  .2  If  Q  represents 
output  and  K  and  L  represent  capital  and  labour  inputs  in  'physical'  units,  then  the 
aggregate  production  function  can  be  written  as: 
F(KL;  t)  (1) 
The  variable  t  for  time  appears  in  F  to  allow  for  technical  change.  Solow  uses  'technical 
change'  as  an  expression  for  any  kind  of  shýft  in  the  production  function.  'Mus 
slowdowns,  speed-ups,  improvements  in  the  education  of  the  labour  force,  and  all  sorts  of 
things  will  appear  as  technical  change  It  is  convenient  to  begin  with  the  special  case  of 
neutral  technical  change.  Shifts  in  the  production  function  are  defined  as  neutral  if  they 
leave  marginal  rates  of  substitution  untouched  but  simply  increase  or  decrease  the  output 
attainable  from  given  inputs.  In  that  case  the  production  function  takeý  the  special  form: 
A(t)f  (K,  L)  (1  a) 
and  the  multiplicative  factor  AW  measures  th6  cumulated  effect  of  shifts  over  time. 
Differentiate  (1a)  totally  with  respect  to  time  and  divide  by  Q  and  one  obtains:  Q*/Q  = 
A*/A  +A  (afK*/aKQ)  +A  (aff  */aLQ)  where  dots  indicate  time  derivatives.  Now  define  wk  = 
(aQ/aK)(IC/Q)  and  wL.  =  (aQ/aL)(L/Q),  the  relative  shares  of  capital  and  labour,  and 
substitute  in  the  above  equation  (note  that  (aQ/aK)=  A(aflaK),  etc.  )  and  there  results: 
QO/Q  =  AO/A  +  wk  (KO/K)+  wL  (LO/L)  (2) 
If  all  factor  inputs  are  classified  either  as  K  or  L,  then  the  available  figures  always  show 
wk  and  wL  adding  up  to  one.  Assume  that  F  is  homogenous  of  degree  one.  This  has  the 
advantage  of  making  everything  come  out  neatly  in  terms  of  intensive  magnitudes. 
Ut  WL  =  q,  K/L  =  k,  wL  =  1-  wk; 
note  that  (q*/q)  =  (Q*/Q)  -  (UAL)  etc.,  and  (2)  becomes: 
(q*/q)  =  (A*/A)  +  wK  (K/K*)  (2a) 
We  need  to  disentangle  the  technical  change  index  A(t)  as  series  for  output  per  man  hour, 
capital  per  man  hour  and  the  share  of  capital.  It  can  be  shown,  by  integrating  a  partial 
46 differential  equation,  that  if  (F*/F)  is  independent  of  K  and  L  (actually  under  constant 
returns  to  scale  only  (K/L)  matters),  then  (1)  has  the  special  form  (1a)  and  shifts  in  the 
production  function  are  neutral.  If  in  addition  (F/F)  is  constant  in  time,  say  equal  to  a, 
then  A(t)  =  e"  or  in  discrete  approximation  A(t)  =  (1+a)' 
The  case  of  neutral  shifts  and  constant  returns  to  scale  can  be  graphically  presented.  3 
rMe  production  function  is  completely  represented  by  a  graph  of  q  against  k.  In  the  figure 
below,  we  note  that  every  ordinate  on  the  curve  for  t=1  has  been  multiplied  by  the  same 
factor  to  give  a  neutral  upward  shift  of  the  production  function  for  period  2.  rMe  problem 
is  to  estimate  this  shift  from  knowledge  of  points  P,  and  P2  Obviously  it  would  be 
misleading  to  fit  a  curve  through  raw  observed  points  like  P,  and  P2  and  others.  But  if  the 
shift  factor  for  each  point  of  time  can  be  estimated.,  the  observed  points  can  be  corrected 
for  technical  change,  and  a  production  function  can  then  be  found. 
Figure:  1.4.1:  The  Production  Function 
11 
47 48 The  natural  thing  to  do,  for  small  changes,  is  to  approximate  the  period  2  curve  by  its 
tangent  at  P2  (or  the  period  I  curve  by  its  tangent  at  PA.  This  yields  an  approximately 
corrected  point  P12  and  an  estimate  for  AA/A  namely  Pj2PIql.  But  kIP12  =  q2-(aqlak)Ak 
and  hence 
P12P,  =  q2.  -  ql-(aqlak)Ak  =  Aq-(aqlak)Ak,  and 
AA/A  -= 
P12PI1qj.  =  Aqlq  -  (aqlok)  (klq)Aklk  =  Aqlq-wkAklk 
4 
which  is  exactly  the  content  of  (2a) 
. 
If  output  growth  is  constrained  to  be  at  the  same  rate  as  labour  force  growth,  can  per 
capita  output  ever  be  increased  in  the  long  run?  The  way  out  of  this  dilemma  is  to  change 
the  production  function.  As  long  as  the  functional  relationship  between  inputs  and  output 
remains  unchanged,  then  the  economy  is  in  a  steady  state  with  zero  growth  in  per  capita 
income,  but  if  the  relationship  changes  so  that  more  output  results  from  the  same  quantity 
of  inputs,  then  the  growth  rate  of  output  will  exceed  n,  the  labour  force.  Defining  technical 
change  as  such  a  shift  in  the  production  function,  then  the  rate  of  growth  of  per  capita 
output  will  be  determined  by  the  pace  of  technical  change.  In  this  formulation,  technical 
change  is  totally  responsible  for  long  run  growth  in  per  capita  output.  Capital  formation 
plays  no  role.  5  Salter  [19601  modified  this  extreme  conclusion  by  allowing  that  technical 
change  may  need  to  be  embodied  in  new  machines;  the  gross  investment  rate  determines 
the  speed  with  which  the  capital  stock  is  modernized,  and  capital  formation  can  thus  be 
associated  with  a  shift  in  the  production  function  as  well  as  a  movement  along  it.  The 
embodiment  hypothesis  reinstates  capital  formation  as  a  source  of  long-run  growth,  but  in 
a  less  dominant  manner. 
I.  4.  iii.  Exogenous  Technical  Pr2gress 
Leaving  aside  the  case  of  overlapping  generations,  recall  the  role  that  technical  progress 
can  play  in  the  neo-classical  theory.  With  labour  augmenting  technical  progress  the 
production  function  takes  the  form: 
49 y=  F(K<AL),  where  A  represents  the  state  of  technology.  Technical  progress  raises  A  and 
thereby  the  marginal  product  of  capital.  Higher  marginal  productivity  of  capital  leads  to  a 
higher  real  interest  rate.  In  steady  state  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  equals  the  rate  of 
technical  progress  and  the  real  interest  rate  remains  constant.  This  describes  the  case  of 
exogenous  technical  progress  that  leads  to  exogenous  long-run  growth.  6 
The  economic  growth  model  associated  with  Solow,  Swan  and  Denison  [19611  has  its 
basic  features,  a  closed  economy  with  competitive  markets,  identical  rational  individuals, 
and  a  production  technology  exhibiting  diminishing  returns  to  capital  and  labour  separately 
and  constant  returns  to  both  inputs  jointly.  Population  and  labour  growth  are  exogenous 
to  the  model,  as  is  disembodied  technological  change,  and  no  distinct  productive  role  is 
assigned  to  human  capital  or  to  government  policy.  Under  these  assumptions,  the  model 
give  rise  to  a  "balanced"  growth  path  in  which  capital  per  capita  is  accumulated  at  the 
same  rate  as  output  or  consumption  per  capita,  and  in  which  the  savings  rate  and  the  real 
rate  of  interest  are  constant  along  the  equilibrium  path.  In  this  regime,  the  rate  of  growth 
of  per  capita  income  and  consumption  is  strictly  proportional  to  the  rate  of  technological 
change.  Put  differently,  technology,  although  exogenously  given,  is  the  only  force  that 
accounts  for  growth  in  per  capita  income.  The  determinants  of  the  propensity  to  save  have 
no  bearing  on  the  equilibrium  growth  rate,  although  they  do  affect  the  per  capita  level  of 
income  and  ConSUMption.  7  The  same  holds,  implicitly,  for  government  policies  that  affect 
the  propensity  to  save.  Indeed,  as  Lucas  (1988)  points  out,  by  assigning  a  predominant 
role  to  an  exqgenousýy  determined  technology  as  an  engine  of  growth,  the  theory  assigns  a 
comparatively  little  role  to  any  other  factor.  Accordingly,  one  is  well  justified  to  expect 
that  growth  rates  across  different  countries  would  tend  to  converge  on  a  common  steady- 
state  value  and  that  the  actually  observed  rates  would  differ  mainly  by  virtue  of  transitory 
differences  in  capital  accumulation  relative  to  its  balanced  growth  path  ("transitional 
dynamics  9.,  ).  8  Furthermore,  because  of  the  treatment  of  population  growth  as  exogenous  to 
the  economy,  the  neo-classical  model  cannot  address  the  interaction  between  economic 
and  population  growth  in  the  process  of  development,  although  the  stylized  facts  of  the 
demographic  transition  that  characterizes  that  process  indicate  a  systematic  association 
between  declining  mortality  and  fertility  rates  and  per  capita  income  growth  during  an 
50 economy's  takeoff  from  a  state  of  stagnant,  low-level  income  to  a  regime  of  persistent 
growth. 
Again,  the  most  well  known  basic  neo-classical  model  of  adjustment  in  response  to  the 
Harrod  problem  of  the  divergence  between  'natural'  and  'warranted'  growth  is  that  of 
Solow  and  Swan  (1956).  The  burden  of  adjustment  falls  here  on  the  capital-output  ratio, 
and  as  such  this  is  the  polar  opposite  of  the  Kaldor  model,  where  the  burden  falls  entirely 
on  the  savings  side  of  the  picture.  If  the  warranted  growth  rate  given  by  s1C  exceeds  the 
natural  rate  given  by  n+m,  the  economy  tries  to  break  through  the  fun  employment 
barrier,  thereby  making  the  labour  more  expensive  vis  a  vis  capital,  inducing  shifts  to 
labour-saving  techniques.  This  raises  the  capital-output  ratio  and  pulls  down  the  value  of 
s1C,  until  it  coincides  with  n+m  This  is,  of  course,  the  same  as  Joan  Robinson's  'creeping 
platinum  age',  'O  but  instead  of  being  just  one  possibility,  as  in  Robinson  model,  this  is  the 
onýy  possibility  in  the  neo-classical  model.  This  result  follows  from  the  assumption  of 
substitutability,  coupled  with  perfect  foresight  and  the  absence  of  constraints  on  the  real 
wage  rate  and  the  interest  rate. 
The  major  contribution  of  the  Solow-Swan  growth  model  is  to  establish  the  stability  of 
neo-classical  growth  equilibrium  in  terms  of  an  extremely  simple  adjustment  mechanism. 
The  inevitability  of  equilibrium  growth  is  demonstrated  in  this  model  with  the  aid  of  an 
adjustment  process  that  has  been  used  before  for  neo-classical  analysis  of  non-growth 
problems. 
I-4.  iv.  Endogenous  Technical  Progress 
One  of  the  first  attempts  to  render  technical  progress  endogenous  in  growth  models  was 
the  seminal  paper  by  Kenneth  Arrow  (1962)  incorporating  the  concept  of  learning  by 
doing  and  was  generalised  and  extended  by  Levhari  (1966)  and  Sheshinski  (1967).  In  this 
framework,  the  level  of  knowledge  is  itself  a  productive  factor  which  depends  upon  past 
levels  of  investment.  Each  firm  within  the  economy  is  assumed  to  operate  with  constant 
returns  to  scale.  A  doubling  of  labour  and  capital  inputs  with  a  given  state  of  knowledge 
(assumed  constant  by  the  firm)  will  double  output.  However,  the  very  act  of  increasing  the 
51 capital  stock  through  investment  by  the  firm  raises  the  level  of  knowledge  elsewhere.  The 
economy  as  a  whole,  therefore,  is  operating  subject  to  increasing  returns.  The  concept  of 
knowledge  being  a  factor  in  the  production  function  renders  increasing  returns  inevitable. 
This  follows  because  a  doubling  of  all  tangible  factor  inputs  and  productive  processes 
should  double  output  in  an  environment  with  a  constant  level  of  knowledge.  When 
knowledge  is  permitted  to  vary  as  well  in  consequence  of  enlarging  the  capital  input, 
increasing  returns  follows  automatically.  Although  the  Arrow-Levhari-Sheshinski  models 
rendered  technical  progress  endogenous  and  explained  economic  growth  in  the  context  of 
aggregate  increasing  returns  being  consistent  with  competitive  equilibrium,  the  steady 
state  solution  remains,  growth  of  the  economy  being  equated  with  the  autonomously 
determined  rate  of  growth  of  the  labour  force.  In  other  words,  within  these  models 
endogenous  technological  change  is  reflected  in  a  level  effect  (via  an  upward  raising  of  the 
production  function)  as  opposed  to  a  growth  effect-to  adopt  the  terminology  of  Lucas 
[19881.  "  King  and  Robson  [19891  invoke  a  technical  progress  function  which  emphasises 
'learning  by  watching'.  The  significance  of  their  analysis  lies  in  its  conclusion  that  multiple 
steady  state  growth  path  exists,  even  for  economics  which  have  similar  initial 
endowments,  and  that  tax  policy  can  influence  the  ultimate  growth  path  attained  by  the 
economy.  Tax  policy  can  accordingly  have  real  and  permanent  effects  upon  the  level  and 
growth  rate  of  income. 
Following  Arrow's  analysis  of  learning-by-doing,  however,  some  growth  theorists  have 
linked  the  state  of  technology  to  cumulative  investment  experience.  With  this  view  the 
state  of  technology  parameter  A  becomes  a  function  of  the  economy's  capital  stock  AW 
12  (Sheshinski  [19671).  The  effect  of  capital  on  productivity  is  assumed  to  be  external  to  an 
individual  investor.  For  this  reason  the  real  interest  rate  equals  the  private  marginal 
product  of  capital  FKP[KA(K)LI  It  follows  that  with  this  form  of  endogenous  technical 
progress  an  economy  can  sustain  long-run  growth  as  long  as  the  state  of  technology  is 
sufficiently  responsive  to  capital  accumulation.  Now  that  we  have  identified  the 
mechanisms  of  long-run  growth  in  the  neo-classical  theory,  we  may  turn  to  the  more 
recent  innovation-based  theories  of  economic  growth. 
52 1.4.  v.  Innovation-based  Models  of  Growth 
Innovation-based  theories  of  economic  growth  can  be  seen  as  an  off-shoot  of 
technological  progress.  'Mese  models  of  Grossman  and  Helpman  [1991b]  show  that  the 
rate  of  investment  increases  with  the  rate  of  output  growth  while  the  latter  increases  with 
the  rate  of  innovation.  Combined  with  the  results  concerning  the  determinants  of  the  rate 
of  innovation,  these  relationships  imply,  for  example,  that  countries  with  low  rates  of  time 
preference  innovate  faster,  experience  faster  output  growth,  and  have  a  higher  rate  of 
investment.  Importantly,  however,  investment  is  not  a  primary  source  of  growth  in  these 
economies.  13  Rather,  the  primary  sources  of  growth  are  a  variety  of  factors  (such  as  the 
rate  of  time  preference  and  the  degree  of  monopoly  power)  that  affect  the  incentive  for 
industrial  research,  while  the  rate  of  investment  adjusts  so  as  to  keep  the  rate  of  expansion 
of  conventional  capital  in  line  with  the  growth  rate  of  output.  In  terms  of  causality,  the 
investment  rate  and  the  rate  of  growth  are  simultaneously  determined  by  technological 
progress  that  affects  them  in  essentially  the  same  direction,  while  the  pace  of  technological 
progress  is  endogenously  determined  by  more  primitive  factors.  We  have  seen  that  in  the 
neo-classical  model  technical  progress  raises  the  marginal  product  of  capital,  thereby 
raising  the  profitability  of  investment  in  plant  and  equipment.  In  the  event  capital 
deepening,  that  ceterisparihus  depresses  the  marginal  product  of  capital,  can  nevertheless 
continue  indefinitely.  The  same  applies  here,  except  that  now  "technical  progress  is  driven 
by  profit  seeking  entrepreneurs.  ý  14  In  other  words,  the  invention  of  new  brands  generates 
the  incentive  to  install  more  plant  and  equipment. 
Ihe  new  wave  of  research  on  economic  growth  was  stimulated  by  Romer  [19861  and 
Lucas  [19881.  Their  work  relies  on  Arrow's  [1962a]  mechanism  of  learning  -by-doing.  In 
an  important  paper,  Arrow  [1962]  formalizes  the  problem  of  learning  in  a  somewhat 
different  manner,  making  learning  a  function  of  the  sum  of  past  gross  investments.  Under 
these  assumptions  Arrow  shows  the  possibility  of  steady  growth  at  a  rate  that  is  a  multiple 
of  the  rate  of  growth  of  population,  the  size  of  the  multiplier  depending  on  the  precise 
form  of  the  learning  parameter.  But  following  Uzawa  [19651,  Romer  and  Lucas  have 
53 redirected  its  application  to  the  accumulation  of  knowledge  and  human  capital  rather  than 
the  accumulation  of  plant  and  equipment.  They  have  changed  the  focus  towards 
explanations  of  sustained  long-run  growth  and  cross  country  variations  in  growth  rates. 
Following  Arrow  they  have  taken  the  view  that  aggregate  production  exhibits  increasing 
returns  to  scale.  But  the  returns  to  scale  are  external  to  single  economic  agents  and 
internal  to  a  sector  or  larger  parts  of  the  economy.  Consequently  competition  can  prevail. 
The  integration  of  imperfect  competition  with  innovation-based  growth  was  first  achieved 
by  Judd  [19851.  '5  His  main  interest  was  in  issues  of  industrial  organization  . 
Romer 
[1990a]  combined  Judd's  approach  with  learning-by-doing  in  innovation  and  thereby 
developed  a  model  that  sustains  long-run  growth  at  an  endogenous  rate.  16  This  was  an 
important  achievement,  because  it  opened  the  door  to  a  new  research  line  with  attractive 
realistic  features. 
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THE  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN  EMPHASIS  ON  HUMAN 
CAPITAL 
GROWTH  FORMULA  THREE.  G3=f(PK3HL3,  TP3,  HC3) 
1.5.  i.  Human  Capital  as  Productivity  Augmenting  Factor 
All  the  endogenous  growth  models  share  with  the  neo-classical  model  the  view  that 
physical  capital  accumulation,  by  itself,  is  insufficient  to  produce  growth  since  all 
production,  including  investment  in  physical  capital,  is  subject  to  diminishing  returns  in  the 
capital  input  alone.  Consequently,  the  catalyst  of  growth  is  traced  to  other  productivity- 
augmenting  factors.  The  endogenous  growth  models  identify  that  catalyst  as  knowledge  in 
either  its  embodied  form  (human  capital)  or  its  disembodied  manifestations  (technological 
innovations).  Even  when  innovations  are  identified  as  the  engine  of  growth,  as  we  have 
seen  in  the  previous  chapter,  innovative  activity  is  assumed  to  be  influenced  directly  by  the 
economy's  endowment  of  human  capital.  The  shift  of  emphasis  from  exogenous  technical 
innovation  to  human  capital  accumulation  as  the  key  source  of  growth  and  development 
[cf.  Schultz  19611  is  one  of  the  major  themes  of  the  new  economic  development 
literature.  1 
The  models  of  endogenous  growth  generally  rely  on  either  a  privately  controlled  engine 
of  growth  or  a  combination  of  such  factors  and  some  external  economies  in  production. 
For  Becker  et  al.,  King  and  Rebelo,  and,  implicitly,  Rosenzweig  as  well,  the  engine  of 
growth  is  human  capital.  Its  distinct  role  is  justified  generally  by  the  assumption  that 
knowledge  is  valuable  not  just  in  the  production  of  goods,  but  even  more  so  in  the 
production  of  new  knowledge  [cf.  Lucas  19881.  Becker  et  al.  specify  the  latter  as  a  linear 
function  of  the  human  capital  accumulated  by  previous  generations,  which  augments  the 
productivity  of  parental  time  inputs  devoted  to  children's  education.  King  and  Rebelo 
56 postulate  a  similar  mechanism  for  the  production  of  human  capital,  except  that  both 
human  and  physical  capital  participate  in  its  production. 
The  shift  of  emphasis  from  accumulation  of  physical  capital  to  investment  in  human 
capital  has  brought  in  a  new  revolutionary  understanding  of  the  engine  of  economic 
growth.  Although  it  is  obvious  that  people  acquire  useful  skills  and  knowledge,  it  is  not 
obvious  that  these  skills  and  knowledge  are  a  form  of  capital.  Recent  research  has  shown 
that  increase  in  human  capital  is  in  substantial  part  a  product  of  deliberate  investment.  It 
has  grown  in  industrialized  societies  at  a  much  faster  rate  than  conventional  (nonhuman) 
capital  and  this  has  become  a  distinctive  feature  and  a  ma  or  explanation  of  the  fact  of 
faster  economic  development.  Investment  in  human  capital  can  be  understood  as  direct 
expenditures  on  education,  health,  and  internal  migration  to  take  advantage  of  better  job 
opportunities;  earnings  foregone  by  mature  students  attending  school  and  by  workers 
acquiring  on-the-job  training;  the  use  of  leisure  time  to  improve  skills  and  knowledge.  2  In 
this  sense,  much  of  what  we  call  consumption  constitutes  investment  in  human  capital.  By 
this,  the  quality  of  human  effort  can  be  greatly  improved  and  its  productivity  enhanced. 
I.  5.  ii.  Human  Beings  as  Capital  Goods? 
According  to  J.  S.  Mill,  the  people  of  a  country  should  not  be  looked  upon  as  wealth 
because  wealth  existed  only  for  the  sake  of  people.  3  The  notion  of  treating  a  human  person 
as  a  commercial  good  or  a  marketable  asset  is  something  that  we  abhor  due  to  our  own 
moral  and  philosophical  understanding  of  a  free  being.  Therefore,  the  mere  thought  of 
investment  in  human  beings  is  offensive  to  some  and  in  this  sense  economists  too  have 
shied  away  from  analysing  this  form  of  investment.  Hence,  economists  did  not  stress  the 
simple  truth  that  people  invest  in  themselves  and  that  these  investments  are  very  large 
though  they  knew  all  along  that  people  are  an  important  part  of  the  wealth  of  nations. 
Measured  by  what  labour  contributes  to  output,  the  productive  capacity  of  human  beings 
is  now  vastly  larger  than  all  other  forms  of  wealth  taken  together.  By  investing  in 
themselves,  people  can  enlarge  the  range  of  choice  available  to  them.  It  is  one  way  free 
economic  agent  can  enhance  their  welfare. 
57 The  philosopher-economist  Adam  Smith  boldly  included  all  of  the  acquired  and  useful 
abilities  of  all  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  country  as  a  part  of  capital.  So  did  H.  von  Thunen, 
who  then  went  on  to  argue  that  the  concept  of  capital  applied  to  man  did  not  degrade  him 
or  impair  his  freedom  and  dignity,  but  on  the  contrary  that  the  failure  to  apply  the  concept 
was  especially  pernicious  in  wars.  4  Irving  Fisher  also  clearly  and  cogently  presented  an  all- 
inclusive  concept  of  capital.  5  Yet  the  main  stream  of  thought  has  held  that  it  is  neither 
appropriate  nor  practical  to  apply  the  concept  of  capital  to  human  beings.  MarshaI16  held 
that  while  human  beings  are  incontestably  capital  from  an  abstract  and  mathematical  point 
of  view,  it  would  be  out  of  touch  with  the  market  place  to  treat  them  as  capital  in  practical 
analyses.  "The  failure  to  treat  human  resources  explicitly  as  a  form  of  capital,  as  a 
produced  means  of  production,  as  the  product  of  investment,  has  fostered  the  retention  of 
the  classical  notion  of  labour  as  a  capacity  to  do  manual  work  requiring  little  knowledge 
and  skiff,  a  capacity  with  which,  according  to  this  notion,  labourers  are  endowed  about 
equally.  0  This  classical  notion  of  labour  is  proved  wrong.  Labourers  have  become 
capitalists  not  from  a  diffusion  of  the  ownership  of  corporation  stocks,  but  from  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge  and  skill  that  have  economic  value.  8  This  knowledge  and  skill  are 
in  great  part  the  product  of  investment  and,  combined  with  other  human  investment, 
predominantly  account  for  the  productive  superiority  of  the  technically  advanced 
countries.  The  observed  growth  in  productivity  per  unit  of  labour  is  simply  a  consequence 
of  holding  the  unit  of  labour  constant  over  time  although  in  fact  this  unit  of  labour  has 
been  increasing  as  a  result  of  a  steadily  growing  amount  of  human  capital  per  worker. 
The  rapid  post-war  recovery  of  countries  that  had  suffered  severe  destruction  of  plant 
and  equipment  during  the  war.,  demands  that  we  take  account  of  all  capital  and  in 
particular  human  capital  and  the  important  part  that  it  plays  in  production  in  a  modem 
economy.  The  expressed  judgements  in  making  capital  available  to  developing  economies 
and  their  ability  to  absorb  the  additional  capital  "slowly  and  gradually"  are  to  be  re- 
evaluated.  9  The  widely  held  impression  that  countries  are  poor  fundamentally  because  they 
are  starved  for  capital  and  that  additional  capital  is  truly  the  key  to  their  more  rapid 
economic  growth  is  at  variance  with  experience  and  the  reconciliation  is  to  be  found  in 
emphasis  on  particular  forms  of  capital.  The  new  capital  available  to  these  countries  from 
58 outside  as  a  rule  goes  into  the  formation  of  structures,  equipment  and  sometimes  also  into 
inventories.  But  it  is  generally  not  available  for  additional  investment  in  people. 
Consequently,  human  capabilities  do  not  stay  abreast  of  physical  capital,  and  they  do 
become  limiting  factors  in  economic  growth.  It  should  come  as  no  surprise,  therefore,  that 
the  absorption  rate  of  capital  to  augment  only  particular  nonhuman  resources  is  necessarily 
low.  The  Horvat'O  formulation  of  the  optimum  rate  of  investment  which  treats  knowledge 
and  skill  as  a  critical  investment  variable  in  determining  the  rate  of  economic  growth  is 
both  relevant  and  important. 
1.5.  iii.  Scope  and  Substance  of  These  Investments 
Human  resources  obviously  have  both  quantitative  and  qualitative  dimensions.  The 
number  of  people,  the  proportion  who  enter  upon  useful  work,  and  hours  worked  are 
essentially  quantitative  characteristics  while  skill,  knowledge,  and  similar  attributes  that 
affect  particular  human  capabilities  to  do  productive  work  are  considered  as  quality 
components.  How  can  we  estimate  the  magnitude  of  human  investment?  While  any 
capability  produced  by  human  investment  becomes  a  part  of  the  human  agent  and  hence 
cannot  be  sold;  it  is  nevertheless  "in  touch  with  the  market  place""  by  affecting  the  wages 
and  salaries  the  human  agent  can  earn.  The  resulting  increase  in  earnings  is  the  yield  on  the 
investment.  In  principle,  the  value  of  the  investment  can,  be  determined  by  discounting  the 
additional  future  earnings  it  yields  just  as  the  value  of  a  physical  capital  good  can  be 
determined  by  discounting  its  income  stream.  According  to  Schultz,  there  are  five  major 
categories  that  improve  human  capabilities:  (1)  health  facilities  and  services,  broadly 
conceived  to  include  all  expenditures  that  affect  the  life  expectancy,  strength  and  stamina, 
and  the  vigour  and  vitality  of  a  people;  (2)  on-the-job  training,  including  old-style 
apprenticeship  organized  by  firms;  (3)  formally  organized  education  at  the  elementary, 
secondary,  and  higher  levels;  (4)  study  programmes  for  adults  that  are  not  organized  by 
firms,  including  extension  programmes  notably  in  agriculture;  (5)  migration  of  individuals 
and  families  to  adjust  to  changing  job  opportunities.  12  Both  the  magnitude  and  the  rate  of 
59 increase  of  this  form  of  human  capital  could  be  an  important  key  to  the  riddle  of  economic 
growth. 
King  and  Rebelo  13  developed  a  model  with  particular  emphasis  on  human  capital.  Their 
model  belongs  to  an  important  class  of  endogenous  growth  models  based  on  work  by 
Uzawa  [19651  and  retains  the  following  key  properties  on  the  basic  neo-classical  model  of 
Solow  [19561,  Swan  [19641,  Cass  [19651,  and  Koopmans  [19651:  (1)  the  existence  of  a 
constant  asymptotic  growth  rate  and  (ii)  the  coincidence  of  competitive  and  optimal 
allocations  in  the  absence  of  public  interventions.  The  crucial  attribute  of  this  class  of 
models  is  that  there  is  a  "core"  of  capital  goods  that  can  be  produced  without  the  direct  or 
indirect  contribution  of  nonreproducible  factors.  (This  class  of  models  is  very  large, 
including  structures  with  many  capital  stocks  in  the  growth  "core"  and  with 
nonreproducible  factors  outside  the  growth  "core"  [Rebelo  19871,  or  with  steady  states 
that  are  only  asymptotically  obtained  (Jones  and  Manuelli  1990). 
1.5.  iv.  Economic  Growth  through  Human  Capital  Accumulation 
We  are  interested  in  models  of  endogenous  growth  that  accord  with  the  major  facts  of 
economic  development.  We  require  that  the  production  of  both  physical  and  human  capital 
goods  be  governed  by  constant-retums-to-scale  technologies  so  that  there  are  feasible 
steady-state  growth  paths.  The  model  economy  [cf.  Uzawa  (1965),  Rebelo  (1987),  and 
Lucas  (1988)]  highlights  the  societal  allocation  of  resources  between  current  consumption 
and  comprehensive  accumulation  (physical  and  human  capital)  under  constant  returns  to 
scale.  (An  important  assumption  in  our  approach  is  that  the  changes  in  productivity 
summarized  by  the  evolution  of  the  composite  human  capital  good  are  embodied  in  the 
rePresentative  worker.  ) 
The  Core  Elements:  To  study  the  accumulation  of  physical  and  human  capital,  King  and 
Rebelo  use  a  two-sector  endogenous  growth  model.  As  in  the  neo-classical  model,  there  is 
a  single  consumption/physical  investment  good.  This  good  is  produced  in  sector  I 
60 according  to  a  constant  returns-to-scale  production  technology  with  physical  and  human 
capital  as  its  inputs.  Hence,  one  technical  constraint  for  the  economy  is  : 
Ct  +  It.  =  Yit.  =  Fi(KnARd;  Ct  and  It  denote  consumption  and  physical  investment. 
Output  of  this  commodity  is  Ylt,  and  physical  capital  and  labour  (human  capital)  inputs  into 
this  sector  are  denoted,  respectively,  by  Kjt'  and  NjtHt  The  human  capital  investment 
good,  which  we  call  IHt,  is  produced  in  the  second  sector  with  another  production 
technology  that  is  constant  returns  to  scale  in  the  two  inputs,  that  is,  IHt.  =  Y2t- 
F2(K2t,  N2tHd. 
The  physical  capital  goods  are  taken  to  obey  standard  neo-classical  accumulation 
,  t,,.  -  Kj 
,  t.  =  Ijt  -  avKjt,  equations,  that  is,  Kj 
where  aq  is  the  depreciation  rate  in  sectorj  Aggregate  physical  capital  investment  is  then 
the  sum  of  the  sectoral  investments,  that  is,  I,  =  Ilt+I2t 
Our  specification  of  the  evolution  of  human  capital  embodies  diminishing  point-in-time 
capacity  to  grow,  as  in  Rosen  [19761: 
Ht+i  -  Ht.  =0  (IHt1HdHt--8HHt,  with  DO  >0  and 
D28  <  0. 
(By  Dg(,,  ),  we  mean  the  derivative  of  the  function  g  with  respect  to  x,  correspondingly, 
D2g(x)  denotes  the  second  derivative.  ) 
This  specification  of  "adjustment  costs"  permits  steady-state  growth  if  IHt  and  Ht  grow  at 
the  same  rate.  Further,  combined  with  IHt  =  Y2t  =  F2(K2tN2,  Hd,  our  set-up  is  consistent 
with  the  view  that  growth  in  human  capital  combines  labour  and  other  inputs  according  to 
a  production  function  as  in  Heckman  [19761.  We  assume  that  both  physical  and  human 
capital  investment  are  irreversible.  Finally,  the  sectoral  allocations  of  labour  must  sum  to 
the  available  stock,  N.  -  Nlt+N2t  !ýN.  Since  human  capital  is  embodied  in  workers'  time,  this 
allocation  also  determines  the  sectoral  allocation  of  human  capital. 
With  this  specification  of  intertemporal  technology,  our  model  has  a  range  of  feasible 
balanced  growth  equilibria  in  which  consumption,  physical  investment,  sectoral.  outputs, 
61 and  capital  stocks  all  grow  at  the  same  rate;  this  rate,  which  we  denote  by  yHis  the  human 
capital  growth  rate.  14 
[Model  Component: 
Sector  1:  consumption/physical  investment:  F,  =  AIKI 
0  -a  I)  (N1H)  aI 
Sector  2:  human  capital  investment:  F2=  A2K2(1  '2)  (N2H)a2 
Evolution  of  physical  capital  stocks:  Kjt,  l  -  Kj  t=  IjtkKjt 
Evolution  of  human  capital  stocks:  Ht,  j  -  H,  =0  (jH,  1Ht;  0)  H,  -  8HHt 
Prderences  :U=  Z'  =o  ß  'u  (c,  -  er) 
AL  %l 
Initial  rates:  After-tax  real  interest  rate  R(t);  real  growth  rate  yH;  and  sectoral  tax  rates 
(r])  J 
I.  5.  v.  Cross-Counta  Eaerience 
The  role  of  human  capital  in  the  process  of  economic  growth  has  been  emphatically 
proved  by  cross-country  studies.  Robert  J.  Barrow  (1989,1990,1991),  while  researching 
on  human  capital  and  economic  growth,  analysed  98  countries  in  the  period  1960-1985,  in 
order  to  show  that  the  growth  rate  of  real  per  capita  GDP  is  positively  related  to  initial 
human  capital  (proxied  by  1960  school-enrolment  rates)  and  negatively  related  to  the 
initial  (1960)  level  of  real  per  capita  GDP.  The  study  reveals  the  following.  Countries  with 
higher  human  capital  also  have  lower  fertility  rates  and  higher  ratios  of  physical  investment 
to  GDP.  Growth  is  inversely  related  to  the  share  of  government  consumption  in  GDP,  but 
insignificantly  related  to  the  share  of  public  investment.  Growth  rates  are  positively  related 
to  measures  of  political  stability  and  inversely  related  to  a  proxy  for  market  distortions. 
These  findings  are  presented  in  his  article  titled  "Economic  growth  in  a  Cross  Section  of 
Countries.  ,  15  There  is  a  force  that  promotes  convergence  in  levels  of  per  capita  income 
across  countries.  Barro  and  Sala  i  Martin  (1990)  show  that  the  tendency  for  poor 
countries  to  grow  faster  than  rich  countries,  termed  P-convergence,  need  not  imply  a 
reduction  in  the  dispersion  of  income  levels,  termed  a-convergence,  if  each  country's  level 
62 of  income  is  continually  subj  ect  to  random  disturbances.  The  main  element  behind  the 
convergence  result  in  neo-classical  growth  models  is  diminishing  returns  to  reproducible 
capital.  Poor  countries,  with  low  ratios  of  capital  to  labour,  have  high  marginal  products 
of  capital  and  thereby  tend  to  grow  at  high  rates  is  reinforced  in  extensions  of  the  neo- 
classical  models  that  allow  for  international  mobility  of  capital  and  technology.  The 
hypothesis  that  poor  countries  tend  to  grow  faster  than  rich  countries  seems  to  be 
inconsistent  with  the  cross-country  evidence,  which  indicates  that  per  capita  growth  rates 
have  little  correlation  with  the  starting  level  of  per  capita  product.  Human  capital  plays  a 
special  role  in  a  number  of  models  of  endogenous  economic  growth.  Barro  also  shows 
that  human  capital  is  the  key  input  to  the  research  sector,  which  generates  the  new 
products  or  ideas  that  underlie  technological  progress.  Thus,  countries  with  greater  initial 
stocks  of  human  capital  experience  a  more  rapid  rate  of  introduction  of  new  goods  and 
thereby  tend  to  grow  faster.  In  multicountry  models  of  technological  change,  the  spread  of 
new  ideas  across  countries  (or  firms  or  industries)  is  also  important.  A  larger  stock  of 
human  capital  makes  it  easier  for  a  country  to  absorb  the  new  products  or  ideas  that  have 
been  discovered  elsewhere.  Therefore,  a  follower  country  with  more  human  capital  tends 
to  grow  faster  because  it  catches  up  more  rapidly  to  the  technological  leader.  In  this 
setting,  increases  in  the  quantity  of  human  capital  per  person  tend  to  lead  to  higher  rates  of 
investment  in  human  and  physical  capital,  and  hence,  to  higher  per  capita  growth.  Using 
recent  theories  of  economic  growth  as  a  guide,  Barro's  study  brings  out  some  empirical 
regularities  about  growth  and  investment. 
1.5.  vi.  Note  on  Poli 
Human  capital  deteriorates  when  it  is  idle  because  unemployment  impairs  the  skills  that 
workers  have  acquired.  Losses  in  earnings  can  be  cushioned  by  appropriate  payments  but 
these  do  not  keep  idleness  from  taking  its  toll  from  human  capital.  There  are  many 
hindrances  from  the  free  choice  of  professions.  Tax  laws  everywhere  discriminate  against 
human  capital.  Human  capital  depreciates.  Racial  and  religious  discrimination  are 
widespread.  It  is  indeed  elementary  to  stress  the  greater  imperfections  of  the  capital 
63 market  in  providing  funds  for  investment  in  human  beings  than  for  investment  in  physical 
goods.  Long-term  private  and  public  loans  to  students  are  warranted.  Internal  migration, 
notably  the  movement  of  farm  people  into  industry,  made  necessary  by  the  dynamics  of 
our  economic  progress,  requires  substantial  investments.  The  low  earnings  of  particular 
people  have  long  been  a  matter  of  public  concern. 
is  there  a  substantial  underinvestment  in  human  beings  other  than  in  these  depressed 
groUPS?  16  This  is  an  important  question  for  economists.  Underinvestment  in  knowledge 
and  skill,  relative  to  the  amounts  invested  in  nonhuman  capital  would  appear  to  be  the  rule 
and  not  the  exception  for  a  number  of  reasons.  The  strong  and  increasing  demands  for  this 
knowledge  and  skill  in  labourers  are  of  fairly  recent  origin  and  it  takes  time  to  respond  to 
them.  In  responding  to  these  demands,  we  are  heavily  dependent  upon  cultural  and 
political  processes,  and  these  are  slow  and  the  lags  are  long  compared  to  the  behaviour  of 
markets  serving  the  formation  of  nonhuman  capital.  Where  the  capital  market  does  serve 
human  investments,  it  is  subject  to  more  imperfections  than  in  financing  physical  capital. 
Should  the  returns  from  public  investment  in  human  capital  accrue  to  the  individuals  in 
whom  it  is  made?  The  policy  issues  implicit  in  this  question  run  deep  and  they  are  full  of 
perplexities  pertaining  both  to  resource  allocation  and  to  welfare.  Physical  capital  that  is 
formed  by  public  investment  is  not  transferred  as  a  rule  to  particular  individuals  as  a  gift.  It 
would  greatly  simplify  the  allocative  process  if  public  investment  in  human  capital  were 
placed  on  the  same  footing.  When  transfer  of  resources  is  made  available  to  developing 
nations,  measures  have  been  taken  to  pave  the  way  for  the  investment  of  more  private 
(nonhuman)  capital.  This  one-sided  effort  is  under  way  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the 
knowledge  and  skills  required  to  take  on  and  use  efficiently  the  superior  techniques  of 
production,  the  most  valuable  resource  that  we  could  make  available  to  them,  is  in  very 
short  supply  in  these  underdeveloped  countries.  Some  growth  can  be  had  from  the 
increase  in  more  conventional  capital  even  though  the  labour  that  is  available  is  lacking 
both  in  skill  and  knowledge.  But  the  rate  of  growth  will  be  seriously  limited.  It  simply  is 
not  possible  to  have  the  fruits  of  a  modem  agriculture  and  the  abundance  of  modem 
industry  without  making  large  investments  in  human  beings.  Truly,  the  most  distinctive 
feature  of  our  economic  system  is  the  growth  in  human  capital.  Without  it  there  would  be 
64 only  hard,  manual  work  and  poverty  except  for  those  who  have  income  from  property.  17 
Economists  have  long  suspected  that  there  is  a  link  between  national  policies  and  long- 
term  rates  of  economic  growth.  Schultz  [19811  suggests  that  many  public  policies  contain 
disincentives  for  growth  because  they  reduce  the  rewards  to  accumulation  of  a 
comprehensive  concept  of  capital  encompassing  human  as  well  as  physical  capital.  King 
and  Rebelo  proposed  a  model  of  economic  growth  in  which  a  comprehensive  measure  of 
,,  technical  progress"  is  made  endogenous  along  the  lines  suggested  by  Uzawa  [19651, 
Rebelo  [19871,  and  Lucas  [19881.  Barro's  study  concretely  shows  the  role  of  human 
capital  in  the  process  of  development.  By  interpreting  this  comprehensive  measure  as 
18  social  investment  in  "human  capital"  ,  our  analysis  provides  a  potentially  valuable 
forrnalization  of  the  ideas  of  Schultz  [1961,1981]  on  economic  development.  We  find  new 
promise  for  the  hypotheses  of  Schultz  [19811  that  incentive  effects  of  policy  can  influence 
economic  activity:  taxation  can  readily  lead  to  development  traps  and  growth  miracles. 
Models  of  endogenous  economic  growth  thus  provide  new  analytical  paths  for  studying 
old  problems  in  the  economics  of  development.  There  is  an  early  morning  scene  in 
Faulkner's  Intruder  in  the  Dust,  of  a  poor,  solitary  cultivator  at  work  in  a  field 
. 
We  shall 
conclude  this  section  by  paraphrasing  that  line,  "The  man  without  skiffs  and  knowledge 
leaning  terrifically  against  nothing.  " 
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66 CHAPTER  SIX 
THE  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN  EMPHASIS  ON  THE 
RESEARCH  SECTOR 
GROWTH  FORMULA  FOUR:  G4  =f(PK4,  HL4,  TP4,  HC4,  RS4) 
1.6.  i.  The  New  Growth  Theo 
While  considering  the  research  sector  as  a  determinant  or  engine  of  economic  growth, 
we  can  formulate  a  hypothesis  with  reference  to  the  recent  Romer-Barro  type  models  of 
endogenous  growth  which  states  explicitly  that  "though  the  rate  of  technological  change  is 
sensitive  to  the  rate  of  interest,  a  subsidy  to  physical  capital  accumulation  may  be  a  very 
poor  substitute  for  direct  subsidies  that  increase  the  incentive  to  undertake  research,  in 
order  to  promote  economic  growth.  "  The  New  Growth  Theory  (NGT)  1-7  distinguishes 
between  physical  capital  (K) 
, 
labour  (L),  human  capital  (H),  and  knowledge  or  technology 
(A).  These  four  factors  are  inputs  in  the  aggregate  production  function  Y=  F(KLHA), 
where  Y  is  national  output.  The  crucial  point  in  the  NGT  is  its  treatment  of  knowledge  as 
an  input  that  is  different  from  the  three  others. 
I.  6.  ii.  Ka  Elements  and  Premises 
Paul  M.  Romer  [1986,1989,1990,1991,19931  while  exploring  and  analyzing  the  problem 
of  economic  development,  presented  a  new  vision  of  growth  through  endogenous 
technological  change.  Again,  knowledge  is  taken  as  an  input  in  the  production  function 
and  competitive  equilibrium  is  rendered  consistent  with  increasing  aggregate  returns 
owing  to  externalities.  Romer  demonstrates  that  the  three  key  elements  of  his  model 
namely  externalities,  increasing  returns  in  the  production  of  output  and  decreasing  returns 
in  the  production  of  new  knowledge  are  consistent  with  competitive  equilibrium.  Thus, 
endogenous  technical  change  is  explained  in  terms  of  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  by 
rational  profit  maximizing  economic  agents.  r1lie  argument  presented  by  Romer  is  based 
on  three  premises.  rMe  first  is  that  technological  change  -  improvement  in  the  instructions 
for  mixing  together  raw  materials  -  lies  at  the  heart  of  economic  growth.  The  second 
67 premise  is  that  technological  change  arises  in  large  part  because  of  intentional  actions 
taken  by  people  who  respond  to  market  incentives.  Thus  the  model  is  one  of  endogenous 
rather  than  exogenous  technological  change.  The  third  and  most  fundamental  premise  is 
that  instructions  for  working  with  raw  materials  are  inherently  different  from  other 
economic  goods.  Once  the  cost  of  creating  a  new  set  of  instructions  has  been  incurred,  the 
instructions  can  be  used  over  and  over  again  at  no  additional  cost.  Developing  new  and 
better  instructions  is  equivalent  to  incurring  a  fixed  cost.  This  property  is  taken  to  be  the 
defining  characteristic  of  technology.  Once  these  premises  are  granted,  it  follows  directly 
that  an  equilibrium  with  price  taking  cannot  be  supported. 
1.6.  iii.  Features  of  Knowledge  in  NGT 
EA;  onornists  studying  public  finance  have  identified  two  fundamental  attributes  of  any 
economic  good:  the  degree  to  which  it  is  rivalrous  and  the  degree  to  which  it  is  excludable 
[Comes  and  Sandler  19861.  Rivalry  is  a  purely  technological  attribute.  A  purely  rival  good 
has  the  property  that  its  use  by  one  firm  or  person  precludes  its  use  by  another;  a  purely 
nonrival  good  has  the  property  that  its  use  by  one  firm  or  person  in  no  way  limits  its  use 
by  another.  Excludability  is  a  function  of  both  the  technology  and  the  legal  system.  A  good 
is  excludable  if  the  owner  can  prevent  others  from  using  it.  Conventional  economic  goods 
are  both  rivalrous  and  excludable.  They  are  privately  provided  and  can  be  traded  in 
competitive  markets.  By  definition,  public  goods  are  both  nonrival  and  nonexcludable.  The 
distinguishing  feature  of  the  technology  as  an  input  is  that  it  is  neither  a  conventional  good 
nor  a  public  good;  it  is  a  non-rival,  partially  excludable  good.  Two  features  of  knowledge  - 
unbounded  growth  and  incomplete  appropriability  -  are  generally  recognized  as  being 
relevant  for  the  theory  of  growth. 
In  the  New  Growth  Theory  developed  by  Romer,  knowledge  is  considered  to  be  a 
partially  excludable"  and  "nonrival"  input  factor.  Partial  excludabilhy  describes  the 
property  of  knowledge  which  permits  its  creators  to  appropriate  only  a  fraction  of  its  total 
economic  value.  What  is  crucial  to  the  model  is  the  assumption  that  patents  exclude  only 
partially  the  use  of  some  aspect  of  the  knowledge  in  other  economic  activities.  In  other 
words,  the  R&D  activities  are  assumed  to  involve  a  positive  externality.  Nonrivalry 
68 characterizes  an  idea  or  insight  which  can  be  used  by  someone  in  an  economic  activity 
without  reducing  the  usefulness  of  the  idea  or  insight  used  by  someone  else.  Knowledge 
can  be  used  by  an  infinite  number  of  firms  and  in  an  infinite  number  of  periods  without 
additional  costs  and  without  reducing  the  value  of  this  factor.  Marginal  costs  of  using  a 
new  product  design  or  a  new  idea  are  assumed  to  be  or  near  zero.  NGT  assumes  in 
addition  that  the  low  cost  of  using  existing  knowledge  also  lowers  the  cost  of  producing 
new  knowledge.  As  a  result,  knowledge  capital  formation  is  subject  to  dynamic  scale 
economies,  which  earlier  models  did  not  consider.  To  the  extent  that  these  dynamic 
economies  accrue  to  others  than  the  investors  in  the  original  R&D,  nonrivalry  implies  the 
existence  of  intertemporal  positive  externalities  from  private  R&D.  8 
1.6.  iv.  Description  of  the  Model 
'Me  model  presented  here  is  essentially  the  one-sector  neo-classical  model  with 
technological  change,  augmented  to  give  an  endogenous  explanation  of  the  source  of  the 
technological  change.  The  four  basic  inputs  in  this  model  are  capital,  labour,  human 
capital,  and  an  index  of  the  level  of  the  technology  (KLH,  and  A).  The  formal  model  of 
the  economy  has  three  sectors.  The  research  sector  which  uses  human  capital  and  the 
existing  stock  of  knowledge  to  produce  new  knowledge.,  an  intermediate  goods-sector 
which  uses  the  designs  from  the  research  sector  together  with  forgone  output  to  produce 
the  large  number  of  producer  durables  that  are  available  for  use  in  final-goods  production 
at  any  time,  and  a  final  goods  sector  which  uses  labour,  human  capital,  and  the  set  of 
producer  durables  that  are  available  to  produce  final  output.  Output  can  be  either 
consumed  or  saved  as  new  capital. 
Final  output  Y  in  this  model  is  expressed  as  a  function  of  physical  labour  L,  human  capital 
devoted  to  final  output  Hy,  and  physical  capital. 
Let,  x=  (xd-ýj=I.,  is  the  list  of  inputs  used  by  a  firm  that  produces  final  output.  A  simple 
functional  form  for  output  is  the  following  extension  of  the  Cobb-Douglas  production 
function: 
Y(Hy,  L,  x)  =HayLp  t 
y-, 
=,  Xii-a-P  (1) 
69 But  in  this  model,  henceforth,  the  index  i  for  the  different  types  of  goods  is  treated  as  a 
continuous  variable,  and  the  sum  in  equation  (1)  is  replaced  by  an  integral: 
Y(Hy,  L,  x)  =WY,  Lß 
ft 
fo-X(i)i-a-ß  (11) 
This  production  function  differs  from  the  usual  production  function  only  in  its  assumption 
about  the  degree  to  which  different  types  of  capital  goods  are  substitutes  for  each  other. 
Thus  K(t)  evolves  according  to  the  rule: 
K0W=Y  (t)  -C  (t) 
where  C(t)  denotes  aggregate  consumption  at  time  t. 
Because  it  takes  rl  units  of  forgone  consumption  to  create  one  unit  of  any  type  of  durableý 
this  accounting  measure  K  is  related  to  the  durable  goods  that  are  actually  used  in 
production  by  the  rule  K=  Tll'i=l  xi  = 
TjXAj=j  xi 
H  and  L  are  fixed,  and  K  grows  by  the  amount  of  forgone  consumption.  It  remains  to 
specify  the  process  for  the  accumulation  of  new  designs,  that  is,  for  the  growth  of  A  W.  As 
noted  above,  research  output  depends  on  the  amount  of  human  capital  devoted  to 
research.  If  the  researcherj  possesses  an  amount  of  human  capital  9  and  has  access  to  a 
portion  Ai  of  the  total  stock  of  knowledge  implicit  in  previous  designs,  the  rate  of 
production  of  new  designs  by  researcher  j  will  be  81",  where  8  is  a  productivity 
parameter.  Growth  in  A  by  itself  increases  the  productivity  of  human  capital  in  the 
research  sector.  The  output  of  researcherj  is  therefore  WA.  If  we  sum  across  all  people 
engaged  in  research,  the  aggregate  stock  of  designs  evolves  according  to 
A  8HAA.,  (3) 
where  HAhas  the  obvious  interpretation  of  total  human  capital  employed  in  research. 
Equation  (3)  contains  two  substantive  assumptions  and  two  functional  form 
assumptions.  The  first  substantive  assumption  is  that  devoting  more  human  capital  to 
research  leads  to  a  higher  rate  of  production  of  new  designs.  The  second  is  that  the  larger 
the  total  stock  of  designs  and  knowledge  is,  the  higher  the  productivity,  for  instance,  of  an 
engineer  working  in  the  research  sector  will  be.  The  two  functional  form  assumptions  are 
70 that  the  output  of  designs  is  linear  in  each  of  HA  and  A  when  the  other  is  held  constant. 
The  crucial  feature  of  the  specification  used  here  is  that  knowledge  enters  into  production 
in  two  distinct  ways.  A  new  design  enables  the  production  of  a  new  good  that  can  be  used 
to  produce  output.  A  new  design  also  increases  the  total  stock  of  knowledge  and  thereby 
increases  the  productivity  of  human  capital  in  the  research  sector.  The  owner  of  a  design 
has  property  rights  over  its  use  in  the  production  of  a  new  producer  durable  but  not  over 
its  use  in  research.  If  an  inventor  has  a  patented  design  for  widgets,  no  one  can  make  or 
sell  widgets  without  the  agreement  of  the  inventor.  On  the  other  hand,  other  inventors  are 
free  to  spend  time  studying  the  patent  application  for  the  widget  and  learn  knowledge  that 
helps  in  the  design  of  a  wodget.  The  inventor  of  the  widget  has  no  ability  to  stop  the 
inventor  of  a  wodget  from  learning  from  the  design  of  a  widget.  This  means  that  the 
benefits  from  the  first  productive  role  for  a  design  are  completely  excludable,  whereas  the 
benefits  from  the  second  are  completely  non-excludable.  In  an  overall  sense,  this  means 
that  the  nonrival  design  inputs  are  partially  excludable.  What  matters  is  that  the  knowledge 
is  a  nonrival  good  that  is  partially  excludable  and  privately  provided.  At  the  aggregate 
level,  HAand  Hy  are  related  by  the  constraint  Hy  +  HA=  H.  According  to  these  equations, 
any  person  can  devote  human  capital  to  either  the  final-output  sector  or  the  research 
sector.  9 
Let  r  denote  the  interest  rate  on  loans  denominated  in  goods.  Let  PAdenote  the  price  of 
new  designs,  and  let  wHdenote  the  rental  rate  per  unit  of  human  capital.  Because  of  the 
assumption  that  anyone  engaged  in  research  can  freely  take  advantage  of  the  entire 
existing  stock  of  designs  in  doing  research  to  produce  new  designs,  it  follows  from 
equation  (3)  that  PAand  wHare  related  by  wH=  PAM. 
Once  a  design  has  been  produced,  a  large  number  of  potential  suppliers  of  the  new  good 
bid  for  the  right  to  do  so.  Each  of  these  firms  takes  the  price  PAfor  designs,  the  price  of 
one  for  capital  goods,  and  the  interest  rate  as  given,  but  if  it  begins  production  it  sets 
prices  to  maximize  profits.  Let  L  and  Hy  be  the  total  amounts  of  labour  and  human  capital 
that  are  used  in  the  production  of  final-output  goods.  Given  values  for  Hy  Y  and  L,  it  is 
71 possible  to  derive  the  aggregate  demand  for  the  durables  from  a  maximization  problem 
that  is  conclitional  on  them:  MaXx-f  0-  [IrYLPX(i)  1-a-p_p  (i)X(j)]di. 
Differentiating  under  the  integral  sign  leads  to  an  inverse  demand  function 
p(j)  =  (4) 
The  demand  curve  in  equation  (4)  is  what  the  producer  of  each  specialized  durable  takes 
as  given  in  choosing  the  profit-maximizing  price  to  set.  Faced  with  given  values  of  Hy,  L 
and  ra  firm  that  has  already  incurred  the  fixed-cost  investment  in  a  design  will  choose  a 
level  of  output  x  to  maximize  its  revenue  minus  variable  cost  at  every  date: 
it  =  max.,  p(x)x-rqx  =  max.,  (l  _CC_ 
p)jlayL  PX  (i)  I  -a-P_rTX.  (5) 
The  flow  of  rental  income  is  p  (x)  times  x.  The  cost  is  the  interest  cost  on  the-TIx  units  of 
output  needed  to  produce  x  durables.  The  monopoly  pricing  problem  specified  in  equation 
(5)  is  that  of  a  firm  with  constant  marginal  cost  that  faces  a  constant  elasticity  demand 
curve.  The  resulting  monopoly  price  is  a  simple  mark-up  over  marginal  cost,  where  the 
mark-up  is  determined  by  the  elasticity  of  demand,  p  rqffl-a-p).  The  flow  of 
monopoly  profit  is  x  =.  (a+  p)plrXbar,  where  x(bar)  is  the  quantity  on  the  demand  curve 
(4)  implied  by  the  price  P  (bar). 
The  decision  to  produce  a  new  specialized  input  depends  on  a  comparison  of  the 
discounted  stream  of  net  revenue  and  the  cost  PA  of  the  initial  investment  in  a  design. 
Because  the  market  for  designs  is  competitive,  the  price  for  designs  will  be  bid  up  until  it 
is  equal  to  the  present  value  of  the  net  revenue  that  a  monopolist  can  extract.  At  every 
date  t,  it  must  therefore  be  true  that 
ft  w  e-ft 
t  r(s)ds 
:  t(r)dT  ý  PA  (6) 
If  PAis  constant,  this  condition  can  be  put  in  a  more  intuitive  form.  Differentiating  with 
respect  to  time  (t)  yields  a  (t)  -r(t)  f,  '  e-ft 
t  r(s)ds 
it(-r)d-r=O 
Substituting  in  the  expression  for  PAfrom  equation  (6)  yields  x(t)  =  r(OPA. 
72 This  equation  says  that  at  every  point  in  time,  the  instantaneous  excess  of  revenue  over 
marginal  cost  must  be  just  sufficient  to  cover  the  interest  cost  on  the  initial  investment  in  a 
AA  *  10 
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Incentive  to  Undertake  Research  in  a  Model  of  Growth 
Since  A  determines  the  range  of  durables  that  can  be  produced  and  sinceTI  of  capital  are 
required  per  unit  of  durable  goods,  x(har),  it  is  possible  to  solve  for  x(har)  from  the 
equation  K=  r)Ax  (bar).  Then  output  Y  can  be  written  as:  Y(HA.,  L,  x)  =  H"yL  ýf 
O'X  (i)  1'  Odi 
=  H"yLW"'-a-P 
=  H"yLWK1,94)"ý  (7) 
(H  A)a(LA)P(K)I-a-P 
a+p-l 
y  Ti 
The  last  line  of  this  equation  shows  that  the  model  behaves  just  like  the  neo-classical. 
model  with  labour  and  human  capital  augmenting  technological  change.  An  examination  of 
the  expression  for  final  output: 
y=HayLpfo-ýýI-a-pdi  =  HaYLPAXbarl-a-P  (8) 
from  equation  (7)  shows,  that  output  grows  at  the  same  rate  as  A  if  LHy,  and  xb"  are 
fixed.  If  xb"  is  fixed,  then  K  must  grow  at  the  same  rate  as  A  because  total  usage  of  capital 
is  &b"TI.  Let  g  denote  the  growth  rate  of  A  Y,  and  K  Since  KIY  is  a  constant,  the  ratio: 
Cl  Y=I-  Wl  Y)  =I-  WIK)  (KI  Y)  (9) 
must  also  be  constant.  The  common  growth  rate  g  for  all  these  variables  is  therefore: 
g=  C'1C  =  Y'1Y  =  K'1K  =  A'/A  =  8HA.  (8HAis  to  be  understood  as  follows: 
Hy  =  1/8[(a/(I-a-p)(a+p)jr.  (10) 
For  a  fixed  value  of  HA=  H-Hy  the  implied  exponential  growth  rate  for  A  is  8HA) 
Together  with  equation  (10),  the  constraint  Hy  =  H-HA  implies  a  relation  between  the 
growth  rate  g  and  the  interest  rate  r.  - 
8HA=  8H  -[(a/(I-a-p)(a+p)lr  (11) 
73 which  can  be  simplified  as  g  8HA=  8H-Ar,  where  A  is  a  constant  that  depends  on  the 
technology  parameters  a  and 
A=  [(aI(1-a-Ii)(a+13)].  (12) 
implicitly,  the  allocation  of  H  between  the  two  sectors  is  constrained  by  the  requirement 
that  HAmust  be  nonnegative  and  that  Hy  can  be  no  larger  than  H.  This  implies  that  g  is 
nonnegative.  To  close  the  model,  it  remains  to  impose  the  relation  between  the  growth 
rate  g  and  the  interest  rate  r  implied  by  the  preference  side  of  the  model,  g=  OIC  =  (r- 
Q)lc.  Combined  with  equation  (11),  this  gives  an  expression  for  g  in  terms  of  the 
fundamentals  of  the  model,  g=  (8H-AQ)/cyA+I),  where  A  is  as  defined  in  equation  (12). 
Almost  all  the  content  of  the  model  is  contained  in  equation  (11),  which  summarizes  the 
effects  of  the  technological  side  of  the  model,  including  the  effects  of  imperfect 
competition  in  the  market  for  producer  durables.  The  opportunity  cost  of  human  capital  is 
the  wage  income  that  can  be  earned  instantaneously  in  the  manufacturing  sector.  The 
return  to  investing  human  capital  in  research  is  a  stream  of  net  revenue  that  a  design 
generates  in  the  future.  The  benefits  of  research  come  largely  in  the  future  and  that  the 
costs  are  incurred  immediately.  If  the  interest  rate  is larger,  the  present  discounted  value  of 
the  stream  of  net  revenue  will  be  lower.  Less  human  capital  will  be  allocated  to  research, 
and  the  rate  of  growth  will  be  lower.  From  a  policy  point  of  view,  the  difference  between  a 
reduction  in  tj  and  a  reduction  in  the  equilibrium  interest  rate  is  very  important.  A  direct 
subsidy  to  investment  in  physical  capital  financed  by  a  lump-sum  tax  is  mathematically 
equivalent  to  a  reduction  in  q.  The  intuition  that  subsidies  to  physical  capital  accumulation 
will  also  speed  up  growth  in  A  was  reinforced  by  the  first  generation  of  endogenous 
growth  models.  " 
The  present  model  of  Romer  shows  that  when  the  decision  to  invest  in  physical  capital  is 
uncoupled  from  the  decision  to  invest  in  research,  the  effects  of  a  subsidy  to  physical 
capital  are  quite  different  from  the  effects  of  a  reduction  in  the  market  interest  rate.  If  the 
fundamental  policy  problem  is  that  we  have  too  many  lawyers  and  MBAs  and  not  enough 
engineers,  a  subsidy  to  physical  capital  accumulation  is  a  weak,  and  possibly 
74 counterproductive,  policy  response.  An  increase  in  scale  as  measured  by  total  human 
capital  H  has  the  effect  of  speeding  up  the  rate  of  growth.  Human  capital  is  the  relevant 
scale  variable  in  this  model  because  it  is  the  input  that  is  used  most  intensively  in  research. 
The  effects  of  a  subsidy  to  capital  can  be  contrasted  with  a  policy  designed  to  encourage 
research.  But  we  notice  that  too  little  human  capital  is  devoted  to  research  due  to  the 
externalities  and  monopoly  pricing.  Both  of  these  effects  cause  human  capital  to  be 
undercompensated.  From  equation  (11)  it  follows  that  an  increase  in  total  human  capital 
would  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  amount  of  human  capital  employed  in  the  research  sector. 
As  a  result,  a  second-best  policy  for  a  government  that  cannot  affect  the  allocation  of 
human  capital  between  different  sectors  would  be  to  subsidize  the  production  of  human 
capital.  Within  the  confines  of  the  model,  the  social  optimum  can  be  achieved  by 
subsidizing  the  accumulation  of  A.  The  model  here  suggests  that  what  is  important  for 
growth  is  integration  not  into  an  economy  with  a  large  number  of  people  but  rather  into 
one  with  a  large  amount  of  human  capital.  Since  growth  seems  to  be  correlated  with  the 
degree  of  integration  into  world-wide  markets  but  not  closely  related  to  population  size  or 
density,  the  results  from  this  model  seem  promising. 
As  we  have  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  Robert  J.  Barrow  [1989,1990,19911  also 
shows  that  human  capital  is  the  key  input  to  the  research  sector,  which  generates  the  new 
products  or  ideas  that  underlie  technological  progress.  The  above  analyses  of  economic 
model  of  endogenous  growth  developed  by  Paul  Romer  allows  us  to  conclude  that 
"though  the  rate  of  technological  change  is  sensitive  to  the  rate  of  interest,  a  subsidy  to 
physical  capital  accumulation  may  be  a  very  poor  substitute  for  direct  subsidies  that 
increase  the  incentive  to  undertake  research,  in  order  to  promote  economic  growth.  "  This 
model  incorporates  the  various  determinants  of  economic  growth  in  its  process  of 
integration  of  knowledge. 
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IDENTIFICATION  OF  A  GROWTH  INFLUENCING  KNOWLEDGE  SECTOR 
I.  7.  i.  The  New  Direction 
The  economic  growth  is  a  dynamic  process.  The  various  determinants  of  economic 
growth  determines  the  pace  and  effectiveness  of  this  process.  The  objective  of  our  analysis 
was  to  see  the  development  of  each  of  the  determinant,  (  physical  capital,  human  labour, 
technological  progress,  human  capital  and  research  sector),  and  their  integration  into  the 
growth  process.  Our  understanding  of  each  determinant  as  an  engine  of  growth  broadens 
as  we  move  from  one  functional  factor  to  another.  Though  we  have  focused  on  each  of 
the  determinants  through  a  particular  model,  our  analyzis  show  that  all  the  determinants 
together  bring  about  the  desired  growth.  They  are  not  competing  against  each  other, 
rather  they  are  complementing  each  other  in  the  process.  This  has  been  clearly  brought  out 
by  Romer's  endogenous  growth  model.  Though  the  explicit  question  in  our  analysis  was 
to  determine  the  determinants  of  economic  growth,  the  implicit  question  was  to  determine 
the  motivating  forces  in  this  process  of  determining  the  determinants.  In  our  discussion  we 
have  also  noted  some  of  the  motivating  forces  like  the  profit  motive.  The  new  direction 
given  by  the  endogenous  growth  models  enables  us  to  understand  better  the  'unexplained 
growth'  by  endogenizing  the  determinants  of  economic  growth.  Following  this  path  of 
direction,  we  shall  try  to  introduce  a  noval  factor  into  the  mechanisms  of  economic  growth 
1.7-ii.  The  Role  of  Basic  Research 
The  New  Growth  Theory  demands  a  further  leap  into  the  knowledge  sector.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  the  economics  literature  and  public  policies  have  long  recognized 
the  existence  of  externalities  arising  from  "basic  research".  Such  research  has  the 
characteristics  that  its  findings  have  no  expected  commercial  applications  but  that  it  can  in 
turn  stimulate  and  raise  the  return  to  R&D  aimed  at  the  development  of  commercially 
valuable  products.  When  we  consider  basic  research  in  social  sciences  to  further  economic 
77 development,  one  area  that  we  need  to  integrate  into  this  research  is  that  of  the  cultural- 
philosophical  orientation  of  a  nation.  Many  of  the  developmental  policies  do  not  seem  to 
succeed  due  to  a  lack  of  integration  of  a  way  of  thinking  of  a  nation  into  its  framework. 
Basic  research  of  this  area  is  a  must  and  this  will  give  birth  to  another  crucial  determinant 
of  economic  growth.  The  relevance  of  the  research  sector  as  we  have  outlined  in  the 
Romer's  model  of  economic  growth  is  of  vital  importance  in  our  study. 
1.7.  iii.  The  Micro-Knowlede 
The  recent  development  in  the  growth  models  focus  on  knowledge  or  research  sector  as 
an  endogenous  factor  in  growth.  The  identification  of  growth  influencing  knowledge 
sectors  have  raised  difficulty  and  this  section  deals  specifically  with  that  aspect  of  growth 
economics.  Our  survey  of  the  various  models  clearly  brings  out  the  relevance  of  investing 
in  human  capital  which  results  in  various  micro-forms  of  knowledge.  This  micro 
knowledge  can  be  developed  or  moulded  or  given  shape  to  according  to  the  existing 
research  knowledge  which  produces  designs  or  enables  a  person  with  various  skills.  Micro 
knowledge  thus  has  the  characteristic  of  an  'acquired  knowledge'.  As  the  person  imbibes 
this  micro  knowledge,  s/he  becomes  progressively  dynamic. 
U.  N.  The  Macro-Knowledg 
But,  there  exists  another  form  of  knowledge  which  economists  tend  to  by-pass  for  fear 
of  trespassing  the  discipline.  If  economics  is  to  deal  with  economic  policies,  neither  can  we 
justify  this  approach  nor  can  we  pretend  of  not  being  able  to  give  a  theoretical  base; 
especially,  when  we  try  to  identify  growth  influencing  knowledge  sectors  for  long-term 
development.  We  have  familiarized  ourselves  with  micro  knowledge  and  its  dynamic  role 
in  growth,  while  analyzing  the  various  models  of  economic  growth  formulae.  There  exists 
the  other  sector  of  knowledge  known  as  macro  knowledge.  Macro  knowledge  has  the 
characteristic  of  an  'inherent-natural  knowledge'  which  one  inherits  by  being  born  into  a 
particular  culture  or  philosophical  system.  This  is  the  a-priori  micro  knowledge  (in  the 
sense  that  all  forms  of  micro  knowledge  is  introduced  into  the  macro  knowledge).  It  is  the 
78 inherent  knowledge  due  to  the  particular  way  of  thinking  one  moulds.  In  a  sense,  macro 
knowledge  is  static-conservative  and  hard-inner-core.  An  analysis  of  the  macro  knowledge 
would  enable  us  to  understand  the  different  pace  of  growth  of  various  developed  and 
developing  nations.  Hence,  British  growth  rate  is  different  from  Japanese  or  Japanese 
growth  rate  is  different  from  Indian  and  so  on  ...  Macro  knowledge  is  peculiar  to  each 
nation. 
A  nation  as  an  entity  has  a  unique  culture  and  philosophy  of  its  own,  eventhough  at 
times  it  seems  derived.  But  even  a  derived  or  dependent  cultural-philosophical  knowledge 
is  integrated,  interpreted  and  assimilated  soon  into  the  already  existing  macro  knowledge. 
The  interpretation-integration  process  is  done  primarily  through  the  national  (patriotic) 
institutions,  such  as  government  (political),  judiciary  (legal),  church  (religious),  schools 
(educational),  press  (media)  and  so  on.  Macro  knowledge  is  a  positive  embodiment  of 
knowledge  and  therefore  the  institutions  that  conveys  this  knowledge  have  to  be  positively 
related  to  the  national  well-being  of  all  its  people.  Institutions  need  to  develop  a  self- 
critique  approach  or  a  praxis  approach  in  this  regard.  Otherwise,  an  institutionalized 
negative  knowledge  could  be  communicated,  and  thereby  defeat  the  original  purpose  of 
the  creation  of  institution  itself.  An  analysis  of  the  existing  institutions  (original  purpose 
and  its  current  mechanism)  could  provide  the  institutionalized  negative  knowledge  (if  any) 
against  the  positive  macro  knowledge.  During  the  formational  stage  of  a  person,  one 
assimilates  macro  knowledge  (it  would  be  misleading  to  use  the  terminology  of  'taught'  in 
this  context,  particularly  in  comparison  with  micro  knowledge).  Here,  a  distinction  can  be 
drawn  between  macro  knowledge  and  its  implicit  variables  (generalization:  concepts  like 
capitalism,  socialism,  etc.  )  and  micro  knowledge  and  its  explicit  variables  (specific:  market 
mechanism,  planning,  etc.  ).  Every  explicit  micro  knowledge  variable  is  tested  in  the 
crucible  of  implicit  macro  knowledge  variable.  While  micro  knowledge  can  be  taught  or 
imported  and  therefore  broadened,  macro  knowledge  tends  to  remain  the  same  and  seek 
depth.  This  is  so  because  even  when  we  import  a  'pure-macro  knowledge'  of  another 
nation,  it  becomes  a  micro  knowledge  when  it  crosses  the  boundary  of  its  origin.  Often, 
macro  knowledge  challenges  the  validity  of  micro  knowledge.  This  would  become  more 
clear  when  we  analyze  the  transitional  economies  later.  Micro  knowledge  can  blossom 
79 only  in  the  bosom  of  macro  knowledge.  Here,  let  us  limit  our  search  to  understand  the 
relationship  between  micro  knowledge  and  macro  knowledge  in  relation  to  economic 
growth. 
1.7.  v.  The  Relevance  of  Micro-Macro  Knowledge  in  Economic  Growth 
There  exists  a  relationship  between  micro  knowledge  and  economic  growth  as  well  as 
macro  knowledge  and  economic  growth.  It  is  the  existing  national  macro  knowledge 
which  determines  the  use  of  micro  knowledge  while  formulating  the  economic  policies. 
Everybody  knows  about  the  need  and  importance  of  economic  growth  (macro  knowledge) 
but  only  a  few  knows  about  the  means  (micro  knowledge)  that  would  bring  about  growth 
and  development.  Before  adapting  the  means  or  implementing  the  micro  knowledge,  we 
should  test  it  within  the  framework  of  macro  knowledge  and  verify  its  acceptability.  How 
much  aware  are  policy  makers  in  this  respect  is  debatable.  rMe  more  policy  makers  are 
aware  of  the  macro  knowledge,  the  probability  of  the  success  of  the  economic  policy  is 
higher  and  vice  versa.  Thus,  merely  deten-nining  the  determinants  of  growth  (micro 
knowledge)  alone  would  not  necessarily  lead  to  economic  development.  Also,  macro 
knowledge  alone  cannot  account  for  economic  growth.  Here  lies  the  necessity  for  the 
integration  of  the  knowledge  sector.  As  long  as  there  exists  a  contrast,  i.  e.,  micro 
knowledge  versus  macro  knowledge,  the  result  would  be  stagnation  or  slow  growth.  Only 
an  integration  of  the  knowledge  sector,  i.  e.,  micro  knowledge  plus  macro  knowledge, 
would  lead  to  short-run  growth  and  permanent  development. 
While  formulating  economic  policies,  the  thinking  that  should  govern  is  to  be  that  of 
macro  knowledge.  Macro  knowledge  is,  thus,  a  system  which  supports  a  nation.  It  is  the 
breath  that  gives  life  to  the  economic  policies.  Macro  knowledge  exists  in  all  or  at  least  in 
the  majority  of  the  people  of  a  nation  without  any  inherent  contradiction.  The 
contradiction  exists  only  between  nations  and  this  we  note  only  in  their  viewpoints.  This 
need  not  be  a  problem  for  national  policy  makers.  Their  main  pre-occupation  should  be  to 
know  how  much  a  nation  and  its  people  desire  progress.  No  nation  wants  to  make 
progress  by  any  means.  For  each  nation,  the  determination  of  this  means  to  achieve 
80 economic  progress  is  of  vital  importance.  Here,  the  primary  role  of  macro  knowledge  in 
economic  growth  is  to  be  acknowledged.  As  we  have  noted  already,  macro  knowledge  is 
the  hard-core  and  therefore  static.  'Me  dynamism  depends  on  the  application  of  micro 
knowledge.  Yet,  we  should  acknowledge  that  micro  knowledge  plays  only  a  secondary 
role  in  economic  growth  and  development. 
This  explains  why,  inspite  of  ,  applying  the  same  economic  growth  models  in  various 
market  economies  (both  developed  and  developing),  we  are  not  able  to  derive  the  same 
result.  This  explains  why,  inspite  of,  investing  in  physical  capital  formation,  physical 
labour,  technology,  human  capital  and  research  and  development,  (as  the  engines  of 
growth),  we  are  not  achieving  the  economic  growth  targets.  This  explains  why  there  exists 
policy  conflicts:  between  government  and  people;  policy  makers  and  implementers.  The 
contradiction  lies  not  in  the  formulation  of  economic  policies  but  at  the  heart  of  ignoring 
the  relevance  of  macro  knowledge.  Only  after  understanding  the  local,  regional  and 
national  ethos  of  existing  macro  knowledge,  we  can  possibly  start  contemplating  the 
formulation  of  economic  policies  for  the  development  of  peoples.  Without  this  venture, 
policy  collapses,  system  stagnates,  and  a  nation  breaks  down.  In  this  scenario,  as  we  note 
in  many  developing  countries,  economic  growth  is  slow  and  development  is  impossible 
within  this  framework  of  performance.  Recently,  many  developed  countries  try  particularly 
through  the  media  to  evoke  and  understand  the  existing  macro  knowledge  before  they 
launch  an  application  of  a  particular  micro  knowledge  in  the  framework  of  a  policy  for 
growth  and  development.  In  order  to  have  a  deeper  and  better  understanding  of  the  super- 
success  of  macro  knowledge  over  micro  knowledge,  we  shall  proceed  to  analyse  the 
socialist  system  in  the  following  section. 
81 SECTION  TWO 
THE  APPLIED  GROWTH  PATH 
THE  planned  economies  as  well  as  the  market  economies  have  a  single  objective  as  they 
pursue  differing  economic  growth  models,  namely,  economic  development.  In  section  one 
of  our  study,  we  were  following  the  capitalist-market  economy  growth  models  with  a  view 
to  determine  the  engines  of  growth  and  their  motivating  forces.  We  have  seen  the 
prospects  and  limitations  of  those  models  within  a  global  framework.  We  have  tried  to 
identify  and  endogenize  a  growth  influencing  knowledge  sector  as  an  extension  to  such 
models.  In  this  section,  we  limit  our  objective  to  the  socialist  framework.  The  socialist 
economic  system  was  a  new  venture  with  lot  of  fears  and  hopes.  The  socialist-planned 
economies  developed  their  own  growth  economic  models  for  their  countries'  economic 
development.  (Appendix  H.  8.1  gives  a  short  description  of  the  concept  of  model  which  we 
apply  in  this  research).  The  socialist  scenario  enable  us  to  familiarize  ourselves  with  an 
applied  growth  path.  The  socialist  ideological  structure  and  dynamism  have  been 
endogenized  in  these  applied  growth  models.  A  critique  of  the  socialist  system  by  means 
of  the  dual  knowledge  sector,  which  we  have  developed,  can  have  a  normative  effect  on 
the  economic  development  policies.  We  shall  analyse  only  certain  basic  socialist  growth 
models  with  a  view  to  generalize  the  socialist  application  criteria.  But  before  we  delve  into 
the  models  proper,  let  us  compose  the  place  of  the  application  criteria. 
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THE  COMPOSITION  OF  PLACE  OF  THE  APPLICATION 
CRITERIA 
FOR  any  in  depth  study,  it  is  of  immense  value  to  compose  the  area  of  research.  Once 
we  specify  the  area  of  research,  it  is  easy  to  apply  the  analytical  tools  in  order  to 
understand  the  existing  mechanism  of  the  area  of  study.  Since  our  present  concern  is  that 
of  the  socialist  system,  let  us  compose  our  spectrum  of  global  socialism. 
H.  8-i.  The  Emergence  of  the  Socialist  System 
The  characteristic  note  that  heralded  the  dawn  of  a  new  economic  system  was  the 
principle  of  socialism.  The  idea  of  socialism  was  in  the  offing  (horizon)  for  centuries.  The 
ancient  civilizations  and  cultures  while  preaching  socialism  alienated  themselves  from  its 
lofty  ideals  and  romanticized  with  the  pragmatism  of  capitalism.  Karl  Marx,  the  eminent 
proponent  of  socialism  of  our  century,  was  born  into  the  bosom  of  market  capitalism. 
Though  his  writings  made  him  the  enemy  of  capitalism,  it  could  be  argued  that  he  is 
indirectly  the  'saviour'  of  capitalism.  It  is  his  writings  that  put  a  rein  to  the  wayward 
capitalistic  behaviour,  that  saved  capitalism.  It  is  pointed  out  that  most  of  Karl  Marx's 
scientific  work  was  concerned  with  capitalism;  he  wrote  little  about  the  future  socialist 
society.  "Marx,  as  a  revolutionary  critic  of  capitalism,  invariably  spoke  very  highly  of  the 
ability  of  capitalism  to  develop  the  forces  of  production,  eliminate  medieval  backwardness, 
promote  technical  progress,  and  bring  to  production  better  organization  and  greater 
concentration.  Marx  argued  that  this  process  takes  place  amid  the  exploitation  of  the 
proletariat.  The  accumulation  of  capital  is  accompanied  by  the  increasing  poverty  of  the 
exploited  class.  In  the  end  the  process  leads  inevitably  to  a  revolution:  the  power  of  the 
capitalists  is  overthrown  and  the  expropriators  expropriated.  "' 
This  form  of  Marxian  thought  includes  the  idea  that  socialism  will  "supersede" 
capitalism.  Capitalism  is  seen  as  a  mechanism  that  would  provide  the  material  conditions 
83 necessary  for  socialism.  The  replacement  will  occur  once  the  capitalist  system  has  fully 
developed  and  become  not  just  mature  but  overripe.  "It  will  have  made  these  preparations 
by  causing  the  bulk  of  production  to  be  undertaken  on  a  large  industrial  scale,  with 
modem  technology  and  a  high  degree  of  organization  within  the  company.  This  high 
degree  of  organization  and  concentration  of  production  will  leave  only  a  handful  of 
capitalist  proprietors,  who  will  be  swept  aside  so  that  the  proletariat  can  take  over  the 
running  of  production.  ýý2  According  to  this  image  of  socialism,  controlling  production  is  a 
fairly  simple  matter.  There  is  a  close  logical  connection  in  this  line  of  thinkiýg  between  the 
high  standard  of  the  production  forces  reached  under  capitalism  and  the  smooth  and 
simple  way  the  socialist  form  of  economic  activity  win  operate.  Marx  considered  it  self- 
evident  that  the  socialist  order  would  take  power  first  in  the  most  highly  developed  of  the 
capitalist  countries.  Though  history  proved  his  prediction  wrong,  socialism  did  emerge  on 
a  global  stage. 
MAL  Socialist  Countries 
Appendix  11.8.2  lists  all  the  countries  where  the  Communist  party  was  in  power  for  a 
fairly  long  period  (at  least  several  years).  The  undivided  power  of  the  Communist  party  is 
the  sole  criterion  for  inclusion  in  the  table  and  henceforth,  they  will  be  referred  to  as 
'socialist  countries'.  Despite  all  the  individual  attributes  that  distinguish  each  of  these 
socialist  countries  from  all  the  others,  they  resemble  one  another  and  exhibit  important 
attributes  in  common.  Even  though  their  actual  systems  differ  in  many  details,  they  are  all 
members  of  a  broader,  clearly  identifiable  class  of  social-political-economic  systems  that  is 
referred  to  as  'socialist  system'.  Just  as  the  individual  members  of  a  biological  species 
differ  from  one  another  while  remaining  members  of  it,  so  the  various  socialist  countries 
differ  while  remaining  members  of  the  same  species  of  systems.  3 
84 11.8.  iii.  InteEpretation  of  the  Term  "Socialism" 
The  association  of  ideas  evoked  by  the  expression  socialism  points  in  two  directions:  on 
the  one  hand  conveying  certain  ideas,  and  on  the  other  conjuring  up  certain  formations  in 
existing  societies.  A  term  frequently  used  by  politicians  and  by  the  press  outside  the 
socialist  world  is  'communist  system'  or  simply  "communism".  However,  Marxism- 
Leniniism,  the  official  ideology  of  the  Communist  party,  uses  the  expression  "communist" 
in  a  quite  different  sense.  It  terms  communist  the  unattained  Utopian  society  of  the  future, 
in  which  all  will  share  in  social  production  according  to  their  needs.  The  adherents  of  the 
Communist  party  in  power  never  referred  to  their  own  system  as  communist.  So  it  would 
be  awkward  to  attach  this  name  to  it  "from  outside.  ,4  The  following  are  some  of  the 
interpretations. 
p.  WileS5  (1962)  calls  "socialist"  an  economy  with  considerable  public  ownership,  and 
"communist"  a  country  where  the  Communist  party  rules.  Others,  for  instance,  R.  W. 
CampbeI16  (1974;  1981)  and  J.  Winiecki7  (1988),  use  the  term  "Soviet-type.  "  From  the 
German  "ientrale  Verwaltungswirtschaft"  we  get  the  term  "centrally  administered 
economy"  used  in  W.  Eucken's8  (1951)  discussion  of  the  Nazi  economy  and  often  applied 
to  socialist  economies.  United  Nations  statistics  refer  to  "centrally  planned  economies.  " 
The  term  "command  economy"  is  often  used  to  distinguish  the  system  from  a  market 
economy  (see,  for  instance,  P.  R.  Gregory,  9  1990).  More  sociologically  oriented  writers, 
such  as  V.  Nee  and  D.  Stark,  'o  eds.  (1988),  often  refer  to  "state  socialism.  " 
H.  8.  iv.  The  Socialist  Economy 
Marx  and  Engels  had  no  detailed  blueprint  for  the  socialist  economy.  More  detailed 
features  of  an  actual  socialist  economy  emerged  in  the  Soviet  practice:  the  problems  of 
transition  to  socialism,  the  organization  of  planning,  accounting  and  control,  money  and 
banking,  exchange  and  distribution  were  discussed  soon  after  the  October  Revolution. 
Lenin,  "  Bukharin  12  and  Preobrazhensky  13  led  the  thinking  during  this  period.  Stalin  YS14 
later  pronouncement  is  representative  of  the  economic  orthodoxy  and  dogmas  of  the 
85 s ,Q  talinist  era.  More  recent  developments  in  socialist  theory  and  practice  are  put  forward  by 
LiberMan15  and  KoSygin.  16 
Despite  wide  differences  in  the  economic  institutions  of  the  socialist  countries  and  their 
respective  stages  of  development,  fairly  similar  patterns  of  economic  organization  have 
emerged.  The  main  common  features  are:  1.  public  ownership  of  the  means  of  production; 
2.  centralized  control  of  the  rate  of  accumulation  and  the  principles  guiding  the  directions 
of  economic  growth;  I  the  existence  of  a  market  for  consumption  goods  (though  not 
necessarily  of  'consumer  sovereignty')  and  for  labour;  4.  Prices,  price  limits  or  price  fixing 
criteria,  for  all  goods  sold  by  the  state  are  decided  by  the  planning  authorities  and  prices 
cannot  change  spontaneously.  'Me  main  economic  differences  between  these  countries  and 
between  their  stages  of  development  depend  on  the  degree  of  central  control  over  the 
functioning  of  the  economy,  and  are  concerned  with  the  decision-making  agencies  and 
their  relations,  the  use  of  money  and  value  (as  opposed  to  physical)  indicators,  the  relative 
scope  of  plans  and  markets  and  the  nature  of  incentives  and  of  methods  of  plan 
implementation.  17 
The  most  recent  process  of  economic  reform  which  ended  with  the  collapse  of  the 
Soviet  bloc  could  be  duly  attributed  to  the  perestroika  and  glasnost  of  Gorbachev.  18 
II.  8.  v.  The  Historical  Setdng 
Let  us  now  look  at  the  actual  course  of  history,  beginning  with  a  description  of  the 
social  system  preceding  the  socialist  revolution.  The  first  question  to  ask  is  how  similar  the 
internal  conditions  in  the  various  socialist  countries  were  when  each  society  embarked  on 
building  a  socialist  system.  The  following  Table  11.8.1  lists  fourteen  of  the  twenty-six 
countries  featured  in  Appendix  11.8.2  in  whose  cases  scholars  largely  agree  that  the  part 
played  by  external  assistance  was  relatively  smaller  than  the  part  played  by  internal  forces; 
the  Communist  party  largely  came  to  power  due  to  internal  forces. 
86 TABLE  11.8.1 
SOCIALIST  COUNTRIES:  Revolution  Largely  by  Internal  Forces 
Before  Communist  Party  Attained  Power 
Serial  Country  Year  Power  Level  of  1ýype  of  Type  of 
Number  was  Attained  Economic  External  Armed 
Developmen  Dependence  Combat 
t,  GDP  per 
Capita' 
(USA=100) 
1.  Soviet  Union  1917  21.8 
b 
Independent  World  War  I 
State 
2.  Albania  1944  -  Independent  World  War 
State,  Italian  IL  war  of 
Occupation  liberation 
3.  Yugoslavia  1945  14.0'  Independent  World  War 
State,  II,  war  of 
Germanand  liberation 
Italian 
Occupation 
4.  China  1949  Independent  World  War 
State,  II, 
Japanese  revolutionar 
occupation  y  wars 
before  and 
after  the  war 
of  liberation 
5.  Vietriam  1954  French  World  War 
colony,  II,  war  of 
Japanese  liberation, 
occupation  first  against 
Japanese, 
then  against 
French 
6.  Cuba  1959  Independent  Guenilla 
State  struggles 
inside  the 
country 
7.  Congo  1963  12.8  French  Colonial 
colony  until  struggles  for 
1960  independenc 
87 Serial  Country  Year  Power  Level  of  1ýype  of  1ýype  of 
Number  was  Attained  Economic  Extemal.  Armed 
Developmen  Dependence  Combat 
t,  GDP  per 
Capita" 
(USA=100) 
e,  military 
seizure  of 
power 
8.  Somalia  1969  5.4  Italian  Military 
colony  seizure  of 
power 
9.  South  1969  6.0  British  Colonial 
Yemen  colony  struggles  for 
independenc 
e 
10.  Benin  1972  5.0  French  Military 
colony  until  seizure  of 
1960  power 
11.  Ethiopia  1974  4.5  Independent  Military 
state  seizure  of 
power 
12.  Mozambique  1975  12.4  Portuguese  Colonial 
colony  struggles  for 
independenc 
e 
13.  Nicaragua  1979  21.4  Independent  Armed 
state  uprising 
14.  Zimbabwe  1980  14.7  Fonner  Seven-year 
British  guerrilla  war 
colony,  in 
practice 
independent 
Source:  J.  Kornai  (1992,  pp.  24-25)  and  is  based  on  the  following  sources:  Row  1:  S.  N. 
Prokopovich  (1918,  p.  66).  Row  3:  E.  Ehrlich  (1960,  table  8).  All  other  rows:  1.  B. 
Kravis,  A.  W. Heston,  and  R.  Summers  (1978,  table  4). 
"  It  would  be  more  expressive  to  describe  the  level  of  economic  development  of  each 
country  by  giving  the  corresponding  data  for  the  last  year  of  peace  before  the  revolution, 
but  the  scarcity  of  data  made  that  plan  hardly  feasible.  The  unmarked  data  refer  to  1970. 
88 'The  European  territory  of  Russia  in  comparison  to  England  on  the  basis  of  national 
income  per  capita  in  1913. 
'The  datum  refers  to  1937. 
For  the  countries  highlighted  in  the  table,  the  following  are  a  few  of  the  main  attributes 
shared  by  their  social-political-economic  systems,  which  served  as  antecedents  to  the 
socialist  system. 
First,  the  countries  in  the  group  were  poor  and  economically  undeveloped.  19  This  is 
clearly  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  their  per  capita  production  before  the  revolution  was 
a  fraction  of  the  production  of  the  most  developed  countries  at  the  time.  Second,  the 
proportion  of  industry  was  low.  They  were  basically  agrarian  countries  in  which  the 
peasants  and  landless  agricultural  workers  formed  the  bulk  of  the  population.  Third,  the 
modem  sector  of  industry  consisting  of  large  factories  equipped  with  up-to-date 
technology  and  organized  in  an  up-to-date  way  was  relatively  small.  Fourth,  their  social 
relations  and  property  forms  contained  many  precapitalist  features.  Fifth,  there  was 
striking  inequality  in  the  distribution  of  income,  which  was  far  less  evenly  spread  than  in 
the  developed  countries  in  the  same  period.  The  gulf  between  rich  and  poor  was 
instrumental  in  revolutionizing  the  population.  Sixth,  in  terms  of  their  political  systems,  it 
is  notable  that  not  one  of  the  countries  listed  in  the  table  was  a  consolidated  parliamentary 
democracy.  All  had  systems  that  to  a  large  extent  suppressed  political  liberties,  and  more 
than  a  few  were  brutal  dictatorships.  Quite  a  number,  if  not  all  the  countries  in  the  table, 
were  partial  or  total  dependencies  of  other  states:  colonies  or  semicolonies,  countries 
under  military  occupation,  or  simply  dependent  economically  and  politically  on  one  or 
another  stronger,  more  highly  developed  country.  Consequently,  the  attainment  of  national 
independence  was  on  the  agenda.  In  most  of  these  countries  there  were  events  in  the  years 
before  the  revolution  that  shook  up  the  institutions  of  society:  war  against  an  outside 
enemy,  civil  war,  or repeated  insurrections.  20 
The  first  four  of  these  attributes  clearly  conflict  with  what  Marx had  expected:  socialism 
does  not  emerge  first  in  countries  where  capitalism  is  overripe  and  has  done  all  it  can  to 
89 develop  the  forces  of  production.  Socialism  does  not  inherit  developed,  well-organized 
production  concentrated  into  large  units,  if  one  discounts  the  relatively  small  modem 
sector.  Moreover,  it  takes  control  of  a  society  in  the  stage  of  upheaval.  'fhe  noted  points 
constitute  a  summary  of  the  main  attributes  common  to  the  social-political-economic 
system  before  the  socialist  revolution.  The  inherited  backwardness  and  the  other 
characteristics  of  the  initial  state  left  a  deep  mark  on  the  forms  of  socialism  that  struck 
root  in  the  Soviet  Union,  China,  and  other  countries  that  took  the  socialist  road  largely  as 
a  result  of  internal  forces.  But  the  majority  of  the  Eastern  European  countries  occupied  by 
the  Soviet  Union  after  the  Second  World  War  had  progressed  beyond  the  low  level  of 
development  that  marked  the  countries  in  Table  8.1  at  the  time  of  the  revolution, 
especially,  Czechoslovakia  and  East  Germany. 
H.  8.  vi.  The  Transition  Staee  of  Socialism 
The  period  that  leads  from  the  presocialist  system  to  the  institutionalized  classical 
system  can  be  described  as  the  revolutionary  transition  stage.  The  transition  took  place  in 
different  ways  in  each  country,  but  one  can  discern  common  features,  mainly  in  the  case  of 
the  countries  that  took  the  socialist  road  basically  by  their  own  efforts.  The  exponents  of 
revolution  are  fired  with  enthusiasm  and  a  feeling  of  doing  a  great  deed  of  historical 
justice.  This  stage  is  often  seen  as  the  "heroic  age"  of  socialism  . 
21  "Expropriation  of  the 
expropriators"  begins  at  once.  Part  of  the  factories,  banks,  and  other  institutions  are  taken 
into  state  or  collective  ownership.  Work  starts  immediately  on  centralizing  production  and 
distribution.  The  most  important  of  the  measures  of  redistribution  is  to  confiscate  the  great 
estates  of  the  landowners  and  divide  them  among  the  landless  and  the  poor  peasants.  What 
takes  place  is  not  simply  a  wave  of  nationalization  and  socialization  -  it  is  accompanied 
by  a  redistribution  of  property  and  income.  Note  the  sharp  inequality  of  the  pre- 
Revolutionary  system;  the  new  regime  tries  to  eliminate  them  as  fast  as  possible.  The 
upper  classes  are  deprived  of  their  high  incomes,  and  most  of  their  property  is  confiscated. 
In  several  places  poor  families  actually  move  into  the  homes  of  the  rich.  Palaces  are  taken 
over  by  schools  and  workers'  vacation  homes.  In  most  countries  this  initial  revolutionary 
90 transformation  takes  place  in  time  of  civil  war  or  war  against  an  external  enemy,  when  the 
economy  is  in  a  state  of  disruption.  However  grave  the  economic  problems  are,  a 
campaign  of  education  covering  the  entire  population  begins,  free  basic  health  care  for  all 
is  promised,  rationing  is  introduced,  and  vacations  for  children  are  organized.  22 
The  impulse  to  dispense  historical  justice  is  not  expressed  exclusively  in  the 
redistribution  of  economic  goods.  'Me  nobility,  the  wealthy,  and  the  old  regime's  leading 
politicians  and  officials  are  also  subjected  to  persecution.  Many  of  them  are  imprisoned, 
sent  to  labour  camp,  or  executed.  Physical  violence  and  merciless  terror  are  common 
accompaniments  of  revolutionary  periods.  From  the  outset  the  country's  population  is 
divided.  The  question  often  arises  as  to  what  would  have  happened  if  Marx's  expectations 
had  been  fulfilled,  if  socialism  had  come  to  power  in  the  most  highly  developed  countries. 
The  historical  fact  is  that  no  socialist  system  has  ever  been  installed  in  power  by  internal 
forces  in  any  developed  capitalist  country.  Numerous  attributes  of  the  revolutionary  period 
are  understandable  in  the  light  of  prior  events  and  easily  explained  by  them.  No  less 
understandable  is  the  fact  that  this  period  can  be  only  transitional,  since  many  of  the 
factors  that  sustain  this  system  are  temporary.  23 
In  very  few  cases  do  revolutionary  fervour  and  self-sacrifice  last  a  life-time.  The  average 
person,  inspired  by  a  great  cause  and  a  mass  movement  and  confident  of  approaching 
victory,  is  capable  of  self-sacrifice  for  the  community,  but  only  for  a  short  time.  After  that 
he  wants  to  get  back  to  normal  daily  life,  and  sense  the  connection  between  his  work,  the 
sacrifices  he  makes,  and  his  own  material  welfare.  It  becomes  vital  for  society  to 
encourage  people  to  perform  well  by  dispensing  material  rewards  and  penalties.  Once  all 
the  wealthy  have  had  everything  possible  confiscated  from  them,  the  scope  for  that  kind  of 
redistribution  is  exhausted.  Production  has  been  set  back  by  the  events  preceding  and 
following  the  revolution  and  the  confusion  of  the  transition.  Z4  It  becomes  clear  that 
production,  not  confiscation,  is  the  way  to  continue  improving  the  population's  material 
position.  Production,  of  which  the  bulk  is  now  in  public,  coflective  hands,  requires 
organization  and  effective  control. 
91 The  pre-Revolutionary  system  has  left  the  country  backward,  and  before  they  came  to 
power  the  revolutionaries  promised  that  once  in  power  they  would  eliminate  this 
backwardness.  As  society  emerges  from  the  bloody  external  and  internal  warfare  and  the 
chance  comes  for  peaceful  labour,  those  in  power  realize  they  must  fulfil  these  promises  by 
rapidly  increasing  the  economy's  forces  of  production.  They  would  like  to  achieve  swift 
and  spectacular  economic  successes.  Moreover,  they  feel  the  system  is  threatened 
militarily,  and  their  desire  to  increase  their  military  power  rapidly  trains  attention  on  fast 
economic  growth.  Attainment  of  these  goals  is  now  hindered  by  the  anarchy,  the  lack  of 
law  and  order,  and  arbitrary  local  actions.  No  society  of  any  kind  can  function  without 
some  sort  of  discipline.  There  is  a  growing  demand  for  order  to  be  restored.  All  these 
altered  circumstances  prepare  the  ground  for  the  country  to  step  beyond  the  socialist 
revolutionary-transitional  system.  The  spirit  of  revolutionary  romanticism  and  heroism 
gradually  fades  and  then  dies,  even  in  those  who  were  enthusiastic  about  the  revolution 
before;  the  new  system  becomes  institutionalized  and  bureaucratic,  and  life  normalizes. 
Ihe  classical  socialist  system  emerges  and  consolidates.  25 
At  this  point  it  is  worth  making  a  short  diversion  to  consider  the  specific  historical 
development  of  Eastern  Europe.  26  Yugoslavia  and  Albania  basically  took  the  socialist  road 
by  their  own  efforts,  and  accordingly,  the  validity  of  the  model  outlined  above  as  a 
summary  of  the  main  features  of  the  socialist  revolutionary  transition  can  be  extended  to 
cover  them.  But,  it  was  the  Soviet  An-ny  that  eliminated  the  German  military  occupation  in 
Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  Poland,  and  Romania,  and  occupied  East  Germany 
after  Germany's  military  defeat;  the  Soviet  military  and  political  presence  in  these 
countries  represented  an  extremely  strong  support  to  the  Communist  party,  which  wanted 
to  institute  a  socialist  system.  The  Soviet  Union  imposed  on  these  countries  the  socialist 
system,  mainly  by  enforcing  a  domestic  political  situation  in  which  the  Communist  party 
was  able  in  the  end  to  attain  undivided  power.  Multiparty  parliamentary  democracy 
operated  in  these  countries  in  the  years  immediately  after  the  war.  They  had  coalition 
governments  in  which  the  Communist  party's  weight  was  greater  than  its  share  of  the 
vote.  The  economy  that  emerged  was  a  curiously  mixed  one,  with  a  "regular"  capitalist 
sector  on  the  one  hand  and  socialist  elements  on  the  other.  A  steady  process  of 
92 nationalization  took  place.  Land  reform  was  carried  out  on  a  large  scale.  This  period  came 
to  an  end  around  1948-49  with  the  amalgamation  of  the  Communist  and  Social 
Democratic  parties  and  the  elimination  of  the  multiparty  system.  From  then  on, 
construction  of  a  socialist  system  began  with  fun  force,  starting  straight  away  with 
classical  socialism.  The  1945-49  period  in  these  countries  had  many  of  the  attributes  of  the 
revolutionary-transitional  system  described  above,  but  it  also  differed  from  it  in  many 
crucial  respects.  These  differences  are  explained  precisely  by  the  fact  that  instead  of  an 
internally  induced  socialist  revolution  taking  place  in  1945,  the  pre-1945  system  was 
demolished  by  an  outside  force,  the  Soviet  Union.  30  A  new  era  of  socialist  economic 
system  began  in  Soviet  and  Eastern  European  arena. 
The  composition  of  place  of  the  socialist  system  within  a  global  framework  allows  us  to 
delve  into  our  particular  form  of  search.,  namely,  the  motives  and  engines  of  economic 
growth  process.  in  the  socialist  economies.  Every  economic  growth  model  has  a  specific 
structure  and  a  dynamism  and  the  application  of  such  a  model  could  either  stagnate 
development  or  ignite  the  economy  forward. 
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THE  STRUCTURE  AND  DYNAMICS  OF  SOCIALIST  ECONOMIC 
GROWTH  MODELS 
The  socialist  principle  evolved  into  a  concrete  socialist  reality  through  the  institution  of  a 
nation  (Soviet  and  its  satellite  nations).  New  forms  of  socio-economic  and  political 
structures  were  to  be  framed  to  contain  this  new  reality.  The  already  existing  non-socialist 
forms  were  substantially  dismantled  to  weave  a  noval  design  for  the  structure  of  the 
socialist  state.  The  utopian  abstraction  of  a  principle  dictates  the  norms  of  this  new 
phenomenon.  The  vision  of  comprehensive  equality  and  self-sufficiency  is  to  be  translated 
into  day  to  day  living  reality.  The  agents  of  socialist  state  began  to  frame  methods  and 
strategies  and  models  to  achieve  the  socialist  objective.  This  chapter  tries  to  clarify  the 
socialist  objective  and  tries  to  understand  the  factors  that  deten-nine  the  rate  of  growth 
under  the  classical  socialist  system,  and  the  social  costs  of  the  growth  process.  ' 
11.9.  i.  EMansion  -  Investment  Motive 
As  we  have  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  by  and  large,  the  advocates  of  socialist 
revolution  came  to  power  in  countries  that  had  been  poor  and  backward.  "In  every 
backward  country,  whether  a  socialist  system  is  in  power  or  not,  the  signs  can  be  observed 
of  an  impatience  typical  of  the  'late  arriver,  '  an  oppressive  awareness  of  having  fallen 
seriously  behind  the  more  developed,  wealthier  countries.  ,2  This  impatience,  manifest  in 
every  developing  country,  is  amplified  in  the  case  of  socialist  countries  by  a  promise  the 
socialist  revolutionaries  made  before  their  victory:  they  would  eliminate  the  backwardness 
very  quickly  once  they  were  in  power.  This  is  among  the  ideas  that  brought  broad  strata  in 
society  over  to  their  side.  This  promise  rests  on  a  belief  that  they  can  catch  up  with  the 
developed  countries  quite  fast  by  virtue  of  the  socialist  system's  superiority.  This  belief  is 
a  major  constituent  of  the  official  ideology.  The  leaders  insist  on  fast  growth  because  it 
Will  provide  further  evidence  of  that  superiority.  Also,  the  imperative  to  catch  up  faster 
97 with  the  more  developed  countries  is  reinforced  by  military  and  defense  considerations. 
Modernization  and  economic  strength  are  needed  to  create  an  army  with  striking  force,  as 
desired  by  Stalin,  Khrushchev  and  Mao  [It  is  worth  quoting  a  speech  of  Stalin  in  193  1.3 
Please  refer  the  note  for  more  details].  The  top  leaders  want  to  impose  with  an  iron  hand  a 
policy  of  the  fastest  possible  growth.  This  is  the  leitmotif  of  the  annual  and  five-year  plans. 
it  is  expressed  in  the  production  plans,  which  are  intended  to  maximize  growth  in  value 
and  outrank  all  other  instructions,  in  the  quantity  drive  apparent  also  in  management,  and 
in  the  highly  ambitious  plans  for  investment. 
It  should  be  stressed,  however.,  that  a  forced  rate  of  growth  is  not  a  policy  the  upper 
leadership  need  compel  the  middle-and  lower-level  leaders  to  follow  against  their  general 
will.  On  the  contrary,  these  people  already  have  a  strong  inner  expansion  drive.  The 
medium-and  lower-level  members  of  the  bureaucracy  are  imbued  by  the  same  political 
conviction  as  the  leaders.  Leaders  at  all  levels  of  the  bureaucracy  consider  that  their  power 
and  prestige  grow  in  accordance  with  the  expansion  of  the  unit  they  lead,  and  so  do  their 
4 
financial  rewards  in  many  cases.  Under  the  classical  socialist  system  there  is  an  additional 
major  factor:  middle-and  lower-level  leaders  recognize  the  chronic  shortage  of  the 
products  or  services  their  ministry,  branch  directorate,  or  firm  provides.  The  pressure  of 
unmet  demand  also  pushes  them  to  expand.  In  addition,  the  difficulties  they  encounter  in 
obtaining  their  own  inputs  may  prompt  them  to  produce  these  within  the  firm  or  branch, 
which  again  requires  investment. 
Some  of  the  impulses  fisted  are  system-specific,  but  others  apply  equally  to  bureaucratic 
leaders  under  capitalism,  not  just  socialism.  One  might  add  that  expansion  drive  is  very 
strong  not  only  among  appointed,  employed  bureaucratic  leaders  but  among  capitalist 
entrepreneurs,  who  expect  expansion  to  bring  greater  profits,  and  so  greater  power  and 
prestige.  Ilie  main  system-specific  distinction  lies  not  in  the  actual  effort  to  expand  but  in 
the  internally  generated  self-restraint  that  runs  counter  to  it.  In  the  eyes  of  capitalist  firms' 
owners  (or  managers  charged  with  running  them  on  their  behalf),  expansion  is  an 
attraction,  but  also  a  big  risk.  They  have  to  consider  carefully  whether  the  products  of  the 
enlarged  company  will  be  saleable,  and  if  so,  at  what  price  and  profitability.  Any  loss 
98 caused  by  a  faulty  investment  decision  hits  them  in  the  pocket.  Though  they  expand  in  the 
hope  of  doing  good  business,  the  risk  of  doing  bad  business  limits  unbridled  expansion. 
This  is  the  curb  that  the  classical  socialist  system  removes.  Because  of  the  chronic 
shortage,  the  extra  production  resulting  from  the  expansion  can  probably  be  sold.  Because 
of  the  soft  budget  constraint,  the  firm  can  reckon  that  liquidation  will  not  follow  any  faulty 
investment  decisions,  however  high  the  costs  and  financial  losses  may  be.  A  great  many 
people  at  all  levels  of  the  hierarchy  have  a  part  in  an  investment  decision,  but  no  loss 
incurred  will  hit  any  of  them  in  the  pocket.  Expansion  drive  is  a  fact  of  life  for  the 
bureaucracy.  This  feature  of  bureaucratic  behaviour  is  seized  upon  in  the  models  in  which 
the  objective  function  of  a  bureaucrat  is  to  maximize  the  budget  at  his  disposal.  5  "And 
because  this  system  has  only  bureaucrats  and  no  real  owners,  there  is  an  almost  total  lack 
of  internal,  self-imposed  restraint  that  might  resist  this  drive.  The  investment  hunger  is 
ubiquitous.  9ý6  Among  the  basic  problems  of  the  capitalism  described  by  Keynesian 
macroeconomics,  is  that  entrepreneurs  lack  a  strong  enough  desire  to  invest,  precisely 
because  of  the  self-restraint.  The  antidote  is  to  stimulate  entrepreneurs'  "animal  spirits,  " 
that  is,  expansion  efforts.  7  This  problem  is  entirely  absent  under  classical  socialism,  where 
the  investment  hunger  is  insatiable.  But,  there  remains  a  strong  and  effective  curb,  and  this 
is  set  by  the  process  of  bureaucratic  allocation  of  investment,  which  fixes  investment 
quotas  and  requires  permits  for  investment  projects. 
11.9.  ii.  AHocation  -Investment  Tension 
The  control  of  the  investment  process  is  far  more  strictly  centralized  than  day-to-day 
production.  On  the  one  hand,  the  national  economic  plan  distributes  investment  funds 
among  the  various  ministries  in  the  course  of  the  planning  and  decision-making  process. 
8  The  disaggregation  of  the  funds  proceeds  from  the  top  downward  in  the  customary  way. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  central  plan  decides  case  by  case  which,  out  of  the  set  of  all 
investment  projects,  will  be  the  priority  projects.  It  is  determined  centrally  what  the 
installation  resulting  from  each  priority  investment  project  will  produce,  what  technology 
it  will  use,  where  it  will  operate,  when  it  should  be  ready,  and  how  much  it  should  cost  to 
99 establish.  As  for  the  execution  of  the  investment  plans,  there  is  excess  demand  for 
investment  goods  and  services  called  in  economic  parlance  'investment  tension.  '  Taken 
together,  the  investment  projects  that  have  been  officially  approved  require  more  inputs 
than  are  physically  available.  This  is  a  horizontal  shortage  that  appears  in  the  relation 
between  the  supplier  and  the  utilizer  of  investment  goods.  Normally,  no  project  in 
progress  is  halted  fully,  not  least  because  each  has  its  powerful  advocates  in  the 
bureaucracy.  Instead,  the  holdups  cause  a  number  of  different  Projects  to  slow  down 
simultaneously.  This  practice  leads  to  a  dissipation  of  investment,  severe  lengthening  of 
the  approval  and  completion  time,  9  and  a  large  increase  in  the  costs. 
11.9.  iii.  Structure  of  the  Growth  Process 
We  shall  examine  the  structure  of  the  growth  process.  The  first  problem  to  study  here  is 
the  breakdown  of  the  expenditure  of  gross  domestic  product  and  the  proportion  of  it  used 
for  investment.  The  investment  proportion  in  most  periods  is  appreciably  higher  in  most 
socialist  countries  than  in  most  capitalist  countries.  'O  This  is  illustrated  in  Table  11.9.1, 
which  presents  some  comparative  data. 
TABLE  11.9.1 
SHARE  OF  INVESTMENT  IN  GDP:  Intemational  Comparison 
Investment  as  Percentage  of  GDP 
100 The  proportion  of  GDP  spent  under  the  classical  socialist  system  on  maintaining  the 
bureaucratic  apparatus  and  funding  the  armed  forces  is  no  smaller  than  in  capitalist 
countries.  "More  can  go  on  investment  only  if  less  is  spent  on  consumption,  meaning 
direct,  individual  consumption  by  households  and  collective  consumption  contributing  to 
public  well-being.  "'  I  Mention  has  been  made  of  the  country's  leaders'  impatience  to 
achieve  the  fastest  possible  growth.  Here  one  should  add  that  they  see  as  the  main  means 
of  achieving  it  as  large  a  scale  of  investment  as  possible.  "In  the  language  of  growth 
theory,  they  have  dangling  before  them  (even  if  they  never  heard  of  one)  a  Harrod-Domar 
model  with  just  a  single  factor  of  production:  capital.  To  their  extremely  simplified 
reasoning,  the  larger  the  proportion  for  investment,  the  faster  the  rate  of  growth.  942 
Table  11.9.2  shows  that  investment  in  fixed  assets  grows  appreciably  faster  in  the 
socialist  countries  that  feature  here  than  it  does  in  the  capitalist  countries  with  which  they 
are  compared. 
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Source:  P.  Marer  et  aL  (1991). TABLE  11.9.2 
Average  Annual  Growth  Rates,  1950-79 
It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  gap  between  the  growth  rates  of  investment  and  GDP  is 
far  wider  than  in  most  of  the  capitalist  countries.  This  confirms  indirectly  the  observation 
made  above  regarding  the  forced  expansion  of  investment.  The  table  also  records  the  low 
efficiency  of  investment:  for  output  to  rise  over  a  long  period  by,  say,  4-6  percent  a  year., 
investment  has  to  grow  by  8-11  percent  a  year.  This  is  among  the  factors  that  impel  the 
leaders  of  a  socialist  economy  to  enforce  a  high  investment  proportion.  "The  country's 
leadership  not  only  wants  a  high  investment  proportion,  it  is  fully  able  to  impose  its  will. 
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Source:  F.  L.  Pryor  (1985,  p.  76) Never,  under  any  previous  system  in  history,  has  so  small  a  group  of  people  kept  so  tight  a 
hold  on  the  nation-wide  investment-consumption  ratio.  ,  13 
Economists  argue  about  the  ex  ante  causal  relationship  between  investment  and  saving 
under  the  capitalist  system.  What  one  certainly  can  say  is  that  both  investment  and  saving 
are  thoroughly  decentralized  processes  in  the  hands  of  millions  of  decision  makers.  Also, 
in  a  high  proportion  of  cases  the  two  kinds  of  decision  are  separate,  although  voluntary 
saving  influences  investment  and  vice  versa.  This  contrasts  with  the  case  under  classical 
socialism.  There  investment  decision  making  is  extremely  centralized  and  embraces 
decisions  on  saving  as  well.  The  saving,  that  is,  nonconsumption,  equals  the  amount  the 
central  authorities  see  fit  to  withdraw  from  consumption  for  investment  purposes,  whether 
the  households,  owners  of  the  personal  incomes,  like  it  or  not.  14  The  economic  concept  of 
saving  becomes  a  negative  notion  in  a  socialist  model  of  growth. 
The  puzzle  to  solve  is  to  find  out,  what,  if  anything,  limits  the  growth  in  the  proportion 
of  investment  and  the  concomitant  fall  in  the  consumption  proportion?  As  already  shown, 
the  classical  socialist  system  lacks  an  automatic  economic  mechanism  equivalent  to  the 
one  operating  under  capitalism,  namely,  the  interactions  among  individual  savings  and 
investment  decisions,  the  capital  market,  and  the  commercial  banking  system.  The 
country's  leadership  feels  at  most  indirectly  the  limits  to  what  the  public  can  tolerate. 
15  These  tolerance  limits  restrain  the  cutback  in  consumption  (public's  material  welfare). 
Looking  at  the  whole  historical  tendency  of  the  classical  system  in  the  consolidated 
socialist  countries,  one  sees  a  significant  rise  in  consumption.  16  But  even  in  these 
countries,  the  consumption  growth  rate  lags  a  good  way  behind  GDP  growth.  In  some, 
such  as  China,  per  capita  consumption  more  or  less  stagnated  for  a  long  period.  17  The 
micro  motives  of  the  bureaucracy  and  the  macro  policy  of  the  central  authorities  coincide: 
the  central  leadership's  decision  in  favOur  of  a  high  investment  proportion  expresses  the 
desire  and  purpose  of  the  whole  power  elite. 
103 The  Ideol2gy  of  Future  Orientation 
"The  philosophy  of  historical  'functionalism'  would  suggest  that  the  institutional  system 
of  classical  socialism  and  the  motivation  of  the  bureaucracy  are  as  they  are  because  that 
best  helps  a  backward  country  to  catch  up.  The  political-economic-ideological  mechanism 
indispensable  to  forcing  fast  growth  emerges  out  of  the  impatient  haste  of  a  poor, 
undeveloped  country.  "'8  Given  the  undivided  power  and  official  ideology  of  the 
Communist  party,  coupled  with  bureaucratic  public  ownership,  the  combined  effect  of  all 
the  factors  is  a  forced  rate  of  growth.  Establishing  the  proportions  of  investment  and 
consumption  ties  in  closest  with  the  problem  sphere  known  in  neo-classical  economics  as 
decision  makers'  time  preference.  The  official  ideology  of  classical  socialism  sought  to 
proclaim  the  leadership's  "future  orientation,  "  namely,  request  of  a  sacrifice  from  the 
present  generation  for  a  better  life  in  the  future.  MAtyAs  Rikosi,  19  Hungary's  leader  in  the 
Stalin  period,  put  it  succinctly:  "We  won't  kill  today  the  hen  that  will  lay  golden  eggs  in 
the  future.  "  In  characterizing  the  time-preference  system  in  the  age  of  forced  growth,  three 
phenomena  can  be  distinguished.  These  marks  of  forced  growth  are  extremely  grave 
sacrifices  by  the  public  and  conspicuous  postponement  and  neglect  in  several  development 
areas.  The  policy  is  not  notably  far-sighted:  maximizing  the  growth  rate  attainable  in  the 
next  decade  or  two  is  preferred  not  only  over  present  and  future  consumption  but  over 
laying  the  foundation  in  the  present  for  production  in  the  more  distant  future.  20  [Whereas 
sacrifice  concems  a  flow  of  consumption,  postponement  concems  the  accumulation  of 
stocks  serving  consumption;  and  neglect  occurs  particularly  in  processes  that  demand 
4  organic'  development  (fields  such  as  higher  education,  health,  or  environrnental 
protection).  If  in  such  cases  specific  tasks  are  neglected  for  decades,  there  is  no  way  to 
compensate  later  by  sudden  resource  reallocation  or  remedial  campaigns  of  action  ---  e.  g. 
oil  spill  and  pollution).  ] 
104 11.9.  v,  The  Priorities  of  the  Sectoral  Structure 
An  examination  of  the  priorities  of  the  socialist  state  reveals  the  structure  and  dynamism 
of  the  socialist  economic  growth  models  more  clearly.  The  discussion  of  priorities  applied 
in  the  allocation  of  investments  begins  by  looking  at  the  'sectoral  structure.  9 
Priority  of  investment  goods:  the  sectors  developed  are  primarily  those  that  directly 
cause  an  increase  in  fixed  capital,  that  is,  the  production  of  investment  goods. 
2.  Priority  of  domestic  production  over  imports:  The  development  of  the  sectoral 
structure  is  stamped  by  the  pursuit  of  autarky.  21 
3.  Priority  of  the  production  sphere:  a  distinction  is  made  in  Marxian  political  economy 
between  "productive"  and  "non-productive"  activity.  A  practical  meaning  is  attached 
to  this  in  the  planning  and  statistics  of  the  socialist  countries:  manufacture  of  tangible 
material  goods  is  viewed  as  the  "productive  sphere"  and  provision  of  most  services  as 
the  "non-productive  sphere.  ,  22  The  priority:  the  productive  sphere  must  have  an 
investment  advantage  over  the  non-productive,  in  other  words,  the  production  of 
material  goods  over  services.  23  Under  capitalism,  as  far  as  the  aflocation  of  resources 
for  public  services  is  concemed,  this  is  subject  to  the  democratic  political  process,  at 
least  in  a  parliamentary  democracy.  The  public  service  sphere  cannot  be  neglected  so 
long  as  the  parties  representing  the  majority  of  the  public  are  willing  to  vote  the  sums 
for  developing  such  services.  By  contrast,  the  allocators  under  the  classical  socialist 
system  are  not  subject  to  any  democratic  control. 
4.  Priority  of  class-one  production:  Marxian  political  economy  makes  a  further  important 
distinction,  between  class-one  and  class-two  production.  The  former  makes  means  of 
production  and  the  latter  consumer  goods.  2A  The  priority:  class  one  must  enjoy  an 
investment  advantage  over  class  two. 
5.  Priority  of  industry:  Industry  is  considered  to  be  the  engine  of  growth.  The  strategy  of 
forced  growth  primarily  means  fast  industrialization.  The  priority:  industry  must  have 
an  investment  preference  over  all  other  branches  of  the  economy.  The  observation  is 
illustrated  in  Table  11.9.3. 
105 TABLE  11.9.3 
Industriala  Investment  as  a  Percentage  of  Total  Investment: 
international  Comparison 
Annual  Averages  at  Constant  Prices 
M  --------------------  T  M 
Socialist  Countries 
I 
..................  ............  Bulgaria  .......  .  44.5  ................  42.3 
. 
a6 
...................................  51.5'  ..........................  54. 
Od 
Czechoslovakia  37.6  38.0 
East  Germany  50.2 
..................................................................  Hungary  ..................................  34.8  ..................  34.2 
.......... 
---------  -  ---  Romania  --------  47.9  49.3 
Soviet  Union  35.0  35.3 
.................................................................  ...................................  1965-73  .....................  .......  1973-80 
.................................................................  Capitalist  Countries  ...................................  .................................. 
Belgium  28.7  24.9 
Denmark  le  16.  16.7 
............  .....................................................  Finland  ..................................  24.6  ..................................  27.1 
..................................................................  France  ..................................  24.6  ..................................  23.9 
-------  ----  -  Ireland  -------  25.9  29.0 
United  Kingdom  31.3  32.4 
.................................................................  West  Germany 
................................................................. 
...................................  25.6 
................................... 
..................................  24.4 
..................................  Source:  J.  Kornai  (1992,  p.  175),  on  the  basis  of  United  Nations  (1986c,  tables  13  and 
16),  and  Central  Statistical  Office,  Budapest  (1986,  p.  28). 
In  the  socialist  countries  industry  covers  manufacturing,  energy  and  fuel-producing 
branches.  In  capitalist  countries  industry  covers  manufacturing,  energy,  and  fuel-producing 
branches,  and  the  electric,  gas,  and  water  utilities. 
State  Investment  at  current  prices. 
'  1953-62. 
'  1971-80. 
1966-73. 
106 6.  priority  of  heavy  industry:  According  to  the  prevalent  official  view  under  the  classical 
system,  mechanization  is  the  prime  means  of  raising  productivity  and  producing  technical 
development.  Large  quantities  of  steel  and  other  metals  are  used  in  both  machinery  and 
arms  manufacturing.  The  priority:  the  industrialization  preference  must  be  given  primarily 
to  heavy  industry,  and  within  it  to  machinery  and  steelmaking.  25 
"Rigid  adherence  to  the  priorities  listed  here  leads  to  a  disharmonious,  deformed  sectoral 
structure.  In  the  early  decades  of  forced  growth,  the  extreme  centralization  of  resources 
appears  to  succeed  in  speeding  up  the  rotation  of  the  internal  spiral,  as  the  priority  sectors 
grow  very  fast.  Meanwhile,  other  sectors  fall  behind,  some  of  them  very  seriously.  The 
farther  they  are  from  the  internal  spiral,  the  less  they  impede  its  rotation,  at  least  for  a 
time,  and  the  more  they  are  relegated.  Sectors  mainly  producing  consumer  goods  fall 
behind,  and  so  do  services,  with  housing  construction,  communal  services,  and  trade 
,,  26 
affected  particularly  seriously.  Agriculture  and  transportation  fall  behind  as  well  . 
Accompanying  all  this  are  the  three  phenomena  noted  earlier,  namely:  grave  sacrifices  by 
the  generation  living  in  the  period  of  forced  growth;  postponement  of  nonpriority, 
relegated  tasks  and  accumulation  of  postponed  tasks  to  the  detriment  of  future 
generations;  and  finally,  cases  of  neglect  and  irreparable  damage.  27 
7.  Priority  of  the  arms  industry:  The  investment  demands  of  the  armed  forces,  including 
both  the  army  and  the  police,  receive  unconditional  priority  over  civilian  development 
tasks  . 
28  'Me  establishment  of  factories  for  purely  military  purposes  receives  particularly 
close  attention  when  investment  funds  are  allocated.  This  can  only  be  gathered  in  part 
from  the  published  plans,  since  a  high  proportion  of  the  investments  for  military  and  police 
purposes  are  kept  secret. 
107 11.9.  vi.  Development  of  the  Nficrostructure 
While  the  above  mentioned  are  priorities  to  do  with  sectoral  proportions,  the  following 
priorities  apply  in  the  development  of  the  microstructure. 
Priority  of  new  installations:  Those  running  the  economy  seek  to  set  up  as  many  new 
factories  as  possible  while  neglecting  properly  to  maintain  the  old,  existing  ones.  The 
motivation  is  mainly  political  . 
29Establishment  of  a  brand  new  factory  makes  a  far  more 
spectacular  example  of  overcoming  backwardness  and  of  achieving  fast  development 
than  the  drudgery  of  carefully  maintaining  an  old  factory's  machinery  and  premises. 
The  policy  of  forced  growth  needs  this  construction  fervour,  because  the  worker's 
enthusiasm  is  viewed  as  a  production-boosting  factor. 
2.  Priority  of  big  installations:  Those  in  charge  of  the  economy  are  attracted  to  the  big, 
and  even  more  to  the  vast.  Often  a  veritable  "cult  of  scale"  and  gigantomania 
emerges.  30  Several  factors  push  decision  makers  in  the  direction  of  this  priority.  The 
first  is  the  expectation  of  economies  of  scale  from  larger  size  and  output  volume.  3'  But 
in  practice,  the  greater  volume  is  accompanied  by  extra  costs  as  well  as  savings.  The 
balance  of  the  two  determines  the  optimum  size  of  a  factory  from  the  purely  economic 
point  of  view.  32  The  factory  size  most  advantageous  at  a  particular  place  and  time 
depends  on  the  nature  of  the  sector,  technology,  ability  of  the  managers,  market 
structure,  and  many  other  factors.  This  explains  why  organizations  of  various  sizes  live 
side  by  side  in  market  competition.  By  contrast,  in  the  forced  growth  process  often 
giant  firms  and  institutions  appear  where  several  medium-sized  or  even  small  units 
would  be  more  efficient.  One  can  certainly  say  that  an  indiscriminate  preference  for 
establishing  larger  units  does  not  contribute  to  the  fast  rate  of  growth.  Considerations 
of  power  play  a  part  equal  to  economic  criteria  or  even  greater. 
3.  Priority  products  and  investment  projects:  Among  the  several  thousand  priority 
products,  one  can  discem  a  smaller  set  consisting  of  "most  important  products  of 
all.  9ý33  nese  receive  special  attention  not  only  in  the  annual  plans  and  the  execution  of 
them  but  in  the  allocation  of  investments  and  the  implementation  of  investment 
decisions.  Everything  said  about  the  forcing  of  growth,  about  rush,  and  about 
108 impetuous  haste  can  be  experienced  tangibly  in  the  sequence  of  events  surrounding  a 
priority  investment  project.  From  one  point  of  view  the  one-sided  attention  to  "priority 
products"  and  "priority  investments"  likewise  belongs  to  the  postponement  sphere.  If 
output  of  a  priority  product  grows  fast,  the  fact  can  be  announced  in  plan  reports.  If  a 
priority  investment  project  is  completed,  it  immediately  supplies  a  graphic 
achievement.  The  relative  lag  in  the  production  of  the  other,  nonpriority  products,  the 
neglect  of  parallel  construction  of  the  ancillary  production  apparatus,  and  the  half- 
hearted,  less  attentive  handling  of  the  nonpriority  investment  projects  only  make  their 
braking  effect  felt  after  some,  although  the  effect  comes  in  the  end.  This  breeds  a  great 
many  stoppages  in  production  and  is  one  cause  of  the  chronic  shortage.  34 
4.  Economic  development  at  the  expense  of  the  environment:  Production  growth  takes 
place  at  the  expense  of  environment.  Damaging  the  natural  environment  is  not  system- 
specific.  All  other  social  systems  are  susceptible  as  well;  it  is  among  the  grave 
drawbacks  of  the  capitalist  system.  Many  thought  envirom-nental  damage  would  be 
ended  precisely  by  the  abolition  of  the  greed  and  selfishness  of  private  property.  But  it 
did  not  happen.  The  bureaucracy  of  a  classical  socialist  system  in  the  midst  of  forced 
growth,  rush,  and  importunate  haste  is  even  more  short-sighted  in  this  respect  than  the 
decision  makers  of  other  systems.  This  combines  with  a  system-specific  disadvantage: 
there  is  no  way  of  organizing  in  society  independent,  strong  environmental  movements 
capable  of  confronting  the  economic  decision  makers  if  necessary.  We  illustrate  just 
one  example  in  the  following  Table.  H.  9.4. 
109 T,  ABLE  11.9.4 
AIR  POLLUTION:  Intemational  Comparison,  1985 
Sulfur  Oxides 
(kg  per  head  of  population) 
Note:  Levels  of  industrial  development  and  car  density,  on  the  one  hand,  and  sulfur  oxide 
pollution  of  the  atmosphere,  on  the  other,  show  a  strong  positive  correlation.  It  is  a  sign  of 
acute  neglect  of  environmental  protection  that  air  pollution  began  to  build  up  at  a 
comparatively  low  level  of  economic  development. 
'Sulfur  dioxide  only. 
Failure  to  protect  the  environment  is  among  the  instances  of  postponement  (and  to  a 
degree  irreversible  neglect).  It  cannot  go  on  forever,  for  it  sooner  or  later  starts  slowing 
production  too,  and  its  ill  effect  on  the  quality  of  life  fuels  public  discontent. 
One  can  conclude  at  the  end  of  this  survey  of  priorities  that  the  list  is  certainly  not 
complete  but  probably  includes  the  most  important  of  them.  For  those  who  like  to  think  in 
a  framework  of  optimization  models,  the  goal  of  forced  growth  can  be  defined  as  follows: 
110 
Source:  J.  Kornai  (1992,  p.  179). The  purpose  is  not  maximization  of  social  welfare  in  the  broad  sense.  The  time  scale  for 
the  maximization  task  is  not  infinite,  and  not  even  truly  "long-term"  when  measured  on  a 
historical  scale.  The  goal  is  far  more  limited  and  short-sighted  than  that:  to  maximize  the 
growth  rate  of  aggregate  output  as  recorded  in  the  official  statistics,  and  to  do  this  on  a 
historical  scale  only  in  the  "medium  term,  "  in  other  words,  for  the  next  decade  or  two. 
This  is  the  purpose  served  by  the  priorities  outlined  above,  which  are  capable  of 
promoting  a  faster  growth  rate  only  for  a  time.  35  As  a  consequence  of  these  priorities,  the 
structure  of  the  economy  becomes  disharmonious  and  sets  in  that  disharmonious  state. 
11.9.  vii.  Extensive  and  Intensive  Methods 
Let  us  now  examine  the  relations  between  the  production  factors  and  output  in  the 
growth  process.  We  can  list  the  factor-output  relationships  under  two  main  groups.  The 
first  group  contains  the  effects  caused  by  the  growth  of  some  factor.  For  instance,  the 
stock  of  capital  or  the  total  labour  expended  on  production  grows,  and  that  causes  output 
to  grow  proportionally.  The  second  group  covers  the  effects  caused  by  the  growth  of  the 
productivity  of  some  factor.  For  instance,  more  efficient  use  is  made  of  capital  or  labour, 
and  that  causes  output  to  grow.  "This  distinction  and  the  accompanying  terminology  are 
quite  widespread  among  Western  writers,  but  writers  in  the  socialist  countries  prefer  to 
use  another  pair  of  expressions,  distinguishing  between  'extensive'  and  'intensive' 
methods.  'Me  two  pairs  of  expressions  are  synonymous:  factor  growth  equals  extensive 
methods,  and  factor-productivity  growth  corresponds  to  intensive  methods.  ,  36  In  our 
study,  we  follow,  the  "Eastern"  terminology.  Strict  dividing  lines  between  various 
extensive  or  intensive  methods  can  only  be  drawn  in  the  framework  of  abstract  analysis.  In 
practice,  they  normally  appear  together.  (See  Appendix  11.9.3.  ) 
The  dominance  of  extensive  methods  is  explained  primarily  by  the  fact  that  the  socialist 
system  usual-ly  comes  to  power  in  backward,  slow-growing  countries  that  make  poor  use 
of  their  resources  from  the  extensive  point  of  view.  Therefore,  there  are  numerous 
opportunities  for  extending  the  utilization  of  them.  We  note  the  following: 
1-  Growth  in  the  number  of  employed. 
ill 2.  More  shifts  and  lengthening  of  working  hours. 
3.  Growth  in  the  area  farmed. 
4.  Wider  exploitation  of  mineral  wealth. 
The  situation  that  results  resembles  war-time  conditions  under  other  systems.  Even  in 
peace-time,  classical  socialism  has  a  'mobilization  economy'.  37  A  "war-consciousness"  is 
filstilled  constantly  by  the  official  ideology:  building  the  economy  is  a  battle  against 
backwardness  and  enemies  without  and  within,  from  which  no  one  and  nothing  can 
withdraw.  ýFhe  struggle  demands  mobilization  of  all  able-bodied  men  and  all  material 
resources. 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  discussion  of  various  intensive  methods,  with  the  advance 
comment  that  they  appear  in  combination  with  each  other  in  the  practice  of  forced  growth. 
1.  Intensity  of  labour. 
2.  Technical  progress. 
3.  Development  of  manpower  skills. 
4.  Organizational  improvement. 
5.  Quantity  at  the  expense  of  quality. 
6.  Overintensive  use  of  service  capacity. 
To  sum  up,  under  conditions  of  forced  growth,  extensive  methods  predominate, 
complemented  by  intensive  methods,  which  have  sometimes  han-nful  effects.  This  general 
qualitative  conclusion  is  supported  by  numerous  econometric  analyses.  Table  11.9.5  gives 
extracts  from  some  calculations  as  an  illustration. 
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. 
Share-,  of  FFactor  oductiv  in  the  Gro 
-LRL-ýýj  LNýrLh  Df  Outaut. 
International  Comparison 
Average  Annual 
Rate  of  Chanze 
Period  Output  Factor  Productivity  Share  of  Factor 
Productivity  in 
Growth  of  Output 
Socialist  Countries 
Czechoslovakia  1960-75  3.0  1.0  0.33 
1976-80  2.2  0.7  0.29 
1981-88  1.4  0.1  0.07 
Poland  1960-75  5.1  2.4  0.47 
1976-80  0.7  -0.6  - 
1981-88  0.8  0.2  0.40 
Soviet  Union  1960-75  4.6  1.2  0.26 
1976-80  2.3  0.5  0.22 
1981-88  1.9  0.5  0.13 
Capitalist 
Countries 
France  1960-73  5.8  3.9  0.67 
1973-79  2.8  1.7  0.65 
1979-88  1.9  1.5  0.75 
Japan  1960-73  10.8  6.6  0.61 
1973-79  3.6  1.8  0.43 
1979-88  4.1  1.8  0.43 
United  Kingdom  1960-73  2.9  2.2  0.76 
1973-79  1.5  0.5  0.60 
1979-88  2.2  1.9  0.95 
Source:  J  Kornai  (1992,  p.  187),  based  on  the  foRowing  sources:  Socialist  Countries: 
1960-75:  P.  R.  Gregory  and  R.  C.  Stuart  (1980,  pp.  378-79);  1976-80  and  1981-88, 
output:  Soviet  Union,  1976-80,  A.  Aslund  (1989,  p.  15),  all  other  data  are  from  P.  Marer 
et  al.  (1991);  factor  productivity:  A  Mejstrik  (1991,  p.  27).  Capitalist  Countries:  1960- 
73:  J.  W.  Kendrick  (1981,  p.  128);  1973-79  and  1979-88,  output:  OECD  (1990,  p.  48); 
factor  productivity:  M.  Mejstrik  (1991,  table  2a). 
Note:  The  measure  of  output  is  GNP,  except  for  capitalist  countries  in  the  periods  after 
1973,  where  the  measure  of  output  is  GDP. 
113 From  the  last  column  on  the  right-hand  side  of  the  table  it  is  apparent  that  total  factor- 
productivity  growth-that  is,  application  of  intensive  methods  -  made  a  relatively  modest 
contribution  in  the  classical  socialist  countries  to  overall  growth.  The  table  shows  clearly 
that  this  is  a  system-specific  characteristic:  the  growth  in  factor  productivity  made  a 
conspicuously  bigger  contribution  to  growth  under  the  capitalist  system  in  the  same 
period. 
11.9.  viii.  Phenomenon  of  C  Icles-Fluctuations  in  Growth 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  considerations  of  certain  dynamic  characteristics  in  growth. 
Three  kinds  of  fluctuation  can  be  distinguished.  (See,  Appendix  H.  9.4.  ) 
1.  "Calendar"  pulsation.  (Annual  plans) 
2.  Endogenous  investment  fluctuation. 
3.  Changes  in  pohtical  line. 
There  are  successive  stages  of  sudden  braking,  slowdown  and  stagnation,  cautious 
revival,  and  unbridled  expansion,  after  which  the  braking  and  a  similar  succession  of 
phases  return.  Then  the  cycle  recommences,  repeating  itself  constantly.  38  The  entire  cycle 
takes  place  amid  conditions  of  rush,  expansion  drive,  investment  hunger,  investment 
tension,  and  chronic  shortage.  Also,  a  change  in  the  political  power  relations  or  the  stance 
taken  by  the  leader  can  lead  to  sudden,  dramatic  turns  even  during  the  same  person's 
period  in  power.  Examples  include  the  transition  from  War  Communism  to  the  NEP  under 
Lenin,  from  slow  development  of  co-operatives  to  swift  and  aggressive  collectivization 
under  Stalin,  from  the  liberal  policy  of  "letting  a  hundred  flowers  bloom"  to  the  "Great 
Leap  Forward"  under  Mao.  In  other  cases  the  sharp  change  comes  when  an  old  leader  dies 
and  his  successor  takes  a  new  policy  course.  Whatever  the  case,  these  sudden  changes  of 
line  have  far-reaching  effects  on  the  economy,  producing  great  swings  in  a  whole  range  of 
indices.  39 
The  various  kinds  of  fluctuation  just  described  are  not  mutuafly  exclusive.  40  One  tbing 
can  certainly  be  said:  socialist  planning  has  belied  the  hope  that  it  would  produce  smooth 
growth  free  of  the  fluctuations,  standstills,  and  setbacks  of  capitalism.  Although  the 
114 fluctuations  under  socialism  are  induced  by  different  mechanisms  and  have  different 
consequences  than  those  under  capitalism,  wave  motions  exist  and  cause  damage  of  a 
great  many  kinds. 
11.9.  ix.  The  System-Specific  Growth  lipe:  Forced  Growth 
We  shall  conclude  this  chapter  by  pointing  out  the  system-specific  growth  type.  The 
literature  has  given  a  variety  of  names  to  the  classical  socialist  system's  specific  type  of 
growth:  forced  growth,  rush,  and  haste.  41  In  our  survey  we  have  already  noted  a  few  main 
features  of  the  growth  process  typical  of  the  classical  system,  and  the  sum  of  these  main 
features  defines  the  type  of  forced  growth.  The  word  "forced"  implies  that  the  acceleration 
of  the  tempo,  rather  than  arising  from  an  integral,  self-propelled  movement  in  society,  is 
compelled  from  above  by  the  bureaucracy.  The  word  "forced"  also  implies  that  the  system 
tries  to  run  faster  than  its  legs  can  carry  it.  This  typical  combination  of  main  features  may 
be  summed  up  as  follows: 
1.  very  high  investment  and  low  consumption  proportions. 
2.  a  specific  set  of  priorities. 
3.  accelerated  utilization  of  the  obvious  potentials  for  extensive  development;  quantity 
drive  at  the  expense  of  quality.  One  is  not  justified  in  calling  this  combination  of  main 
features  a  definite  "growth  strategy.  "  "Strategy"  implies  the  kind  of  plan  selected 
consciously  by  military  commanders,  whereas  the  elements  of  conscious  choice  in 
forced  growth  are  diluted  with  spontaneous,  concomitant  phenomena,  and  even  trends 
that  develop  in  spite  of  the  leadership's  wishes.  Priorities  1  to  6  (as  we  have  outlined 
above)  are  applied  consciously,  influenced  by  the  ideas  of  Marx  and  Lenin  and  other 
contributions  to  the  official  ideology.  But  no  one  adopts  a  conscious  policy  of 
neglecting  quality,  overstretching  utilization  of  the  service  sphere,  damaging  the 
natural  environment,  in  some  periods  reducing  consumption,  and  so  on.  Yet  the 
combination  of  main  features  forms  an  organic  whole:  the  planned  and  spontaneous 
priorities,  conscious  and  instinctive  methods,  and  desired  and  undesired  consequences 
115 go  together.  After  all,  these  features  were  not  chosen  according  to  a  particular 
planner's  own  preferences.  This  type  of  growth  and  the  accompanying  behaviour  and 
mutual  relations  of  those  taking  part  are  formed  largely  by  their  social  situation,  which 
circumscribes  their  scope  for  decision  making.  A  combination  of  prevalent  power 
structure,  ideology,  property  relations,  and  co-ordination  mechanisms,  together  with 
the  system's  initial  state  characterized  by  poverty  and  backwardness,  sets  the  process 
of  growth  on  the  system-specific  path  which  we  have  described.  42 
Our  survey  of  the  structure  and  dynamics  of  the  socialist  state  unveils  the  nature  of  a 
veiled  economic  system.  The  question  that  arises  at  this  stage  is  "how  can  this  happen?  " 
There  are  various  ways  of  answering  this  question.  Our  method  would  be  to  follow  a  set 
of  basic  socialist  economic  growth  models  which  were  shaped  to  bring  about  the  objective 
of  the  socialist  state.  In  other  words,  this  would  be  an  examination  of  the  features  of 
forced  growth  in  the  light  of  the  diverse  theoretical  literature  on  growth. 
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THE  SOCIALIST  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN 
EMPHASIS  ON  PRIMITIVE  ACCUMULATION 
The  age  of  historical  socialism  has  dawn  in.  A  new  design  of  socio-economic  and 
political  culture  was  in  the  making.  Any  leap  forward  from  the  existing  system  depends  on 
an  economic  leap.  The  agents  of  the  socialist  state  followed  a  method  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation. 
II.  10.  i.  The  Emergence  of  Preobrazhensky 
A  sharp  debate  on  growth  policy  took  place  in  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  1920's,  '  when 
one  of  the  foremost  economists  on  the  "left  wing,  "  Preobrazhensky,  put  forward  his 
notable  theory  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation.  Marx  had  well-known  ideas  about 
primitive  capitalist  accumulation,  which  was  accompanied  by  brutal  expulsion  of  the 
peasants  from  their  land,  enforcement  of  a  high  rate  of  saving,  and  thereby  the  first  "big 
push"  to  speed  up  the  growth  of  capitalism.  According  to  Preobrazhensky,  something 
similar  must  inevitably  occur  under  the  socialist  system.  Investment  must  be  concentrated 
on  industry,  particularly  heavy  industry,  and  retardation  of  light  industry  and  agriculture 
consciously  accepted.  Resources  needed  for  investment  must  be  obtained  by  forced 
saving.  Consumption  must  be  kept  on  a  tight  rein,  or  even  forced  back.  Produce  must  be 
bought  cheaply  from  the  peasants,  whose  purchasing  power  must  be  cut  further  by  taxes 
and  high  industrial  prices.  There  must  be  accelerated  collectivization  of  agriculture,  which 
among  other  things  will  free  labour  required  for  industrialization.  2  By  a  tragic  irony  of 
history,  Preobrazhensky  and  many  exponents  of  his  ideas  fen  victim  to  the  terror  of  Stalin, 
who  then  went  on  to  implement  some  components  of  his  recommendation  in  a  way  even 
Preobrazhensky  probably  did  not  envisage. 
122 H.  1  ii.  Preobrazhenskj  Mod  el 
When  accumulation  policy  was  discussed  in  the  1920s  in  the  Soviet  Union  more  specific 
problems  had  to  be  tackled.  Preobrazhensky  considers  the  problems  of  an  economy  in 
transition  to  socialism,  especially  the  financing  of  'primitive'  socialist  accumulation,  i.  e. 
capital  accumulation  within  the  state  sector  of  a  mixed  economy  (as  opposed  to  capital 
accumulation  in  the  whole  economy  where  public  and  private  sector  still  coexist  under  a 
socialist  regime).  The  methods  he  suggests  for  channelling  the  surplus  produced  in  the 
private  sector  to  the  State  sector  have  all  been  widely  used  to  finance  socialist 
industrialization  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  other  socialist  countries. 
H.  10.  iii.  A  Systematic  Comparison  between  the  Initial  Stages  of  Capitalist  and 
Socialist  Mode  of  Production. 
In  order  to  understand  the  early  phase  of  development  of  the  Soviet  economy  it  is 
extremely  helpful  to  carry  out  a  systematic  comparison  between  the  first  steps  of  socialism 
and  the  first  steps  of  the  capitalist  mode  of  production.  This  comparison  is  most 
instructive  and  will  greatly  assist  us  in  our  analysis.  Both  the  similarity  and  the  difference  - 
and  the  differences  are  incomparably  greater  than  the  similarities  -  bring  out  remarkably 
well  the  special  features  of  the  Soviet  system  of  economy.  Let  us  begin  with  the  most 
important  difference,  which  conditions  a  number  of  others. 
Capitalist  production  arises  and  develops  within  the  womb  of  feudal  society,  or  of  feudal 
society  which  has  been  half  disintegrated  by  commodity  economy,  many  decades  before 
the  bourgeois  revolutions.  This  fully  applies  to  the  development  of  merchant  capital,  as  the 
necessary  preliminary  stage  of  capitalist  production.  It  applies  also  to  the  first  steps  of 
manufacture  in  England  and  to  the  first  steps  of  capitalist  machine  industry  on  the 
Continent.  "Capitalism  was  able  to  pass  through  its  period  of  primitive  accumulation  in  the 
age  of  absolutism  in  politics  and  of  simple  commodity  production  and  feudal-serfdom 
relations  in  the  economic  sphere.  ,3 
123 Bourgeois  revolutions  begin  after  capitalism  has  gone  far  in  building  up  its  system  in  the 
economic  sphere.  'Me  bourgeois  revolution  is  only  an  episode  in  the  process  of  bourgeois 
development,  which  begins  long  before  the  revolution  and  goes  on  more  rapidly  after  it. 
The  socialist  system,  on  the  contrary,  begins  its  chronology  with  the  seizure  of  power  by 
the  proletariat.  This  follows  from  the  very  essence  of  the  socialist  economy  as  a  single 
complex  which  cannot  be  built  up  molecularly  within  the  world  of  capitalism.  "While 
merchant  capital  could  develop  in  the  pores  of  feudal  society,  while  the  first  capitalist 
enterprises  could  function  without  coming  into  irreconcilable  contradiction  with  the 
existing  political  structure  and  property-forms  (rather  being  nourished  by  their  juices),  the 
complex  of  state  socialist  production  can  appear  only  as  a  result  of  a  breaking  through  of 
the  old  system  all  along  the  line,  only  as  a  result  of  social  revolution.  A  This  fact  is  of 
colossal  significance  for  understanding  not  only  the  genesis  of  socialism,  but  also  the  entire 
subsequent  process  of  socialist  construction. 
H.  10.  iv.  Rgquisites  for  Capitafist  Accumulation 
For  capitalist  accumulation  to  begin,  according  to  Preobrazhensky,  the  following 
requisites  were  needed: 
1.  A  preliminary  accumulation  of  capital  in  particular  hands  to  an  extent  sufficient  for  the 
application  of  a  higher  technique  or  of  a  higher  degree  of  division  of  labour  with  the 
same  technique. 
2.  ne  presence  of  a  body  of  wage-workers. 
3.  A  sufficient  development  of  the  system  of  commodity  economy  in  general  to  serve  as 
the  base  for  capitalist  commodity  production  and  accumulation. 
Regarding  the  first  of  these  conditions  Marx  says:  "The  basis  of  the  production  of 
commodities  can  admit  of  production  on  a  large  scale  in  the  capitalist  form  alone.  A 
certain  accumulation  of  capital  in  the  hands  of  individual  producers  of  commodities  forms 
therefore  the  necessary  preliminary  of  the  specifically  capitalist  mode  of  production.  We 
had,  therefore,  to  assume  that  this  occurs  during  the  transition  from  handicraft  to  capitalist 
industry.  It  may  be  called  primitive  accumulation  -  because  it  is  the  historic  basis  instead  of 
the  historic  result  of  specifically  capitalist  production.  9. v  5  The  question  arises  of  how 
124 matters  stand  in  this  connection  with  primitive  'socialist'  accumulation.  Has  socialism  a 
pre-history?  If  so,  when  does  it  begin? 
11.10s.  Has  Socialism  a  Pre-Hist2r:  Y2. 
As  we  have  seen  above,  primitive capitalist  accumulation  could  take  place  on  the  basis 
of  feudalism.,  whereas  socialist  accumulation  cannot  take  place  on  the  basis  of  capitalism. 
Consequently,  if  socialism  has  a  pre-history,  this  can  begin  only  after  the  conquest  of 
power  by  the  proletariat.  The  nationalization  of  large-scale  industry  is  also  the  first  act  of 
socialist  accumulation,  that  is,  the  act  which  concentrates  in  the  hands  of  the  state  the 
minimum  resources  needed  for  the  organization  of  socialist  leadership  of  industry.  In 
socializing  large-scale  production  the  proletarian  state  by  that  very  act  changes  from  the 
start  the  system  of  ownership  of  the  means  of  production:  it  adapts  the  system  of 
ownership  to  its  future  steps  in  the  matter  of  socialist  reconstruction  of  the  whole 
economy.  In  other  words,  the  working  class  acquires  by  revolution  only  that  which 
capitalism  already  possessed  in  the  shape  of  the  institution  of  private  property,  without  any 
revolution,  on  the  basis  of  feudalism.  "Primitive  socialist  accumulation,  as  a  period  of  the 
creation  of  the  material  prerequisites  for  socialist  production  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word 
could  begin  only  with  the  seizure  of  power  and  nationalization.  .,  6 
. 
Preobrazhensky  distinguishes  the  concepts  of  socialist  accumulation  and  primitive 
socialist  accumulation  in  the  following  words.  By  'socialist'  accumulation  we  mean  the 
addition  to  the  functioning  means  of  production  of  a  surplus  product  which  has  been 
created  within  the  constituted  socialist  economy  and  which  does  not  find  its  way  into 
supplementary  distribution  among  the  agents  of  socialist  production  and  the  socialist  state, 
but  serves  for  expanded  reproduction.  'Primitive  socialist'  accumulation,  on  the  other 
hand,  means  accumulation  in  the  hands  of  the  state  of  material  resources  mainly  or  partly 
from  sources  lying  outside  the  complex  of  state  economy.  This  accumulation  must  play  an 
extremely  important  part  in  a  backward  peasant  country,  hastening  to  a  very  great  extent 
the  arrival  of  the  moment  when  the  technical  and  scientific  reconstruction  of  the  state 
125 economy  begins  and  when  this  economy  at  last  achieves  purely  economic  superiority  over 
capitalism. 
11.10.  vi.  The  Period  of  Preliminary  Accumulation 
It  is  true  that  in  this  period  accumulation  takes  place  also  on  the  production-base  of  state 
economy.  In  the  first  place,  however,  this  accumulation  also  has  the  character  of 
preliminary  accumulation  of  the  means  for  a  really  socialist  economy,  and  is  subordinated 
to  this  purpose.  Secondly,  accumulation  at  the  expense  of  the  non-state  milieu  greatly 
predominates  in  this  period.  For  this  reason,  Preobrazhensky  called  this  entire  stage  the 
period  of  primitive  or  preliminary  socialist  accumulation;  and  this  is  the  basic  law  to  which 
are  subordinated  all  the  basic  processes  of  economic  life  within  the  range  of  the  state 
economy.  This  law,  moreover,  changes  and  partly  does  away  with  the  law  of  value  and  all 
the  laws  of  commodity  and  capitalist  commodity  economy,  in  so  far  as  they  appear  or  can 
appear  in  this  system  of  economy.  Consequently,  not  only  can  we  speak  of  primitive 
socialist  accumulation,  we  can  understand  nothing  of  the  essence  of  Soviet  economy  if  we 
do  not  discover  the  central  role  which  is  played  in  this  economy  by  the  law  of  primitive 
socialist  accumulation,  which  determines,  in  conflict  with  the  law  of  value,  both  the 
distribution  of  means  of  production  in  the  economy  and  the  distribution  of  labour  power, 
and  also  the  amount  of  the  country's  surplus  product  which  is  alienated  for  expanded 
socialist  reproduction.  7 
H.  10.  vii.  The  Methods  of  Primitive  Accumulation 
Let  us  try  to  analyse  how  matters  were  during  the  period  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation,  as  we  examine  the  methods  of  primitive  accumulation  based  mainly  on 
plundering  of  small-scale  production  and  non-economic  pressure  upon  it.  As  regards 
colonial  plundering,  a  socialist  state,  carrying  out  a  policy  of  equality  between  nationalities 
and  voluntary  entry  by  them  into  one  kind  or  another  of  union  of  nations,  repudiates  on 
principle  all  the  forcible  methods  of  capital  in  this  sphere.  This  source  of  primitive 
accumulation  is  closed  to  it  from  the  very  start  and  for  ever.  According  to 
126 Preobrazhensky,  it  is  quite  different  in  the  case  of  the  alienation  in  favour  of  socialism  of 
part  of  the  surplus  product  of  all  the  pre-socialist  economic  forms.  Taxation  of  the  non- 
socialist  forms  not  only  must  inevitably  take  place  in  the  period  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation,  it  must  inevitably  play  a  very  great,  a  directly  decisive  role  in  peasant 
countries  such  as  the  Soviet  Union. 
Another  source  of  socialist  accumulation  can  be  taxation  of  private  capitalist  profit,  that 
is,  systematic  deduction  from  capitalist  accumulation.  When  the  state  imposes  heavy  taxes 
on  private  capitalist  enterprises  it  is  restoring  to  the  fund  of  socialist  accumulation  part  of 
the  surplus  value  which  would  have  been  received  as  surplus  product  by  the  state  if  it  had, 
all  other  conditions  being  equal,  been  conducting  these  enterprises  itself.  In  so  far  as  the 
socialist  state  taxes  traders,  buyers-up,  capitalists,  and  kulaks  who  obtain  part  of  their 
income  from  the  peasantry  who  carry  on  'independent  economies'  we  have  here 
accumulation  at  the  expense  of  the  peasant  economy  (accumulation  at  the  expense  of  the 
semi-proletarian  labour  of  the  country  side).  The  persons  mentioned  constitute  both  the 
accumulators  of  capitalist  accumulation  and  the  intermediate  stage  of  one  of  the  processes 
of  socialist  accumulation.  As  regards  state  loans,  which  form  a  very  important  channel  of 
primitive  capitalist  accumulation,  their  role  is  different  in  the  period  of  socialist 
accumulation.  In  spite  of  having  reservations  against  external  loans,  these  loans  can  serve 
as  a  powerful  stimulus  to  socialist  accumulation,  contributing  thereby  a  larger  percentage 
to  the  socialist  accumulation  fund  than  they  contribute  to  the  capitalist  accumulation  fund. 
When  the  state  is  at  the  same  time  an  organ  which  rules  the  country  and  the  master  of  a 
huge  economic  complex.,  issue  of  paper  money  directly  serves  as  a  channel  for  socic-dist 
accumulation.  8 
H-10-viii.  Economic  Channels 
The  model  of  Preobrazhensky  presents  another  method  of  primitive  accumulation  of 
capital  by  way  of  economic  channels.  Here  we  must  distinguish  between  accumulation 
which  is  carried  out  in  production  itself,  at  the  expense  of  the  surplus  value  created  in 
enterprises  belonging  to  the  proletariat,  and,  on  the  other  hand  the  exchange  of  a  smaller 
127 quantity  of  labour  by  one  system  of  economy  or  one  country  for  a  larger  quantity  of 
labour  furnished  by  another  system  of  economy  or  another  country 
The  difference  from  the  period  of  primitive  capitalist  accumulation  here  consists,  first,  in 
the  fact  that  socialist  accumulation  has  to  take  place  at  the  expense  not  only  of  the  surplus 
product  of  petty  production  but  also  of  the  surplus  value  of  capitalist  economic  forms. 
Secondly,  the  difference  here  is  conditioned  by  the  fact  that  the  state  economy  of  the 
proletariat  arises  historically  on  the  back  of  monopoly  capitalism  and  therefore  has  at  its 
disposal  means  of  regulating  the  whole  economy  and  of  redistributing  the  national  income 
economically  which  were  not  available  to  capitalism  at  the  dawn  of  its  history.  'Ilie 
fundamental  law  of  primitive  socialist  accumulation  is  the  mainspring  of  the  entire  Soviet 
state  economy.  "The  more  backward  economically,  petty-bourgeois,  peasant,  a  particular 
country  is  which  has  gone  over  to  the  socialist  organization  of  production,  and  the  smaller 
the  inheritance  received  by  the  socialist  accumulation  fund  of  the  proletariat  of  this 
country  when  the  social  revolution  takes  place,  by  so  much  the  more,  in  proportion,  will 
socialist  accumulation  be  obliged  to  rely  on  alienating  part  of  the  surplus  product  of  pre- 
socialist  forms  of  economy  and  the  smaller  wifl  be  the  relative  weight  of  accumulation  on 
its  own  production  basis,  that  is,  the  less  will  it  be  nourished  by  the  surplus  product  of  the 
workers  in  socialist  industry.  Conversely,  the  more  developed  economically  and 
industrially  a  country  is,  in  which  the  social  revolution  triumphs,  and  the  greater  the 
material  inheritance,  in  the  form  of  highly  developed  industry  and  capitalistically  organized 
agriculture,  which  the  proletariat  of  this  country  receives  from  the  bourgeoisie  on 
nationalization,  by  so  much  the  smaller  will  be  the  relative  weight  of  pre-capitalist  forms  in 
the  particular  country;  and  the  greater  the  need  for  the  proletariat  of  this  country  to  reduce 
non-equivalent  exchange  of  its  products  for  the  products  of  the  former  colonies,  by  so 
much  the  more  will  the  centre  of  gravity  of  socialist  accumulation  shift  to  the  production 
basis  of  the  socialist  forms,  that  is,  the  more  will  it  rely  on  the  surplus  product  of  its  own 
industry  and  its  own  agriculture.  "9 
Preobrazhensky's  model  is  aimed  at  "the  nourishment  of  the  state  economy  at  the 
expense  of  the  non-socialist  n-dlieu"  especially  at  the  early  stage  of  socialist  formation  of  a 
128 state  in  order  that  it  may  gain  a  momentum  in  its  objective  of  development.  If  capitalism  is 
motion,  socialism  is  still  more  rapid  motion.  'O  And  what  it  loses  in  speed  in  the  period  of 
primitive  accumulation,  in  the  sense  of  development  of  its  technical  economic  base,  owing 
to  extreme  poverty  in  capital,  it  is  obliged  to  make  up  for  by  intensified  accumulation  at 
the  expense  of  the  non-socialist  milieu.  This  view  of  economic  growth  played  an  important 
role  during  the  period  of  Stalin.  Two  more  views  could  be  associated  with  this  way  of 
promoting  the  objective  of  socialist  state. 
II.  10.  ix.  Lewis  Model 
One  of  the  main  ideas  in  Arthur  Lewis's  theory  is  expressed  in  the  title  of  a  classic 
article  of  his:  "Economic  Development  with  Unlimited  Supplies  of  Labour'  Lewis 
analyzes  the  growth  of  capitalist  developing  countries,  where  a  dual  economy  operates:  a 
modem,  fast-growing,  capitalist  sector  coexists  with  a  declining,  backward,  traditional 
sector.  Ilie  former  absorbs  successfully  the  labour  released  by  the  latter.  The  wages  of  the 
labour  flowing  into  the  capitalist  sector  are  decided  by  the  social  norms  for  living 
standards,  not  by  endogenous  market  forces.  Our  socialist  analysis  makes  clear  the 
similarities  and  the  differences  between  the  situation  Lewis  describes  and  the  forced 
growth  of  classical  socialism.  In  both  Lewis's  theory  and  the  practice  of  forced  growth,  a 
key  part  is  played  by  extensive  method  1,  the  fast  expansion  of  employment  and  practically 
unlimited  supply  of  labour  -  until  the  scope  is  exhausted.  Here  only  the  major  differences 
are  mentioned.  In  our  case,  the  modem  sector  is  socialist,  not  capitalist.  According  to 
Uwis's  analysis,  the  capitalist  advance  and  the  profit  motive  are  capable  of  raising  a 
stagnant  developing  country's  saving  proportion  of  4-5  percent  to  12-15  percent.  The 
motivation  described  in  our  analysis,  along  with  the  historically  unprecedented  methods 
available  to  the  socialist  bureaucracy,  can  even  force  a  saving  proportion  of  30-40 
percent.  12 
11.10.  x.  Hirschman-Streeten  Model 
129 The  theory  of  unbalanced  growth  is  associated  with  A.  0.  Hirschman  and  P.  Streeten.  13 
it  is  a  normative  theory;  those  subscribing  to  it  recommend  a  growth  strategy  in  which  a 
few  "driving"  sectors  pull  ahead  and  their  excess  demand  encourages  the  other  sectors  to 
catch  up.  It  is  debatable  whether  that  is  really  the  preferable  strategy  for  a  developing 
country  on  the  capitalist  road.  But,  classical  socialism  follows  this  course  in  practice  as  we 
have  brought  about,  among  other  things,  by  the  combination  of  priorities  described  in  our 
analysis.  The  pull  of  "backward  linkages"  recommended  by  the  adherents  of  unbalanced 
growth  and  the  chronic  shortage  of  socialist  systems  overlap  as  concepts  in  many  respects. 
Primitive  socialist  capital  accumulation  ,  as  described  by  Preobrazhensky,  simply  cannot 
go  on  unobstructed  for  a  long  period.  There  is  neither  unlimited  supply  of  labour  nor  is  it 
advisable  to  follow  an  unbalanced  growth  path.  Therefore,  new  devices  had  to  be 
formulated  to  fulfill  the  economic  objectives.  Since  the  adherents  of  the  socialist  state 
were  convinced  of  the  role  of  capital  formation,  they  decided  to  follow  the  model  of 
investment  to  which  we  shall  proceed. 
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131 CMPTER  ELEVEN 
THE  SOCIALIST  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN 
EMPHASIS  ON  NON-CONSUMPTION-INVESTMENT 
MECHANISM 
The  concept  of  accumulation  has  become  the  keyword  of  the  principle  of  material 
socialism.  In  the  previous  chapter  we  have  described  the  notion  of  primitive  socialist 
accumulation  and  noted  its  limitation.  The  following  analysis  of  the  socialist  economic 
growth  is  based  on  a  remarkable  article  by  the  Soviet  economist  Fel'dman'  (1928a  and 
1928b).  Besides  the  first  five-year  plan,  the  Soviet  State  Planning  Commission  was 
working  then  on  a  so-called  General  Plan  extending  over  a  period  of  some  ten  to  twenty 
years.  Fel'dman  was  instructed  to  prepare  a  theoretical  model  as  a  basis  for  this  plan. 
II.  11.  i.  Fel'dman  Model 
r?  -  I 
rel  dman,  being  a  Marxist  himself,  starts  with  Marx's  celebrated  division  of  the  total 
output  of  an  economy  (W)  into  Category  1-  producer  goods  (raw  materials  and  capital), 
and  Category  2-  consumer  goods,  the  production  of  each  category  expressed  as  the  sum 
of  C  (constant  capital  =  depreciation  plus  raw  materials  broadly  defined),  V  (variable 
capital  =  payrolls),  and  S  (surplus  value): 
Ci+Vi+Si  =Wl 
C2+V2+S2  ýW2 
+V  +S  =W 
With  certain  changes,  this  scheme  would  approximate  our  allocation  of  output  by  factor 
costs  (depreciation,  wages  and  salaries,  and  property  income).  2  Fel'dman,  however,  was 
not  concerned  with  factor  costs;  he  concentrates  all  his  attention  on  the  distribution  of 
currently  produced  capital  goods  (a  part  of  the  output  of  Category  1)  between  the  two 
categories.  But  first  he  had  to  modify  Marx's  scheme  once  more  by  redefining  the 
132 categories.  So  in  his  final  version,  Category  1  produces  all  capital  goods  for  both 
categories,  while  all  consumer  goods,  including  the  corresponding  raw  materials,  are 
produced  in  Category  2,  the  output  of  each  category  consisting  of  its  respective  final 
products  only.  3  As  a  result,  the  economy  is  literally  split  from  top  to  bottom  into  these  two 
categories.  Of  course  any  division  of  an  economy  by  industries,  or  even  of  output  between 
consumption  and  investment,  is  difficult  and  arbitrary,  but  it  is  clear  that  Fel'dman's 
method  creates  special  difficulties.  4  pigoU,  S5  wage-goods  industries,  Hayek'  S6  stages  of 
production,  Marx'  S7  standard  scheme,  Hicks'  S8  induced  versus  autonomous  investment,  all 
give  rise  to  models  with  an  elusive  empirical  content  and  yet  not  devoid  of  interest.  The 
empirical  content  of  his  model  worried  FeFdman  less  than  its  deviation  from  the  standard 
Marxist  scheme.  Yet,  this  is  a  growth  model  constructed  on  a  Marxist  foundation9  and  it 
may  be  of  use  in  unravelling  a  few  puzzles  in  Soviet  economic  development  and  in 
achieving  a  better  understanding  of  Soviet  economic  thinking.  It  also  raises  some 
questions  regarding  economic  development  in  general. 
H.  11.  ii.  Assumptions  of  the  Model 
Like  other  growth  models,  Fel'dman's  model  is  based  on  a  number  of  simplifýdng 
assumptions,  such  as:  constant  prices;  capital  as  the  only  limiting  factor;  absence  of  lags;  a 
closed  economy;  production  independent  of  consumption;  'O  absence  of  government 
expenditures  as  a  separate  category  distinct  from  consumption  and  investment;  absence  of 
bottlenecks;  and  several  others.  The  division  of  the  economy  between  the  two  categories 
is  complete,  in  the  sense  that  no  existing  capital  can  be  transferred  from  one  to  another 
(there  being  no  other  limitations  on  production).  Thus  the  rate  of  investment  is  rigidly 
determined  by  the  capital  coefficient  and  the  stock  of  capital  in  Category  1.  Similarly,  the 
output  of  consumer  goods  is  determined  by  the  stock  of  capital  and  the  capital  of 
coefficient  of  Category  2.  "  Hence  the  division  of  total  output  between  consumption  and 
investment  at  any  given  moment  depends  on  the  relative  productive  capacities  of  the  two 
categories,  and  not  on  the  propensity  to  save,  though  the  latter  can  reassert  itself  by 
causing  an  underutilization  of  the  capital  stock  in  one  category  or  another,  a  waste  ruled 
133 out  in  the  model.  The  division  of  total  investment  (that  is,  of  output  of  Category  1) 
between  the  two  categories  is,  however,  completely  flexible.  Indeed,  the  fraction  of  total 
investment  allocated  to  Category  1  is  the  key  variable  of  the  model.  12 
11.1l.  ni.  Mathematical  Derivation  of  the  Model 
Let  us  derive  Fel'dman's  results  by  considering  the  case  of  permanent  assets.  (and  assets 
subject  to  wear.  also  could  be  considerd.  ) 
P-ermanent  Assets 
13 
List  of  Symbols.  (In  order  of  their  appearance). 
7=  fraction  of  total  investment  allocated  to  Category  1. 
I=  annual  rate  of  net  investment  (output  of  Category  1. 
II  .d  12indicate  annual  rates  of  net  investment  allocated  to  the  respective  categones,  so 
that  11  +12  ý-- 
time  measured  in  years. 
V=  marginal  capital  coefficient  for  the  whole  economy. 
V,  , dV2  indicate  the  marginal  capital  coefficients  of  the  respective  categories  (not  to  be 
ýconfused  with  Marx's  V). 
C=  annual  rate  of  output  of  consumer  goods  (not  to  be  confused  with  Marx's 
Y=  annual  net  rate  of  output  of  the  whole  economy  (national  income). 
a=  average  propensity  to  save  (ratio  of  total  investment  to  national  income). 
aI=  marginal  propensity  to  save  (ratio  of  the  increment  in  total  investment  to  the 
increment  in  national  income). 
lo,  Co,  and  Yo  indicate  the  respective  initial  magnitudes  of  these  variables  (when  t=  0). 
By  definition  of  7, 
It 
=  71,  (1) 
134 and  since  only  11  increases  the  capacity  of  Category  1, 
dI/dt  =  11  /Vi. 
rl 
I- 
ý,  uDstituting  1  into  2,  we  obtain 
d/I  =  YI/  Vi, 
A-  -  die  solution  of  which  is 
I=  lo.  e  (ytvl)t 
To  simplify  all  derivations,  we  set  Io  =  1;  then 
I=  (Y/V  1)  t; 
in  other  words,  total  investment  will  grow  at  a  constant  exponential  rate  of  y/Vi. 
Again,  by  definition  of 
12  ý  (1 
-Y)  I  -": 
(1 
-7) 
(Y/vl)t 
12  being  the  only  source  of  increased  capacity  in  Category  2, 
dC/dt  -ý 
12  N2 
--,: 
(1 
-TN2  )e  (Y/Vl)t  and  (7) 
C=  Co  +  (1_Y/y  )  Vl  /V2  [te(y/vl)t)-11, 
dY/dt  =  dC/dt  +  dl/dt  =  e(y/vl)t/  Vj  V2  IVJ_7(Vl_v2  )I,  (9) 
I+C  =  YO  +1(1-7/7)  VI  /  V2,  +  1]  [le(ytvl)tl-ll.  (10) 
'Mus  C  and  Y  each  represent  a  sum  of  a  constant  and  an  exponential  in  t. 
Their  rates  of  growth  will  therefore  differ  from  y/  Vi.  As  time  goes  on,  the  exponential  will 
dominate  the  scene  and  the  rates  of  growth  of  C  and  Y  will  gradually  approach  T/  Vi.  But 
this  may  take  quite  a  long  time,  unless  of  course  it  so  happens  that:  Co  =  (1-y/y)  V,  /  V2,  in 
which  case  the  constants  will  vanish  and  C  and  Y  will  grow  at  the  rate  of  yN,  from  the 
very  begi  in  ,  but  this  is  not  an  interesting  case  from  the  int  of  view  of  this  Model.  14  1MM9  Po 
11.1l.  iv.  The  Rate  of  Growth  of  Investment 
135 Why  the  rate  of  growth  of  investment  here  differs  from  the  one  derived  in  the  earlier 
growth  models  (cf.  Harrod-Domar).  The  latter  was  equal  to  a/V  where  a  indicated  both 
the  marginal  and  the  average  propensities  to  save  and  V  was  the  over-all  capital 
coefficient.  To  compare  the  earlier  models  with  Fel'dman's  it  is  necessary  to  rework  their 
results  without  the  assumption  that  the  average  propensity  to  save,  a,  equals  the  marginal 
one,  a'.  We  shall  continue  to  treat  a'  as  a  constant,  but  since  a#  a',  a  has  now  become  a 
variable.  It  can  be  easily  shown  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  investment  will  now  be  a'/V.  '5 
The  expression  a'/V  is  of  course  the  ratio  of  the  marginal  propensity  to  save  to  the  over- 
all  capital  coefficient.  In  Fel'dman's  model,  however,  we  have  obtained  yN,  as  the  rate  of 
growth  of  investment,  where  7  is  the  fraction  of  investment  allocated  to  Category  1,  and 
V,  is  the  capital  coefficient  of  this  category  only. 
Let  us  find  a'  of  the  present  model.  From  5  and  9  we  obtain 
YV2  /Vl 
-7 
(Vl 
- 
V2  ) 
--,:  Y/  (VI/  V2  )-71  VI  N2  ) 
-11 
(11) 
In  the  special  case  when  V,  =  V2we  obtain  the  not-quite-expected  result  that 
(12) 
that  is,  Fel'dman's  fraction  of  investment  allocated  to  Category  1  and  Keynes's  marginal 
propensity  to  save  become  identical.  16  If  V1  ý>  V2then  of  course  7>  a'.  That  Fel'dman's  7 
and  Keynes's  a'  should  be  so  closely  related,  and  even  identical  when  V,  =  V2,  may  be 
surprising,  but  it  is  merely  a  reflection  of  the  fact  that  if  a  certain  fraction  of  the  increment 
in  national  income  W)  is  to  be  devoted  to  investment,  a  corresponding  fraction  of 
investment  (y)  must  be  allocated  to  capital  goods  industries  to  make  the  production  of  this 
increment  in  investment  possible.  17  In  other  words,  in  a  growing  economy  some  capital  is 
used  to  make  more  capital.  The  explicit  recognition,  of  this  fact  is,  one  of  the  virtues  of 
Fel'dman's  model,  though  ironically  enough  Fel'dman  kept  insisting  that  the  final  purpose 
of  all  production  is  consumption.  In  a  growing  economy  this  is  simply  not  true. 
The  relationship  between  V,  and  V2on  the  one  hand  and  V  (the  over-all  coefficient  for 
the  whole  economy)  on  the  other  is  also  simple.  The  rate  of  growth  of  investment  being 
independent  of  the  manner  in  which  it  is  expressed., 
136 y  /Vi  =  a'/V. 
Solving  11  for  y  in  terms  of  a',  we  have 
y= 
a'Vl/V2+a'(Vl-V2)., 
and  inserting  14  into  13,  we  obtain 
a'Vi  +(l-a')V2, 
that  is,  V  is  a  weighted  average  of  V,  andV2.18 
11.11.  v.  The  Development  Decisions 
The  development  decisions  made  in  terms  of  a  or  a'  imply  corresponding  decisions 
regarding  the  magnitude  of  y,  and  vice  versa.  The  average  propensity  to  save  (ratio  of 
investment  to  income)  a  plays  a  minor  role  in  Fel'dman's  model.  It  can  be  computed  and 
it  is  relevant  to  many  policy  decisions  (the  level  of  taxation,  for  instance),  but  it  has  no  life 
of  its  own,  so  to  speak,  and  is  completely  determined  by  the  relative  productive  capacities 
of  the  two  categories,  because  the  underutilization  of  capital  in  either  category  is  excluded 
by  the  assumed  absence  of  any  limits  to  production  other  than  capital.  According  to 
Fel'dman's  model,  a  closed  economy  without  well-developed  metal,  machinery,  and 
subsidiary  industries  (the  complex  of  the  so-called  heavy  industries)  is  unable  to  produce  a 
sizeable  quantity  of  capital  goods  and  thus  to  invest  a  high  fraction  of  its  income,  however 
high  its  'potential'  saving  propensity  may  be.  In  Soviet  economic  thinking  the  former 
consideration  has  been  predominant;  in  our  recent  literature  the  ability  to  save  has  been 
emphasized.  Perhaps  a  synthesis,  or  more  correctly,  a  return  to  a  synthesis,  is  in  order.  '9 
A  country's  investment  can  grow  very  rapidly  even  with  a  low  average  propensity  to 
save  for  some  time.  The  latter  does,  however,  determine  the  rate  of  growth  of  income,  and 
a  low  a  will  of  course  result  in  a  slowly  growing  income.  But  a  low  a  is  not  incompatible 
with  a  high  rate  of  growth  of  investment  for  a  period  of  time.  Here  may  be  found  at  least  a 
partial  explanation  of  their  simultaneous  existence  in  Soviet  Russia,  as  found  by  Norman 
20  Kaplan,  a  phenomenon  which  has  puzzled  some  economists.  With  capital  coefficients 
137 1--aing  treated  as  given,  the  one  and  only  variable  which  can  be  varied  as  an  instrument  of  LJ%' 
planning  is  our  y,  the  fraction  of  total  investment  allocated  to  Category  1  (capital  goods 
industries).  Since  Fel'dman's  model  allows  complete  intra-category  flexibility,  7  can  vary 
all  the  way  from  zero  to  one.  21  The  optimum  size  of  y  (and  it  need  not  be  constant)  chosen 
by  the  planning  authorities  will  depend  on  what  they  consider  to  be  the  purpose  of 
economic  development. 
H.  1l.  vi.  The  PuMose  of  Economic  Development 
If  the  purpose  of  economic  development  lies  in  the  maximization  of  investment  or  of 
national  income  (without  differentiation  between  investment  and  consumption)  at  a  point 
of  time,  or  of  their  respective  rates  of  growth,  or  of  integrals  over  time,  y  should  be  set  as 
high  as  possible.  This  is  always  true  for  investment,  and  nearly  always  for  income,  the  only 
exception  being  when  V,  greatly  exceeds  V2,  and  even  then  for  only  a  short  period  of 
time.  22  A  high  y  does  not  imply,  however,  any  reduction  in  consumption.  with  capital 
assets  assumed  to  be  permanent,  even  y=1  would  merely  freeze  consumption  at  its  original 
level.  If  assets  were  subject  to  wear,  consumption  would  be  slowly  reduced  by  failure  to 
replace  them.  Finally,  a  transfer  of  resources  from  consumption  to  investment  industries 
would  reduce  consumption  still  further.  The  latter  possibility  is,  however,  excluded  from 
Fel'dman's  model. 
Such  an  indifference  between  consumption  and  investment  irrespective  of  the  magnitude 
of  y  (or  of  a)  must  be  rare  even  among  Soviet  planners:  after  all,  consumption  standards 
affect  the  ability  and  the  incentive  of  the  populace  to  work  and  the  willingness  to  obey. 
Fel'dman,  who  did  not  regard  labour  as  a  factor  limiting  production,  had  no  room  for  such 
considerations,  but  he  insisted  time  and  again  that  consumption  was  the  sole  purpose  of 
23  production,  the  emphasis  given  to  investment  in  his  model  being  only  temporary.  He  did 
not  specify  whether  the  variable  to  be  maximized  should  be  consumption  at  a  point  of 
time,  or  its  rate  of  growth,  or  its  integral  over  time;  whether  consumption  should  be 
discounted  or  not;  and  what  value,  if  any,  should  be  attached  to  the  increasing  capital 
138 stock  as  such,  particularly  in  Category  1,  so  important  during  a  war.  On  the  whole,  he  was 
most  concerned  with  the  (relative)  rate  of  growth  of  consumption,  and  desired  a  high  7 
with  that  end  in  mind. 
19.1l.  vii.  The  Dual  Effect  of  i  on 
The  examination  of  the  expression  8  1C=C0+(1-7/7)VI/V2  [[e(y/v1)tj-1J  ]quickly  reveals  that  7 
has  a  dual  effect  on  C.  As  the  numerator  of  the  exponent  of  e(y/vl)t,  it  is  related  to  C 
directly;  as  a  member  of  the  expression  (1-y)/y,  inversely.  As  y  increases,  the  latter  falls 
very  rapidly;  thus  with  y=0.1,  (1-y)/y  =  9;  when  y=0.2,  (1-y)/y  =  4;  ay  of  0.5  brings  it 
down  to  1.  Over  short  periods  of  time  C  is  dominated  by  (1-y)/y  and  is  therefore  depressed 
by  a  high  y.  As  time  goes  on,  the  exponential  '("/")twiIl  assert  itself,  and  a  high  y  will 
eventually  produce  a  large  C. 
When  one  variable  (y)  has  a  dual  effect  on  another  (C),  it  is  usually  possible  to  find  the 
magnitude  of  the  former  maximizing  the  latter.  It  can  be  shown  that  7  maximizing  C  at  a 
given  point  of  time  is  given  by  the  expression 
y=  1-  (1-e-(Y/vl)'/(y/Vi  (16) 
and  that  this  value  of  7,  being  independent  ofV2  ,  varies  inversely  with  V1,  and  directly 
with  t  (it  is  a  direct  function  of  the  ratio  t/Vi);  thus  the  longer  the  period  in  question,  the 
higher  the  value  of  y  should  be  set.  All  this  presupposes  a  constant  y  over  time.  A  variable 
y  would  be  a  more  flexible  instrument.  24  "Since  a  planning  horizon  is  a  hazy  notion  at  best, 
even  if  expressed  in  terms  of  one  or  more  five-year  plans,  the  maximization  of 
consumption  at  some  point  of  time  provides  no  sensible  clue  to  the  optimum  magnitude  of 
7.9-,  25  To  explain  this  mathematical  puzzle,  FigureII  11.1  presents  the  actual  behaviour  of  C 
over  time. 
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140 The  lower  straight  line  corresponding  to  y=1  is  horizontal:  all  investment  being 
allocated  to  Category  1,  consumption  stays  at  its  original  level  without  any  increase.  This 
example  is  an  extreme  and  misleading  one  because  even  a  slight  reduction  in  y  (to  90  per 
cent)  results  in  a  rapid  growth  of  C  (the  solid  curve)  after  a  few  years.  The  y=0  straight 
fine  is  more  interesting:  here  all  investment  is  directed  to  consumer  goods  industries 
(Category  2);  hence  the  capacity  of  Category  1  remains  constant,  as  does  its  output,  i.  e. 
the  total  stream  of  investment.  Consequently  the  capacity  of  Category  2  increases,  but 
only  at  a  constant  absolute  rate.  Its  relative  rate  of  growth  declines  with  time.  26  The 
dotted  curves  on  Figure  1  correspond  to  several  reasonable  magnitudes  of  y  (10,20,  and 
50  per  cent),  and  as  expected,  the  higher  the  y,  the  smaller  C  is  in  the  early  years,  and  the 
more  rapidly  it  grows  thereafter.  These  curves  are  fairly  close  to  each  other  and  to  the 
straight  line  y=0;  they  all  intersect  the  latter  within  a  surprisingly  narrow  period  of  time, 
in  our  case  between  6  and  8  eight  years.  This  explains  why  the  maximization  of  C  gave 
such  an  unstable  magnitude  of  7.27 
The  message  conveyed  by  Figure  1  is  fairly  clear:  if  the  planning  authorities  have  a  short 
time  horizon,  they  may  just  as  well  leave  capital  goods  industries  alone  and  stay  on  the  line 
y=0.  As  their  horizon  expands,  a  strong  effort  to  develop  these  industries  should  be 
made.  Not  much  is  gained  by  playing  with  small  magnitudes  of  y.  If  reality  only 
corresponded  to  Fel'dman's  model,  the  presence  of  so  many  undeveloped  countries  would 
be  inexplicable.  28 
The  maximization  of  consumption  at  a  point  of  time  may  not  be  a  satisfactory  objective 
of  economic  development  because  it  implies  an  indifference  to  the  behaviour  of 
consumption  during  the  intervening  period.  To  remedy  this  defect,  the  integral  of  C  over 
the  whole  period  should  be  maximized  instead. 
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142 As  shown  on  Figure  11.11.2,  the  dotted  (y  =50  per  cent)  curve  and  the  solid  (y  =  0)  one 
are  so  close  together  that  there  is  no  room  for  drawing  the  y=  10  and  y=  20  per  cent 
curves.  (Note,  however,  the  difference  in  scale  between  the  two  charts.  )  If  drawn,  all  these 
curves  would  again  intersect  the  y=0  one  in  a  very  narrow  range,  between  9  and  11 
years,  though  the  range  itself  is  further  away  in  time  than  it  was  on  Figure  IL  11.1  (6  and  8 
years).  For  a  country  with  a  reasonably  long  time  horizon,  a  high  magnitude  of  y  is  still 
worth  while.  This  approach,  however,  turns  out  to  be  no  more  helpful  in  determining  the 
optimum  magnitude  of  7  than  the  preceding  one  did.  29 
H.  1l.  viii.  Critique  of  the  Model 
These  refinements  did  not  bother  Fel'dman  particularly.  To  him,  the  aim  of  economic 
development  lay  in  the  long-run  maximization  of  consumption,  and  particularly  of  its 
(relative)  rate  of  growth.  As  an  objective  of  economic  development,  the  latter  can  be 
misleading,  because  it  abstracts  from  the  absolute  magnitude  of  C  at  a  given  point  of  time. 
Obviously,  a  slow  growing  C  can  exceed  a  rapidly  growing  one,  at  least  for  some  time,  if 
it  started  from  a  higher  level.  This  is  not  important  for  Fel'dman's  model  because  the 
initial  magnitude  of  C  is  the  same  for  all  time  patterns.  But  the  rate  of  growth  of  C  is  not 
constant  over  time,  and  as  shown  on  Figure  11.11.1,  rapid  growth  at  the  beginning  is 
achieved  at  the  expense  of  slower  growth  later,  and  vice  versa.  Fel'dman  could  justify  his 
disregard  of  these  aspects  of  the  model  by  his  concern  for  the  long  run  only.  In  the  long 
run,  which  need  not  be  very  long,  a  higher  y  will,  as  a  rule,  result  in  a  more  rapidly 
growing  consumption  . 
30  The  notions  of  time  preference  and  the  rate  of  interest  do  not 
seem  to  play  any  role  in  this  model. 
V- 
9 
Ful  dman's  task  was  to  explain  to  the  Soviet  planners  the  basic  principles  of  economic 
growth  and  to  furnish  them  with  several  alternative  patterns  of  development,  depending  on 
ý1-  - 
Me  magnitudes  of  y  and  of  the  capital  coefficients.  It  was  up  to  the  planners  to  choose  the 
optimum  path,  depending  on  their  own  objectives,  and  on  their  evaluation  of  existing 
economic  and  political  conditions  and  possibilities.  31 
143 Our  survey  of  the  experience  of  historical  socialism  reveals  the  existence  of  an 
investment-consumption  tension  which  had  a  retardation  effect  on  economic  development. 
Actually,  Marx  himself,  was  aware  of  the  problems  brought  about  by  the  crises  of 
underconsumption  under  capitalism  and  wanted  to  solve  this  problem  under  socialism. 
While  providing  explanation  of  why  cyclical  crises  are  destined  to  occur  in  capitalism,  he 
tried  to  explain  the  crises  in  terms  of  underconsumption.  He  noted  the  effects  of 
insufficient  effective  demand  on  the  part  of  workers  for  the  commodities  they  have 
produced.  Marx  writes:  "The  ultimate  reason  for  all  real  crises  always  remains  the  poverty 
and  restricted  consumption  of  the  masses,  in  the  face  of  the  drive  of  capitalist  production 
to  develop  the  productive  forces  as  if  only  the  absolute  consumption  of  society  set  a  limit 
to  them.  02  The  same  basic  idea  is  again  expressed  as  follows  in  his  Theories  of  Surplus 
Value.  "The  greatest  part  of  the  producers  (the  workers)  are  non-consumers  (non-buyers) 
of  a  very  considerable  part  of  their  product,  they  can  only  consume  an  equivalent  for  their 
product  as  long  as  they  produce  more  than  this  equivalent-surplus  value  or  surplus 
product.  They  must  always  be  over-producers,  must  always  produce  over  and  above  their 
needs,  in  order  to  be  able  to  be  consumers  or  buyers  within  the  limits  of  their  needs.  963 
Essentially,  the  point  which  Marx  makes  is  that  the  forces  at  work  under  capitalism 
inevitably  do  not  produce  an  equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand  for  consumers' 
goods,  nor  an  equilibrium  between  supply  and  demand  for  luxuries.  The  problem  of 
underconsumption  has  not  been  seriously  addressed  by  Fel'dman;  rather  he  opted  to 
provide  a  model  of  investment,  hoping  this  model  would  solve  the  problem  of 
underconsumption  in  the  long-run.  Historical  socialism  proved  this  fatal  to  its  own 
foundations.  More  investment  coupled  with  less  consumption  raises  the  issue  of  savings. 
The  role  of  savings  in  a  socialist  state  is  a  new  phenomenon  in  the  theory  of  economic 
growth  and  let  us  endeavour  to  examine  this  aspect  in  the  following  chapter. 
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A  SOCIALIST  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN 
EMPHASIS  ON  NON-SAVINGS-INVESTMENT  MECHANISM 
Modem  macroeconomics  theories  of  economic  growth  outlines  the  role  of  savings  in 
economic  development.  The  relationship  that  exists  between  savings  and  investment  is 
clear  in  a  capitalist-market  economy  system.  But  it  is  not  so  conspicuous  in  a  socialist- 
planned  economy  system.  The  following  is  an  attempt  to  understand  the  role  of  savings 
and  the  relationship  between  savings  and  investment  in  a  socialist  economic  growth  model. 
II.  12.  i.  Accumulation  and  Economic  Growth 
There  is  a  widespread  belief  that  Marx  confined  his  vision  of  the  realization  of  socialism 
to  the  most  advanced  capitalist  countries  but  it  is  pointed  out  that  he  only  postulated  that  a 
level  of  capitalist  development  would  have  to  be  reached,  sufficient  for  the  creation  of  an 
industrial  proletariat.  "The  fact  that  the  'weakest  link'  of  the  system  turned  out  to  be  a 
relatively  underdeveloped  country  vastly  damaged  by  war  put  a  strong  emphasis  on 
accumulation  and  growth,  first  to  reconstruct  the  economy,  then  to  engage  the  economy  in 
a  race  with  the  advanced  capitalist  countries,  with  an  aim  to  reach  and  overcome  these 
countries  and  realize  the  'higher'  stage  of  communism.  "'  The  emphasis  on  accumulation 
and  growth  therefore,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapters,  played  a  crucial  role  in  the 
shaping  of  the  first  instance  of  a  socialist  economy.  The  process  of  capital  accumulation  is 
enhanced  by  investment  and  investment  is  supposed  to  be  enhanced  by  saving. 
M.  H.  Dobb's  essay  "A  Note  on  Saving  and  Investment  in  a  Socialist  EconoMy,,  2  is  an 
important  contribution  to  the  general  theory  of  investment  under  socialism.  He  points  out 
the  relation  between  wages,  prices  and  savings-accumulation  policy  and  discusses  the  use 
of  interest  rates  in  short  and  long  term  planning.  Hitherto  discussion  of  a  socialist 
economy  has  been  preoccupied  with  the  problem  of  the  allocation  of  a  given  quantity  of 
resources  between  various  uses,  and  little  or  no  attention  has  been  given  to  problems 
148 noted  by  Dobb.  To  solve  the  problem  of  ideal  allocation  a  number  of  writers  like  Lange,  3 
Lerner,  4  and  HaI15  have  agreed  in  proposing  that  decisions  as  to  output  and  investment  in  a 
socialist  economy  should  be  ruled  by  the  following  principles. 
II.  12.  ii.  Aflocation  Principles 
In  his  essay  "On  the  Economic  Theory  of  Socialism"..  0  Lange  suggests  that  all  prices, 
whether  in  the  case  of  finished  goods  or  of  factors  of  production,  shall  be  fixed  by  a 
process  of  trial  and  error  until  an  'equilibrium  price'  is  found  at  which  the  current  supply  is 
equal  to  the  demand.  If  the  commodity  or  factor  in  question  is  in  surplus  supply  (e.  g.  if 
unsold  stocks  are  accumulating)  the  price  will  be  lowered;  if  it  is  in  deficit-supply,  the 
price  will  be  raised.  Secondly,  decisions  as  to  output  and  investment  shall  be  taken  by  each 
industry  on  the  basis  of  carrying  the  utilization  of  resources  to  the  point  where  marginal 
cost  is  equated  to  price:  the  output  of  each  plant  presumably  being  extended  to  the  point 
where  the  short-period  (or  prime)  cost  of  additional  output  is  equal  to  the  value  of  that 
output,  and  new  investment  in  the  industry  being  undertaken  if,  and  only  if,  the  additional 
output  resulting  from  the  investment,  when  valued  at  current  prices,  equals  or  exceeds  its 
long-period  cost,  including  the  current  interest-charge  on  the  capital  involved  in  the 
construction  of  the  new  equipment.  6  The  advantage  of  this  mechanism  that  its  sponsors 
appear  to  have  in  mind  is  that  it  would  facilitate  a  considerable  decentralization  of 
investment  and  output  decisions.  "The  central  planning  authority  need  decide  only  the 
'total'  amount  to  be  invested  (thoug  how  to  decide  this  total  still  remains  unknown)  in  any 
period:  the  direction  and  the  form  of  the  investment,  and  a  fortiori  the  output  of  existing 
plants,  could  be  left  to  the  managements  of  the  various  industries  to  determine  according 
to  the  second  of  the  above  rules.  All  that  the  central  planning  authority  would  need  to  do, 
having  decided  the  total  investment  for  the  system  as  a  whole,  would  be  to  adjust  the 
aggregate  demand  for  capital  to  that  supply  by  appropriate  shifts  of  an  interest  rate.  ,7 
It  is  pointed  out  by  Dobb  that  a  system  controlled  in  this  way  may  inherit  two  of  the 
principal  vices  of  capitalism.  With  a  price-mechanism  of  this  kind  in  operation,  the  only 
way  of  precluding  a  large  measure  of  chronic  unemployment  may  be  to  maintain  the  rate 
149 of  investment  at  a  given,  'arbitrary'  level,  which  may  be  quite  different  from  the  level  that 
would  be  dictated  by  other  considerations.  Moreover,  it  is  not  difficult  to  show  that, 
unless  some  stabilizing  mechanism  is introduced,  in  addition  to  or  as  a  substitute  for  this 
pricing-mechanism,  a  socialist  economy  may  inherit  the  instability  of  capitalism  in  an  even 
more  pronounced  form.  "As  soon  as  it  is  realized  that  the  'demand  for  capital'  is  a 
function,  inter  alia,  of  the  current  rate  of  investment,  and  that  this  demand  will  vary 
directly,  and  not  inversely,  with  the  rate  of  investment,  ceteris  paribus,  the  existence  of  a 
powerful  de-stabilizing  influence  inherent  in  this  relationship  becomes  apparent.  q18  In  other 
words,  the  so-called  schedule  of  the  marginal  efficiency  of  capital  is  not  independent  of  the 
rate  of  investment.  If  the  rate  of  investment  is  increased  (or  decreased),  so  will  be  the 
inducement  to  invest;  and  the  situation  will  be  one  of  unstable  equilibrium,  where  the 
tendency  to  a  Wicksellian9  cumulative  movement,  with  increased  investment  'creating  its 
own  draught,  can  hardly  be  controlled  efficiently  by  a  trial-and-error  process  of  searching 
for  an  equilibrium-price  for  capital.  If,  moreover,  an  attempt  is  made  to  adhere  to  the  rule 
of  equating  price  and  marginal  cost,  the  volume  of  output  from  existing  plant,  and  hence 
employment,  will  be  determined  by  the  relation  between  the  price  level  of  finished  goods 
and  money  wages,  and  this  relation  is  also  a  function  of  the  rate  of  investment.  If, 
therefore,  the  rate  of  investment  upon  which  the  State  happens  to  have  decided  is  a 
relatively  low  one,  unemployment  may  be  impossible  to  avoid,  since  to  intensify  the 
utilization  of  existing  plant  by  employing  more  labour  per  unit  of  equipment  would  cause 
marginal  prime  cost  to  exceed  price.  (This,  of  course,  is  to  assume  that  output  is  at  the 
level  at  which  short-period  costs  are  'rising'.  )  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  condition  of  full 
employment  has  already  been  attained,  it  win  be  impossible  both  to  increase  the  rate  of 
investment  and  at  the  same  time  to  maintain  an  equality  between  price  and  cost,  even 
between  price  and  short-period  marginal  cost.  'o 
H.  12.  iii  Assumptions 
To  elucidate  the  reason  for  these  statements  let  us  examine  the  working  of  such  a 
mechanism  as  is  proposed  by  Lange  and  Lerner  and  Hall,  in  a  simplified  situation  and  in 
150 their  own  terms.  To  make  the  task  of  analysis  easier  we  will  start  by  discussing  the 
assumptions  employed  in  these  models.  (a)  We  will  assume  both  that  the  only  form  of 
personal  income  consists  of  wages,  "  and  that  wage-earners  spend  the  whole  of  their 
income  in  a  given  period  on  consumption  goods  -  that  their  saving  is  zero.  (b)  We  will 
assume  that  prime  costs  of  current  output  consist  exclusively  of  wages  (this  is  plausible  if 
we  imagine  that  each  industry  is  vertically  integrated,  and  that  production  in  each  plant 
embraces  all  processes  from  extraction  from  the  soil  to  a  finished  product).  We  may 
further  assume  that  each  industry  undertakes  the  repair  and  maintenance  of  its  own  plant, 
employing  permanent  repair  workers  as  well  as  process-workers,  and  counts  the  wages  of 
the  former  in  its  prime  or  operating  costs.  (c)  We  will  assume  that  land  is  a  free  good  and 
is  not  priced,  so  that  the  only  element  in  total  cost  other  than  wages  consists  of  the 
accounting-price  of  capital,  as  currently  fixed  by  the  State  Bank  or  Investment  Board  or 
Central  Planning  Council.  (d)  We  will  assume  that  there  is  technical  homogeneity  between 
various  industries  to  the  extent  of  making  the  ratio  of  capital  to  labour  approximately 
uniform  in  the  mall.  (e)  We  will  assume  that  the  amount  of  reserve  productive-capacity 
that  exists,  at  the  outset,  in  the  industries  producing  consumption-goods  is  small  (i.  e. 
short-period  costs  have  a  rising  tendency).  It  will  be  obvious  that  there  follows  from 
assumptions  (a)  and  (b)  the  corollary  which  can  be  expressed  by  saying  that:  C=W  and  P 
=  (pW  where  C  represents  the  value  of  output  of  consumption  goods,  W  represents  the 
total  wage-bill  of  the  country,  P  represents  total  profits  of  industry,  and  y  the  proportion 
of  the  total  wage-bill  which  is  expended  by  the  State  in  new  constructional  work  (i.  e.  yW 
is  the  rate  of  investment).  12 
11.12.  iv.  Four  Classes  of  Decisions 
It  will  be  convenient  to  distinguish  four  classes  of  decisions  that  the  management  of 
industry  will  have  to  make. 
1-  Given  a  plant  of  a  particular  type  and  size,  how  much  labour  to  employ  in  that  plant  and 
how  much  output  to  obtain  from  it?  This  we  will  call  the  intensity  of  utilization  of  a  given 
Plant  by  labour.  If  the  second  of  the  above  rules  is  observed  (controlling  output  in  such  a 
way  as  to  attempt  to  equate  price  and  marginal  cost),  this  will  depend  on  the  price  of 
151 output,  the  level  of  wages  and  the  extent  to  which  marginal  operating  cost  (MOC)  rises  as 
the  intensity  of  utilization  of  the  plant  is  increased.  The  difference  between  the  price  of 
output  and  the  average  operating  cost  (AOQ  multiplied  by  the  output  will  represent  the 
profit  of  that  plant. 
2.  What  should  be  the  size  of  each  plant?  This  will  be  determined  by  the  average  total  cost 
(ATC)  of  production  in  plants  of  different  sizes  according  to  the  rule  that,  where  the 
plants  in  the  industry  are  numerous,  that  size  of  plant  should  be  chosen  which  makes  ATC 
a  rninimum.  13  This  can  be  expressed  by  Lerner's  envelope  U-curve,  where  the  envelope 
curve  represents  the  ATC  under  plants  of  different  sizes,  and  the  smaller  curves  tangential 
to  it  represent  the  cost  of  producing  with  a  plant  of  a  given  size. 
3.  What  should  be  the  number  of  plants  in  an  industry?  This  will  generally  depend  on  the 
profit  that  each  plant  is  making,  as  defined  under  1.  If  the  profit-rate  (i.  e.  the  ratio  of  profit 
to  the  value  of  the  plant  when  valued  at  reconstruction-cost)  being  earned  by  a  typical 
plant  in  an  industry  is  greater  than  the  accountmg-pnce  of  capital,  then  presumably  the 
number  of  plants  will  generally  be  increased,  and  vice  versa.  (Note  that  the  economies  and 
diseconomies  may  make  expansion  or  contraction  desirable  even  when  the  profit-rate  is 
equal  to  the  accounting-price  of  capital.  ) 
4.  Which  of  a  variety  of  technical  types  of  plant  (irrespective  of  their  size)  to  choose  to 
construct?  These  types  will  differ,  not  only  in  that  operating  costs  under  each  type  of  plant 
will  be  different,  but  also  in  their  costs  of  construction  and  maintenance.  It  will  follow  that 
if  the  accounting-price  of  capital  is  low,  plant-types  which  have  a  relatively  high  cost  of 
construction,  compared  to  the  economies  of  operating  costs  that  they  promise,  will  be 
preferred  to  a  greater  extent  than  when  the  accounting-price  is  high.  Changes  of  this  class 
9  14 
represent  Hawtrey's  'deepening  process',  as  distinct  from  his  'widening  process  . 
II-12.  v.  Wages-Prices-Profit-Saving  Mechanism 
Let  us  suppose  that  the  State,  in  order  to  stimulate  an  increase  of  investment,  lowers  its 
accounting-price  for  capital.  There  will  then  be  a  tendency  for  changes  under  3  and  4  to 
152 take  place.  The  increased  constructional  activity  will  involve  either  a  transfer  of  labour 
from  making  consumption  goods  to  construction  jobs,  or  else  the  absorption  of  previously 
unemployed  labour  into  construction  work.  The  net  effect  win  be  a  rise  in  the  price  of 
consumption  goods  (measured  either  in  money  or  in  wage-units);  '5  since,  as  we  have  seen 
above,  P,  which  =  C-(W-q)W),  varies  with  the  rate  of  investment.  In  other  words,  if  the 
demand,  depending  on  the  total  wage-bill,  rises  relatively  to  the  supply  of  consumption 
goods,  as  will  be  the  consequences  of  increased  investment,  the  consumption  price-level 
rnust  rise  relatively  to  the  wage-level.  At  a  later  stage,  it  is  true,  as  the  new  plants  come 
into  existence,  the  output  of  consumption  goods  will  increase  and  their  price  will  tend  to 
fall  again.  But  for  the  time  being  while  the  investment  is  taking  place,  the  price  level  of 
finished  output  will  inevitably  rise,  and  with  it  the  profits  of  industry.  "This  rise  will, 
indeed,  measure  the  community's  'saving';  the  profits  of  industry  corresponding  to  the 
rate  of  investment,  so  that  from  a  budgetary  point  of  view  the  State  investment 
programme  will  be  self-financing,  creating  exactly  the  amount  of  profit  necessary  to 
finance  the  investment.  "  16 
But  this  very  rise  of  price,  by  increasing  profits,  has  increased  the  'demand  for  capital', 
and  hence  raised  the  equilibrium-price  of  capital  above  the  level  at  which  it  originalýy 
stood.  If  the  State  delays  the  raising  of  its  accountig-price  (after  the  initial  lowering  of  it), 
the  inducement  to  expand  constructional  activity  will  not  only  persist,  but  will  grow 
cumulatively  greater.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  after  initially  lowering  its  rate  to  stimulate,  it  is 
too  quick  to  raise  it  again  as  a  check  on  the  inflationary  tendency,  it  may  find  itself 
heralding  an  opposite  effect.  In  other  words,  the  difficulty  which  today  exists  in 
influencing  long-term  investment  through  changes  in  the  short-term  rate  may  reappear, 
and  reappear  in  an  accentuated  form.  17 
These  results  will  not  appear  strange  to  those  familiar  with  the  proposition  that  'saving 
equals  investment'.  Where  the  State  is  the  investor,  its  investment  decisions  will  determine 
and  create  the  communal  'saving'  necessary  to  finance  it,  as  will  be  the  case  when 
investment  is  done  by  private  entrepreneurs.  But  when  all  (or  nearly  all)  personal  incomes 
are  spent,  this  saving  must  partake  of  the  nature  of  so-called  'forced  saving':  the 
153 significant  effect  of  the  investment  will  be,  not  to  enhance  the  money  incomes  of 
individuals,  but  the  income  of  the  State  in  the  shape  of  industrial  profits.  The  notion  that 
the  State  'creates'  its  own  profits  by  its  own  investment  is,  of  course,  analogous  to  the 
contention  of  Kalecki  (1937)  18  that,  on  similar  assumptions,  capitalists'  spending  'creates' 
capitalists'  profits  (see  also  van  Dorp,  1937).  '9  If,  therefore,  changes  in  the  price  of 
output,  and  in  the  profits  to  which  these  give  rise,  are  allowed  to  influence  the  investment 
decisions  of  industry,  a  cumulative  tendency  will  be  latent  in  any  acceleration  or 
deceleration  of  investment  during  the  short  period. 
This  characteristic  of  the  situation  is  more  marked  in  a  Socialist  economy  (unless  its 
investment  is  centrally  planned)  because,  in  so  far  as  wages  are  the  only  form  of  personal 
income  and  little  or  nothing  is  'saved'  out  of  wages,  the  demand  for  finished  output  is 
identified  with  the  short-period  cost  of  output  unless  State  expenditure  is  taking  place.  In 
a  capitalist  society  other  incomes  than  wages  exist,  and  to  the  extent  that  expenditure  from 
these  incomes  (measured  in  real  ten-ns)  tends  to  alter  inversely  with  the  price  of  finished 
output,  a  stabilizing  element  is  introduced;  and  it  is  on  some  such  assumption  as  this  that 
traditional  writers  seem  to  have  relied  when  they  have  pictured  the  system  as  tending 
towards  stable  equilibrium,  and  in  particular  have  treated  variations  in  money  wages  as  an 
equilibrating  influence.  20 
154 H.  12.  vi-  Sut)erioriU  of  the  Centrally  Planned  Investment  Mechanism 
Dobb  rendered  centrally  planned  investment  superior  to  a  decentralized  system 
operating  under  the  control  of  an  accounting  price  or  interest  rate.  It  is  that  by  the  former 
method  investment  could  be  more  wisely  and  consistently  planned  through  time,  since 
investment  decisions  could  be  taken  in  the  light  of  fuller  knowledge  of  the  data  on  which 
the  rightness  or  wrongness  of  such  decisions  must  depend.  "This  would  seem  to  be  so 
crucial  an  element  in  the  superiority  of  a  socialist  over  a  capitalist  economy  as  to  render  it 
an  essential  keystone  of  a  planning  system.  9.,  21  If,  on  the  other  hand,  questions  of  plant 
construction  were  left  to  be  decided  decentrally,  according  to  rule-of-thumb  responses  to 
accounting  prices,  the  industrial  managers  who  decided  these  things  would  be  largely 
ignorant  of  future  developments,  upon  which  their  decisions  ought  to  depend.  It  follows 
from  the  situation  in  which  they  are  placed  that  these  managers  could  not  have  all  the 
22  relevant  data  before  them;  and  this  is  the  crucial  difficulty.  Since  investment  represents  a 
locking  up  of  resources  over  time,  the  'future'  price  of  capital  and  the  future  price  of 
products  would  be  relevant  to  any  of  the  decisions  of  types  2,3,  and  4  referred  to  above. 
The  capitalist  entrepreneur  takes  his  decision  on  the  basis  of  'expectations'  as  to  the  future 
trend  of  these  factors,  and  because  these  expectations  are  necessarily  mere  guesses, 
mistakes  and  subsequent  jerks  in  development  and  fluctuations  develop.  On  what  is  the 
industrial  manager  in  a  socialist  economy  to  base  his  decision?  In  order  to  estimate  the 
future  trend  of  interest-rates  and  the  price  of  his  product,  he  will  have  to  guess  not  only 
what  the  State  policy  with  regard  to  investment  is  going  to  be,  but  what  the  current 
reaction  of  industrial  managements  is  going  to  be  to  the  current  interest  rate  -  how  much 
current  construction  work  is  being  undertaken  in  the  economy  at  large,  and  its  results.  In 
other  words,  the  future  trend  will  itself  be  affected  by  his  own  decision  and  that  of  all  his 
fellow  industrialists.  It  seems  inconceivable  that  this  guessing-game  can  be  reduced  to  any 
simple  set  of  rules.  Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  Lange's  accounting  price  for  capital,  if 
it  is  to  be  a  long-term  rate,  can  be  a  'trial  and  error'  rate  in  any  significant  sense  of  the 
term,  since  the  process  of  trial  and  error  that  is  to  test  it  and  adjust  it  necessarily  fies  in  the 
future,  and  is  itself  being  influenced  by  current  happenings  which,  under  a  regime  of 
decentralized  investment  decisions,  are  outside  the  planning  authority's  immediate  control. 
155 it  would  seem  as  though  the  only  accounting  price  for  capital  that  can  properly  be  said  to 
1-.  a 
,,  subject  to  trial  and  error,  and  hence  have  any  tendency  to  be  a  'true  rate',  is  a  short- 
term  ra  e. 
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Where  decisions  cannot  be  quickly  revised,  as  is  the  case  with  long-term  investment,  it 
would  seem  to  be  rational  that  a  series  of  decisions,  each  of  which  affects  the  others, 
should  be  co-ordinated  in  a  unified  decision  instead  of  being  separated  into  a  number  of 
autonomous  decisions.  This  is  possible  with  a  moderate  degree  of  planning  with  a  wider 
vision.  In  a  planned-socialist  economic  system  where  wages,  prices,  consumption  and 
profits  are  directed  according  to  the  investment  motive,  the  role  of  savings  mechanism  is  a 
dubious  matter. 
Savings  in  a  centrally  planned  economic  system  is  a  non-existent  phenomenon.  In  a 
literal  sense,  there  is  no  savings.  Since  planned  investment  is  the  controlling  force,  the  role 
of  savings  is  irrelevant  as  far  as  economic  decisions  are  concerned.  The  decision  of  the 
central  planners  to  reduce  the  consumption  of  the  households  is  no  alternative  mechanism 
for  savings  mechanism.  It  is  this  misunderstanding  among  the  socialist  planners  that 
derailed  the  investment  in  the  long-run  and  thereby  stagnated  the  growth  of  the  economy. 
If  the  socialist  state  has  to  survive,  the  household  consumption  has  to  be  improved.  The 
priority  to  consumption  over  production  goods  resulted  in  a  new  debate,  to  which  we  shall 
proceed. 
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159 EEN 
THE  NEO-SOCIALIST  ECONOMIC  GROWTH  MODEL  WITH  AN 
EMPHASIS  ON  CONSUMPTION 
During  the  stage  of  transitional  socialism,  tighten  the  belt  approach  was  thought  to  be 
the  right  course;  where  promises  of  future  but  imminent  prosperity  was  given.  But  when 
this  method  was  continued  into  the  classical  socialism,  the  adherents  of  socialist  principles 
were  shattered.  Their  dream  of  more  consumption  was  translated  into  the  bleak  reality  of 
shortage  and  rationing.  The  socialist  mechanism  of  capital  accumulation,  investment  and 
production,  though  gave  a  new  and  bright  face  to  socialism,  in  reality  it  marred  the  face  of 
the  household.  'Me  following  analyzis,  based  on  the  research  by  Brus  and  Laski  (inspired 
by  Kalecki's  work  and  by  the  Polish  experience),  stresses  the  conflict  between  the  then 
rate  of  consumption  and  growth,  and  the  factors  limiting  economic  growth,  anticipating  a 
new  trend  of  giving  priority  to  consumption  rather  than  to  production  goods;  and 
therefore  this  can  be  considered  as  a  neo-socialist  model  of  economic  growth.  The  model 
of  Kalecki,  while  emphasizing  the  necessity  of  a  shift  towards  consumption,  also  brings 
out  the  problems  in  the  theory  of  growth  under  socialism. 
11.13J.  Dimensions  of  the  Factors  of  Growth 
'Problems  in  the  theory  of  growth  under  socialism.,  written  by  W.  Brus  and  K.  Laski.,  1 
outlines  a  general  approach  to  the  factors  of  growth.  According  to  them  realistic  models 
of  growth  in  a  socialist  economy  take  as  their  starting-point  the  problems  of  the 
dimensions  of  available  factors  of  growth.  Rather  than  the  problems  of  aggregate  effective 
demand,  they  emphasize  'supply'  as  limiting  the  size  and  the  growth  rate  of  production. 
Factors  concerning  the  'supply-side'  can  be  dealt  with  in  two  ways:  first  from  the  point  of 
view  of  current  labour  (labour  reserves  and  their  increase;  level  of  productivity  and  its 
changes).  Viewed  thus  the  gross  national  income  (Y)  is  determined  by  the  product  of 
employment  (Z)  and  productivity  (W)  defined  as  gross  value  added  per  employee: 
160 Y=zw  (1) 
CCU- 
,  ondly,  we  can  approach  the  same  problems  from  the  point  of  view  of  stored-up  labour 
(stocks  of  means  of  production  and  their  increase;  effectiveness  of  means  of  production 
and  its  changes).  Thus  the  gross  national  income  can  be  presented  as  the  product  of  the 
real  productive  fixed  capital  (M)  by  the  effectiveness  of  this  fixed  capital  (E)  defined  as 
gross  value  added  per  unit  of  capital,  or 
Y=  ME  (2) 
The  model  of  growth  formulated  by  Kalecki2  (p.  174,2)  forms  a  suitable  starting-point  for 
the  following  discussion. 
11.13.  ii.  Kalecki  Model 
On  the  basis  of  the  methodological  assumptions  expressed  by  formula  1,  the  rate  of 
growth  of  the  national  income  (r)  during  the  period  t  is  determined  in  this  model  as 
follows: 
AY/Y  =  a+p  (3) 
where  AY  is  the  increment  of  national  income  during  the  period  t,  i.  e.  the  difference 
between  gross  national  income  at  the  period  t  and  the  period  t-  1; 
Y  is  gross  national  income  at  the  period  t-1; 
a  is  the  rate  of  increase  in  average  productive  employment  at  the  period  t  in  relation  to 
period  t-  1; 
is  the  rate  of  increase  in  average  labour-productivity  at  the  period  t  in  relation  to  period 
1.  (The  product  a.  P  is  omitted  as  negligible). 
Thus  the  rate  of  income  growth  is  the  sum  of  the  rate  of  increase  in  employment  and  of 
the  rate  of  increase  in  productivity.  But  both  the  increase  in  employment  and  the  increase 
in  productivity  assume  at  the  same  time  a  corresponding  increase  in  real  productive  fixed. 
161 capital  and  in  its  effectiveness.  Thus  the  rate  of  income  growth  should  at  the  same  time  be 
expressed  in  terms  of  the  methodological  assumption  resulting  from  formula  2: 
r=  AY/Y  =  ix(l/m)-a+u 
where 
(4) 
1:  is  gross  productive  investment  in  fixed  capital  (the  increase  in  inventories  omitted  for 
simplicity)  at  the  period  t-  1,  put  into  operation  at  the  period  t; 
i=  I/Y  is  the  rate  of  investment  or  the  share  of  gross  productive  investment  in  the  gross 
national  income  at  the  period  t-1; 
m:  is  the  investment  outlay  necessary  to  obtain  an  increase  in  national  income  by  one  unit 
or  the  ratio  I/AY',  where  AY'  is  the  increase  in  national  income  due  to  investment; 
a:  coefficient  of  the  decrease  in  national  income  resulting  from  the  actual  loss  of  means  of 
production  or  the  diminution  in  their  effective  functioning  due  to  physical  depreciation; 
u:  coefficient  of  the  increase  of  national  income  resulting  from  all  kinds  of  improvements 
raising  the  effectiveness  of  the  existing  real  productive  fixed  capital. 
Kalecki  stresses  the  fact  that  formula  4  cannot  be  applied  in  a  capitalist  economy,  as 
A-  - 
mere  the  coefficient  V  is  not  an  independent  variable  and  fluctuates  gently  (even  in  terms 
of  +  or  -)  as  a  result  of  the  business  cycle.  On  the  other  hand  in  a  socialist  economy  in 
normal  conditions  this  coefficient  is  always  positive,  reflecting  the  tendency  of  continued 
improvement  of  the  existing  productive  apparatus.  It  results  therefrom  that  the  magnitude 
ix(l/m)  becomes  a  strategic  factor  detennining  the  rate  of  economic  growth.  This 
argument  can  be  reinforced  by  emphasizing  that  in  a  capitalist  economy  the  rate  of 
investment  also  is  not  independent  of  the  magnitude  'm',  which  really  determines  the 
rentability  of  investments  (assuming  a  given  distribution  of  income  between  profits  and 
wages)  -  In  comparing  the  fon-nulae  3  and  4  we  see  that:  a+P  =  ix(l/m)--ýx+u  as  is  obvious, 
since  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  national  income  does  not  change  according  as  we  look  at  it 
from  the  point  of  view  of  labour  or  of  real  productive  fixed  capital. 
162 Full  Utilization  of  the  National  Growth  Potential 
The  confrontation  of  these  two  aspects  is  important  as  it  enables  us  to  realize  some  of 
the  interrelations  needed  to  define  the  optimal  rate  of  growth  in  given  conditions.  It  is 
obvious  that  first  of  all  the  key  magnitude  I/Y  =  i,  i.  e.  the  rate  of  investment  must  be 
properly  established.  The  degree  of  complexity  of  the  problem  of  properly  defining  the 
rate  of  investment  depends  on  the  degree  of  variability  of  the  remaining  factors  to  which 
the  rate  of  investment  should  correspond.  "Thus,  to  obtain  the  optimal  rate  of  growth,  it 
would  be  necessary  to  do  two  things  only:  first,  to  establish  satisfactorily  the 
unequivocally  determined  rate  of  investment;  secondly,  to  put  into  operation  a  mechanism 
to  ensure  the  actual  attainment  of  such  a  rate  of  investment  and  its  maintenance  at  the 
same  level.  ýA  And  yet  every  step  toward  reality  must  mean  at  the  same  time  a  progressive 
relaxation  of  the  assumptions  regarding  the  invariability  of  the  factors  present  in  the  model 
under  consideration.  In  reality  the  rate  of  growth  of  available  labour  resources,  as  well  as 
the  rate  of  productivity,  are  variable.  The  coefficients  m,  a  and  u  have  different  values  at 
different  stages,  especially  when  account  is  taken  of  different  time-horizons.  "A  fun 
utilization  of  the  growth  potential  requires  in  reality  a  variable  rate  of  growth,  and 
therefore  also  a  rate  of  investment  that  varies  at  least  at  certain  intervals  of  time.  "5 
This  means  that  the  criteria  for  the  evaluation  of  the  conditions,  within  the  given  social 
and  economic  system,  for  the  optimal  process  of  growth,  cannot  be  limited  to  the 
possibility  of  attaining  once  and  for  all  a  definite  rate  of  investment.  "These  criteria  include 
also  the  essential  factor  of  flexibility  in  establishing  the  rate  of  investment,  a  proper 
relation,  that  is,  of  investment  to  consumption  in  the  national  income.  And  this  flexibility 
must  be  such  that  it  will  not  cause  a  lack  of  effective  aggregate  demand  in  relation  to 
productive  capacities  and  thus  will  not  cause  any  waste  of  the  real  growth  potential.  ý96  A 
socialist  planned  economy  creates  more  favourable  conditions  for  a  full  utilization  of  the 
national  growth  potential  than  those  created  by  an  economy  where  the  general  rate  of 
investments  depends  on  the  private  'propensity  to  invest.  ' 
11.13.  iv.  Acceleration  of  Growth  with  Existing  bour  Reserves 
163 The  rate  of  growth  of  the  national  income  (r)  existing  at  the  starting  period  to  is  below 
the  limit  set  by  the  labour  force  (there  exists  a  reserve  of  population  able  to  work  and  not 
yet  employed)  and  therefore  it  can  be  increased.  The  assumption  of  stability  in  the  rate  of 
increase  of  productivity  (P),  in  as  much  as  P  depends  on  the  coefficient  m,  is  meanwhile 
maintained.  (Polish  experience,  before  1949,  can  be  cited  as  a  case  study  in  this  regard.  )8 
We  shall  examine  the  variability  of  the  rate  of  growth  at  the  period  of  acceleration. 
When  a'  indicates  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  labour-force-supply  due  to  the  rate  of  increase 
of  the  population  with  a  given  ratio  of  active  to  total  population  and  a'>  a,  meaning  that 
the  rate  of  increase  in  employment  has  been  less  than  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  labour 
force,  so  that  the  growth  potential  was  not  fully  taken  advantage  of,  this  would  necessitate 
a  change  from  the  rate  r=  a+P  to  the  rate  of  r'  =  a'+p  (assuming  that  P  remains  constant, 
which  is  not  precisely  true  even  when  the  coefficient  m  remains  unvariable).  A  change, 
however,  from  the  rate  r  to  the  rate  r'  is  a  very  complicated  process  which  cannot  follow  a 
uniform  path.  9  Though  the  gradual  increase  of  r  to  r'  means  a  formal  equalization  of  the 
actual  and  of  the  potential  rate  of  growth,  the  absolute  increase  of  employment  in  this 
situation  is  still  lower  than  the  absolute  increase  in  labour  force.  If  the  above-mentioned 
conditions  were  stabilized,  then  employment  would  grow  by  a',  but  simultaneously 
unemployment  would  grow  also,  at  the  same  rate,  by  a'.  Thus  to  stabilize  the  rate  of 
growth  after  n  years  in  the  year  t,,  at  the  level  r'  there  must  be  some  moment  between  the 
period  to  and  the  period  tn  during  which  the  rate  of  growth  r>  r',  in  order  to  bring  the 
economy  on  to  the  new  course  of  growth.  Only  after  a  period  during  which  the  rate  of 
growth  is  sufficient  both  to  absorb  the  whole  current  increase  in  labour  force  and  in 
addition  the  surplus  of  labour  from  the  preceding  periods,  can  growth  be  stabilized  at  the 
level  r'.  We  have,  therefore,  the  following  course  of  the  process  of  changing  the  economy 
from  the  rate  of  growth  r',  corresponding  to  the  rate  of  increase  of  labour  force  a': 
r-4r9  -4r'9  --->r'  while  r<  r'<  r". 
In  Figure  Il.  13.1  this  process  is  shown  diagramatically. 
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1  6ý5 Until  the  year  to  the  economy  grows  at  the  rate  r  with  the  rate  of  investment  1.  In  the 
year  t.  (intermediate  between  the  year  to  and  the  yeartn  Ohe  economy  attains  for  the  first 
time  the  rate  of  growth  r'  with  a  rate  of  investment  1'.  The  line  AB  shows  the 
development  between  the  year  to  and  t.  rMe  line  BC  shows  the  development  from  the  year 
Ln  to  tn,  when  the  rate  of  income  growth  and  the  rate  of  investments  must  temporarily 
increase  above  r'  and  i'  to  r"  and  i"  to  secure  the  elimination  of  unemployment.  In  the 
year  tn  the  economy  returns  to  the  rate  of  growth  r'  with  the  rate  of  investment  V.  This  is 
the  rate  adapted  to  the  equilibrium  balance  of  the  labour  force.  The  change  to  the  new 
stabilized  growth  goes  through  the  points  A--->B-4C->B.  This  analysis  of  the  probable 
course  of  the  process  of  absorption  of  the  unutilized  labour  force  and  of  the  elimination  of 
this  source  of  difference  between  the  actual  and  the  potential  rates  of  growth  confirms  the 
complexity  of  this  process.  The  rate  of  investment  must  not  only  increase  but  even  exceed 
temporarily  the  long-term  optimal  level  and  decrease  again  later.  This  requires,  among 
other  things,  even  a  temporary  reversal  of  the  direction  of  the  change  in  the  rate  of  growth 
and  in  the  rate  of  investment.  'o 
11.13.  v.  Acceleration  and  the  Dynamics  of  Consumpti  !:  on 
The  basic  problem  is  the  degree  of  freedom  in  determining  the  ratio  of  investment  to 
current  consumption  in  the  national  income.  The  current  consumption  (defined  as  Y-1)  is 
the  more  affected,  the  lower  is  the  starting-point,  defined  as  the  relative  value  r  and  i,  and 
also  the  lower  the  starting  level  of  consumption  per  head  of  population.  The  lower  is  the 
figure  r  in  relation  to  r'  (and  also  r"),  so,  ceteris  paribus,  the  larger  must  be  the  growth  of 
I  The  growth  of  i  diminishes  correspondingly  the  share  of  consumption  in  the  national 
income  0-0,  and  during  the  period  of  acceleration  it  restricts  the  rate  of  increase  in 
consumption.  The  consequences  of  this  restriction  are  the  more  onerous  the  lower  is  the 
level  of  consumption  per  head  of  population.  From  this  point  of  view  of  course  not  only  is 
the  rate  of  acceleration  of  fundamental  importance,  but  also  the  length  of  time  in  which  the 
economy  is  to  take  the  new  course  of  growth.  The  shorter  is  n,  the  more  violent  is  the 
growth  of  i  and  the  fall  of  I-i,  and  the  slower  is  the  growth  of  consumption. 
166 Let  us  now  consider  in  detail  the  problem  of  acceleration  in  relation  to  the  dynamics  of 
consumption.  In  order  to  simplify  we  shall  not  take  into  consideration  all  the  intermediary 
stages  of  the  course  between  the  points  A->B->C->B.  Before  the  year  to  the  economy 
grows  at  the  rate  r.  There  is  the  same  growth  of  consumption,  C.  This  growth  is  the  sum 
of  a+P,  which  means  that  P  is  not  only  the  rate  of  growth  of  labour  productivity  but  also 
the  rate  of  growth  of  average  real  wages.  On  the  other  hand  population  grows  by  a'>  a  so 
that  consumption  per  head  grows  by  a+p--a',  or  slower  than  labour  productivity  and 
average  wages  P,  as  a+p--a'  <P  when  a'  >  a.  "  By  the  year  t,,  the  economy  will  have 
attained  the  stabilized  rate  of  growth  r'  =  a'+  P.  Total  consumption  will  thenceforth 
increase  at  the  same  rate.  Simultaneously  the  rate  of  increase  in  labour  productivity  and 
that  of  average  real  wages  will  equal  the  rate  of  increase  in  consumption  per  head  of 
population,  which  will  amount  to  a'+  P-  a'  =  P.  The  final  effect  is  satisfactory. 
But  what  happens  during  the  n  years  between  the  year  to  and  t,,?  Let  us  assume  that  the 
decision  to  increase  the  rate  of  growth  was  taken  in  the  year  to  . 
This,  assuming  one  year 
as  period  of  'maturing'  of  investment,  leads  to  a  change  in  the  rate  of  investment  in  the 
year  ti,  and  to  a  change  in  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  national  income  in  the  year  t2.12 
Essential  importance  to  be  attached  to  the  fact,  that  in  the  year  to,  when  the  decision  is 
taken  to  increase  the  investment  rate  in  the  year  ti,  a  given  rate  of  investment  already 
exists,  resulting  from  decision  taken  in  the  year  t-1.  Thus  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  national 
income  in  the  year  ti  and  the  absolute  level  of  the  national  income  in  that  year  are 
determined  completely  independent  of  the  fact  whether  and  to  what  degree  the  rate  of 
investment  may  change.  In  such  conditions,  however,  any  growth  of  the  investment  rate 
does  not  only  mean  a  reduction  of  the  share  of  consumption  in  income  -  which  is  always 
true  -  but  it  also  means  that  the  level  of  consumption  is  absolutely  below  the  level  which 
would  have  been  attained  had  the  acceleration  process  not  been  started  in  the  economy 
concerned. 
Let  us  denote  national  income,  consumption  and  investments  in  the  year  to  by  Y,  C,  and 
I  correspondingly.  Were  there  no  acceleration,  in  the  year  tj  these  figures  would  amount 
respectively  to  Y  (1  +r),  C  (1  +r),  and  1  (1  +r).  If  we  intend  to  accelerate  growth  and  establish 
167 a  share  of  investment  in  income  amounting  to:  i'  =  1(1+r)+AI/Y(l+r),  then  consumption 
would  amount  to:  Y  (1  +r)  -1  (1  +r)  -AI  <C  (1  +r). 
The  rate  of  increase  in  consumption  in  the  year  tj  will  be  therefore  smaller  than  r=  a+P, 
and  it  must  be  smaller  if  acceleration  is  to  be  achieved.  13 
11.13.  vi.  The  Limiting  Factors  of  Consumption 
The  extent  of  the  limitation  of  consumption  depends  on  several  factors,  but  above  all  on 
the  magnitude  Al  which  in  turn  depends  on  the  difference  r'-r  with  the  given  coefficient  m. 
If  r'  is  much  larger  than  r,  then  Al  must  also  be  large  and  it  must  Emit  relatively  strongly 
the  consumption  in  the  year  ti.  It  depends  further  on  the  magnitude  r  whether  this 
limitation  takes  the  form  of  a  slower  growth,  a  stabilization  or  an  absolute  decline.  The 
lower  r,  the  greater  the  danger  of  stabilization  or  even  of  absolute  decline  of  consumption 
in  conditions  in  which  it  is  necessary  to  increase  markedly  the  rate  of  income  growth. 
Independently,  however,  of  different  possible  quantitative  changes,  the  phenomenon  of 
initial  losses  of  consumption  in  order  to  raise  the  economy  to  a  higher  growth  path  of 
national  income  and  consumption  always  occurs  in  the  process  of  acceleration. 
It  is  illustrated  in  Figure  H.  13.2  (on  a  logarithmic  scale). 
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169 Until  the  year  to  the  economy  (national  income  =  Y,  real  productive  fixed  capital  =  M, 
consumption  Q  has  been  growing  at  a  stable  rate  r=  a+P  lower  than  the  potential  rate 
of  growth  r'  a'+P.  In  the  year  to  the  decision  is  taken  to  increase  the  rate  of  investment 
in  order  to  adapt  it  to  the  available  labour  force.  In  order  to  simplify  let  us  assume  that 
there  has  occurred  a  single  increase  in  the  rate  of  investment  to  a  magnitude  sufficient  to 
ensure  the  absorption  of  the  whole  labour  surplus  (the  increase  of  population  and  those 
unemployed  in  the  preceding  period).  The  rate  of  investment  will  increase  initially  up  to  i" 
(coffesponding  to  the  rate  of  growth  of  fixed  capital  r").  Assuming,  however,  that  the 
maturing  period  of  investment  is  one  year,  then  in  the  year  tj  national  income  continues  to 
grow  at  the  rate  r.  "When  the  rate  of  investment  is  increased,  this  means  a  decline  in  the 
rate  of  consumption,  which  in  case  of  drastic  changes  in  proportions  may  lead  even  to  an 
absolute  fall  of  consumption.  ,  14  In  any  case,  as  it  is  shown  in  the  diagram,  the  rate  of 
increase  in  consumption  in  the  year  tj  is lower  than  the  hypothetical  one  (that  which  would 
occur  were  there  no  acceleration,  indicated  by  a  broken  line).  In  the  year  t2  the  rate  of 
growth  of  national  income  reaches  r",  consumption  grows  correspondingly  at  the  rate  r", 
which  is  higher  than  the  rate  r  at  the  initial  period.  Thus  at  some  moment  tk  actual 
consumption  will  reach  the  level  of  the  hypothetical  consumption  (the  point  of  intersection 
of  the  continuous  line  with  the  broken  one).  This  moment  (year)  is  described  as  the 
moment  (year)  of  equalization,  and  the  period  between  this  moment  and  the  moment  of 
starting  the  process  of  acceleration  (tk  -to)  as  the  time  of  equalization.  15  In  the  following 
period,  if  growth  continues  for  a  period  to  be  at  the  rate  r",  actual  consumption  will 
exceed  hypothetical  consumption.  In  the  year  t,  1-2,  foreseeing  the  exhaustion  of  the  labour 
surplus  during  the  year  tn,  the  planning  authorities  will  decide  to  decrease  the  rate  of 
investment  for  the  year  tn-1  to  i',  corresponding  to  the  long-term  rate  of  growth  r'.  Thus 
between  the  year  tn-2  andtn-1  there  will  occur  a  phenomenon  inverse  to  the  one  observed 
during  the  interval  of  time  from  to  to  tj:  income  grows  still  at  the  rate  r",  but  with  a  rate  of 
investment  i'  <  i"  the  increase  in  consumption  is  more  rapid  than  r".  From  the  year  tn, 
national  income.,  consumption  and  real  productive  fixed  capital  grow  at  the  long-term  rate 
r9,  which  is  higher  than  the  initial  rate  r  and  corresponds  (on  the  basis  of  the  assumptions 
we  have  made)  to  the  potential  rate  of  growth  cc'+  P.  The  segment  hatched  horimntally 
170 represents  relative  losses  in  consumption  (in  relation  to  the  hypothetical  consumption) 
during  the  period  to-  tk,  the  segment  hatched  vertically  represents  the  relative  gain  in  the 
periodtk-  tj  .  During  the  period  after  the  year  t,  the  relative  gains  are  proportionate  to  the 
difference  between  the  rates  of  growth  r'  and  r. 
11.13.  vii.  Acceleration  and  the  Role  of  Lengthening  of  the  nme 
It  is  important  to  realize  the  part  played  in  the  process  by  the  length  of  time  over  which 
acceleration  takes  place.  At  the  end  of  this  period  the  rate  of  investment  must  grow  from  i 
to  i".  A  lengthening  of  the  time  over  which  the  process  of  acceleration  occurs  is  necessary 
to  relieve  the  conflict  between  the  growth  of  investment  and  the  level  of  current 
consumption,  as  it  makes  it  possible  to  have  a  higher  rate  of  investment  i"  when  income 
and  consumption  have  also  attained  an  absolutely  higher  level.  This  is  the  problem  facing 
socialist  planning,  since  such  planning  cannot  aim  exclusively  at  a  maximum  shortening  of 
the  period  of  under-utilization  of  the  labour  reserve  (though  theoretically  it  would  be  most 
advantageous),  but  it  should  aim  at  what  is  in  the  given  conditions  the  best  compromise 
between  growth  with  future  consumption  and  the  needs  of  present  consumption.  16 
H.  13.  viii.  The  Role  of  Non-Investment  Factors 
From  the  above  analysis  it  is  clear  that  the  strategy  of  growth  during  the  period 
concerned  must  emphasize  the  taking  advantage  of  all  possibilities  of  shortening  the  period 
of  under-absorption  of  the  labour  force,  just  so  far  as  that  can  be  done  without  damaging 
the  actual  consumption.  "Countries  at  an  intermediate  stage  of  development  have  at  their 
disposal  a  productive  equipment  which  in  conditions  of  capitalism  is  not  fully  utilized 
owing  to  lack  of  effective  demand.  We  have,  therefore,  at  the  beginning  of 
industrialization  not  only  an  under-utilized  labour  force  but  also  some  under-utilized 
productive  capacity,  the  mobilization  of  which  does  not  require  any  investment  outlays.  ,  17 
With  the  expansion  of  investment  the  violently  growing  internal  demand  can  be  met  in 
some  measure  by  the  elimination  of  shorter  working  weeks,  the  increase  of  the  number  of 
171 shifts,  and  similar  measures.  We  have  here  an  example  of  the  importance  of  the  power  of 
rnacro-economic  calculation  under  socialism  to  take  advantage  of  an  existing  growth 
potential.  An  analogous  part  may  be  played,  for  a  very  short  period,  indeed,  by  the 
reduction  of  repair  and  period  outlay  maintenance  (provided  it  does  not  decrease 
immediately  output  capacity  in  proportion  to  the  reduction  of  outlay),  and  especially  by 
refraining  from  replacing  equipment  which  is  out  of  date  from  the  economic  viewpoint.  It 
is  true  that  this  equipment  gives  a  very  low  return,  in  many  cases  not  even  exceeding  the 
wages  of  the  workers  employed.  It  makes  it  possible,  however,  to  use  productively  the 
surplus  labour.  Thus  we  can  temporarily  increase  u  and  decrease  a,  increasing  the 
difference  u-a,  which  means  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  income  growth  independently  of 
changes  in  i.  This  factor  is  of  special  importance  since,  unlike  ffivestment,  it  produces  very 
quick  effects  merely  by  increasing  income,  in  which  the  share  of  productive  investment 
may  be  expected  to  be  greatly  augmented.  The  increase  of  the  difference  u-a,  achieved 
mainly  by  employing  gradually  a  larger  labour  force  on  already  existing  equipment,  can  be 
considered  as  an  alternative  to  applying  primitive  methods  of  production  in  order  to  take 
advantage  of  the  so-called  saving  potential  existing  in  incomplete  employment.  After  the 
Second  World  War  this  alternative  was  rather  commonly  used  in  socialist  countries.  18  The 
influence  of  the  change  in  the  difference  u-a  on  the  process  of  setting  the  national 
economy  on  a  new  path  of  growth  can  be  illustrated  in  Figure  H.  13.3. 
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173 in  comparison  with  the  Figure  11.13.1,  we  have  here  an  additional  straight  line  at  the 
same  inclination  (1/m)  as  the  line  AC,  but  at  a  greater  distance  from  the  base  of  the 
diagram.  This  distance  is  greater  by  the  segment  A(u-a),  which  expresses  the  average  total 
effect  of  the  increase  of  u  and  of  the  decrease  of  a  during  the  period  (number  of  years)  in 
which  this  effect  occurs.  We  assume  in  this  connection,  as  usually  happens  in  practice,  that 
workers  additionally  employed  as  a  result  of  the  increase  in  A(u-a)  stay  there  permanently. 
In  consequence  of  this  effect,  the  rate  of  growth  r"  is  temporarily  attained  due  to  the  rate 
of  investment  i'(point  B').  When  the  temporary  effect  A(u-a)  ceases,  at  the  rate  of 
investment  i9,  we  descend  to  point  B  on  the  straight  line  AC.  But  if  at  that  moment 
unemployment  is  still  existing,  we  must  reach  point  C,  that  is  increase  the  rate  of 
investment  to  i99,  in  order  to  liquidate  unemployment  and  to  come  to  point  B.  In  view  of 
the  fact,  however,  that  some  part  of  unemployed  was  absorbed  by  taking  advantage  of  the 
effect  A(u-  a),  the  period  of  our  stay  at  point  C  will  correspondingly  be  shorter,  which 
brings,  of  course,  an  essential  advantage  from  the  point  of  view  of  actual  consumption. 
Independently  of  it,  an  extremely  important  advantage  consists  in  the  fact  too,  that  the  rate 
of  investment  grows  from  i  to  i'  and  eventually  from  i'  to  i"  when  there  is  an  absolutely 
higher  level  of  income,  and  thus  also  at  an  absolutely  higher  level  of  consumption.  This 
schematic  process  considers  the  fact  of  taking  advantage  of  the  effect  A(u-a)  which 
facilitates  the  acceleration  of  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  most  difficult  initial  phase  of 
socialist  economic  planning. 
The  additional  increase  of  income  due  to  non-investment  factors  will  consist  in  the  first 
place  of  capital  goods  and  not  of  consumption  goods.  Without  previous  investment  no 
growth  in  agricultural  production  is  to  be  expected,  and  in  the  countries  concerned 
agriculture  produces  the  main  part  of  consumption  goods.  On  the  other  hand  labour 
productivity  will  grow  more  slowly  when  non-investment  factors  are  utilized,  than  if  the 
labour  reserve  were  absorbed  by  new  equipment.  There  occurs  therefore  a  notable  trend 
towards  the  increase  of  employment  to  the  detriment  of  the  factor  of  the  increase  of 
Productivity.  This  is  related,  then,  to  the  problem  of  the  appearance  of  inflationary 
phenomena  in  the  fft-st  stage  of  socialist  industrialization.  19 
174 II,  13.  ix.  Function  of  the  Growth  of  Labour  Produc 
The  growth  of  labour  productivity,  amounting  in  the  initial  variant  to  P,  plays  an 
important  part  in  the  reduction  of  strains  in  consumption  caused  by  the  acceleration  of 
growth.  It  is  easiest  to  represent  it  by  denoting  the  rate  of  investment  as  the  function  of 
the  level  of  labour  productivity  (W)  and  of  real  wages  W.  We  have  then 
i=  IN  =  IZ(W-W)/ZW}-l-wiw  (5) 
it  follows  therefrom  that  the  rate  of  investment  depends  on  the  ratio  of  wages  to  labour 
productivity,  assuming  that  the  whole  difference  W-w  is  productively  invested.  The 
increase  of  i  calls  for  a  decrease  in  the  ratio  w/W.  When  productivity  grows  by  P  annually, 
some  increase  in  real  wages  is  compatible  with  a  decrease  of  the  ratio  w/W  provided  that 
the  rate  of  increase  of  real  wages  is  lower  than  P.  If,  however,  a  significant  increase  of  i  is 
required,  then  the  increase  of  real  wages  must  remain  far  below  P.  When  is  large 
enough,  real  wages  can  grow,  or  at  least  not  fall,  even  if  their  trend  is  far  below  But  if  P 
decreases,  then  the  possibility  of  real  wage  increase,  which  is  far  less  than  P,  falls  also. 
When  P=0  or  W  is  constant,  any  increase  of  i  requires  unconditionally  the  fall  of  w  to  a 
level  determined  by  the  postulated  magnitude  i.  Again  when  P  is  positive,  but  relatively 
low,  in  general  the  required  magnitude  of  the  rate  of  investment  will  not  be  attained 
without  a  certain  decrease  in  real  wages.  "Thus  the  danger  of  decrease  of  real  wages  is 
greater  when  investment  is  linked  with  non-investment  than  when  investment  alone  is 
imposed  (but  within  definite  limits).  v,  20 
But  the  level  of  real  wages  should  not  be  identified  with  consumption  per  head.  If,  when 
investment  alone  is imposed  unemployment  lasts  longer,  then  employment  is  lower  also  at 
the  start.  With  a  given  consumption  fund,  wages  will  be  higher  the  lower  is  employment. 
With  an  additional  utilization  of  non-investment  factors  A  (u-a)  employment  is  higher  in  the 
first  stage,  while  unemployment  is  lower.  With  the  same  consumption  fund,  wages  will  be 
lower  if  employment  is  higher.  This  will  be  the  case  also,  even  when  the  consumption  fund 
is  greater,  provided  that  employment  is  still  correspondingly  greater. 
175 it  would  seem  that  this  last  case  was  characteristic  of  the  first  stage  of  rapid 
industrialization  in  Poland.  At  that  period  real  wages  increased  very  little  and  in  the  years 
1951-53  they  even  decreased  markedly.  But  the  increase  in  employment  was  so  great  in 
cornparison  with  the  growth  of  population  that  consumption  per  head  grew  during  the 
whole  of  this  period.  Even  a  stabilization,  not  to  speak  of  a  decrease,  in  real  wages  is  a 
hard  nut  to  crack  for  a  socialist  society.  On  the  other  hand,  when  there  is  a  conflict 
between  increase  in  wages  and  increase  in  consumption  per  head,  it  is  in  the  general 
interest  of  the  economy  to  solve  it  to  the  benefit  of  consumption.  21 
The  Problem  of  InflationaCy  Phenomena 
In  these  conditions  the  danger  of  inflation  generally  arises.  It  occurs  when  real  wages 
cannot  rise  further,  while  money  wages  still  must  rise  by  a  certain  percentage  even  if  only 
because  of  payment  by  piece  rates.  If  efficiency  grows  by  P,  then  money  wages  grow  by 
P/p,  where  p  ýý  1/(l/p)  is  the  coefficient  of  increase  of  money  wages  in  relation  to  the 
increase  in  productivity.  But  since  real  wages  are  to  stay  fixed,  then  prices  and  costs  of 
living  must  rise  also  by  P/p.  Naturally  this  phenomenon  operates  more  acutely  if  real 
wages  have  to  decrease  at  some  time,  and  much  less  acutely  if  real  wages  are  able  to  rise 
though  to  a  smaller  degree  than  the  'natural'  increase  in  money-wages.  It  should  be 
remembered  that  during  the  phase  of  rapid  industrialization  of  a  country  the  growth  of 
average  money  wages  is  strongly  influenced  by  rapid  changes  in  the  structure  of 
employment  arising  from  the  transformation  of  the  general  economic  structure. 
Employment  increases  most  rapidly  in  heavy  industry  and  in  building,  where  relative 
wages  are  high,  as  is  necessary  to  attract  labour  in  the  desired  direction.  The  resulting 
increase  of  average  money  wages  becomes  an  inevitable  additional  factor  increasing  the 
inflationary  pressure.  22  This  is  the  problem  of  inflationary  phenomena  in  the  introductory 
stage  of  socialist  industrialization. 
We  have  considered  the  problems  relating  to  the  process  of  the  acceleration  of  growth  by 
employing  for  production  unemployed  and  hitherto  surplus  labour.  The  increase  of  the 
ratio  of  active  participation  renders  possible  growth  at  a  higher  rate,  but  only  so  long  as 
176 there  exist  conditions  favourable  to  the  increase  of  this  ratio.  The  ratio  of  participation  of 
the  population  depends  in  a  great  measure  on  expenditure  on  social  institutions  (e.  g. 
cr&hes  and  kindergartens  which  make  possible  an  increase  in  the  participation  ratio  of 
women)  an  in  certain  other  forms  (transportation  facilities,  hostels  for  workers,  etc.  ).  The 
possibility  of  allocating  funds,  to  education  and  professional  training  of  skilled  personnel 
and  for  health  measures  and  other  socio-economic  purposes,  directly  by  the  planning 
authorities  according  to  the  criteria  of  socio-economic  productivity  -  without  having  to 
depend  on  private  'propensity'  to  meet  these  needs  adequately  -  is  widely  adopted  in 
23 
socialist  countries.  This  is  shown  by  many  indices  reaching,  and  even  exceeding,  the 
levels  of  highly  developed  capital  countries,  let  alone  countries  at  the  same  level  of  general 
development. 
II.  13.  xi.  Acceleration  of  Growth  and  Technical  Progress 
The  'rejuvenation'  of  capital  stock,  according  to  Kalecki  (1970),  is  the  increase  of  the 
proportion  of  new  capital  in  the  total  of  all  capital.  If  we  raise  the  rate  of  increase  in 
employment,  a  corresponding  growth  in  average  labour  productivity  will  follow.  It  will  be 
higher  than  P,  though  the  incremental  labour  productivity  of  the  newly  employed  grows  at 
a  stable  rate  P.  The  effect  of  the  'rejuvenation'  of  capital  stock  will  naturally  disappear 
gradually  as  the  process  advances,  but  this  does  not  diminish  its  importance.  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  changes  in  the  rate  of  increase  in  employment,  and  even  more  so  changes  in 
the  structure  of  employment,  are  bound  to  influence  the  dynamics  of  labour  productivity. 
"The  basic  factor  in  the  increase  of  labour  productivity  is  technical  progress,  a  factor  that 
is  fundamentally  different  in  character.  "24  Change  in  the  rate  of  increase  of  labour 
productivity  acquires  a  special  importance  in  conditions  when  the  possibilities  of  raising 
the  rate  of  increase  in  employment  are  exhausted.  If  the  rate  of  employment  growth  a' 
cannot  be  increased,  the  only  way  to  raise  the  rate  of  growth  r'  is  to  raise  the  rate  of 
increase  in  labour  productivity  P.  We  shall  proceed  to  the  analysis  of  this  question. 
Variability  of  the  rate  of  growth  during  the  acceleration  period  can  be  detennined  by  the 
technical  progress  and  the  choice  of  the  rate  of  growth.  In  view  of  the  co-existence  of 
177 methods  of  productio,  125  embodying  different  degrees  of  mechanization  (including  also 
degrees  of  automatization),  planning  authorities  aimmig  to  accelerate  the  existing  rate  of 
growth  may  decide  to  raise  the  degree  of  mechanization  of  investment  goods.  Let  us 
assume  that,  during  the  period  preceding  this  decision,  the  process  of  growth  was 
stabilized  at  a  fixed  rate  of  growth  r'  =  a'+p  and  continued  for  at  least  n  years, 
representing  the  average  period  of  life  of  the  different  constituents  of  the  real  productive 
fixed  capital.  Included  in  this  assumption  is  not  only  the  rate  of  growth  of  average  labour 
productivity,  but  also  the  rate  of  growth  of  incremental  labour  productivity,  defined  as  the 
ratio  of  labour  productivity  attained  in  completed  investments  put  into  operation  in  the 
year  t.  to  labour  productivity  achieved  in  investments  put  into  operation  in  the  year 
Any  increase  in  labour  productivity  greater  than  P  and  any  rate  of  income  growth 
greater  than  r'  will  be  the  result  of  the  above-mentioned  decision.  But  in  these 
circumstances,  the  coefficient  m  will  increase  too.  An  increase  of  the  coefficient  m  is 
inevitable  with  increasing  mechanization  and  a  given  state  of  technical  knowledge.  Were  it 
possible  to  increase  the  rate  of  growth  of  labour  productivity  without  any  increase  of  m, 
there  would  be  no  reason  to  choose  methods  of  production  absolutely  worse  than  others 
co-existing  at  that  time.  The  increase  of  the  coefficient  m  is  the  price  to  be  paid  for  a 
higher  rate  of  labour  productivity  resulting  from  higher  mechanization.  Let  us  assume  that 
planning  authorities  decide  on  such  a  single  increase  of  the  coefficient  m  to  m'  .  Let  us 
assume  that  it  will  lead  to  a  considerable  single  growth  of  incremental  labour  productivity 
by  more  than  P  and  in  the  following  years  the  incremental  labour  productivity  will 
continue  to  grow  by  p.  26  This  will  in  turn  lead  to  the  process  shown  in  Figure  11.13.4. 
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179 This  single  increase  of  the  capital  coefficient  from  m  to  m'  is  expressed  by  a  lower 
inclination  of  the  straight  line  having  the  direction  coefficient  11M.  We  assume  that  the 
single  increase  of  incremental  labour  productivity,  achieved  by  this  decision,  will  imply  a 
rate  of  average  labour  productivity  amounting  to  P'.  And  accordingly  the  increase  will 
grow  for  once  by  r"  =  a'+P'.,  but  as  point  B  indicates  this  wiR  require  an  increase  in  the 
rate  of  investment  from  P  to  i" 
. 
It  will  be  impossible,  however,  to  keep  up  this  rate  of 
investment  with  the  given  assumptions.  We  have  assumed  that  the  realization  of 
investment  at  the  coefficient  m'  gives  a  rate  of  growth  of  incremental  labour  productivity, 
amounting  still  to  (I  Accordingly  the  increase  of  average  labour  productivity,  which  for 
once  was  P'..  will  decrease  and  tend  to  (I  It  will  reach  it  after  n  years,  during  which  the 
entire  productive  equipment  will  'change'  into  a  new  capital  coefficient  m.  Thus  during 
the  period  of  'change'  of  the  productive  equipment  we  shaH  have  to  deal  with  a  decline  of 
the  rate  of  increase  of  average  labour  productivity  from  P'  to  (ý  and  together  with  it,  a 
decline  of  the  rate  of  income  growth  from  r"  to  r'.  This  process  will  be  accompanied  by  a 
fall  of  the  investment  rate  from  i"  to  P'.  At  this  rate  of  investment,  the  rate  of  growth  wiH 
again  become  r'  =  a4p,  but  the  absolute  increment  of  income  will  be  larger  than  were 
they  achieved  without  changing  the  productive  equipment  to  a  new  capital  coeffiCient.  27 
Thus  the  whole  process  follows  the  line  A-ýB-->C,  as  we  have  already  seen  earlier. 
(Kalecki,  1960). 
"In  considering  whether  to  accelerate  growth  by  utilizing  the  labour  surplus  -  that  is  by 
eliminating  unemployment  -  there  is  no  choice  for  a  socialist  state  whether  'to  accelerate., 
or  not  to  accelerate'.  There  is  no  question  regarding  the  advantage  and  necessity  of 
utilizing  the  possibility  created  by  socialism  of  accelerating  the  rate  of  growth.  "2'  The 
matters  of  choice  are  only  the  forms  and  the  speed  of  the  process.  In  emphasizing  the 
specific  difficulties  involved  in  changing  the  productive  equipment  into  a  higher  m,  it 
should  be  remembered  at  the  same  time  that,  after  the  initial  reserves  have  been  exhausted, 
this  is  the  main  means  to  accelerate  the  rate  of  growth,  and  also  that  we  have  then  to  deal 
with  an  economy  that  is  much  more  mature  in  all  respects,  and  with  an  absolutely  higher 
level  of  consumption.  It  is  thus  an  economy  capable  of  solving  much  more  complex 
180 problems.  The  experience  gained  from  the  second  stage  of  industrialization  in  Poland  fully 
confirms  this  view. 
H.  13.  xii.  Three  Lýpes  of  Technical  Progress 
We  assumed  that  the  single  increase  of  the  coefficient  m  increases  labour  productivity, 
but  the  incremental  labour  productivity  at  a  new  capital  coefficient  amounting  to  m' 
continues  to  grow  by  P,  as  it  did  with  the  previous  coefficient  m.  Whether  this  will  be  so 
depends  on  the  type  of  technical  progress,  and  this  cannot  be  predicted  theoretically.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  the  incremental  labour  productivity  with  the  capital  coefficient  m'  will 
not  grow  by  (ý  but  by  more  than  [i  If  this  happened  after  having  changed  the  productive 
apparatus  into  a  new  degree  of  capital  intensity,  the  rate  of  income  growth  would  be 
stabilized  at  a  level  higher  than  r.  The  opposite  would  occur  if  the  single  increase  of  the 
capital  coefficient  should  yield  an  increase  of  incremental  labour  productivity  lower  than  fl 
It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  gain  from  changing  the  productive  equipment  to  a  higher  m 
will  be  different,  ceteris  parihus,  with  each  of  these  three  possibilities,  arising  from  the 
type  of  technical  progress  in  the  period  concerned:  if  there  is  a  possibility  of  securing  an 
incremental  labour  productivity  greater,  than  P  there  will  be  clear  incentives  to  increase  the 
capital-intensity;  if  the  possibility  of  increasing  the  incremental  labour  productivity  is  lower 
than  fý  the  opposite  situation  will  arise  (an  this  is  not  only  in  regard  to  increasing  the 
capital-intensity  but  even  maintaining  it);  if  there  is  the  possibility  of  securing  an 
incremental  labour  productivity  equalling  fý  there  will  be  no  incentive  whatever  in  either 
direction.  On  the  basis  of  such  reasoning,  Kalecki  deduces  his  criteria  differentiating  the 
types  of  technical  progress,  defining  the  first  as  encouraging  capital-intensity,  the  second 
as  discouraging  capital-intensity,  and  the  third  as  neutral.  29  With  given  preferences,  the 
planning  authorities  will  be  the  more  disposed  to  apply  additional  mechanization  designed 
to  increase  labour  productivity  and  thus  to  accelerate  the  rate  of  growth,  the  more  capital- 
intensive  is  the  type  of  technical  progress. 
181 This  brief  sketch  of  the  problems  of  adjusting  the  rate  of  growth  in  the  light  of  technical 
progress  seems  to  confirm  the  significance  of  production-relations  in  taking  advantage  of 
national  growth  potential  and  the  favourable  conditions  in  this  respect  created  by 
socialism.  The  importance  is  again  evident  of  planned  determination  of  basic  macro- 
economic  magnitudes  and  of  possible  flexibility  in  adapting  the  rate  of  investment  to  the 
varying  requirements  of  the  different  stages  of  the  development  process.  Apart  from  this 
the  problems  involved  in  raising  the  rate  of  growth  in  different  conditions  of  technical 
progress,  bring  to  light  the  role  of  the  time-horizon  in  taking  advantage  of  growth 
potential.  The  broad  time-horizon  of  central  planning  authorities  in  a  socialist  economy 
renders  possible  the  mobilization  of  such  factors  of  growth  of  which  otherwise  advantage 
30  could  not  be  taken. 
H.  13.  xiii.  Factors  Limiting  the  Rate  of  Growth 
The  examination  of  the  problem  enables  us  to  realize  better  the  relevance  of  some  of  the 
problems  to  the  strategy  of  growth  and  to  visualize  the  opportunities  created  by  socialism 
to  apply  this  strategy.  But  we  cannot  overlook  some  of  the  inevitable  difficulties  met  in  the 
rapid  process  of  growth  under  socialism.  We  are  concerned  not  only  with  obvious  issues, 
as  frictions  and  planning  mistakes  while  the  rate  of  growth  is  being  changed  and  the 
sectoral.  proportions  involved  are  changing  too.  We  are  concerned  with  problems  of  a 
more  general  character.  What  are  the  factors  limiting  freedom  to  determine  the  rate  of 
growth. 
H.  13.  xiv.  Issues  of  Foreien  Trade 
Kalecki  was  the  first  to  study  these  problems  and  he  proved  that  the  difficulties 
connected  with  the  acceleration  of  the  rate  of  growth  are  related  above  all  to  foreign 
trade,  and  this  both  directly  and  indirectly.  In  countries  strongly  dependent  on  imports  of 
investment  goods  and,  especially,  of  raw  materials  (most  countries,  including  Poland),  the 
acceleration  of  growth  implies  directly  the  necessity  to  increase  imports  and  -  with  a  well- 
182 balanced  foreign  trade  -  exports.  To  overcome  these  difficulties,  it  may  be  necessary  to 
make  some  less  profitable  exports  or  even  to  take  measures  against  imports.  Thus  the 
corresponding  investment  will  have  a  comparatively  high  capital  coefficient.  But  this  is 
possible  only  to  some  degree.  In  every  situation  there  exists  a  certain  limit  imposed  by 
foreign  trade  which  cannot  be  exceeded;  it  may  be  nearer  or  further  from  the  existing  rate 
of  growth,  but  it  will  not  allow  the  rate  to  exceed  a  certain  maximum  magnitude.  31 
It  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  that  foreign  trade  is  the  universal  remedy  for  a  number  of 
difficulties  arising  during  the  acceleration  of  growth,  quite  apart  from  any  necessity  to 
increase  imports.  These  difficulties  are  the  familiar  'bottlenecks',  which  determines  the 
trend  of  the  whole  economy.  These  'bottlenecks'  may  take  the  form  of  a  shortage  of 
natural  resources;  of  a  shortage  of  highly  qualified  technical  personnel  and  experienced 
workers;  or  of  a  shortage  of  personnel  in  some  regions  while  there  is  satisfactory  balance 
of  supply  and  demand  for  the  labour  force  as  a  whole.  They  may  take  the  form  of  delays  of 
in  planning  and  completing  investment  projects  in  some  sectors;  of  limited  production 
capacity  in  design  of  office  and  building  enterprises,  and  so  on.  Such  difficulties  may  be, 
and  are,  overcome  by  widening  these  'bottlenecks'  and  by  adjusting  them  to  the  needs  of 
the  national  economy  rather  than  by  adjusting  the  economy  to  them.  But  it  often  requires 
additional  investment. 
There  is  no  question  that  the  development  of  co-operation  between  socialist  countries  is 
diminishing  foreign  trade  difficulties,  especially  when  acceleration  takes  place 
simultaneously  in  all  or  most  of  the  countries  concerned.  But  since  'bottlenecks'  occur, 
none  the  less,  in  all  socialist  countries  and  since  relations  between  these  countries  and  the 
non-socialist  countries  exist  and  are  expanding,  the  difficulties  described  above  emerge 
32 
sooner  or  later  when  it  is  attempted  to  raise  the  rate  of  growth  above  some  level 
. 
The  increase  of  the  capital  coefficient  involved  in  overcoming  difficulties  in  foreign  trade 
and  in  removing  'bottlenecks'  plays  an  essential  part  in  giving  effect  to  decisions 
concerning  the  acceleration  of  growth.  This  is  illustrated  in  Figure  11.13.5. 
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184 The  planning  authority  is  prepared  to  introduce  some  limitation  on  current  consumption 
and  to  raise  the  rate  of  growth  from  ro  to  rl,  or  pass  from  point  A  to  point  B  by  increasing 
the  rate  of  investment  from  io  to  ii.  This  implies  that  the  capital  coefficient  grows  from  m 
to  m'l-  which  increases  the  average  labour  productivity  from  f3o  to  P1.  But  to  attain  the  rate 
of  growth  ri,  difficulties  in  foreign  trade  must  be  overcome  and  'bottlenecks'  must  be 
removed  -  the  price  to  be  paid  for  it  is  the  further  increase  of  the  capital  coefficient  to  m". 
Thus  the  point  B  is  unattainable  and  the  rate  of  income  growth  ri  is  represented  by  point  C 
with  the  rate  of  investment  i2.  But  though  the  planning  authorities  were  willing  to  increase 
the  rate  of  investment  to  ii  as  the  price  of  gaining  the  rate  of  growth  r1l  it  is  doubtful  that 
they  would  be  willing  to  make  a  much  greater  effort,  that  is  to  increase  the  rate  of 
investment  to  i2,  to  obtain  the  same  result.  To  simplify  the  problem  we  assume  that  the 
planning  authorities  are  willing  to  increase  io  only  up  to  ii  -  considering  for  some  reason 
that  this  is  the  optimum  in  given  conditions  -  then  they  will  plan  a  rate  of  growth  indicated 
at  point  D,  that  is  r2<  rl.  This  means  that  in  the  event  of  foreign  trade  difficulties  and 
'bottlenecks'  appearing,  the  planning  authorities  choose  a  lower  acceleration  of  the  rate  of 
growth  rather  than  the  acceleration  to  which  they  would  have  given  priority  were  there  no 
difficulties  or  'bottlenecks'.  Finally,  on  the  vertical  axis  the  magnitude  r,,,,,  is  shown, 
corresponding  to  the  share  of  investment  in  the  income  at  the  capital  coefficient  m"' 
which  results  in  these  conditions  and  is  sufficient  to  overcome  the  difficulties  mentioned.  If 
the  planning  authorities  were  willing  to  increase  the  share  of  investment  in  the  income 
higher  than  4.,  in  order  to  attain  a  rate  of  growth  higher  than  r,  then  this  willingness 
would  be  faced  by  an  impassable  Emit  (a  deadline)  of  the  maximum  magnitude  of 
acceleration  of  growth.  Thus  the  real  range  of  choice  for  the  planning  authorities,  when  ro 
is  a  rate  correlated  with  the  balance  of  labour  force  at  a  given  magnitude  Po,  is  within  the 
magnitudes  represented  by  ro  - 
11.13.  xv.  Comments  on  Macro-Micro  Economic  Decisions 
We  shall  conclude  this  analysis  by  making  some  comments  on  the  relations  between 
macro-and  micro-economic  decisions.  In  the  first  place  we  should  mention  work  designed 
185 to  improve  and  develop  the  techniques  of  co-ordination  calculus  and  of  optimization  of 
the  plan.  We  refer  here  to  the  work  devoted  to  the  analysis  of  input-output,  both  from  the 
theoretical  and  the  technical  point  of  view,  and  to  work  on  the  theory  and  the  technique  of 
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programming.  We  have  touched  on  the  problem  of  relations  of  the  highest  central  level 
and  the  lower  levels  in  a  socialist  economy.  This  problem  is  fundamental  from  the  point  of 
view  of  growth.  The  starting  point  of  the  discussion,  on  the  model  of  the  functioning  of  a 
socialist  economy  on  the  premises  of  centralization  and  decentralization,  was  the  thesis 
that,  with  the  raising  of  the  economy  to  a  higher  stage  of  development,  the  complexity  of 
economic  problems  grows  also.  With  it,  there  is  a  growing  importance  of  such  factors  as: 
the  flexibility  of  adjustment  of  the  structure  of  supply  to  the  structure  of  demand  (both  in 
production  and  in  consumption);  economically  justifiable  substitution  of  different  forms  of 
expenditures;  expansion  of  different  enterprises  and  sectors  related  to  their  economic 
achievements.  It  was  just  from  this  point  of  view  that  excessive  centralization  was 
criticized,  since  this  takes  the  form  of  concentrating  nearly  all  decisions  at  the  highest  level 
and  passing  targets  and  resources  to  lower  echelons  only  in  the  form  of  orders  and 
physical  allocations.  As  a  result,  the  functions  of  lower  echelons  (particularly  in 
enterprises)  were  limited  to  pure  execution  of  orders  only.  The  discussion  showed  that  the 
problem  of  centralization  and  decentralization  under  socialism  cannot  be  considered  in 
terms  of  centralization  or  decentralization  of  all  economic  decisions.  It  is  to  be  noted  that 
the  problem  of  creating  institutional  conditions  favourable  to  the  fun  use  of  potential 
growth  does  not  disappear  once  the  socialist  system  is  built.  Socialism  overcomes  a 
number  of  fundamental  contradictions  of  the  capitalist  system;  this  does  not  mean, 
however,  that  it  eliminates  all  contradictions  of  every  kind,  nor  that  it  avoids  creating  new 
contradictions  arising  from  the  characteristics  of  the  socialist  system  as  such.  This  implies 
a  necessity  for  continual  search  for  optimal  institutional  forms  to  solve  these 
contradictions,  and  especially  to  adapt  the  functioning  system  of  a  socialist  economy  to  the 
various  stages  of  development,  both  from  a  purely  economic  point  of  view  and  a  socio- 
political  one.  A  socialist  socio-economic  system  provides  a  possibility  of  different 
solutions  of  the  method  of  functioning  of  the  economy,  thus  allowing  choice  of 
alternatives  in  this  field  also,  within  certain  obvious  limits 
. 
34  Our  analysis  of  the  model 
186 developed  by  Brus  and  Laski,  which  is  based  on  the  works  of  Kalecki,  shows  not  only  the 
interplay  of  consumption  and  production  but  also  the  inherent  problems  of  a  socialist 
system.  We  shall  proceed  to  make  a  critique  of  the  socialist  economic  system  based  on  the 
applied  core  economic  growth  models  which  we  have  endogenized  in  our  study. 
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A  CRITIQUE  OF  THE  APPLIED  MODELS  OF  GROWTH  UNDER 
SOCIALISM 
Our  survey  of  the  socialist  growth  models  together  with  the  dynamics  and  structure  of 
the  socialist  state  reveals  the  strength  and  the  flaws  of  the  centrally  planned  economic 
system.  We  shall  proceed  to  make  a  critique  of  the  applied  socialist  economic  growth 
path. 
11.14J.  A  Stream  of  ThoUgh 
The  writings  of  Marx  and  Engels  illustrate  the  general  features  of  the  two  stages  of 
communism:  socialism,  'the  lower  phase'  in  which  all  the  countries  mentioned  in  our  study 
can  be  said  to  be,  and  communism,  'the  higher  phase'.  The  ABC  of  Communism,  written 
during  the  civil  war,  by  Bukharin  and  Preobrazhensky,  represents  an  extreme  position  but 
one  that  was  then  held  by  the  majority  of  party  intellectuals,  who  espoused  a  moneyless 
economy  and  a  direct  leap  into  socialism.  Bukharin  also  wrote  the  important  Economics  of 
the  Transition  Period,  which  expressed  similar  views.  He  anticipated  the  imminent 
withering  away  of  economics  under  socialism:  there  would  be  no  room  for  markets  and 
prices  when  goods  are  allocated  consciously  by  society.  Lenin  did  not  go  quite  so  far  as 
this.  The  bitter  experience  of  war  communism  led  him  to  attach  great  importance  to 
markets,  prices  and  trade  in  his  last  years  of  political  life.  By  1921  the  New  Economic 
Policy  was  adopted,  this  being  a  compromise  between  market  forces  and  peasantry.  The 
state  kept  hold  of  the  'commanding  heights"  of  the  economy  (large-scale  industry, 
banking,  foreign  trade)  while  permitting  private  enterprise  in  industry  and  trade  and  basing 
its  relations  with  the  peasantry  on  purchase  and  sale. 
In  our  analyzis  of  Preobrazhensky,  we  note  that  he  highlights  the  problems  actually 
faced  by  Lenin's  successors  since  they  viewed  the  New  Economic  Policy  differently.  While 
Bukharin  became  the  chief  protagonist  of  caution  and  of  an  affiance  with  the  peasantry, 
191 which  meant  a  moderate  rate  of  capital  investment,  Trotsky  demanded  faster  growth  and 
action  against  the  richer  peasants.  Preobrazhensky  sided  with  Trotsky  and  in  his  New 
Economics,  in  which  he  wrote  about  primitive  socialist  accumulation,  he  was  advocating  a 
more  rapid  transfer  of  resources  from  the  private  (principally  peasant)  sector  to  the  state 
sector,  as  we  have  noted  in  our  analyzis.  The  implied  challenge  to  the  then  dominant 
official  policy  led  him  into  spirited  polemics  with  Bukharin,  who  was  at  that  time  backed 
by  Stalin.  But  as  we  have  noted,  in  due  course  Stalin  split  with  his  ally  and  launched  his 
revolution  from  above,  with  rapid  industrialization  and  forcible  collectivization;  also  in  the 
great  purges  that  followed  both  Bukharin  and  Preobrazhensky  as  did  many  other 
economists,  politicians,  generals,  writers,  perished.  In  our  survey  of  the  socialist  growth 
models,  we  also  noticed  that  Fel'dman,  an  officer  of  the  Gosplan,  was  given  the  task  of 
preparing  a  theoretical  framework  for  a  general  plan,  extending  over  a  period  of  ten  to 
twenty  years,  to  be  drafted  by  Gosplan  alongside  the  first  five-year  plan.  Starting  from 
Marx's  schemes  of  expanded  reproduction,  Fieldman  built  a  two-sector  model  of 
acceleration  of  economic  growth  and  thus  became  a  pioneer  Marxist  growth  theorist.  His 
model  expresses  the  foundations  of  the  Soviet  strategy  for  economic  growth  until  the  mid- 
1950's,  based  on  priority  for  heavy  industry  and  production  goods;  the  same  strategy  was 
passively  followed  by  the  other  socialist  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  after  the  war.  In  our 
study  of  the  dynamics  of  socialsim,  we  also  noted  the  view  that  the  state  'creates'  its  own 
profits  by  its  own  investment  and  discussed  the  role  of  prices  (including  the  interest  rate) 
in  investment  planning  and  pointed  out  that  savings  in  socialist  state  is  a  negative  notion. 
Our  analyzis  based  on  the  research  by  Brus  and  Laski  (inspired  by  Kalecki's  work  and  by 
the  Polish  experience),  pointed  towards  the  then  existing  conflict  between  consumption 
and  growth,  and  the  factors  limiting  economic  growth,  anticipating  the  new  trend  of  giving 
2  priority  to  consumption  rather  than  to  production  goods.  These  chain  of  thought 
modelled  the  growth  strategy  of  the  socialist  state  at  its  various  phases  of  development. 
192 Growth  Performance  Duting  the  Period  of  Classical  Socialism 
The  results  of  forced  growth  can  be  summed  up  by  using  the  following  tables.  Tables 
I1.14A,  11.14..  2,  and  11.14.3  give  the  aggregate  growth  indices  for  several  socialist 
countries  and  compare  these  with  similar  growth  indices  for  capitalist  countries. 
TABLE  11.14.1 
te  Output:  Intemational  Compariso 
Average  Annual  Growth  Rate 
1961-70  1971-80  1981-88 
Socialist  Countries 
Bulgaria  5.8  2.8  1.2 
Czechoslovakia  2.9  2.8  1.4 
East  Germany  3.1  2.8  1.8 
Hungary  3.4  2.6  1.0 
Poland  4.2  3.6  0.8 
Romania  5.2  5.3  -0.1 
Soviet  Union  4.9  2.6  2.0 
Capitalist  Countries 
Austria  4.7  3.6  1.7 
France  5.6  3.2  1.9 
Greece  7.6  4.7  1.5 
Italy  5.7  3.8  2.2 
Japan  10.5  4.6  4.0 
Netherlands  5.1  2.9  1.3 
Portugal  6.4  4.7  2.2 
Spain  7.3  3.5  2.6 
United  States  3.8  2.7  3.2 
West  Germany  1  4.5  1  2.7  1  1.7 
Source:  J  Kornai  (1992,  p.  200);  compiled  by  J.  Arvay,  based  on  P.  Marer  et  A  (1991) 
for  socialist  countries  and  OECD  (1991)  for  capitalist  countries. 
Note  that  socialist  output  data  refer  to  GNP,  while  capitalist  output  data  refer  to  GDP- 
TABLE  11.14.2 
193 jcth  Rate  of  Aggregate  Output  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  United  States 
Average  Annual  GDP  Growth  Rates  (percent) 
Source:  W.  D.  Nordhaus  (1990)  based  on  A.  Maddison  (1989,  p.  36) 
TABLE  11.14.3 
Growth  Rate  of  Aggregate  Output:  China  Compared  to  Capitalist  Countries 
Average  Annual  GDP  Growth  Rates  (percent) 
Under  the  classical  system,  though  we  note  that  the  growth  performance  is  substantial,  it 
is  still  questionable  if  it  emerges  that  the  data  must  be  revised.  (See,  Appendix  5,  where  an 
international  comparison  of  official  and  alternative  estimates  of  growth  are  shown).  The 
statement  that  classical  socialism  certainly  took  many  countries  from  a  state  of  severe 
backwardness  at  least  to  a  medium  level  of  development,  is  again  debatable.  What  we  can 
194 
Source:  J.  Echeverri-Gent  (1990,  p.  105). observe  is  that  leaders  of  the  socialist  countries  are  inclined  to  attach  high  intrinsic  value 
to  the  fast  growth  or  even  make  a  fetish  out  of  growth  rate  for  aggregate  output  and  go 
for  its  increase  at  any  price.  An  impartial  observer,  however,  cannot  accept  this  short- 
sighted  criterion  of  evaluation.  Even  if  the  rate  should  be  high  in  some  socialist  country  or 
other,  at  least  for  a  period,  the  question  remains:  what  sacrifice  had  to  be  made  for  that 
growth  rate?  And  what  kind  of  economic  structure  lies  behind  the  aggregate  index?  The 
price  paid  for  forcing  growth  is  very  high.  It  involves  a  great  deal  of  abnegation  and 
causes  contemporaries  much  suffering.  At  the  same  time,  this  type  of  growth  undermines 
its  own  economic  performance.  Even  where  a  high  growth  rate  is  attained  initially,  it 
cannot  be  kept  up;  sooner  or  later,  the  growth  rate  starts  to  fall  more  and  more 
conspicuously.  Each  generation  leaves  a  baleful  legacy  for  the  next  -  of  grave,  postponed, 
and  increasingly  urgent  tasks,  and  of  an  economy  with  a  disharmonious  structure.  3 
H.  14.  iii.  Growth  Poligy  During  the  Period  of  Classical  Socialism 
The  policy  position  on  growth  under  the  classical  system  is  unambiguous:  as  fast  growth 
as  possible  has  to  be  attained  in  the  medium  term,  regardless  of  cost  or  sacrifice.  That 
expresses  itself  in  the  priorities  and  methods  applied  in  the  strategy  of  forced  growth,  as 
we  have  noticed.  During  the  process  of  reform,  this  clear-cut  line  gives  way  to 
ambivalence  and  in  many  cases  downright  schizophrenia.  The  leadership  half  wants  to 
continue  the  forced  growth,  and  half  inclines  to  slow  it  in  favour  of  quicker  results  in 
improving  the  standard  of  living  and  rectifying  the  previous  disproportions.  Both  these 
conflicting  attitudes  are  backed  up  by  the  influence  of  a  range  of  factors.  The  leadership  in 
several  countries  is  distressed  that  the  growth  rate  is  slowing  down,  and  the  sight 
4  strengthens  further  its  determination  to  combat  the  declining  trend  . 
Among  the  reasons 
behind  the  deceleration  is  that  the  potential  for  using  the  earlier  extensive  methods  of 
attaining  fast  growth  is  being  exhausted.  This  primarily  relates  in  the  European  socialist 
countries  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  surplus  of  labour.  5The  leadership  repeatedly  announces 
a  policy  switch  to  intensive  methods  of  growth,  the  strategy  of  "the  new  road  of  growth,  " 
but  it  proves  impossible  to  apply  under  the  conditions  of  the  existing  economic  system.  So 
195 at  times  of  acceleration,  it  tries  the  most  immediate  method  of  effecting  growth  centrally, 
which  is  to  increase  investment.  That  brings  us  directly  to  one  of  the  impulses  behind  a 
source  of  tension,  namely,  overheating  of  investment  activity. 
in  the  discussion  of  the  motives  for  moving  on  from  the  classical  system,  the  first  to  be 
rnentioned  was  the  slowing  of  growth,  to  which  the  counter-reaction  was  the  "growth  at 
any  price"  attitude  just  outlined.  But  no  less  important  a  motive  behind  the  reform  is  the 
dissatisfaction  of  the  general  public.  Deciding  how  economic  policy  should  react  to  that 
poses  a  serious  dilemma.  On  the  one  hand,  the  ratio  of  accumulation  to  consumption  must 
be  altered  in  the  latter's  favour,  so  that  the  growth  in  real  consumption  can  speed  up  at 
last.  But  on  the  other  hand,  people's  living  conditions  and  the  quality  of  life  are  governed 
not  merely  by  the  flow  of  goods  consumption,  but  by  the  capital  accumulated  by  the 
sectors  directly  serving  consumption:  their  stock  of  equipment  and  buildings.  A  fast  and  if 
possible  instant  increase  in  consumption  requires  a  fall  in  the  share  of  investment,  while  a 
rise  in  investment  is  needed  in  the  sectors  directly  affecting  the  quality  of  life.  Within  the 
general  dilemma  of  investment  versus  consumption,  there  arises  the  specific  dilemma  of 
how  to  reallocate  the  investment  among  the  sectors.  The  traditional  beneficiary  from  the 
priorities  of  the  classical  system  is  industry,  notably  heavy  industry.  It  now  feels  doubly 
threatened  and  applies  more  pressure  to  obtain  its  accustomed  investment  "allowances.  "  If 
development  of  the  previously  neglected  sectors  actually  begins,  for  instance,  if  the  pace 
of  housing  construction  increases,  the  high  capital  requirement  of  this  activity  draws 
investment  resources  from  the  "internal  spiral"  directly  inducing  growth  and  causes 
growth  rate  to  Slow  .6 
Whereupon  the  dilemma  becomes  even  more  acute:  should  the  ratio 
of  investment  be  reduced  at  all.,  and  to  what  sectors  should  the  resources  be  transferred? 
There  is  no  real  solution  to  the  problem.  There  is  alternate  acceleration  and  deceleration 
of  investment,  and  an  oscillation  can  also  be  seen  in  the  reallocation  of  investment  in 
favour  of  the  service  sectors!  But  if  either  of  the  constituents  of  this  schizophrenic 
condition  does  come  out  on  top,  it  tends  to  be  the  element  of  the  ambiguous  policy  that 
inclines  toward  forced  growth.  This  behaviour  has  become  a  conditioned  reflex  for  the 
bureaucracy.  Implanted  in  the  decision  makers  by  the  official  ideology  they  have  digested 
196 is  the  feeling  that  the  faster  production  grows,  the  stronger  the  system  becomes.  The 
forcing  of  growth  is  a  spontaneous  inclination,  whereas  the  other  attitude  of  making 
concessions  in  favour  of  consumption  and  investment  to  serve  consumption  is  suggested 
more  by  common  sense,  possibly  backed  up  by  fear  at  the  sight  of  mass  dissatisfaction. 
unsurprisingly,  the  bureaucracy  constantly  relapses  from  the  self-compelling,  pro-living 
standards  attitude  into  its  natural,  pro-growth  behaviour.  8 
11.14.  iv.  A  Socialist-Soul-Searching 
The  applied  Marxian  socialist  mechanism  of  economic  growth  and  development  came  to 
a  historical  end  with  the  collapse  and  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  COMECON 
community.  The  dream  of  the  heroes  and  heroines  of  the  'heroic  age'  during  the  period  of 
transitional  socialism  remained  a  dream.  The  initial  phase  of  the  classical  socialism 
witnessed  an  economic  boom  due  to  the  forced  application  of  the  extensive  methods.  The 
illusory  stage  of  socialism  resulted  in  the  development  of  an  oasis.  The  oasis  dried  up  as 
the  exploitation  of  available  resources  exhausted.  The  panic-stricken  leaders  of  socialist 
state  turned  to  intensive  methods  only  to  realize  that  they  are  far  behind  the  developed 
economies  of  the  world.  The  catch-up  urge  resulted  in  brutal  and  inhuman  models  of 
development.  The  revelation  of  the  social  cost  of  socialist  growth  and  development 
undermined  the  lofty  principles  of  socialism.  The  guardians  of  socialist  state  became 
annihilators  of  the  socialist  ideals.  In  the  name  of  socialism,  wars  were  fought,  nations 
were  conquered,  cultures  were  dismantled  and  human  dignity  was  robed  and  destroyed. 
Nations  after  nations  suffered  and  people  after  people  were  stripped  of  their  human  worth 
under  socialist  regime  under  the  iron  curtain.  All  the  brutality  of  the  socialist  agents  could 
not  bend  the  human  spirit  to  the  socialist  states'  desired  motives.  The  free  spirit  of  the 
human  person  triumphed  over  the  applied  socialism,  when  the  Berlin  wall  was  tom  down, 
to  the  cheers  of  millions  of  socialist  subjects  all  over  the  world.  They  realized  that  they  had 
nothing  to  loose  except  the  inhuman  chains  that  controlled  them  for  decades.  The 
principles  of  glasnost  and  perestroika  freed  true  socialism  from  being  exposed  and 
exploited  any  further.  The  human  ideal  and  understanding  of  true  socialism  could  not 
197 succumb  to  the  tortures  of  institutionalised  socialism.  This  is  the  victory  of  the  human 
culture  of  macro-knowledge.  (Please  refer  to  chapter  seven  of  section  one). 
11.14.  v.  Introduction  of  Nficro  Knowle&e  as  an  Economic  System 
In  our  identification  of  the  Knowledge  Sector,  in  chapter  seven  of  section  one,  we  have 
modelled  a  dual  sector  of  micro-macro  knowledge.  Here,  we  shall  try  to  make  a  step 
further  of  our  understanding  of  micro  knowledge.  As  we  have  already  noted,  the  micro 
knowledge  can  be  developed  or  moulded  and  applied.  'Me  application  of  micro  knowledge 
could  be  a  reason  for  dynamism  or  stagnation  in  the  process  of  development.  In  section 
two  we  have  been  familiarising  ourselves  with  an  applied  growth  path,  that  of  socialism. 
This  applied  model  of  socialism  can  be  considered  as  a  form  of  micro  knowledge.  The 
exponents  of  this  applied  micro  knowledge  believed  in  the  efficacy  of  this  as  an  economic 
system.  They  thought  that  by  introducing  a  new  form  of  micro  knowledge,  they  would 
replace  the  existing  macro  knowledge  and  therefore  they  did  not  consider  the  relevance  of 
the  macro  knowledge.  They  thought  that  macro  knowledge,  i.  e.,  national  way  of  thinking 
or  philosophy,  could  easily  be  replaced  by  a  micro  knowledge,  i.  e.,  an  ideology,  namely, 
Marxism  and  its  offshoots.  The  ulterior  objective  was  to  develop  the  culture  of 
communism  as  the  dominant  macro  knowledge.  Here,  we  encounter  a  few  contradictions. 
The  introduction  of  a  micro  knowledge  through  'one  ideology'  of  Marxism  in  view  of 
'one  objective'  of  communism,  to  be  evolved  as  a  macro  knowledge,  faces  with  the  first 
contradiction. 
11.14.  vi.  First  Contradiction:  Ideologl  versus  PhilosWhv 
Can  we  associate  the  vociferous  process  of  economic  development  of  a  nation  with  the 
philosophical  trends  that  silently  reside  in  the  national  consciousness?  Does  the  way  of 
thinking  influence  the  way  of  economic  behaviour?  Does  economics  determine  philosophy 
or  vice  versa?  We  are  familiar  with  ideologies  which  model  economics.  In  section  two,  we 
have  been  trying  to  understand  an  economic  model  within  the  framework  of  a  Marxist- 
198 socialist  ideology.  Even  the  so-called  Marxian  philosophy  is  only  a  form  of  micro 
knowledge  and  therefore  an  ideology.  But  philosophy  is  not  an  ideology.  Philosophy  is  the 
authentic  existing  macro  knowledge.  Falsity  cannot  exist  in  philosophy.  Ideology  results  in 
fundamentalism,  even  economic  fundamentalism,  which  can  be  detrimental  to  economic 
development  for  it  cuts  the  existential  human  needs.  It  creates  a  world  of  division:  North 
vs.  South;  rich  vs.  poor;  bourgeois  vs.  proletariat  etc.  But  philosophy  is  something  that 
transcends  ideology.  Ideology  is  created  in  a  short  time  while  philosophy  evolves  in  a 
process  of  internalization  of  a  civilization  which  happens  in  the  long-run.  Thus  even  an 
ideology  that  determines  or  models  economics,  in  the  course  of  time,  gives  way  to 
philosophy.  Thus  philosophy  can  give  the  final  judgement  about  an  ideology  which  has 
become  the  base  for  the  economic  action  or  inaction  of  a  nation.  And  while  giving  the 
judgement,  philosophy  evolves  as  a  corrective  measure  of  a  wrong  ideology  or  an 
evaluative  rod  which  balances  ideology  and  economic  advancement.  Thus,  in  our  analyzis 
we  could  apply  and  evaluate  the  particular  ideology  by  the  macro  knowledge  and  this 
would  enable  us  to  understand  the  relevance  of  the  way  of  thinking  that  does  influence 
economic  behaviour  of  a  nation. 
We  shall  use  the  subjective  dissimilarities  or  paradoxes  of  the  socialist  economic  system 
to  prove  our  point.  First,  human  being  as  a  free  economic  being  is  the  source  of  any 
economic  action.  The  experience  of  the  economic  individual  under  a  socialist  economic 
system,  by  and  large  as  we  have  seen,  was  a  stifling  one  due  to  the  imposition  of  state 
rigidity.  This  experience  of  the  'free  economic  being  versus  state  rigidity'  is  a  subjective 
one  because  it  is  the  individual  who  suffers  the  contradiction  (scale  of  time-immediate). 
Second,  unlimited  human  wants  and  scarcity  of  resources  is  a  fact  of  economic  life.  Under 
a  regime  of  ideology,  unfulfilled  promises  become  the  source  of  false  generosity.  Without 
consideration  to  the  truth  of  the  scarcity  of  natural  and  other  resources,  the  agents  of  the 
socialist  state  (e.  g.  leaders-planners)  act  generously  by  an  exploitative  mechanism  of 
plundering.  This  experience  of  the  'scarce  resources  versus  false  generosity'  is,  again,  a 
subjective  one  because  it  is  the  leaders-planners  who  suffer  the  contradiction  (scale  of 
time-too  late).  Third,  the  growth  model  of  the  socialist  economic  system,  as  we  have  seen, 
results  in  forced-superficial  growth.  When  the  real  worth  is  tested,  it  collapsed  with  a  big 
199 bang.  The  socialist  economic  system  proved  itself  superficial  without  any  real  worth  of  its 
own.  This  experience  of  the  'real  worth  versus  forced  superficial  growth'  is  therefore  a 
subjective  one  because  it  is  the  system  and  hence  the  economy  suffers  the  contradiction 
(scale  of  time-distant).  These  subjective  dissimilarities  unfold  the  dynamism  of  the  first 
contradiction  of  the  socialist  economic  system.  It  is  the  triumph  of  macro  knowledge 
(philosophy-the  national  way  of  thinking)  over  the  micro  knowledge  of  an  ideology, 
Marxian  socialist  system  and  therefore  its  coflapse  is  naturally  justified. 
11.14.  vii.  Second  Contradiction:  Political  Consolidation  Vs.  Economic  Vision 
Marxian  socialist  model  had  an  inherent  structural  imbalance.  At  the  dawn  of  historical 
socialism,  this  contradiction  became  more  conspicuous.  While  the  consolidation  of 
economic  mode  of  production  through  the  proletarian  victory  made  the  economic 
consolidation  easy,  the  political  consolidation  became  a  stumbling  block.  Marx  did  not 
develop  a  political  structure  of  the  proletariat  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  socialist  revolution. 
As  we  have  seen  in  our  analysis,  the  emerging  revolutionary  leaders  designed  a  political 
structure  of  consolidation  which  was  detrimental  to  socialist  ideals.  The  feudafist- 
capitalist-bourgeoise  political  structure  of  the  socialist  state  underniined  the  victory  of 
socialism.  In  this  sense,  they  could  not  replace  political  capitalism  with  political  socialism. 
Every  step  towards  the  political  consolidation  resulted  in  a  systemic  failure.  Gradual 
decaying  of  a  political  system  inevitably  lead  to  the  final  collapse  of  any  economic  system. 
Socialist  political  collapse  could  be  described  as  a  systematic  failure  of  a  system  which 
could  not  find  a  resonation  between  the  socialist  aspiration  of  economics  and  pohtics. 
When  the  iron  curtain  was  removed,  we  were  able  to  see  the  decay  and  the  inherent 
contradiction  that  exists  between  the  political  and  economic  nature  of  a  socialist  system. 
The  ideological  micro  knowledge  of  an  economic  system  failed  to  integrate  with  a  macro 
knowledge  of  common  sense. 
11.14.  viii.  Third  Contradiction:  Applicational  Faults 
200 our  analysis  of  the  introduction  of  a  micro  knowledge  based  on  an  ideology  of  Marxian 
socialism,  points  out  a  few  applicational  faults.  The  macro  knowledge  of  socialism 
was/is/Will  be  a  living  phenomenon.  Ancient  civilizations  and  medieval  cultures  and 
modem  nations  vied  to  be  socialist.  But,  true  socialist  longing  came  to  an  end  with  the 
first  victim  of  applied  socialism.  The  experience  of  historical  socialism  was  against  the 
macro  knowledge  of  socialist  ideals.  This  was  due  to  the  faulty  application  of  an  ideology 
by  an  administrative  hierarchy  who  were  victims  rather  than  result  of  a  system.  A  victim 
would  never  opt  to  be  a  master  of  a  system  which  has  made  him  a  victim.  S/he  would  live 
always  in  that  pre-victim  stage.  The  role  model  of  a  socialist  was  a  capitalist.  The  socialist 
model  has  been  interpreted  and  applied  to  satisfy  the  immediate  needs,  by  these  longing 
6would-be  capitalists'  in  the  mantle  of  socialists.  This  contradicts  with  the  eternal  vision  of 
socialism  towards  communism.  True  socialism  did  not  happen.  Marxist  vision  of 
communism  would  never  blossom.  Applied  socialism  removed  the  vision  of  communism 
and  this  in  turn  corrupted  historical  socialism.  This  explains  why  the  micro  knowledge, 
rather  than  being  a  growth  factor,  became  a  non-growth  factor  in  the  working  of  a 
socialist  state.  Overcoming  a  stagnant  and  decaying  applied  micro  knowledge  has  become 
the  sole  objective  of  the  'non-administrative  hierarchy'  of  the  socialist  state.  The  vision  of 
'one-ideology  and  one  objective'  of  the  socialist  state  collapsed.  The  micro  knowledge  of 
an  ideology  could  not  have  any  impact  on  the  macro  knowledge  of  the  way  of  thinking  of 
the  people  and  their  aspirations  in  spite  of  a  whole  applied  mechanism  of  fatal  apparatus. 
This  is  the  super-success  of  the  macro  knowledge  over  micro  knowledge  as  an  ideology 
oriented  economic  system.  At  every  juncture  of  the  historical  socialism,  it  is  the  macro 
knowledge  which  challenged  the  validity  of  the  application  of  micro  knowledge.  The 
failure  of  historical  socialism  and  Soviet  Union  and  COMECON  community,  is  the  success 
story  of  the  strength  of  macro  knowledge  that  subsists  in  every  nation  and  cultures.  The 
emergence  of  transitional  economies  from  the  ashes  of  historical  socialism  have  to  be 
understood  as  a  true  longing  of  the  people  to  live  according  to  the  culture  of  macro 
knowledge. 
201 14.  ix.  The  Arrival  of  Socialism 
In  the  existing  economic  systems  which  are  based  on  the  principles  of  Capitalism, 
contrary  to  the  general  opinion,  there  is  a  huge  public  sector.  The  bureaucrats  and 
technocrats  of  The  Culture  of  Contentment  of  Galbraith  is  a  good  example.  9  Of  course, 
this  is  being  complemented  by  the  private  sector.  As  capitalism  ripens,  competitive  market 
mechanism  plays  its  role.  A  gradual  privatization  of  the  existing  public  sector  is  being 
visioned  and  implemented,  as  it  is  happening  in  Britain  and  other  developed  market- 
economy  oriented  countries.  This  was  the  pre-condition  for  the  Marxist  vision  of 
socialism.  Marx  hoped  that  the  total  capitalist  privatization  would  lead  to  the  emergence 
of  the  industrial  proletariat.  This  has  not  yet  happened  in  any  of  the  developed  capitalist 
economies.  Moreover,  industrial  proletariat  were  given  a  fairer  treatment  than  was 
expected  by  Marx.  This  is  due  to  the  application  of  Marxian  insights  into  the  capitalist 
mode  of  production,  distribution  and  consumption.  In  this  sense,  contrary  to  general 
belief,  Marx  has  become  the  saviour  of  capitalism. 
When  full  capitalist-privatization  coupled  with  proletariat-exploitation  of  the  Marxian 
range  occurs,  socialist  revolution  could  happen.  But  this  is  far  from  reality  and  is  a  wishful 
and  utopian  dream.  This  is  a  negative  understanding  of  socialism.  Even  if  capitalist- 
privatization  is  completed,  the  exploitation  of  the  proletariat  would  not  happen  as  Marx 
predicted,  because  of  the  post-Marxian  approach  to  welfare.  Only  if  the  social  welfare 
system  collapses,  and  the  discontent  of  the  working-class  accumulates,  the  problem  arises; 
strikes  and  demonstration  of  a  transformatory  system  echoes;  and  the  entertainment  of 
capitalist-privatization  comes  to  an  end.  From  the  ashes  of  capitalist-privatization,  a  form 
of  public  ownership  is  envisaged.  But  here  the  lessons  of  history  become  the  guide  to 
further  march.  A  new  mode  of  production  is  to  be  envisaged  and  modelled.  The  feasibility 
and  viability  of  the  public  ownership  of  the  means  of  production  coupled  with  market 
mechanism  and  all  its  functions  are  to  be  taken  into  account.  This  is  a  new  form  of 
socialism.  It  is  to  be  modelled  on  the  existing  macro  knowledge  of  each  nation  which 
wants  to  participate  in  this  transformatory  global  economic  system.  Let  me  conclude  this 
section  by  a  quote  which  can  be  applied  to  any  nation  in  transition. 
202 "Russia  has  already  gone  through  many  cultural  invasions  -  Mongolia,  Dutch, 
German,  French,  -  but  Russian  culture  and  language  has  been  preserved.  I  think 
penetration  by  foreign  culture  is  a  natural  process.  We  are  not  an  island,  we  are  not 
on  the  planet  Mars,,  and  we  are  hungry  for  mass  culture.  We  had  a  Stalinist  mass 
culture,  created  for,  but  not  by,  the  masses.  Now  we  want  American  mass  culture, 
and  of  course  there  is  a  danger  in  that,  but  our  culture  is  strong.  " 
(Svetlana  Kolesnika) 
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THE  TRANSITION  GROWTH  PATH 
THE  economies  in  transition  are  making  a  heroic  and  challenging  march  towards 
progress.  They  are  simultaneously  engaged  in  dismantling  the  legacies  of  a  planned 
economic  system  and  building  up  a  structure  of  market-oriented  economic  system.  The 
economic  objective  of  growth  and  development  remains  a  top  priority  during  the  period  of 
transition.  The  transition  process  that  began  a  few  years  ago  in  eastern  and  central 
European  countries,  after  the  collapse  of  socialist  economies,  moved  decisively  to 
implement  reforms  to  establish  a  market  economy.  "By  now,  virtually  all  of  the  former 
centrally  planned  economies  are,  to  a  greater  or  a  lesser  degree,  attempting  to  establish  a 
market  economy,  and  most  countries  have  experienced  substantial  and  sustained  output 
declines.  The  experience  of  the  countries  of  central  Europe  that  first  and  most  boldly 
implemented  market  reforms  clearly  show  that  macroeconomic  stabilization  and  structural 
reform  are  essential  prerequisites  for  a  resumption  of  growth,  and  that  there  is  no 
advantage  to  postponing  them.  These  countries  are  now  growing,  or  appear  to  be  on  the 
threshold  of  recovery,  and  prospects  for  continued  growth  are  good"  (EBRD  Transition 
Report,  1994).  In  the  theoretical  growth  path  that  we  have  designed,  in  section  one  of  our 
study,  we  were  following  the  capitalist-market  economy  growth  models  with  a  view  to 
determine  the  engines  of  growth  and  their  motivating  forces.  We  have  seen  the  prospects 
and  limitations  of  those  models  within  a  global  framework.  We  have  tried  to  identify  and 
endogenize  a  growth  influencing  knowledge  sector  as  an  extension  to  such  models.  In  the 
applied  growth  path  that  we  have  designed,  in  section  two  of  our  study,  we  followed  the 
economic  growth  models  of  a  socialist  economic  system.  The  socialist  ideological 
structure  and  dynamism  have  been  endogenized  in  these  applied  growth  models.  A  critique 
of  the  socialist  system  by  means  of  the  dual  knowledge  sector,  which  we  have  developed, 
shows  the  inherent  socialist  contradictions.  From  the  ashes  of  historical  socialism  emerges 
205 the  hopes  of  the  economies  in  transition.  These  hopes  are  to  be  translated  into  reality  by 
following  a  seemingly  difficult  but  unavoidable  structural  reforms;  particularly  by  treading 
the  macroeconomic  stabilization  path.  This  win  give  a  new  vision  to  their  economic 
oýective.  From  the  vision-growth  path  of  the  economies  in  transition  we  move  to  design  a 
solution-growth  path.  As  we  have  done  in  our  previous  sections  of  this  study,  let  us  begin 
with  the  composition  of  place  of  the  economies  in  transition. 
206 CIL&PTER  FIFTEEN 
THE  COMPOSITION  OF  PLACE  OF  ECONOMIES  IN 
TRANSITION 
rMe  cosmos  is  in  an  ever  transitional  process.  ne  physical  and  metaphysical  realities  are 
understood  in  this  process  of  being  in  transition.  In  this  transitional  process,  the  old  is 
given  way  to  the  new;  and  the  freshness  of  this  new  age  is  constantly  seeking  new  forms 
and  ways  of  life.  In  the  global  economic  scenario,  this  has  been  existentially  more  vibrant 
in  the  continent  of  Europe.  "Europe  has  entered  a  new  promising  era.  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe  is  liberating  itself.  The  Soviet  Union  has  embarked  on  the  long  journey  towards  a 
free  society.  The  walls  that  once  confined  people  and  ideas  are  collapsing.  Europeans  are 
determining  their  own  destiny.  They  are  choosing  freedom.  They  are  choosing  economic 
liberty.  They  are  choosing  peace.  They  are  choosing  a  Europe  whole  and  free.  "'  This 
declaration  of  the  NATO  Summit  (See  Appendix  111.15.1)  heralded  a  promising  era.  To 
enter  into  this  new  promising  era,  we  need  to  make  an  archaeological  tour  of  the  region  to 
find  the  roots  and  sources  which  have  geographically  knit  together  the  ground  of  their 
existence. 
IH.  15-i.  Geographical  Composition 
The  imperial-colonial  world  collapsed  at  the  emergence  of  new  nation  states.  The  most 
significant  achievement  of  the  peace  treaties  of  1919,  following  the  end  of  World  War  1, 
was  the  creation  of  a  belt  of  central  European  states  from  the  buffer  zones  of  the  pre-war 
German,  Austro-Hungarian  and  Russian  empires.  Their  true  independence  proved  short- 
lived;  within  two  decades  the  expansion  of  Nazi  Germany  and  the  Soviet  Union  had  erased 
their  autonomy.  To  understand  the  geography  of  Eastem  Europe,  we  need  to  consider  the 
area  which  lies  east  of  a  line  from  Lubeck  to  Trieste  and  is  bordered  by  the  Ural  and 
Caucasus  Mountains.  We  include,  therefore,  those  central  and  southem  European  states 
which  came  under  Soviet  influence  at  the  end  of  World  War  11,  and  also  the  European 
207 republics  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Accordingly,  the  expression  'Eastern  Europe'  has 
commonly  been  used  to  refer  to  the  arc  of  Soviet  sateflite  states  established  after  the 
World  War  II  between  the  Baltic  and  the  Black  Sea.  2  The  terms  'central  Europe'  and 
4east-central  Europe'  are  increasingly  used  as  attention  is  directed  to  the  political  events 
between  the  Soviet  border  and  the  states  of  the  European  Community.  The  region  we  are 
referring  to  as  Eastern  Europe  covers  an  area  of  5.5  mifflon  square  kilometres  and 
contains  some  330  million  inhabitants.  3  The  differences  in  ethnic  and  religious  terms  are 
also  marked  .4 
The  economies  of  east-central  Europe  are  in  a  process  of  transition  and 
therefore  they  are  also  known  as  Transitional  Economies  (TEs)  or  Economies  in 
Transition.  This  transition  is  also  from  an  ideology  to  which  they  have  been  chained  for 
decades. 
HI.  15.  ii.  Ideological  Composition 
As  we  have  noted  in  the  previous  section,  the  world's  first  successful  Communist 
revolution,  The  Bolsheviks'  'October  Revolution'  of  1917,  came  as  a  surprise  even  to 
most  Marxists,  since  Russia  was  a  relatively  backward  country  economically.  Marx  had 
always  believed  that  revolution  would  occur  first  in  the  industrially  advanced  states. 
During  the  early  days,  even  the  Bolsheviks  believed  that  only  a  Communist  revolution  in 
.  I- 
- 
die  West  could  guarantee  the  success  of  their  movement.  5  At  home,  the  'Reds'  faced 
strong  opposition  and  they  had  to  fight  a  lengthy  and  bloody  civil  war  before  emerging 
triumphant.  As  they  consolidated  their  revolutionary  success  the  Bolsheviks  grew  in 
confidence  and  came  to  believe  that,  far  from  seeking  help  from  the  West,  revolution 
could  be  exported  to  the  rest  of  Europe-on  the  bayonets  of  the  Red  Army.  Although  the 
Bolsheviks  were  heirs  to  the  vast,  multinational  empire  of  the  Tsars,  it  took  them  several 
Years  to  reconquer  and  reabsorb  a  number  of  the  outlying  republics  which  had  tasted 
independence  and  had  developed  along  nationalist  lines.  Soviet  Russia  became 
transformed  into  the  USSR  (Union  of  Soviet  Socialist  Republics)  only  following  the 
acceptance  of  the  1923  Constitution.  6 
208 The  emergence  of  USSR  with  a  new  ideology  and  a  new  power  structure  caused  a 
global  alarm.  Communist  Russia  was  treated  with  suspicion  by  the  international 
comniunity  and  remained  isolated  during  the  early  years  of  its  existence.  Only  in  the  late 
1920s,  the  Western  states  began  to  give  the  USSR  grudging  recognition.  German-Soviet 
co-operation  in  the  military-industrial  sphere  was  extensive  during  the  1920s  and  was 
suspended  only  when  Hitler  came  to  power.  For  a  number  of  years  the  Nazis'  open 
hostility  towards  Communism  made  co-operation  impossible.  Then,  in  a  remarkable 
reversal  of  policy  (which  dismayed  his  Italian  and  Japanese  allies),  Hitler  agreed  to  a  new 
understanding  with  the  Soviet  leader,  Stalin,  which  resulted  in  'The  Nazi-Soviet  Non- 
Aggression  Pact'  of  August  1939.  But  in  1941  Hitler  turned  his  armies  east  to  attack  his 
ally,  and  the  Soviet  Union  was  plunged  unexpectedly  into  a  desperate  'Great  Patriotic 
War'  which  costed  her  over  20  million  dead.  Immediately  Hitler  attacked,  the  Soviet 
leadership  found  itself  allied  with  Nazi  Gen-nany's  existing  enemies,  notably  Britain  and 
7 
USA  and  the  wartime  alliance  of  the  Big  Three  Powers  was  born.  The  alliance  during  the 
World  War  II  gave  USSR  a  strengthening  position  in  compromising  deals  which  are 
reflected  in  the  post-war  division  of  Europe. 
Ul.  15.  iii.  The  Post-war  Composition 
The  post-war  division  of  Europe  can  be  traced  back  to  the  Great  Power  conferences8 
which  took  place  in  the  closing  stages  of  the  war.  Western  policy  makers  realized  after  the 
Soviet  victories  of  Kursk  and  Stalingrad  that  the  defeat  of  Germany  was  inevitable.  'Mey 
saw,  moreover,  that  the  Red  Army  would  liberate  most  areas  of  east-central  Europe  from 
German  occupation.  Faced  with  this  inevitability,  Churchill  and  Roosevelt  attempted  to 
meet  with  Stalin  at  an  early  stage  to  agree  on  the  principles  of  post-war  reconstruction. 
Consequently,  there  was  a  readiness  to  make  concessions  to  Stalin  and  smooth  over  any 
Points  of  conflict.  In  late  October  1944  Churchill  had  put  to  Stalin  the  famous 
6  percentages  agreement'  concerning  the  relative  influence  of  the  Great  Powers  in  south- 
central  European  countries  expected  to  be  liberated  by  the  Red  Army's  advance.  The 
Soviet's  were  to  have  a  90%  interest  in  Romania,  75%  in  Bulgaria  and  50%  in  Hungary 
209 and  Yugoslavia.  In  return,  the  British  were  ceded  a  90%  interest  in  Greece.  Stalin  seized 
the  Baltic  states  (to  the  disquiet  of  the  Western  allies,  who  refused  to  recognize  their 
absorption  into  the  Soviet  Union),  Bessarabia  and  northern  Bukowina  from  Romania,  and 
part  of  Czechoslovakia.  In  fact,  Stalin  reclaimed  nearly  all  the  territory  he  had  occupied 
during  1939  and  1940  as  a  result  of  his  Pact  with  Hitler.  Two  results  flowed  from  this 
deal.  rMe  first  was  that  Poland,  having  lost  almost  half  its  territory  in  the  east,  was 
compensated  in  the  west  at  the  expense  of  Germany.  A  large  strip  of  territory  from  the 
Baltic  coast  to  Silesia  became  Polsih,  including  towns  such  as  Stettin  (Szczecin)  and 
Breslau  (Wroclaw).  Millions  of  German  inhabitants  were  expelled  to  make  way  for  Poles 
being  'repatriated'  from  the  Soviet-occupied  eastern  regions  of  the  country.  The  second 
was  that  after  1945  the  Soviet  Union  had  a  common  border  with  Hungary  and 
Czechoslovakia.  This  was  to  have  considerable  significance  in  1956  and  1968.9  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  along  with  the  territorial  expansion,  Soviet  Union  made  an  ideological 
expansion  through  the  new  economic  ideology  of  Communism,  which  resulted  in 
unforeseen  consequences. 
111.15.  iv.  The  Various  Stages  of  Communist  Take-over 
The  Communist  take-over  of  east-central  Europe  between  1944  and  1948  -  the 
imposition  of  one-party  rule  -  took  place  by  stages.  The  first  was  that  of  military 
occupation  by  the  Red  Army.  With  the  Soviet  forces  stalled  outside  Warsaw  in  the 
summer  of  1944  the  offensive  moved  to  the  south.  Bucharest  fell  on  31  August  1944.  On 
5  September  Moscow  declared  war  on  Bulgaria  and  the  Red  Army  crossed  the  Danube. 
On  19  October  Soviet  troops  were  established  in  Debrecen  in  eastern  Hungary.  Only  in 
January  1945  was  Warsaw  eventually  taken,  and  Soviet  troops  crossed  into 
Czechoslovakia  in  March  of  the  same  year.  The  Soviets  were  sufficiently  subtle  not  to 
install  Communist  regimes  at  the  outset.  But  everywhere  '0  the  Red  Army  was  able  to 
install  'its'  people  in  the  local  administration  and  to  eliminate  potential  opponents.  The 
second  stage  of  the  take-over  was  marked  by  the  establishment  of  provisional  coalition 
governments,  with  the  participation  of  both  Communist  and  non-Communist 
210 representatives.  The  Communists  had,  at  best,  marginal  influence  in  most  of  these  states 
before  the  war  and  were  given  a  role  which,  in  importance,  far  exceeded  their  support. 
The  third  stage  involved  propaganda  and  terror.  In  all  cases  the  Communists  took  control 
of  key  ministries  such  as  Justice,  Internal  Affairs  or  Security,  and  Defence.  This  put  them 
in  an  ideal  position  to  break  the  back  of  democratic  opposition  and  cloak  their  actions  in 
legality.  The  Communists  habitually  made  lavish  promises,  whether  or  not  they  were  able 
to  carry  them  out.  As  Communist  control  of  the  mass  media  grew,  the  population  became 
increasingly  subject  to  the  Party's  line  on  all  matters.  Communist  ideological  censorship 
was  more  severe  than  that  imposed  during  the  German  occupation.  The  fourth  stage 
involved  'salami  tactics'  to  undermine  their  enemies  by  subversion,  intrigue  and  bribery. 
Communist  support  varied  widely  (from  17%  in  Hungary  to  38%  in  Czechoslovakia),  but 
in  all  cases  they  were  in  a  minority  in  government.  The  fifth  stage  involved  the  elections 
themselves.  Although  the  1946  elections  in  Czechoslovakia  were  fairly  conducted,  those  in 
Poland  and  Hungary  during  1947  were  not.  The  final  stage  involved  the  further  settling  of 
accounts  with  political  opponents  once  political  power  had  been  consolidated. 
In  asking  why  the  Communists  were  successful  we  have  to  recognize  a  number  of 
characteristics,  in  addition  to  skilful  use  of  propaganda  and  terror.  They  were,  on  the 
whole,  better  organized  than  their  democratic  opponents.  During  this  period  the  party 
apparatus  was  highly  centralized  and  extremely  disciplined.  They  were  playing  the  political 
game  to  a  different  set  of  rules  from  their  opponents,  who  were,  in  any  case,  often  divided 
among  themselves.  Indeed,  if,  between  the  wars  and  as  a  result  of  the  Versailles  settlement 
(1919),  the  newly  independent  states  of  central  Europe  had  provided  the  West  with  a 
protective  barrier  against  the  contagion  of  Bolshevism,  after  World  War  II,  they  gave  the 
USSR  a  security  shield  behind  which  it  could  recover  and  arm  itself.  Hopes  that  the  'Big 
Three'  alliance  would  last  beyond  the  war  were  disappointed.  "  The  global  political  scene 
and  even  the  destiny  of  humanity  itself  were  tested  to  the  grim  reality  of  an  imminent 
annihilative  nature  of  nuclear  war  and  fear. 
211 15.  v.  The  Dawn  of  Cold  War  Period 
Historians  are  divided  about  when  the  Cold  War  actually  began.  Some  choose  March 
1946,  when  Churchill  attempted  to  draw  the  world's  attention  to  what  was  happening  in 
east-central  Europe.  Churchill  had  been  awarded  an  honorary  degree  by  a  small  American 
liberal  arts  college  at  Fulton,  Missouri.  His  acceptance  speech,  delivered  in  the  presence  of 
president  Truman,  echoed  around  the  world.  An  'iron  curtain',  said  Churchill,  had 
descended  across  Europe  from  Stettin  in  the  Baltic  to  Trieste  in  the  Adriatic.  Behind  it  the 
Communist  parties  which  were  previously  very  small  had  'been  raised  to  a  pre-eminence 
and  power  far  beyond  their  numbers'  and  were  seeking  every  where  to  obtain  totalitarian 
control.  They  constituted  'a  growing  challenge  and  peril  to  civilization.  '  Churchill,  who 
had  been  in  opposition  since  the  July  1945  General  Election,  had  employed  the  term  'iron 
curtain'  in  a  parliamentary  speech,  in  August  1945,  when  referring  to  the  expulsion  of 
Germans  from  Poland.  But  after  the  Fulton  address  the  term  entered  into  popular  usage 
and  became  part  of  the  vocabulary  of  the  Cold  War.  By  the  end  of  1947  the  division  of 
Europe  was  clearer.  The  Communists  were  no  longer  hiding  behind  coalition 
governments,  but  had  in  most  states  taken  absolute  control,  had  outlawed  the  opposition 
and  were  hounding  them.  12  The  deepening  of  the  Cold  War  chilled  the  relationship 
between  the  West  and  the  Soviet  Union,  which  resulted  in  varying  responses. 
HI.  15.  vi.  The  Western  Response 
The  West  began  to  respond  to  Communist  expansion  during  1947  when  in  March  the 
American  President  outlined  what  came  to  be  known  in  his  name  as  'Truman  Doctrine'. 
Washington  would  help  those  countries,  which  sought  to  avoid  coming  under  Communist 
domination,  to  retain  their  freedom  and  independence.  This  policy  of  'containing' 
Communist  expansion  was  later  superseded  under  the  Eisenhower  administration.  The 
European  Recovery  Programme,  or  Marshall  Plan,  (named  after  US  Secretary  of  State, 
George  Marshall),  was  also  brought  to  life  during  1947.  This  was  a  move  to  extend 
economic  d  to  rebuild  Europe's  war-shattered  economies,  a  condition  being  that  the 
212 Europeans  agreed  to  economic  co-operation  ($12  billion  dollars  was  sent  to  Europe 
between  1947  and  1951). 
Following  the  defeat  of  Nazi  Germany,  Germany  had  been  divided  into  four  occupation 
zones,  to  be  administered  by  the  victorious  Allied  powers:  the  USA,  Britain,  France,  and 
the  Soviet  Union.  13  When  moves  to  fuse  the  Western  zones  (after  the  Potsdam  Conference 
agreement  of  July  1945)  were  eventually  taken  in  1947,  and  currency  reform  was  effected 
in  the  West  without  Soviet  agreement  or  participation,  the  scene  was  set  for  a  showdown. 
The  Soviets  retaliated  in  June  1948  by  cutting  Western  road  and  rail  links  which  crossed 
the  Soviet-occupied  territory  to  the  capital,  Berlin.  The  West  foiled  this  by  a  massive  airlift 
of  supplies  into  Berlin. 
Subsequently,  the  demarcation  line  with  the  Eastern,  Soviet,  zone  became  virtually  a 
state  border.  The  German  Democratic  Republic-East  Germany-  became  de  jure  an 
independent  state  from  1949,  with  its  own  parliament  and  decision  to  frame  a  constitution. 
In  1955  it  joined  the  Warsaw  Pact.  Events  like  Tito's  defection  (1948),  the  Berlin 
confrontation  and  Atlantic  Pact  led  to  decisive  moves  to  consolidate  Communist  rule  in 
A-  - 
the  satellite  states  and  to  weld  them  into  a  political  bloc.  In  the  economic  sphere, 
industrialization  was  pushed  forward  and  central  planning  bodies  set  up.  Tighter 
censorship  was  imposed,  and  a  greater  cultural  and  artistic  conformity  demanded. 
Increasing  pressure  was  exerted  on  the  Church;  Roman  Catholic  primates  were  arrested 
and  imprisoned;  church  property  was  confiscated  and  church  charitable  organizations 
wound  up  or  taken  over  by  the  state.  The  use  of  secret  police  to  eliminate  political 
14  opponents  was  soon  directed  towards  the  ranks  of  the  Party  itself 
. 
The  new  political 
scenario  also  demanded  a  firm  Soviet  response  due  to  the  Western  policies. 
III.  15.  vii.  The  Soviet  RMons 
The  Soviet  response  was  the  Zhdanov  Doctrine.  An  associate  of  Stalin,  A.  A.  Zhdanov 
expounded  his  theory  of  the  'two  camps'  to  delegates  at  the  founding  session  of  the 
Communist  Information  Bureau  (Cominform)  in  Polish  Silesia  in  September  1947. 
213 According  to  Zhdanov's  vision,  the  world  was  divided  into  opposing  camps  -  the 
,  imperialist',  'anti-democratic'  camp  (headed  by  the  USA)  and  the  'socialist',  'anti- 
imperialist  ',  'democratic'  camp  led  by  the  USSR.  This  speech  provided  a  justification  for 
the  sovietization  of  east-central  Europe. 
In  January  1949  the  Communist  world's  trade  organization,  the  Council  of  Mutual 
Economic  Assistance  -  known  as  Comecon  or  CMEA  -  was  called  into  being  in  Moscow. 
The  forming  of  Comecon  was  regarded  by  most  observers  as  the  Soviet  answer  to  the 
Marshall  Plan.  The  aims  of  Comecon,  as  outlined  in  the  communique,  were  to  'exchange 
economic  experience',  to  extend  technical  aid  and  encourage  trade  between  the  member 
states.  Its  stated  political  aims  were  to  'strengthen  the  unity  and  solidarity  of  members' 
and  encourage  co-operation  'in  the  interest  of  the  building  of  socialism  and  communism'. 
The  fusing  of  the  Soviet  bloc  nations  in  a  military  alliance  did  not  take  place  until  1955, 
when  the  Warsaw  Treaty  Organization  (better  known  as  the  Warsaw  Pact,  See  Appendix 
111.15.2)  15  was  created.  Western  analysts  have  suggested  that  the  formation  of  the  Warsaw 
Pact  was  an  early  Soviet  gambit  to  bring  about  the  dismantling  of  NATO  and  the 
withdrawal  of  American  troops  from  Europe  -  on  a  quid  pro  quo  basis.  Soviet 
justifications  for  the  creation  of  the  Eastern  bloc  pacts  -  that  they  were  reacting  to 
developments  in  the  West  -  ignore  the  reasons  why  the  Cold  War  began;  the  aggressive 
methods  undertaken  by  Moscow,  especially  during  the  Stalinist  period,  to  enforce 
Communist  rule  on  its  Western  neighbours.  16  The  Soviet  bloc  nations  embraced  the 
ideology  of  Communism  to  defeat  the  Western  responses  to  the  Cold  War. 
HI.  15.  viii.  The  Characteristics  of  Communist  Rule 
The  regimes  which  came  into  power  in  east-central  Europe  after  the  1945  called 
themselves  'people's  republics'  or  'socialist  democracies'.  In  fact  they  were  neither 
socialist  in  the  accepted  Western  sense  of  the  word  nor  were  they  democracies,  since  they 
did  not  allow  for  free  choice  in  competitive  elections.  Nor  were  the  regimes  in  any  way  the 
choice  of  the  people.  Misuse  of  such  terms  and  misinformation  about  the  true  nature  of 
conditions  obtaining  under  Communist  rtýde  have  been  characteristic  of  Communist 
214 regimes.  The  emerging  Communist  states  did  have  a  number  of  things  in  common  as  we 
have  discussed  in  the  previous  section.  The  first  is  that  of  an  official  ideology  of  Marxism- 
Lemmsm,  which  had  three  important  elements:  it  provided  a  'scientific'  interpretation  of 
history  in  class  terms;  it  explained  that  the  victory  of  the  proletariat  and  the  triumph  of 
Communist  rule  was  logical  and  inevitable;  finally,  it  presented  a  vision  of  a  more 
egalitarian  society,  with  the  elimination  of  poverty  and  exploitation.  Ihe  concept  of 
,  building  socialism'  was  portrayed  as  a  thorough  worthy  and  progressive  exercise. 
Marxism  provided  the  moral  and  theoretical  justification  for  Communist  Party  rule  in  the 
name  of  the  working  classes.  Another  characteristic  was  the  introduction  of  single-party 
rule.  Party  control  was  extended  outwards  and  downwards  by  means  of  the 
nomenklatura;  Party  nominees  selected  for  key  posts  in  all  areas  of  public  life  -  from  the 
economy  and  local  government  to  the  media  and  the  diplomatic  service.  The  economic 
systems  introduced  into  east-central  Europe  were  modelled  on  the  Soviet  type;  that  is,  the 
market  relationship  between  consumer  and  producer  was  largely  removed.  The  result  was 
empty  shops  and  queues  for  basic  necessities.  Communist  economic  systems  almost 
everywhere  failed  in  terms  of  the  efficiency  and  the  standards  of  living  achieved  under  the 
successful  market  economies.  Communists  everywhere  worked  to  achieve  a  monopoly  on 
the  supply  of  news  and  information  to  the  public.  The  post-war  Communist  regimes 
shared  in  the  elimination  of  civil  society.  17  Our  previous  analysis  in  section  two  reveals 
well  the  nature  of  communist  rule  in  the  Soviet  bloc  nations.  In  spite  of  the  initial 
successes  in  the  accumulation  of  physical  capital  and  commanding  control,  the  Soviet 
system  collapsed  into  a  vacuum  of  economic  chaos. 
What  were  the  factors  which  led  to  the  break-up  of  Soviet  hegemony  over  east-central 
Europe?  While  'changing  of  the  guard'  in  the  Kremlin  in  1985,  the  mantle  falls  on  the 
shoulders  of  the  representative  of  a  new  generation,  Mikhail  Gorbachev,  for  whom  the 
days  of  the  Red  Army's  triumphs  during  World  War  II  were  scarcely  more  than  a 
childhood  memory.  But  from  his  early  policy  statements  there  was  little  to  suggest  that  we 
would  see  the  far-reaching  transformation  which  has  occurred,  both  in  East-West  relations 
and  in  those  between  Moscow  and  its  Eastern  European  satellites.  It  seems  clear  that  the 
radical  change  in  policy  leading  to  the  Soviet  disengagement  from  central  Europe  was  not 
215 just  a  spontaneous  process.  Influences  of  an  almost  irresistible  nature  on  the  Krernlin 
leadership  forced  a  reassessment  of  traditional  policies  and  relationships.  These  influences 
or  pressures  came  from  three  areas:  pressure  for  change  from  within  Eastern  Europe  itself, 
pressures  due  to  developments  in  Moscow's  relationship  with  the  West,  and  domestic 
Soviet  policy  considerations. 
111.15.  ix.  The  Unstable  Socialist  Zone 
The  Soviet  bloc  nations  experienced  economic  growth  but  at  a  very  high  social  cost  as 
we  have  explained  in  our  previous  section.  Unstability  has  become  a  constant  problem  in 
the  socialist  states.  The  nations  of  east-central  Europe  did  not  submit  happily  to 
Communist  rule  and  became  increasingly  turbulent  over  the  four  post-war  decades. 
Protests  and  unrest  were  apparent  from  an  early  stage.  The  first  major  upheaval  of  any 
consequence  occurred  in  East  Germany  in  June  1953  -  shortly  following  the  death  of 
Stalin.  In  1956  came  the  Polish  October  -  following  Khrushchev's  denunciation  of  Stalin 
at  the  Soviet  Party's  Twentieth  Congress.  ne  Polish  events  were  followed  by  the  Rising 
in  Hungary.  All  the  revolts  were  put  down  by  force.  An  estimated  20,000  people  a  month 
were  flooding  across  the  borders  of  East  Germany  by  the  end  of  the  1950s,  which  became 
an  embarrassment  to  the  Communist  authorities.  On  the  night  of  12/13  August  1961, 
barbed  wire  was  put  up  along  the  boundary  between  Soviet  and  Westem  sectors,  to  be 
replaced  within  days  by  a  more  substantial  structure  -  the  Berlin  Wall.  The  Wall  became  a 
symbol  of  the  post-war  division  of  Europe  -  and  of  Communist  repression.  It  illustrated  in 
stark  form  the  lost  freedoms  of  the  people  who  lived  behind  it. 
The  erection  of  the  Wall  and  the  storm  of  international  protest  which  resulted  detracted 
significantly  from  the  propaganda  value  of  Yuri  Gagarin's  first  marmed  space  flight,  which 
took  place  during  the  same  year.  The  intervention  by  Warsaw  Pact  troops  and  tanks  in 
Czechoslovakia,  during  the  Prague  Spring  (1968),  harmed  East-West  relations,  increased 
Warsaw  Pact  members'  suspicion  of  the  Organization,  and  undermined  Moscow's 
standing  with  previously  sympathetic  leftist  groups  in  the  West.  No  sooner  had  the  Prague 
Spring  been  nipped  in  the  bud,  than  unrest  broke  out  again,  this  time  along  Poland's  Baltic 
216 coast.  The  'recurrent  crises'  afflicted  the  Communist  regime  and  the  central  command  in 
Moscow.  The  rise  of  the  Solidarity  trade  union  under  Lech  Walesa's  leadership  (1980) 
proved  the  most  serious  threat  to  Soviet  control  of  the  region,  and  the  most  difficult  to  put 
down,  precisely  because  it  clearly  had  such  huge  public  support  (10  million  members).  The 
vision  of  Poland,  the  largest  of  Moscow's  central  European  satellites,  being  ruled  during 
the  1980s  by  a  military  junta  style,  (after  the  introduction  of  martial  law  in  December 
1981),  forced  the  Soviet  leadership  to  rethink  its  policy  in  the  region.  The  'proletarian 
rule'  of  a  military  junta  against  the  very  industrial  working  class,  whose  interests  the  Party 
was  supposed  to  be  representing,  brought  shame  to  Moscow.  The  unstable  socialist  zone 
became  a  liability  rather  than  a  'cordon  sanitaire'.  Furthermore,  the  trade  costs  of 
maintaining  the  defensive  cordon  had  become  prohibitive.  But,  the  subsidy  measures 
continued;  even  after  the  oil  crisis,  we  note  that  Moscow  was  selling  its  partners  valuable 
supplies  of  oil  at  below  world  prices  in  return  for  poor-quality  manufactured  goods.  18  Into 
this  unstable  socialist  zone,  some  signs  of  hope  was  brought  in  by  the  development  of 
East-West  relations. 
111.15.  x.  Development  in  East-West  Relations 
The  socialist  zone  remained  isolated  during  the  Cold  War  period.  Development  in  East- 
West  relations  were  important  in  influencing  Soviet  policy  towards  Central  Europe.  One 
of  the  early  moves  to  defuse  tension  was  the  reorientation  of  West  Gerrnan  foreign  policy 
towards  rapprochement  with  Eastern  Europe.  This  'Ostpolitik'  was  set  in  motion  as  early 
as  1966  under  Chancellor  Kurt  Kiesinger,  but  flourished  under  his  successor,  Willy 
Brandt,  with  whom  it  is  now  chiefly  associated.  Brandt's  Ostpolitik  led  to  the  process  of 
East-West  d6tente  in  the  1970s.  It  paved  for  the  Helsinki  Conference  (1973-75)  on 
Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  (CSCE).  19  Appendix  111.15.3  explains  the  relevance 
of  the  Summits  held  in  Helsinki  and  Paris.  Soviet  policy  makers  were  forced  to  recognize 
that  the  stifling  of  the  aspirations  of  its  citizens  was  a  greater  threat  to  stability  than 
NATO  tanks.  The  Helsinki  talks  revealed  the  need  for  continuing  East-West  dialogue,  and 
so  the  Helsinki  process  was  born.  However,  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan  (December 
217 1979)  led  to  the  collapse  of  &tente  and  the  return  to  a  Cold  War  atmosphere  in  the  last 
years  of  the  Brezhnev  period.  This,  in  turn,  resulted  in  a  renewal  of  the  arms  race.  If 
increased  military  spending  was  creating  imbalance  for  the  US  budget,  it  was  making  the 
economic  prospect  bleak  in  Moscow.  'Me  war  in  Afghanistan  constituted  a  further  drain 
on  the  resources  and  the  international  standing  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Further  east,  the 
chinese  Communists  had  introduced  limited  economic  reforms  and  were  achieving 
impressive  9%  annual  growth  rates  throughout  the  decade.  Not  only  was  Japan  now  an 
economic  super-power,  but  the  nations  of  the  Pacific  Rim,  with  their  market  economies, 
were  making  commendable  efforts  to  emulate  it.  It  was  against  this  background  that  the 
Soviet  leadership  looked  to  the  West,  saw  the  impressive  moves  towards  economic  and 
political  union  made  by  the  West  European  states  and  their  prosperity,  and  realized  that 
greater  hope  for  stability  lay  in  courting,  rather  than  confronting,  their  West  European 
neighbours.  Also,  they  could  not  any  more  handle  by  themselves  problems  like  the  external 
debt,  dependency  on  imported  food  etc.  Moreover,  the  decreasing  oil  price  during  the 
second  half  of  the  1980's  was  a  blow  to  the  Soviet  economy.  The  Soviet  policy  in  the 
closing  years  of  the  decade  developed  from  this  scenario:  liberalization  at  home  , 
abandonment  of  the  arms  race  and  rapprochement  with  the  West,  enunciation  of  the 
concept  of  'Common  European  home',  and,  in  regard  to  the  central-Eastern  European 
satellites,  rejection  of  the  Brezhnev  Doctrine  in  favour  of  the  so-called  'Sinatra  Doctrine' 
of  'let  them  do  it  their  way.  '  20  The  domestic  policy  considerations  together  with  the 
development  of  the  East-West  relations  finally  led  to  the  loosening  of  the  claws  of  the 
Soviet  central  command  in  relation  to  the  Soviet  bloc  nations.  A  series  of  CSCE  summit 
meetings  took  place  such  as  those  on  disarmament  at  Madrid  (1983),  Stockholm  (1984-6), 
Vienna  (1986-89),  and  Paris  (1990). 
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The  realization  that  the  unstable  socialist  zone  could  not  make  any  remarkable  economic 
growth  in  the  current  economic  structure  was  brought  home  by  the  recurring  upheavals  in 
the  various  regions  of  East-Central  Europe.  In  both  Hungary  and  Poland  change  began 
earlier  and  was  altogether  more  gradual  and  less  dramatic  than  elsewhere.  In  the  early 
months  of  1989  the  Party  made  repeated  concessions  to  an  opposition  movement  headed 
by  the  Democratic  Forum,  until  the  way  was  eventually  cleared  for  a  multi-party 
democracy.  The  Hungarian  Party  reshaped  itself  in  preparation  for  elections  in  the  spring 
of  1990.  In  Poland  too,  Solidarity  representatives  were  invited  to  round-table  talks,  which 
took  place  in  the  spring  of  1989.  These  led  to  the  'partly  free'  elections  in  June  and  to  the 
appointment  of  the  first  non-Communist  premier  of  a  Warsaw  Pact  state.  During  this 
period,  the  motives  of  Moscow  remained  inconspicuous.  In  the  Eastern  European  capitals 
the  message  had  been  received  early  that  the  Soviets  were  prepared  for  a  liberalization  and 
a  loosening  of  ties.  Gorbachev  made  his  views  clear  during  two  key  speeches  in  July  1989: 
one  to  the  Council  of  Europe  in  Strasbourg  and  the  other  at  the  Warsaw  Pact  summit  in 
Bucharest.  In  Bucharest,  the  Soviet  leader  stressed  to  his  allies  his  rejection  of  the 
Brezhnev  Doctrine;  there  was  no  set  model  for  the  building  of  socialism.  Each  Communist 
party  had  the  right  to  pursue  its  own  strategy  in  line  with  national  conditions.  At 
Strasbourg,  Gorbachev  signalled  his  desire  to  'consign  to  the  archives  the  postulates  of  the 
Cold  War,  when  Europe  was  regarded  as  an  arena  of  confrontation'.  In  a  final  break  with 
the  doctrine  of  interventionism,  he  stated:  "The  affiliation  of  the  states  of  Europe  to 
different  social  systems  is  a  reality,  and  the  recognition  of  that  historical  state  of  affairs, 
respect  for  the  sovereign  right  of  every  people  to  choose  a  social  system  as  it  sees  fit,  is  a 
vital  prerequisite  for  the  normal  European  process.  'Ihe  social  and  political  orders  of  one 
country  or  another  changed  in  the  past  and  may  change  in  the  future  as  wen.  However, 
that  is  exclusively  the  affair  of  the  peoples  themselves,  a  matter  for  their  choice.  Any 
interference  in  internal  affairs,  any  attempts  to  Emit  the  sovereignty  of  states,  both  of 
friends  and  allies,  no  matter  whose  it  is,  is  impermissible.  9)21  While  Gorbachev  gave  the 
green  light  to  change  it  is  unlikely  that  even  he  realized  how  rapidly  change  would  come. 
219 in  August  and  September  of  1989  (28  years  after  the  erection  of  the  Berlin  Wall)  waves 
of  East  Germans  began  once  more  to  exercise  their  choice  of  political  order.  East 
Germans  flooded  to  the  West  via  Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  and  the  West  German 
embassy  in  Poland.  The  refugee  exodus  and  the  mass  demonstration  led  in  October  to  the 
resignation  of  Party  leader,  Erich  Honecker,  to  be  replaced  by  Krenz.  'Me  ultimate  goal  of 
the  demonstrators  was  now  the  complete  removal  of  the  Communists  from  power.  On  7 
November  the  government  resigned,  to  be  followed  a  day  later  by  the  whole  Politburo.  On 
9  November  the  Berlin  Wall  was  breached  by  the  authorities,  by  which  time  200,000  East 
Gen-nans  (1%  of  the  population)  had  left  the  country.  On  the  day  after  the  Berlin  Wall  was 
breached,  Bulgarian  leader  Todor  Zhivkov  was  toppled  by  Party  colleagues  and  was 
replaced  by  Petur  Mladenov.  Within  days,  the  Czechoslovak  regime  capitulated  and  the 
change  was  complete  in  early  December.  Finally,  the  dramatic  and  bloody  events  in 
Romania  erupted  in  the  days  before  Christmas  1989  and  the  Romanian  leader  Nicolae 
Ceausescu  was  executed  with  his  wife  after  a  summary  trial.  The  withering  of  Communist 
leadership  in  the  Eastern  bloc  happened  so  sudden  that  even  an  onlooker  was  surprised  by 
the  speed  with  which  the  old  structures  of  power  collapsed.  Their  frailty  shocked  even 
those  opposition  elements  responsible  for  their  downfall.  The  movement  for  change  and 
reform  seemed  to  gather  its  own  irresistible  momentum.  Though  we  can  elucidate  various 
reasons  for  the  sudden  Communist  collapse  of  the  Eastern  European  states,  we  can  safely 
state  the  following  reason  as  a  crucial  one.  In  their  philosophical,  religious,  cultural  and 
political  traditions  they  identified  more  closely  with  the  West  than  with  Russia.  We  can 
also  refer  to  the  collapse  of  belief  in  Marxist  ideology  (and  therefore  in  the  future  it 
promised),  the  economic  failures,  the  removal  of  the  threat  of  force  (both  domestic  and 
22  extemal).  The  Soviet  policy  of  greater  openness  -  glasnost  -  also  had  an  effect.  The 
Eastern  and  Central  European  nations  asserted  their  right  to  be  free  from  any  external 
interventions  in  determining  their  way  of  life. 
In  the  aftermath  of  revolution,  the  new  free  sovereign  states  were  given  a  job  of 
designing  a  fresh  way  of  life.  Whereas  the  second  half  of  1989  saw  the  toppling  of 
Communist  regimes  in  much  of  central  Europe,  in  the  first  half  of  1990  there  was  a 
consolidation  of  the  reforms  that  had  been  set  in  motion.  The  most  significant  events  to 
220 take  place  during  this  period  were  the  democratic  elections  in  most  of  the  east-central 
European  states.  In  the  second  half  of  1990  a  good  deal  of  the  euphoria  and  optimism 
generated  by  the  collapse  of  Communist  regimes  evaporated,  as  the  states  of  east-central 
Europe  discovered  that  there  is  more  to  democracy  than  merely  holding  elections.  As  one 
east  European  academic  put  it,  they  woke  up  with  a  post-revolutionary  hangover.  The 
necessary  strains  of  rurining  a  democracy  led  to  the  break-up  of  the  Solidarity  consensus  in 
poland  and  that  of  Civic  Forum  in  Czechoslovakia  and  such  other  parties.  German 
unification  occupied  the  thoughts  of  policy  makers  of  both  East  and  West  during  1990, 
23 
and  full  unification  took  place  on  2  December  after  the  'two  plus  four'  treaty  was  signed  . 
One  of  the  most  disappointing  features  of  this  period  of  post-Communist  rule  in  central 
Europe  has  been  the  resurgence  of  nationalism,  often  in  its  most  bigoted  and  intolerant 
form. 
On  the  economic  front  moves  have  been  made  to  end  central  planning  and  introduce 
market  mechanisms,  to  cut  spending  on  the  defence,  armaments  and  security  forces.  Steps 
are  being  taken  to  remove  state  subsidies,  to  privatize  state-owned  concerns  and  to 
encourage  foreign  investment.  Western  aid  and  relaxation  of  export  of  advanced 
technology  goods  to  these  emerging  economies  and  the  interest  shown  by  Western  firms 
etc.  strengthened  the  economic  prospects.  To  promote  economic  development  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  to  keep  a  discreet  eye  on  the  democratic  and  human-rights  records  of 
potential  beneficiaries,  The  European  Bank  of  Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD) 
was  opened  in  London  in  1991  with  the  following  purpose:  "In  contributing  to  economic 
progress  and  reconstruction,  the  purpose  of  the  Bank  shall  be  to  foster  the  transition 
towards  open  market  oriented  economies  and  to  promote  private  and  entrepreneurial 
.  itiative  in  the  central  and  eastern  European  countries  committed  to  and  applying  the 
principles  of  multiparty  democracy,  pluralism  and  market  economics.  "24  Economic 
forecasts  for  the  region  vary  widely.  The  reality  is  likely  to  be  considerably  more  complex, 
with  possibly  significant  divergences  in  economic  performance  between  individual  states. 
Political  stability  is  a  major  factor  in  determining  where  foreign  investment  will  be 
directed.  There  is  the  further  problem  in  all  the  new  democracies  of  changing  attitudes  to 
221 work  and  developing  the  skills  necessary  to  run  a  market  economy.  It  is  not  proving  easy 
to  develop  an  entrepreneurial  culture  rapidly  in  societies  where  private  trade  has  been 
condemned  for  decades  as  'speculation'.  The  collapse  of  Communist  rule  in  east-central 
Europe  also  led  to  a  crumbling  of  the  Communist  bloc  alliances.  At  the  beginning  of  1991 
the  dissolution  of  Comecon  was  announced  and  the  Warsaw  Pact  was  dissolved  as  a 
military  organization  in  March  1991.  One  way  of  filling  the  vacuum  caused  by  the  collapse 
of  the  old  bloc  structures  is  to  forrn  regional  sub-groupings.  The  Pentagonale  is  such  a 
grouping  and  is  also  perceived  in  some  quarters  as  providing  a  'fast  track'  for  entry  into 
the  European  Community.  Appendix  111.15.4  provides  the  policy  document  of  the 
Pentagonale.  Between  19  and  21  November  1990  a  CSCE  summit  took  place  in  Paris 
(See,  Appendix  111.15.3).  Thirty-four  nations  took  part  -  all  the  signatories  of  the  Helsinki 
Final  Act.  At  the  Elysee  Palace  NATO  and  Warsaw  pact  members  signed  an  agreement  to 
cut  arms  in  Europe.  The  'Helsinki  process'  was  also  given  a  new  institutional  form  -  in  the 
shape  of  a  secretariat  to  be  based  in  Prague  and  a  Conflict  Prevention  Centre  in  Vienna.  25 
The  East-Central  European  nations  have  definitely  entered  a  new  era.  "While  1989  was  a 
euphoric  year  of  political  revolutions  in  Eastern  Europe,  1990  and  1991  saw  a  growing 
disillusionment  with  the  long-awaited  Great  Transfon-nation.  According  to  many  analysts, 
the  big  question  of  the  years  1992  and  1993  was  whether  anything  one  might  be  proud  of 
from  among  the  achievements  of  1989  has  survived.  ýý26  How  to  re-invigorate  these 
economies  in  transition  is  an  issue  that  we  would  be  dealing  with  as  we  discuss  the 
transition  growth  path.  As  though,  edified  by  the  adventures  of  the  followers,  the  leader 
has  decided  to  follow  the  steps  of  the  followers.  No  alternative  path  was  on  the  vicinity. 
We  shall  proceed  to  analyse  the  transitional  growth  path  of  the  former  Soviet  Union. 
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NATO  Summit  (London,  5-6  July  1990),  from  The  Times,  7  July  1990.  This  quote  is 
from  the  Preamble:  point  1  of  the  23-point  declaration.  It  is  Vven  in  Keith,  Sword, 
(ed.  ),  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe:  Inside  the  Other  Europe,  Times  Books, 
1991,  London,  p.  272. 
2.  There  are  some  questions  about  the  usage  of  'Eastern  Europe.  '  Yugoslavia  and 
Albania,  which  were  never  subject  to  Moscow,  are  sometimes  referred  to  as  bemg  in 
'Eastern  Europe.  '  Prague,  often  during  the  interwar  years  taken  as  being  at  the  heart 
of  Europe,  is  almost  equidistant  from  Madrid  and  Moscow.  Many  people  forget  that 
Vienna  is  further  east  than  Prague  or  Zagreb,  that  Athens  is  further  east  than  Warsaw, 
Budapest  and  Belgrade. 
3.  There  are  great  differences  between  the  various  states  and  republics.  Poland  is  the 
most  populous  state  outside  the  Soviet  frontier  with  a  population  of  38  million,  which 
contrasts  with  Albania's  3  million.  Ukrainian  SSR  has  52  million.,  while  tiny  Estonia 
has  only  1.5  million.  In  spatial  terms,  Poland  is  ten  times  the  size  of  Albania,  and  more 
than  twice  the  size  of  Czechoslovakia  or  Hungary,  while  Ukrainian  Republic  is  twice 
the  area  of  Poland. 
4.  Few  are  as  homogeneous  in  ethnic  and  religious  terms  as  Poland.  The  Poles, 
Lithuanians,  Slovaks,  and  Hungarians  are  predominantly  Roman  Catholic;  Latvia  and 
Estonia  are  mainly  Protestant;  Bulgaria,  Byelorussia,  Romania  and  Ukraine  are  mainly 
Orthodox. 
5.  We  could  point  out  the  short-lived-  attempts  to  create  soviet  regimes  like  that  of  Bela 
Kun  in  Hungary  or  the  Soviet  Republic  declared  in  Bavaria  in  1919. 
6.  Keith,  Sword,  (ed.  ),  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe:  Inside  the  Other  Europe, 
Times  Books,  1991,  London,  pp.  9-10. 
7.  Ibid. 
8.  Note  particularly  the  Great  Power  conferences  at  Teheran  in  November  1943  and  at 
Yalta,  in  the  Crimea,  in  February  1945. 
9.  Keith,  Sword,  (ed.  ),  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe:  Inside  the  Other  Europe, 
Times  Books,  1991,  London,  p.  12. 
10.  Except  in  Yugoslavia,  where  Tito's  partisans  took  control,  and  Albania  was  beyond 
the  reach  of  Soviet  units. 
11.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  14. 
12.  'nie  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  15. 
13.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  16. 
14.  ne  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  17. 
15.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  19. 
16.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  20. 
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the  Soviet  System  Transformable?:  The  Perennial  Question,  in  "Dilemma  of 
Transition:  In  the  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe",  Breslauer,  G.  W.,  University  of 
California  at  Berkley,  1991,  pp.  1-13. 
18.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  pp  23-25. 
19.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  25. 
20.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  27.  Also,  see  Robert  W.  Campbell, 
How  to  Think  about  Perestroika,  in  "Socialism,  perestroika,  and  the  Dilemmas  of 
Soviet  Economic  Reform",  John  E.  Tedstrom  (ed.  ),  Westview  Press,  Oxford,  1990, 
pp.  1-22. 
21.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  28.  Also,  see  Gregory  Freidin,  How 
Communist  is  Gorbachev's  Communism  9,  in  "Dilemmas  of  Transition",  op.  cit.,  pp. 
25-45. 
22.  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  op.  cit.,  p.  29.  Also,  see  Gail  W.  Lapidus,  The 
Crisis  of  Perestroika,  in  "Dilemmas  of  Transition",  op.  cit.,  pp.  15-25. 
23.  ne  'two  plus  four'  talks  were  among  the  US,  USSR,  Britain,  France  (the  wartime 
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THE  TRANSITION-PATH  OF  THE  FORMER  SOVIET  UNION 
While  the  Central  and  East  European  socialist  nations  decided  to  determine  their 
political  destiny  by  following  the  democratic  path  and  economic  destiny  by  following  the 
njarket  mechanism  of  the  capitalist  path,  the  historical  socialism  upheld  by  the  Soviet 
leadership  crumbled.  The  consequences  of  turning  away  from  the  principles  of  applied 
socialism,  in  turn,  shattered  the  confidence  of  the  Soviet  strength.  The  unprecedented 
historical  events  that  happened  in  the  former  Soviet  Union  ultimately  resulted  in  the 
disintegration  of  the  empire  and  its  reconstruction  into  several  newly  independent  states. 
Since  the  'mongol  yoke'  was  lifted  in  the  fourteenth  century,  there  has  been  one  dominant 
power  in  the  region  from  Poland  to  the  sea  of  Japan:  Russia.  "Under  the  czars, 
russification  -  one  czar,  one  language,  and  one  religion  -  characterized  a  policy  that  placed 
all  political,  economic,  social  and  military  power  in  the  hands  of  the  leaders  in  the  Russian 
capital.  Soviet  leaders  paid  hp  service  to  self  determination  and  preservation  of  minorities 
but  in  effect  reinforced  this  historical  orientation  toward  the  centre  with  an  emphasis  on 
one  party  leadership,  one  Russian  culture,  and  a  Marxist-Leninist  ideological  substitute  for 
religion.  "l  The  end  of  the  Leninist-Stalinist  system  and  the  empire  paradoxically  came 
through  an  attempt  to  reinforce  the  traditional  system  of  governance  by  reforming  it.  As 
Mikhail  Gorbachev  attempted  to  strengthen  the  party's  central  role  with  transformation  to 
a  socialist  market,  his  reforms  eroded  the  power  of  the  party-dominated,  command- 
economy  system;  his  political  reforms  and  glasnost  eroded  the  cohesion  of  the  Moscow- 
centred  system  and  challenged  the  principle  of  geographic  unity.  With  the  abortive 
Moscow  coup  in  1991,  it  became  clear  that  the  military  and  police  force  that  had  held 
together  the  old  system  and  empire  was  unwilling  to  support  the  overthrow  of  Gorbachev. 
Gorbachev,  in  turn,  was  unable  to  hold  back  the  forces  that  led  to  the  break  up  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  2  The  end  result  of  this  catastrophic  phase  was  the  emergence  of  sovereign 
states. 
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Yeltsin  moved  quickly  to  abolish  the  Communist  Party  and  to  begin  the  dismantlement 
of  the  command  economy  system.  As  the  power  of  the  party,  military,  and  police  proved 
unable  to  maintain  the  Stalinist  system  and  the  empire,  the  long  repressed  forces  of 
ethnicity  and  nationalism  surged  forward.  Free  to  choose,  all  republics  took  their  own 
sovereignty  in  preference  to  subservience  to  Russia;  many  minority  ups  within  newly  .  gro 
sovereign  states  and  between  states  likewise  challenged  the  authority  of  the  new  states 
being  formed.  "While  the  change  from  russification.  seemed  irreversible,  the  new 
sovereignty  based  on  self-deten-nination  was  unstable  as  the  networks  of  trade,  investment, 
infrastructure,  and  other  regional  interrelationships  were  strained  or  ruptured,  and  old 
ethnic  hostilities  were  let  loose.  The  creation  of  new  sovereign  states  weakened  the  long- 
established  economic  integration  of  the  region  and  thereby  unden-nined  economic 
recovery,  development,  and  the  transition  to  a  market  system.  ,3  The  security  problems  of 
demilitarization,  also  regional,  were  complicated  by  the  disintegration  of  the  empire; 
weapons  held  in  Ukraine,  Kazakhstan,  Belarus  and  other  newly  independent  states  could 
no  longer  be  controlled  or  dismantled  by  order  from  Moscow.  The  mix  of  ethnicity  and 
nationalism  in  a  new,  weak  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)  has  not  been 
conducive  to  regional  economic  reintegration.  The  new  states  need  trade,  investment, 
infrastructure,  and  the  environment  to  act  as  centripetal  forces  for  regional  integration  if 
they  are  to  make  effective  transitions  to  market  economies  and  if  they  are  to  join  and 
compete  successfully  in  the  world  economy.  Most  of  the  new  states  favour  economic 
integration  but  not  with  their  neighbours,  especially  Russia.  While  the  IMF,  the  World 
Bank,  and  the  OECD  draw  the  various  independent  states  toward  the  global  market 
system  by  stimulating  openness  and  market-oriented  discipline,  the  indirect  conditionality 
they  prescribe  is  not  sufficient  impetus  for  regional  reintegration.  The  divorce  from  Russia, 
as  the  ruble  zone  ends  and  as  other  economic  ties  that  bound  the  empire  are  broken, 
creates  a  fissure  that  will  be  hard  to  fill  or  repair.  While  the  international  system  of 
economic  institutions  may  play  a  role  in  integration,  it  appears  at  best  a  marginal  factor. 
'Me  CIS,  multilateral  and  regional  organizations,  and  bilateral  arrangements  are  all 
potential  engines  for  integration.  Private  non-governmental  institutions  might  play 
226 effective  roles.  One  of  those  in  particular,  the  "International  Committee  for  Economic 
4  Reform,,  "  might  be  effective  if  taken  over  by  the  G-7.  The  International  Committee  offers 
a  multilateral,  but  non-governmental  framework  for  identifying  practical  opportunities  for 
the  use  of  international  assistance  -  in  full  participation  with  countries  of  the  region  and 
properly  co-ordinated  with  the  efforts  of  countries  themselves.  Such  organizational  and 
structural  umbrellas  as  the  International  Committee  and  the  Energy  Charter5  could  form  a 
useful  framework  for  interrelating  security,  political,  and  economic  issues  such  as 
payments  and  environmental  protection  that  Russia  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  republics 
seem  to  be  unable  to  resolve  either  bilaterally  or  through  the  CIS.  If  destruction  of  the  old 
command  economy  has  opened  the  opportunity  for  a  transition  to  the  market,  the  manner 
in  which  the  empire  is  disintegrating  makes  it  more  difficult  to  create  the  broader,  regional, 
open  economic  space  so  important  to  successful  reform  within  and  among  the  newly 
6  sovereign  states.  This  has  been  experienced  by  all  the  newly  formed  sovereign  states  as 
they  find  themselves  in  a  state  of  economic  stagnation  out  of  which  no  immediate  recovery 
is  foreseen. 
III.  16.  ii.  Period  of  Slow  Growth  and  Stagnation 
Although  there  is  controversy  and  uncertainty  over  the  precise  measurement  of  key 
aspects  of  the  economy  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  there  is  widespread  agreement  among 
specialists  regarding  the  general  trends.  The  Soviet  Union  was  unable  to  reverse  or  arrest 
the  long  term  slowdown  in  growth  that  began  in  the  1960s  and  grew  steadily  worse.  The 
slowdown  and  accompanying  signs  of  weakness  in  many  sectors  of  Soviet  economy 
resulted  in  a  period  of  slow  growth  and  Stagnation.  7  The  estimates  of  the  World  Bank 
show  Soviet  GNP  declined  slightly  in  1981,  and  dipped  again  in  1986  and  1990.  Annual 
growth  for  the  10  year  period,  1981-1990,  averaged  just  under  2  percent.  8A  downtum 
occurred  in  1990  which  accelerated  over  the  next  2  years.  There  was  a  sharp  drop  in 
production  in  both  industry  and  agriculture  and  output  declined  in  all  sectors.  Trade 
among  the  republics  was  disrupted  and  foreign  trade  fell,  especially  with  Eastern  Europe 
which  could  not  meet  the  hard  currency  terms  set  by  Moscow  during  the  early  years  of 
227 transition.  Living  standards  deteriorated.  According  to  the  International  Monetary  Fund 
(IMF),  real  gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  in  the  former  USSR  went  down  by  9%  in  1991 
and  by  18.6%  in  1992.  The  IMF  also  estimates  that  consumer  prices  increased  by  about 
90%  in  1991  and  by  nearly  1200%  in  1992.  Export  volumes  declined  by  about  24%  in 
each  of  those  years.  '  The  downturn  extended.,  more  or  less,  throughout  the  region. 
Inflation  in  Russia  was  somewhat  higher  than  elsewhere.  Retail  prices  were  estimated  at 
1400  percent  and  the  ruble  plummeted.  In  spite  of  all  these  challenging  difficulties,  it  is 
heartening  to  note  that  the  newly  formed  sovereign  states  boldly  opted  to  tread  the  path  of 
market-economy  models. 
III.  16.  iii.  From  Sovietization  To  Marketization 
As  we  have  already  noted,  two  of  the  most  significant  events  in  recent  decades  were  the 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  Empire  and  the  decision  by  Russia  and  the  other  successor  states  to 
transforrn  themselves  into  market  economies.  The  break  up  of  the  Soviet  Union  left  in  its 
place  15  independent  states,  including  3  Baltic  nations,  Georgia,  and  the  11  republics  that 
made  up  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS).  In  1992  all  struggled  to 
stabflize  their  economies  and  implement  market  reforms.  The  transitions  were  difficult  and 
the  outcomes  still  uncertain.  But  despite  severe  downturns  throughout  the  region,  major 
reform  initiatives  were  underway  and  governments  appeared  to  remain  committed  to  the 
goal  of  marketization.  In  Russia,  as  in  other  successor  states,  both  economic  policy  and 
performance  measures  are  drastically  changing  in  the  emerging  new  system.  An  economy 
that  for  seventy  five  years  placed  military  and  protected  industrial  power  at  the  top  of  the 
priority  scale,  is  moving  to  favour  consumers  needs.  'O  This  is  made  possible  by  the  steps 
taken  by  the  government  of  Boris  Yeltsin. 
111.16.  iv.  From  Socialist  Mikhail  Gorbachev  To  Cppitafist  Boris  Yeltsin 
Appendix  IH.  16.1.  shows  the  milestones  in  economic  policy  and  perfon-nance  during  the 
Gorbachev  Era.  While  Mikhail  Gorbachev  should  be  credited  with  many  achievements,  it 
228 is  pointed  out  that  all  he  wanted  was  to  create  a  'socialist  market'  within  the  framework  of 
a  command  economy  dominated  by  the  Communist  Party.  Boris  Yeltsin,  the  first  president 
of  Russia,  pressed  for  a  market  economy  and  pledged  himself  to  a  transformation  to  a  true 
market  system.  There  were  generally  good  harvests  during  the  Gorbachev  years,  1985- 
1991.  in  that  period  numerous  reforms  were  introduced.  "But  there  were  fundamental 
flaws  in  Gorbachev's  economic  plans.  The  reforms  were  haphazard  and  at  times 
contradictory.  There  were  no  meaningful  steps  to  decontrol  prices  or  to  end  the  effective 
monopolies  of  the  state  enterprises.  He  refused  to  accept  and  implement  the  500  Day 
Program  of  radical  reform,  and  end  the  Party  dominated  command  economy  system.  He 
sought  to  perfect  Soviet  socialism.  In  the  end,  he  failed  to  halt  the  slide  into  deep 
recession  or  to  prevent  price  increases  from  reaching  a  near  hyperinflationary  stage.  "" 
Yeltsin's  approach  to  economic  reform,  in  the  first  year  of  his  presidency,  was  strikingly 
different  from  Gorbachev's.  At  the  end  of  1991,  Yeltsin  outlined  a  programme  of  radical 
change  to  a  market  economy  and  was  given  the  power  by  Russia's  congress  to  implement 
it.  Yeltsin  moved  decisively  to  outlaw  the  Communist  Party,  dismantle  the  old  ministerially 
directed  economy,  and  liberalize  prices.  Price  liberalization  was  the  clear  signal  the  West 
looked  for  to  make  reform  credible.  The  other  characteristics  of  the  economic  reforms 
would  be  clear  as  we  proceed  with  our  analysis. 
The  debate  over  economic  reforms  within  Russia  can  be  described  in  the  context  of  four 
camps:  "shock  therapy"  advocates,  conservative  gradualists,  liberal  democrats,  and 
reactionary  nationalists.  12  The  'shock  therapy'  approach  followed  by  Yeltsin  in  1992 
emphasized  stabilization  through  price  liberalization,  and  restrictive  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies.  Proponents  of  this  approach  wanted  to  move  quickly  to  achieve  a  free  market. 
They  would  put  safety  net  programmes  in  place  to  help  persons  in  dire  need,  but  would 
tolerate  substantial  falls  in  production  and  increases  in  unemployment.  A  number  of 
groups  pressed  for  a  more  gradual  approach.  They  argue  that  "economies  are  more  like 
giant  tankers  than  they  are  like  rowboats.  They  cannot  be  manoeuvred  readily  or  turned 
about  quickly.  "13  This  is  the  situational  experience  of  transitional  economies.  The 
conversion  of  a  socialist  command  economy  into  a  modem,  mixed  market  economy  is 
without  historical  precedent,  and  much  disagreement  exists  both  among  economists  in  the 
229 transitional  economies  and  within  the  Western  economic  community  about  how  to  go 
about  the  transformation  process.  Communism  and  the  socialist  command  economy  have 
been  repudiated  in  favour  of  democracy  and  the  market  economy.  'Me  conversion  of 
democracy  has  progressed  rather  more  swiftly  and  successfully  than  the  attempt  to  convert 
to  a  market  economy,  and  many  observers  both  in  and  outside  the  former  Soviet  Union 
fear  that  resistance  by  vested  interests  to  marketization  will  ultimately  undermine  the 
democratization  movement  too.  We  need  to  explore  the  question  of  whether  the  market 
mechanism  is  still  too  weak  in  the  CIS  and  other  transitional  economies  to  carry  the  entire 
burden  of  allocation,  production,  and  distribution.  Enormous  external  assistance,  both 
financial  and  educational,  will  be  necessary  to  avoid  failure  of  the  economic  transformation 
process  and  backsliding  into  another  variant  of  the  crisis  administered  economy. 
Ultimately,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  each  transitional  economy  to  develop  their  own 
unique  transformation  strategies  based  on  their  own  peculiar  economic  circumstances, 
histories,  and  opportunities.  14  The  post-Soviet  economic  reforms  are  to  be  seen  in  this 
perspective. 
III.  16.  v.  Economic  Reforms  in  Perspective 
The  transitional  economies  are  in  the  midst  of  an  attempted  societal  transformation  that 
is  unprecedented  in  nature  and  scope.  Under  the  old  regime,  the  economy  functioned 
through  a  system  that  possessed  its  own  internal  logic  and  through  institutions  that  were 
closely  interconnected  and  mutually  reinforcing.  15  In  the  economic  realm,  these  states 
begin  the  transition  from  socialist  central  planning  to  capitalist  market  economies  with 
formidable  legacies  from  failed  communism.  16  The  legacies  are  found  in  the  remnants  of 
the  institutions  through  which  the  economy  was  managed  for  many  decades  and  in  the 
mindsets  and  habits  of  the  people  whose  behaviour  was  moulded  by  those  institutions. 
Other  legacies  stem  from  the  development  strategies  17  that  were  pursued  and  are 
PhYsically  embodied  in  the  land  use  patterns,  capital  stocks,  environment,  and  skills  of  the 
labour  force.  Related  to  those  institutions  and  strategies  are  the  legacies  that  are  primarily 
the  result  of  protectionist  policies  that  not  only  insulated  business  firms  from  foreign 
230 competition,  but  from  domestic  competition  as  well.  18  Nonetheless,  the  old  system,  despite 
its  manifest  flaws,  did  generate  economic  growth",  secular  gains  in  living  standards,  and 
an  extraordinary  degree  of  personal  economic  security.  Unlike  in  the  West  in  general., 
Soviet  growth  was  fuelled  by  a  massive  build-up  of  capital  stock,  near-maximum 
mobilization  of  the  population  into  the  work  force,  profligate  use  of  energy  and  raw 
materials,  and  an  almost  total  disregard  for  the  environmental  consequences2o  of  what 
amounted  to  a  policy  of  production  at  any  cost.  Whatever  the  disputes  over  the  numerical 
calculations,  it  would  be  generally  agreed  that  improvements  in  productivity  beyond  those 
embodied  in  the  capital  stock  and  a  better-educated  work  force  contributed  little,  if  at  all 
to  Soviet  growth,  a  situation  markedly  different  from  Western  growth  experience  . 
21  To 
maintain  perspective  on  the  emerging  new  economic  orders  in  the  transitional  states,  one 
needs  to  keep  in  mind  the  totality  of  the  old  monolithic  order  and  its  legacies,  both  good 
and  bad.  Also,  it  is  this  perspective  that  would  determine  the  economic  objective  of 
transformation  processes. 
HI.  16.  vi.  The  Objective  of  Economic  Transformation 
The  new  states  are  experiencing  three  types  of  transformations:  the  transformation  of 
governance  from  dictatorial  rule  to  rule  by  participatory  consensus,  the  transformation  of 
the  economic  system  from  socialist  central  planning  to  one  based  on  private  enterprise  and 
markets,  and  the  transforrnation  from  units  in  a  highly  integrated  and  centrally  managed 
empire  to  fully  sovereign  nation-states.  As  all  these  intertwined  revolutionary  processes 
unfold  in  the  coming  years,  the  need  to  assess  the  progress  of  the  three  transformations 
will  be  ever  present.  Evidence  of  progress  (or  regress)  will  take  the  form  of  innumerable 
actions  at  all  levels  of  society  and  in  all  arenas  -  political,  economic  and  social.  Here,  we 
aim  to  develop  a  perspective  focusing  on  the  economic  transformation. 
All  the  attempts  to  reform  socialism  resulted  in  failure  because  "they  were  attempting  to 
eficit  capitalist  behaviour  from  socialist  firms  without  placing  them  in  a  capitalist 
environment.  .,  22  But  the  real  breakthrough  occurred  in  1990  in  a  series  of  developments 
that  brought  a  sea  change  on  the  economic  reform  front.  23  The  harbinger  of  those  historic 
231 developments  was  the  so-called  "Abalkin  Blueprint"  set  forth  in  the  fall  of  1989,  which  for 
the  first  time  made  property  ownership  the  centrepiece  of  reform.  2A  This  theme  also 
figured  in  a  more  subdued  way  in  the  more  conservative  programmes  set  forth  by  the 
Ryzhkov  government  in  December  1989  and  in  May  and  September  1990.  'Me  most 
radical  of  the  programmes,  however,  appeared  in  August  1990  as  the  much-touted  "500 
day"  (Shatalin)  Plan.  25Tbis  programme  was  unprecedented  both  for  its  stress  on  property 
ownership  and  for  its  fast  timetables  for  "destatizing"  and  privatizing  state  property  and 
for  decontrolling  prices  -  steps  that  are  essential  to  creating  a  market  economy.  The  basic 
features  of  this  plan  were  incorporated  in  more  general  terms  in  the  so-called  Presidential 
Plan  that  was  adopted  by  the  federal  legislature  on  October  19,1990.26  It  was  soon 
realized  that  in  order  to  achieve  these  objectives,  the  creation  of  a  normal  economy  was 
imperative. 
III.  16.  vii.  The  Creation  of  a  Normal  Econom 
The  decision  to  institute  a  market  economy,  with  its  radically  different  institutions  to 
replace  the  failed  economic  system  of  socialist  central  planning,  was  a  recognition  at  long 
last  of  the  futility  of  further  attempts  to  reform  socialism.  The  transitional  economies 
(Russia,  Baltic  States,  CIS,  and  Central  and  Eastern  Europeans  states)  aim  to  join  the 
international  community  as  well-functioning  market  economies  that  can  generate 
economic  growth  and  improve  living  standards  for  the  people.  The  goal  is  often  put  as  one 
of  creating  a  "normal  economy.  ý.,  27  Economic  theory  and  world  experience  define  clearly 
the  basic  characteristics  of  a  successful  market  economy.  They  are:  the  majority  -  three- 
quarters  or  more  -  of  land  and  capital  assets  are  in  private  hands  with  property  rights  that 
are  clearly  defined  and  legally  protected;  production  is  guided  by  consumers  through 
flexible  prices;  the  economic  role  of  the  state  is  limited  to  defining  and  enforcing  property 
rights,  ensuring  macro-economic  stability,  and  providing  public  goods  as  chosen  by  the 
Political  process.  For  the  new  states  bent  on  creating  a  market  economy,  this  means, 
Privatization  of  most  now  state-owned  property,  removal  of  controls  on  prices  and 
economic  activity,  and  institution  of  a  new  role  for  the  state.  These  are  the  challenging 
232 tasks  that  the  newly  formed  sovereign  states  would  have  to  undertake  as  they  try  to  create 
a  nonnal  economy. 
III.  16.  viii.  The  Transformation  Tasks 
How  to  create  a  nonnal  economy  during  the  period  of  transition?  "The  institutional 
economics  has  no  agreed-upon  theoretical  model  that  prescribes  an  optimal  strategy  for 
transforming  one  economic  system  into  another  one.  "  The  real  possibility  of  mapping  the 
transition  presented  a  new  and  exciting  challenge  for  mainstream  economists.  The  result 
was  a  lively  debate  among  Western  economists,  and  a  subdued  one  by  Soviet  economists, 
about  what  steps  must  be  taken  to  bring  about  a  market  economy  and  about  the  sequence 
28  and  speed  with  which  they  ought  to  be  taken.  Early  on,  the  issues  came  to  be  discussed 
in  terms  of  "Big  Bang"  versus  gradualism  and  in  terms  of  whether  macro-economic 
stabilization  should  precede  privatization  or  vice-versa.  "In  the  process  of  proffering 
policy  advice  to  the  post-communist  governments  and  interacting  with  them,  Western 
mainstream  economists  learned  much  about  the  entrenched  economic  and  political  legacies 
of  socialism,  and  Soviet  economists  learned  much  about  the  desiderata  for  a  market 
economy.  9)29  In  the  meantime,  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  were  providing  models  and 
experience  in  diverse  transition  paths  and  privatization  schemes.  Out  of  these  debates  and 
experience  has  come  a  broad  consensus  about  what  must  be  done  to  transform  a  centrally 
planned  economy  into  a  democratic  market  economy  and  todeal  with  the  legacies  of  many 
decades  of  economic  development  under  socialism.  According  to  G.  E.  Schroeder  30 
,  these 
tasks  are  the  following: 
1.  Stabilization.  Inflation  must  be  brought  under  control  through  drastic  reduction  in 
budget  deficits  and  restricted  credits. 
2.  Liberalization.  Prices  must  be  freed  from  controls,  Profit  seeking  business  firms  and 
farms  must  be  allowed  to  decide  for  themselves  what  to  produce  and  how  to  produce 
and  firms  must  be  able  to  engage  freely  in  foreign  trade.  The  currency  should  be 
made  convertible  as  soon  as  possible. 
233 3.  privatization.  Most  land  and  capital  assets  must  be  put  into  private  hands  and  market 
arrangements  set  up  for  the  exchange  of  such  assets.  Individuals  and  groups  must  be 
free  to  establish  new  private  businesses  with  ease.  Monopolies  must  be  broken  up. 
4.  Regulation.  The  state  must  assume  the  role  of  regulator  of  the  macro-economy  and  of 
business  activity  using  instruments  that  promote  well-functioning  markets  through 
their  influence  on  decisions  of  individuals  and  fin-ns.  The  state  itself  should  provide 
legal  and  social  protection  and  supply  public  goods  and  services  in  amounts  and  kinds 
chosen  by  electorates. 
5.  New  institutions.  Legal,  accounting,  and  statistical  systems  appropriate  for  a  market 
economy  must  be  established  and  new  financial  institutions  created,  such  as  a  central 
bank  and  a  network  of  private  commercial  banks,  insurance  companies,  and  securities 
exchanges. 
6.  Restructuring  of  production.  The  mix  of  goods  and  services  produced  must  change 
and  the  land,  capital  and  labour  resources  must  be  redeployed  in  accord  with  the 
preferences  of  consumers  at  home  and  abroad.  The  state  may  play  a  role  in  such 
restructuring  but  ought  not  to  dictate  its  directions,  which  should  come  from  market 
SignaiS.  31 
These  are  the  six  major  sets  of  tasks  that  must  be  carried  out  by  each  of  the  transitional 
economies,  if  they  are  to  create  a  reasonably  well-functioning  market  economy  starting 
from  the  physical,  human,  institutional,  and  economic  legacies  of  central  planning.  Each  of 
these  major  tasks  encompasses  a  multitude  of  specific  tasks  and  entails  numerous  and 
perhaps  conflicting  choices.  "What  has  to  be  done  economically  is  gargantuan,  and  the 
tasks  must  be  accomplished  through  political  processes  that  are  still  in  formation 
everywhere.  The  sheer  magnitude  and  inter-connectedness  of  the  tasks  would  seem  to 
require  that  a  start  be  made,  (not  necessarily  in  time  sequence),  on  almost  all  fronts 
simultaneously.  02  The  new  states  will  choose  their  own  particular  paths  and  paces  of 
reform  and  development.  Even  though  they  have  common  legacies  and  large  economic 
interdependencies,  these  choices  will  be  influenced  by  the  political,  social,  and  economic 
Particularities  in  each  state.  We  shall  look  into  those  tasks  in  more  detail  later. 
234 In  its  last  year  of  existence,  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  witnessed  the  culmination  of  the  combined 
failures  of  courses  of  action  it  had  long  pursued  in  two  critical  realms  -  its  attachment  to 
within-system  economic  reforms  and  its  vaunted  "nationalities  policies.  "  Once  the  union 
government's  reins  were  loosened  under  the  policies  of  glasnost  and  perestroika  33 
,  the 
result  was  a  bloodless  revolt  of  the  republics  that  proceeded  swiftly  and  ended  in 
replacement  on  the  world  stage  of  the  unitary  Soviet  state  by  15  new  sovereign  states. 
Each  is  a  nation-state  in  the  sense  that  an  indigenous  ethnic  group  is  dominant  in  its  total 
population  as  is  shown  in  the  following  Table.  We  may  not  be  able  to  strictly  apply  this 
criteria  to  the  case  of  Kazakhstan. 
Table  111.16.1. 
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Source:  Based  on  data  given  in  The  Fonner  Soviet  Union  in  Transition,  Edited  by  Richard  F.  Kaufman 
and  John  P.  Hardt  for  the  Joint  Economic  Committee,  Congress  of  the  United  States,  1993. 
235 in  order  to  gain  perspective  On  what  the  new  states  have  accomplished  thus  far  in  the 
area  of  economic  reforms,  we  must  remind  ourselves  of  what  are  the  most  urgent  of  the 
tasks  of  new  statehood.  In  the  area  of  foreign  relations,  the  new  states  must  now 
forrnulate  their  own  foreign  policy,  establish  diplomatic  relations  with  foreign  states  and 
negotiate  new  international  agreements  on  a  wide  range  of  matters.  They  must  decide  on 
rnatters  of  national  defense.  In  the  domestic  political  arena,  the  new  states  need  new 
constitutions,  laws  and  administrative  structures  suited  to  independence.  The  political 
processes  need  to  be  managed  to  ensure  a  reasonable  degree  of  stability  of  government  in 
order  to  formulate  and  execute  policy  over  a  broad  spectrum.  In  the  social  arena,  the  new 
states  must  revamp  their  social  systems  and  fon-nulate  policies  to  deal  with  urgent 
problems  in  public  health,  criminal  justice,  and  the  environment.  34 
In  the  economic  realm,  the  tasks  are  even  more  daunting  and  also  more  pressing,  since 
they  concern  the  daily  welfare  of  the  entire  population.  While  pursuing  the  complex  tasks 
of  systemic  reform  process  forward,  the  beleaguered  governments  must  cope  with  the 
daily  crises  stemming  from  the  deep  recession  into  which  their  economies  have  been 
plunged  by  the  collapse  of  the  center  with  its  ability  to  command,  by  the  steep  decline  in 
defense  spending,  by  the  disarray  in  trade  with  former  CMEA  members  and  the  former 
republics,  by  the  introduction  of  separate  monetary  unit,  by  worker  strikes  or  strike 
threats,  and  by  ethnic  strife.  The  new  states  must  now  manage  their  own  public  sectors 
and  try  to  balance  their  own  budgets.  In  the  international  arena,  they  must  forge  new 
economic  relationships  with  other  countries,  interact  with  them  through  international 
35  organizations,  and  seek  economic  aid  and  foreign  investment 
. 
Given  the  revolutionary  nature  of  the  many-faceted  transformation  from  subservience  to 
independence,  the  speed  with  which  it  occurred,  and  the  excessive  burden  on  the  new 
governments,  the  progress  on  economic  reform  made  thus  far  is  remarkable.  Human 
attitudes  and  habitual  ways  of  doing  things  changes  slowly  in  all  societies.  But  there  is 
much  evidence  that  such  changes  are  indeed  taking  place.  36  Although  systemic 
transformation  is  in  process  at  long  last  in  all  of  the  transitional  economies,  large  elements 
Of  the  old  system  remain  in  place  (particularly  in  CIS),  a  situation  that  could  hardly  be 
236 otherwise,  given  the  brevity  of  their  independence.  "As  for  restructuring  the  mix  of 
production,  however,  much  alteration  is  occurring  willy-nilly,  as  defense  production  falls 
and  conversion  to  civilian  production  is  attempted,  as  firms  and  farms  spontaneously  or 
under  government  prodding  alter  their  product  mixes,  as  the  private  sector  oriented 
toward  consumers  expands,  and  as  such  investment  as  is  taking  place  in  the  present 
chaotic  conditions  gravitates  toward  consumer-oriented  sectors.  ,  37  The  tasks  still  ahead  in 
establishing  the  conditions  and  institutions  of  a  viable  market  economy  are  awesome.  They 
would  severely  tax  the  political  and  social  fabric  of  even  the  most  seasoned,  stable,  and 
ethnically  homogeneous  democracy.  But  there  is  no  economic  reason  why  they  cannot  be 
accomplished  in  time.  Under  the  best  circumstances,  the  transformation  will  require  many 
years,  and  given  the  physical  and  psychological  legacies,  the  fun  recovery  of  the 
economies  will  be  slow  in  coming.  As  is  already  clear,  the  transformation  process  will  be 
characterized  by  much  diversity.  38 
Our  analysis  of  the  transition  process  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  unfolds  the  complexity 
of  the  nature  of  the  task  that  is  ahead.  The  economies  in  transition  need  to  follow  certain 
strategies  to  accomplish  the  desired  economic  objective  of  growth  and  development.  In 
the  following  chapter  let  us  try  to  comprehend  those  transition  strategies  that  have  been 
followed  by  the  economies  in  transition. 
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240 TEEN 
ECONOMIC  GROWTH  STRATEGIES  OF  TRANSITION 
E.  A.;  onomic  growth  is  very  much  determined  by  the  strategies  a  country  adopts. 
Throughout  the  republics  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  Eastern  Europe,  the  state  can  no 
longer  dictate  economic  results  and  the  market  is  not  yet  sufficiently  well  established  to 
provide  the  incentives  necessary  for  vigorous  or  stable  growth.  In  this  transformation, 
economic  and  political  reforms  are  inextricably  intertwined.  '  We  shall  concentrate  here  on 
those  transition  strategies  and  the  number  of  issues  relating  to  the  speed  and  sequence  of 
reform  in  the  economies  in  transition.  The  heart  of  that  effort,  the  most  difficult  and 
protracted  part  of  it,  is  the  construction  of  market  economies  on  the  ruins  of  central 
planning  from  the  eastern  part  of  Germany  to  the  Pacific  coast  of  Russia.  "Making 
markets  where  none  existed  before  is  an  enterprise  of  daunting  scale.  It  is  far  greater  in 
scope  than  the  parallel  shift  from  communist  to  democratic  governance.  Government,  after 
all,  is  a  full-time  activity  for  only  a  handful  of  people  in  any  society.  The  economy,  by 
contrast,  is  the  setting  in  which  most  adults  in  any  country  spend  their  working  fiVeS.,,  2 
The  transition  from  plan  to  market  involves  abrupt  and  sweeping  changes  in  the  daily 
routines  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  people  -  changes  in  how  and  where  they  work,  what 
they  buy,  how  they  earn  money  to  pay  for  their  purchases,  and  where  they  live.  At  the 
outset  we  can  safely  state  that  there  is  no  unique  optimal  path  of  transition.  Much  depends 
on  the  starting  point  and  the  events  preceding  it.  Many  countries  have  moved  sufficiently 
far  that  there  is  little  point  in  suggesting  embarking  on  a  new  path  which  might  involve 
retracing  steps.  But,  while  no  single  path  should  be  seen  as  the  "model"  or  "right"  way, 
3  there  are  some  basic  elements  that  are  central  to  the  success  of  the  process.  Let  us  begin 
analysing  these  strategies  by  having  an  understanding  of  the  term  transition. 
241 111.17.  i.  The  ConcWtual  Understandim!  of  Transition 
Since  the  present  transition  has  no  historical  precedent,  it  would  be  better  if  we  can 
familiarize  ourselves  with  this  concept  as  we  use  in  our  study.  In  the  "Transition  Report" 
of  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development,  the  term  transition  is  defined 
in  the  following  words.  "In  general  terms,  transition  is  the  progression  from  a  command 
economy  to  an  open  market-oriented  economy.  The  transition  concerns  institutional 
change.  It  is  the  institutional  arrangements  for  the  allocation  and  generation  of  goods  and 
resources,  and  the  ownership  incentive  and  reward  structures  that  institutions  embody, 
that  characterise  the  differences  between  a  market  and  a  command  economy.  9A  Transition 
is  not  only  an  intermediate  goal  contributing  to  economic  development.  It  may  also  be 
regarded  as  an  ultimate  objective  in  itself.  The  market  economy,  in  contrast  to  central 
planning,  gives,  in  principle,  the  individual  the  right  to  basic  choices  over  aspects  of  his  or 
her  life:  occupation  and  place  of  work,  where  to  live,  what  to  consume,  what  risks  to  take 
or  avoid,  and  so  on.  The  right  to  these  choices  may  be  seen  as  basic  liberty  and  as  a 
fundamental  aspect  of  standard  of  living.  Of  course,  the  notion  of  liberty  goes  far  beyond 
the  elements  of  choice  described  but  these  choices  may  be  regarded  as  basic  to  it.  Thus  the 
transition  is  also  an  end  in  itself. 
Individuals  freely  pursuing  their  interests  and  interacting  in  the  market  place  together 
provide  a  more  efficient,  dynamic  and  creative  economy  than  one  based  on  centralised 
commands.  "The  centralised  command  economy  may  suffer  more  severely  from  political 
manipulation,  corruption,  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  power,  poor  information,  cumbersome 
systems  and  perverse  incentives.  "5  In  summary,  since  the  founding  of  the  Bretton  Woods 
institutions,  the  dominant  view  is  that  a  market-based  system  has  overwhelming 
advantages  over  central  planning.  The  transition  from  a  command  to  a  market  economy  is 
the  movement  towards  a  new  system  for  the  generation  and  allocation  of  resources.  It 
6  involves  changing  and  creating  institutions,  particularly  private  enterprises.  The 
transitional  economies  need  to  integrate  certain  basic  ingredients  of  open  market-economy 
as  they  strive  to  create  a  market-based  system. 
242 111.17.  n.  The  Ingredients  of  Open  Market-Economy 
As  we  have  seen,  transition  is  a  progression  towards  an  open  market-economy.  The  key 
ingredients  of  the  open  market-oriented  economy  must  be  examined  more  closely,  since 
that  would  enable  the  identification  of  the  important  dimensions  of  the  progression.  "In 
identifying  the  'key  ingredients'  it  must  be  remembered  that  there  are  many  varieties  of 
market  economy  which  may  be  viewed  as  the  'end  point'  or  'target'  of  the  transition.  ,7 
The  contrasts  between  the  economies  of  Japan,  Germany  and  the  USA  illustrate  that  the 
possibilities  are  very  broad.  It  is  important  to  remember  that  the  transition  is  not  a  simple, 
linear,  one-dimensional  progression  to  a  'standard'  market  economy.  It  involves  the 
designing  of  a  new  economic  system  which  is  naturally  a  demanding  venture  with  a 
complex  process. 
What  are  the  key  ingredients  of  a  market  economy?  We  shall  merely  outline  the  basic 
elements  of  the  market  economy  as  they  are  understood  within  a  capitalist  framework. 
(1)  enterprises  and  households,  which  are  responsible  for  decisions  concerning  production 
and  consumption.  These  decisions  are  taken  in  response  to  incentive  structures  embodied 
in  the  workings  of  the  markets  in  which  they  operate; 
(2)  markets,  which  are  the  means  by  which  goods  and  resources  are  exchanged  between 
enterprises  and  households; 
(3)  financial  institutions,  which  are  crucial  players  in  the  integration  of  transactions  over 
time;  in  particular  the  channelling  of  savings  and  investments,  the  organization  of 
payments,  and  the  enforcement  of  individual  (household  and  enterprise)  financial 
discipfine.  8 
Integrating  these  basic  elements  of  the  market  economy  into  the  new  economic  system 
of  the  newly  formed  economies  in  transition  is  an  unavoidable  task.  The  new  sovereign 
states  must  make  all  effort  to  bring  about  political  stability  in  order  to  accomplish  the 
economic  transformation. 
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The  role  of  the  state  in  a  market  economy  remains  important,  although  very  different 
from  that  in  a  command  economy.  This  changed  role  requires  fundamentally  different 
governmental  institutions.  The  state  plays  a  major  role  in  the  market  economy,  across 
many  dimensions,  which  is  very  different  from  that  of  the  command  economy.  Basic 
elements  include: 
(a)  legal  and  regulatory  structures  and  governmental  responsibilities  concerning  the 
behaviour  of  enterprises  and  financial  institutions,  property  rights,  transactions  and 
contracts,  and  the  functioning  of  markets; 
(b)  the  provision  of  parts  of  education,  public  health  and  medical  care; 
(c)  the  provision  and  protection  of  certain  public  goods  or  services  including  defence,  law 
and  order,  the  environment,  and  elements  of  the  infrastructure; 
(d)  the  provision  of  protection  against  important  aspects  of  poverty; 
(e)  a  system  of  taxation  that  can  support  the  provision  of  the  above  services.  9  The 
fulfilment  of  these  functions  by  the  state  is  a  necessary  step  towards  the  system  of  market 
mechanism.  As  the  very  term  transition  implies  a  short-term  scenario,  it  was  believed  that 
the  measures  which  are  to  be  taken  by  the  economic  policy  makers  should  be  radical. 
111.17.  iv.  The  Interlocking  Wheels  of  Transition 
Despite  the  lack  of  experience  with  a  transition  of  this  sort,  a  consensus  has  emerged  in 
both  East  and  West  on  what  it  involves.  They  broadly  agree  that  the  vehicle  to  reach  a 
private  market  economy  should  ride  on  four  interlocking  wheels.  The  first  is 
macroeconomic  stabilization  -  bringing  the  balance  of  payments  into  rough  equilibrium  and 
above  all  correcting  economic  imbalances  that  are  ordinarily  expressed  as  overt  or 
suppressed  inflation.  (The  following  chapter  analyses  in  detail  stabilization  as  a  transition 
strategy.  )  A  second  set  of  changes  necessary  for  the  transition  from  plan  to  market  comes 
under  the  rubric  "liberalization.  "  All  involve  dissolving  state  controls  of  economic  activity 
244 and  substituting  market  rules  and  practices.  They  include  such  measures  as  breaking  up 
the  monopolistic  structure  of  industries  to  foster  competition  and  putting  economic 
relations  with  other  countries  on  a  market  basis,  an  important  element  of  which  is  making 
local  currencies  convertible.  Liberalization  involves  freeing  up  prices,  including  interest 
rates;  devaluing  the  currency  to  a  realistic  -  perhaps  supercompetitive  -  level,  and  then 
managing  the  exchange  rate  under  some  "flex-fix"  regime  (such  as  pegging  with  periodic 
large  devaluations,  crawling  peg,  or  frequent  minidevaluations,  or  managed  float);  making 
the  currency  convertible  for  the  current  account  (that  is,  for  international  transactions  of 
goods  and  services);  integrating  with  the  world  economy  by  eliminating  barriers  to  cross- 
border  movements  of  goods,  services,  capital,  technology,  and  ideas;  and  reforming  other 
(for  example,  financial  and  labour)  markets.  71he  third  set  of  changes  involves  privatization 
of  the  economy,  which  we  shall  describe  briefly  later  in  this  chapter.  The  fourth  set  of 
changes  requires  building  the  institutions  necessary  to  sustain  a  market  economy.  This  is  a 
process  of  developing  a  market-  supporting  institutional  infrastructure.  This  encompasses 
constitutional,  legislative,  legal,  accounting,  regulatory,  fiscal,  monetary,  and  social 
insurance  reform.  10  Among  the  market-supporting  institutional  infrastructure,  perhaps,  the 
most  important  is  private  property.  Ownership  must  be  transferred  from  the  state  to 
private  hands.  Also  important  is  the  establishment  of  a  legal  framework  within  which 
private  economic  activity  can  take  place,  contracts  are  enforced,  and  private  property  is 
protected.  Important  as  well  is  the  development  of  a  financial  system  that  can  channel 
capital,  in  the  form  of  private  savings,  to  profitable  uses.  And  perhaps  most  important  of 
all  is  the  accumulation  of  the  skills  -  managerial,  legal,  and  entrepreneurial,  among  others  - 
that  are  necessary  to  make  free  markets  work.  "  Liberalization,  privatization  of  the 
economy,  and  development  of  a  market-supporting  institutional  infrastructure  could  be 
grouped  together  under  the  overall  label  of  "marketization.  "  Economists  also  broadly 
agree  on  the  following  point:  in  order  to  move  fast  and  maintain  the  momentum,  the 
vehicle  should  initialýy  befielled,  not  just  lubricated,  by  massive  foreign  governmental 
assistance  -  moral,  intellectual,  technical,  and  financial.  One  can  therefore  view  adequate 
external  assistance'2  as  the  essential  start-up  fuel  to  ignite  the  engine,  get  the  wheels 
moving,  and  build  up  the  momentum  to  put  the  economy  on  the  turnpike  to  capitalism. 
245 rMus,  the  consensus  strategy  for  capitalist  transformation  may  also  be  described  as  a 
structure  resting  on  three  primary  pillars:  stabilization,  marketization,  and  foreign  aid. 
Economists  further  agree  -  though  with  more  qualifications  -  on  the  essential  features  of 
the  transitional  performance  of  the  Central  and  Eastern  European  (CEE)  countries  since 
1990,  and  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  since  1991.13 
While  economists  generally  agree  on  components  that  should  compose  the  core  of  the 
transformation  strategy,  the  convergence  breaks  down  on  the  sequencing,  speed,  and 
stress  (relative  intensity  of  implementation)  of  these  components,  as  well  as  on  whether 
and  how  sectoralism  (i.  e.,  industrial  pohcy)  should  shape  their  implementation.  One 
instructive  start  toward  understanding  the  debate  on  sequencing,  speed,  stress,  and 
sectoralism  is  to  separate  the  semantics  from  the  economics  of  such  catchphrases  as 
"shock  therapy,  "  "big  bang,  "  and  "gradualism,  "  We  shall  proceed  to  analyse  these 
catchphrases  in  the  context  of  transition. 
111.17.  v.  Shock  Therapy.  Big  Bang,  and  Gradualism  as  Transition  Stratggies 
The  conventional  practice  is  to  use  the  terms  "shock  therapy"  and  "big  bang" 
interchangeably,  and  contrast  them  with  the  alternative  of  "gradualism"  (some  call  it  a 
step-by  step  or  conservative  approach).  14  The  shock  therapy/big-bang  strategy  typically 
implies  a  simultaneous  and  rapid  deployment  approach  on  all  fronts.  In  terms  of  the  four 
interlocking  wheels  described  earlier  -  stabilization,  liberalization,  privatization,  and 
institutional  infrastructure  building  -  the  big  bang  approach  means  exactly  what  it  says:  get 
all  four  wheels  moving  together  and  quickly  with  minimum  emphasis  on  sectoral 
selectivism  (industrial  policy).  By  contrast,  gradualism  usually  connotes  an  approach 
involving  a  great  deal  of  attention  to  appropriate  sequencing  of  the  various  components 
and  subcomponents  of  the  overall  policy  package,  as  well  as  differentiation  in  speed  and 
stress  of  these  component  reforms  determined  in  light  of  sectoral.  considerations. 
"Shock  therapy  is  a  highly  conservative  Western  economic  doctrine  emphasizing 
monetary  policy.  Originally  developed  to  stabilize  and  invigorate  an  economy  with 
246 substantial  capitalist  aspects,  it  is  here  modified  to  convert  a  command  economy  to 
capitalism.  "15  The  conditions  for  shock  therapy  to  succeed  are  quite  stringent.  (Moreover, 
the  theory  upon  which  it  rests  makes  a  number  of  questionable  assumptions,  especially  for 
the  Russian  case.  )  It  is  assumed  by  the  theory  that  if  monetary  and  pecuniary  problems  can 
be  solved,  production  will  be  restored  without  central  government  intervention  in 
production  decisions.  Let  us  analyse  the  case  of  Russia,  which  followed  this  strategy. 
Yegor  Gaidar,  in  Russia  as  acting  Prime  Minister  during  1992,  initiated  a  transformation 
regime  that  is  called  "shock  therapy"  because  it  attempts  to  create  the  necessary 
institutions  for  a  functioning  capitalist  economy  and  achieve  macroeconomic  stability  in 
the  shortest  possible  time  period.  This  strategy  recommends  speed  in  implementation  on 
two  grounds.  First,  a  market  economy  requires  the  existence  of  a  minimum  set  of 
institutions  coming  into  operation  simultaneously.  Liberalizing  retail  prices,  for  example, 
can  have  little  beneficial  effect  upon  production  and  allocation  decisions  unless  enterprises 
have  been  privatized  and  thus  are  operated  according  to  the  dictates  of  profit 
maximization.  A  second  reason  given  to  move  fast  with  the  economic  transformation  is 
that  the  process  is  expected  to  be  economically  painful  for  most  members  of  the 
population.  The  quicker  the  new  economic  regime  is  in  place,  the  less  time  opponents  will 
have  to  organize  and  the  sooner  it  will  begin  to  yield  benefits  to  offset  the  costs  of  the 
transition,  such  as  unemployment  and  the  loss  of  welfare  entitlements  and  lifetime 
savings.  16 
As  a  transition  strategy,  shock  therapy  is  the  approach  generally  supported  by  the  World 
Bank,  the  International Monetary  Fund  and  such  well-known  academic  consultants  as 
Harvard  Professor  Jeffrey  Sachs.  In  Poland,  influenced  by  Sachs,  the  Balcerowicz  Plan 
scrapped  the  gradualist  approach  to  transformation  agreed  in  the  spring  of  1989  in  the 
Round  Table  negotiations  which  led  to  the  change  of  regime  in  favour  of  shock  therapy 
and  the  big  bang.  17  The  transformation  regime  is  based  on  a  monetarist  philosophy  and  a 
free  market  ideology.  Jude  Wanniski,  for  example,  has  expressed  the  ideology  underlying 
it  most  clearly  in  an  essay  on  the  future  of  Russian  capitalism:  "It  is  possible  to  imagine  a 
future  of  Russian  capitalism  that  asserts  itself  early  in  the  21st  century  as  the  envy  of  the 
247 world....  The  Russian  people  are  now  engaged  in  nothing  less  than  designing  the  basic 
architecture  of  a  brand  new  country.  Why  not  consider  all  possibilities?  Why  not  design 
the  Russian  system  of  capitalism  to  be  the  best?  1)  18  By  the  "best,  "  Wanniski  means  most 
unfettered  by  state  intervention  and  ownership.  It  calls  for  complete  displacement  of  the 
prior  economy  (of  former  Soviet  economic  institutions). 
But  critics  of  the  Gaidar  transformation  regime,  like  the  Nikolay  Shmelev  (a  Russian 
economist)  and  Georgi  Matyukhin  ý(director  of  the  Russian  Gosbank),  believe  that  it  is 
unrealistic  to  create  a  market  economy  in  so  short  a  time.  They  argue  that  the  Western 
advisors  are  not  famifiar  with  the  political  and  economic  "realities"  of  the  Russian 
economy.  The  majority  of  Western  economists  who  were  specialists  on  the  Soviet 
economy  prior  to  the  collapse  of  communism,  tend  to  agree  with  the  critics  of  shock 
therapy  and  would  call  for  gradual  modification  of  existing  economic  institutions,  not  their 
wholesale  elimination  (a  reformist  approach).  There  also  tend  to  be  conscious  political 
economists  who  believe  that  economists  recommending  economic  policies  must  take 
political  constraints  and  realities  into  account  in  formulating  economic  reform.  Supporters 
of  shock  therapy  base  their  recommendations  instead  on  a  theoretical  model  of  the  market 
economy  that  they  are  attempting  to  replicate  in  Russia,  and  they  see  little  advantage  in 
attempting  to  salvage  or  modify  existing  institutions.  They  also  tend  to  be  impatient  with 
political  constraints.  What  is  appealing  to  leaders  of  the  transitional  economies  who  are 
facing  a  leap  into  the  unknown  in  the  face  of  popular  unrest,  is,  of  course,  the  simple  and 
quick  solutions  provided  by  the  confident  assertions  of  Western  economic  advisors.  The 
danger  is  that  they  may  be  merely  leaping  from  one  obsolete,  unworkable  economic 
dogma  to  another,  from  the  frying  pan  into  the  fire.  19 
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The  strategy  of  shock  therapy  has  been  criticized  for  the  following  reasons.  According 
to  the  dictates  of  the  model  of  shock  therapy,  unemployment  should  be  increasing  as 
industries  trim  and  rationalize  their  labour  forces  in  order  to  maximize  profits. 
TA13LE  111.17.1. 
sia  in  1991-1992 
Populat  Proport  Econo  Forecas  and  Real  in  1991  Forecas  1992 
ion  ion  of  mic  t  for  Employ  Situatio  t  for 
(Thous  the  Regions  1991  ment  of  n 
ands)  Local  (Ministr  Russia) 
Populat  y  of 
ion  in  Labour 
the 
Total  Thousa  Percent  Thousa  Percent  Thousa  Percen 
Able-  nds  of  age'  nds  of  age 
a 
nds  of  tage 
a 
Bodied  People  People  People 
Russian 
Populat 
ion 
N.  A. 
b  N.  A. 
b  Russia,  1,329.0  1.6  61.9  0.07  762.4  0.9 
total 
6,155.3  4.3.  Norther  32.9  0.9  1.5  0.04  18.3  0.5 
n 
8,301.8  5.7  North-  76.3  1.6  3.5  0.07  52.2  1.1 
West 
30,478.  20.4  Central  257.1  1.5  12.0  0.07  119.5  0.7 
3  5.6  Volga-  84.3  1.8  3.9  0.08  46.7  1.0 
8,476.5  Vyatsky 
7,756.0  5.0  Central  50.3  1.2  2.4  0.06  25.1  0.6 
Black 
Earth 
16,543.  11.2  Volga  179.1  1.9  8.4  0.09  113.5  1.3 
0  11.1  North  149.5  1.6  6.9  0.07  102.6  0.9 
16,944.  Caucas 
3  us 
15,127.  10.4  West-  157.2  1.8  7.3  0.08  87.6  1.0 
6  Siberian 
9,224.9  6.3  East-  106.4  2.0  4.9  0.09  80.2  1.5 
Siberian 
8,032.4  5.9  Far-  59.9  1.2  1.8  0.06  30.1  0.6 
I  I  East  I  I  I  I  I  I 
249 N.  A.  b  0.6  Kalinin  4.8  0.9  0.3  0.05  2.1  0.4 
grad 
area 
Source:  Russian  Business  Monitor,  No.  1,1992,  p.  25 
".  The  number  of  registered  unemployed  against  the  total  able-bodied  population. 
b  Note:  The  source  does  not  give  the  population  figure  for  the  Kaliningrad  area  (column 
1).  Columns  1  and  2  for  Russia  are  also  not  specified.  Finally,  the  percent  figures  given  in 
Column  2  refer  to  a  total  able-bodied  Russian  population  that  is  not  identified.  The  text 
states  (p.  24)  that  the  regions  listed  in  the  table  represent  approximately  75%  of  the 
Russian  population.  The  unemployed  are  defined  here  consonant  with  the  April  19,1991, 
Law  on  Employment  as  all  "able-bodied  citizens  that  have  [no]  job  or  earning,  (excluding 
payments  for  public  works  on  assignment  of  government  employment  agencies)  ... 
[and 
are]  ...  registered  in  an  employment  agency  as  seeking  an  adequate  (sic.  )  job  and  ready  to 
take  it.  "  (Millar,  P.  51). 
Pee 
.  entially  nothing  has  happened  with  respect  to  this  criterion  as  seen  in  Table  111.17.1. 
By  Western  standards  unemployment  is  zero.  Enterprise  managers  continue  to  see  it  as 
their  prime  responsibility  to  provide  for  the  welfare  of  their  employees,  even  at  the 
expense  of  profits.  Laying  workers  off  in  order  to  streamline  and  rationalize  factory  labour 
force  deprives  workers  of  more  than  their  jobs.  Most  employers  are  struggling  to  protect 
their  workers  from  the  ravages  of  shock  therapy;  their  efforts  of  course,  undermine 
govemment  economic  policies.  A  survey  of  all  available  data  on  the  various  independent 
states  of  the  CIS  indicates  that,  in  general,  the  short-run  objectives  of  shock  therapy  are 
not  being  attained,  as  shown  in  Table  1H.  17.2. 
Table 
. 
17.2. 
Success  Criteria:  A  Visual  Guide  to  Reform  Progress  in  CIS" 
Inflation  Unemploy 
ment 
Retail 
Rationing 
Hoarding  Full 
Shelves 
output 
Increase 
Textbook  x  x  0  0  x  x 
Russia  x  0  0  0  z  0 
Ukraine  z  0  0  0  z  0 
Belarus  z  0  c  z  c  0 
Moldova  x  0  N/A  x  c  0 
LU=zbekistan 
X1  0  N/A  N/A  c  N/A 
250 TaJikistan  X  0  N/A  N/A  x  N/A 
Turkmenist 
an 
Z  0  Z  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Kyrgyzstan.  x  0  N/A  N/A  c  0 
Kazakhstan  x  0  z  N/A  c  0 
Azerbaijan  x  0  N/A  N/A  N/A  0 
Annenia  N/A  0  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
[ýeýorgia  N/A  0  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Source:  MiHar,  The  Economy  of  the  CIS,  p.  52. 
'  Compiled  impressionistically  from  the  following  Russian  and  English  language  sources 
by  Alexander  Sulla:  USSR  Today,  December  1991-January  1992;  CIS  Today,  January- 
July  1992;  FBIS  Daily  Reports  -  Central  Eurasia,  January-July  1992;  RFE/RL  Daily 
Reports,  January-July  1992;  RFE/RL  Research  Report,  January  24,1992;  The  New  York 
Times,  February  13,1992;  The  Washington  Post,  February  2,6,7,  and  8,1992. 
Legend:  x=  full;  z=  partial;  c=  minimal;  0=  zero;  N/A  =  not  known. 
The  textbook  solution  calls  for  an  end  to  hoarding  and  queues  and  for  rising 
unemployment  in  the  short  ran.  Money  wages  and  pensions  have  not  been  successfully 
IC.  -  - 
frozen,  but  they  have  not  thus  far  increased  at  the  same  rate  that  prices  have.  The  slower 
growth  of  money  wages  than  prices  is  serving  as  an  anchor  -a  "dragging  anchor'920  that  is 
preventing  hyperinflation  for  the  moment. 
Shock  therapy  focuses  on  financial  and  price  issues,  but  it  cannot  succeed  without 
privatization,  demonopolization,  and  a  well-conceived  industrial  policy.  This  last 
component  is  an  essential  but  rarely  discussed  policy.  "What  is  needed  is  something  much 
more  like  the  Marshall  Plan  than  like  shock  therapy.  The  Marshall  Plan  focused  on 
production  and  economic  integration  as  well  as  on  macroeconomic  stabilization.  It  put  the 
burden  of  organizing  investment,  production,  and  distribution  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
potential  beneficiaries,  and  it  discouraged  a  mercantilist  or  beggar-thy-neighbour  approach 
by  beneficiaries.  sý21  Unfortunately,  the  new  independent  states  are  reluctant  now  to 
cooperate  freely  in  a  common  economic  space. 
The  Soviet  economy  was  always  a  crisis  management  economy.  The  market  mechanism 
is  still  too  weak  in  the  CIS  to  carry  the  entire  burden  of  allocation,  production,  and 
251 distribution.  Shock  therapy  is  creating  the  external  features  of  a  market  economy  but  not 
necessarily  its  content.  The  Russian,  Ukrainian,  and  other  republic  economists  will  have  to 
gain  their  own  seat-of-the-plants  experience  in  the  central  management  of  a  market 
economy.  This  will  take  many  years.  The  various  other  republics  are  following  at  different 
rates  the  pace  set  by  Russia.  Most  objective  observers  see  the  process  as  taking  at  least  ten 
years  or  more  if  a  stop-and-go  approach  infects  policy  implementation,  which  has  been  the 
fate  of  shock  therapy  experiments  elsewhere  in  the  world.  The  problem  of  a  "common 
ruble  space",  self-conscious  national  and  ethnic  groups  etc.  pose  a  threat  to  Russia  and 
other  CIS.  To  the  extent  that  the  new  states  that  compose  the  CIS  focus  on  ancient 
rivalries,  hatreds,  and  grudges,  economic  reform  will  be  undercut.  Shock  therapy  was 
initially  successful  in  Yugoslavia  until  ethnic  rivalries  made  the  question  of  economic 
reform  moot.  Military  conflict  has  superseded  economic  concerns.  A  similar  development 
in  the  CIS  would  be  even  more  destructive.  Under  these  socio-political.  scenario,  a 
rejection  of  shock  therapy  is  the  more  likely  outcome.  The  objectives  of  economic  policy 
will  remain  the  same  as  under  shock  therapy,  but  implementation  will  be  slowed  in  order 
to  maintain  peace  among  the  member  states  of  the  CIS  and  political  stability  within  each 
state.  Politics,  it  has  been  said,  is  "the  art  of  the  possible.  "  A  review  of  the  economic 
policy  in  the  CIS  indicates  that  shock  therapy  is  not  within  the  realm  of  the  "possible" 
politically  or  economically.  22 
The  usage  of  the  very  term  "shock  therapy"  is  being  criticized  on  the  following  grounds. 
This  technical  term  of  psychiatry  is  used  by  economists  as  a  metaphor  which  involves  a 
misleading  analogy;  and  worse,  it  carries  a  false  negative  connotation.  Psychiatrists  apply 
electrical  shocks  as  a  last  resort  to  treat  patients  suffering  from  certain  types  of  severe 
depression  and  catatonic  schizophrenia.  Here  the  electrical  shock  is  the  therapy.  "In  other 
words,  the  shock  is  the  intended  means  to  achieve  an  end  -  relieve  the  symptoms,  if  not 
Cure  the  patient.  By  contrast,  for  a  postcommand  economy,  the  shock  that  flows  from  a 
simultaneous  and  speedy  implementation  of  a  transitional  strategy  is  an  unintended  - 
though  unavoidable  -  consequence.  Unlike  the  objective  in  psychiatry,  the  purpose  is  not 
to  administer  the  shock  to  treat  the  symptoms  of  the  underlying  disease,  but  to  apply  a 
curative  therapy  that  unfortunately  involves  a  shock.  ,  23  put  Succinctly,  in  psychiatry  the 
252 shock  is  the  intended  therapy,  whereas  in  the  economics  of  transition,  the  shock  is  the 
unintended  consequence  of  the  therapy.  ' 
These  seemingly  fine  points  of  distinction  have  serious  political  implications.  It  so 
happens  that  observers  often  take  this  metaphor  literally,  and  fall  into  the  intellectual  trap 
of  viewing  the  shock  as  the  intended  therapy  while  interpreting  the  alternative  approach  as 
therapy  without  shock  (the  psychiatric  analogy  would  be  the  painless  drug  therapy),  and 
thus  preferable.  All  the  complex  issues  of  sequencing,  speed,  stress,  and  sectoral  activism 
are  thus  reduced  to  a  choice  between  shock  or  no  shock.  Thus,  the  critics  argue  that  it 
would  be  better  to  avoid  the  usage  of  "shock  therapy"  and  remove  this  vocabulary  from 
the  economics  of  transition.  Let  us  delve  into  the  gradualist  approach.  The  Economistý5 
defines  gradualists  as  those  who  put  priority  on  creating  market  institutions  (legal, 
accounting,  and  regulating  frameworks;  autonomous  commercial  banks;  capital  markets; 
and  so  on)  over  privatization,  and  advocate  a  strong  state  role  in  ownership  reform  of 
large  enterprises  with  a  step-by-step  approach.  The  Economist  would  label  Fischer  and 
Gelb  -  along  with  many  World  Bank  economists  -  gradualists,,  since  they  suggest,  61t 
seems  doubtful  that  the  private  sector  could  handle  restructuring  of  very  large,  weak 
industries,  so  the  state  will  need  to  restructure  or  close  diem.  9Y26  Interestingly,  it  is  The 
Economist's  version  of  the  gradualist  model  that  many  often  criticize  as  a  painful  big  bang 
involving  simultaneous.,  forceful,  and  speedy  implementation  of  stabilization  and 
liberalization,  but  with  little  progress  on  privatization  and  institution  building.  Indeed,  this 
is  the  Polish  big  bang  that  many  love  to  hate.  Clearly,  The  Economist's  big  bang  entails 
not  only  speedy  implementation  of  stabilization  and  liberalization,  but  also  rapid 
privatization  of  small  and  large  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs).  This  is  the 
Czechoslovakian  big-bang  model  which  in  practice  did  not  yield  the  desired  result.  This 
debate  about  the  dichotomy  between  big  bang  and  gradualism  reduced  the  practical 
complexities  of  the  transition  strategy  into  two  conceptual  pigeonholes.  As  PorteS27  has 
indicated,  the  paradox  of  the  big-bang  strategy  is  that  in  reality  it  cannot  be  implemented. 
There  is  no  conceivable  way  privatization  and  structural  market  reforms  can  be 
implemented  as  rapidly  as  liberalization  and  stabilization.  This  inherent  speed-gap  means 
capitalism  cannot  be  created  with  a  big-bang.  The  lesson  -  from  the  post-Industrial 
253 Revolution  history  of  today's  advanced  industrial  nations,  as  well  as  from  experiments 
with  "test-tube  capitalism"  since  1989  -  is  clear:  In  the  real  world,  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
capitalism  with  a  big  bang,  but  only  gradualism  of  different  shapes,  sizes,  and,  of  course, 
speed-28  Let  us  conclude  this  survey  by  quoting  Fred  Block,  "The  fantasy  of  one  royal 
road  to  rational  decision-making  must  give  way  to  recognition  of  the  need  for  constant 
adjustment  and  adaptation  to  find  effective  ways  to  make  choices.  ,  29 
111.17.  vii.  Transition  Strateg  y  With  an  Emphasis  on  Privatization 
The  challenges  facing  privatization  in  the  postcommunist  nations  are  of  an 
unprecedented  scale.  The  citizens  of  the  new  democracies  expect  privatization  to  eliminate 
the  public  immorality  that  Communism  generated,  30  the  selfishness  of  living  at  the  expense 
of  the  future,  the  problem  of  the  "free-rider"  syndrome,  and  questions  of  the  legitimacy  of 
the  emerging  property  rights  and  relations.  In  the  economic  context  of  the  postcommunist 
transformations,  privatization  means  the  shift  from  a  centrally  governed  and  state-owned 
economy  to  a  system  based  on  the  spontaneous  interactions  between  autonomous  private 
participants.  Alexander  Yakovlev,  a  Russian  lawyer,  likens  the  restructuring  of  the 
postcommunist  societies  to  the  destruction  of  a  huge,  unified,  state  factory  built  on 
L,  eriin's  political  ideals.  Transformation  requires  not  only  the  destruction  of  the  state  9s 
monopoly  of  administrative  machinery,  but,  more  importantly,  of  the  Communist  party's 
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monopoly  of  every  sector  of  society.  In  this  sense,  privatization  means  not  merely  the 
technical  restructuring  of  property  rights  and  property  relations  in  order  to  make  the 
economy  efficient,  but  the  razing  and  rebuilding  of  the  entire  political  process  into 
institutions  which  permit  and  encourage  public  participation.  Privatization,  therefore,  is 
understood  both  as  an  end  and  as  a  means  of  democracy. 
Privatization  of  the  economy  requires  development  of  a  new  private  sector.  It  also 
requires  reform  of  ownership  and  management  of  existing  state  enterprises  (liquidation, 
restructuring,  commercialization,  and  privatization  of  existing  enterprises);  and  property 
rights  reform  of  land  and  housing.  32  A  key  element  in  the  transition  is  the  restructuring  and 
Privatization  of  state  enterprises,  for  which  an  important  first  step  is  the  imposition  of 
254 product  market  discipline.  Two  broad  policy  approaches  to  restructuring  and  privatization 
can  be  found:  early  mass  privatization  on  the  one  hand  and  comprehensive  financial 
restructuring  before  privatization  on  the  other.  Key  differences  between  these  approaches 
are  the  quality  of  governance  and  management  provided  by  new  owners  of  enterprises  at 
the  time  of  privatization  and  the  methods  of  resolving  any  debt  overhang.  33 
The  first  approach  achieves  rapid  privatization,  but  often  at  the  expense  of  ownership 
and  governance  quality  at  privatization.  Ownership  typically  becomes  dispersed  among 
voucher  funds,  managers,  workers  and  private  investors.  One  potential  source  of 
governance  is  the  funds  that  intermediate  investment  of  vouchers;  however,  their  ability  to 
perform  tasks  beyond  portfolio  diversification  has  yet  to  be  convincingly  demonstrated. 
Another  is  the  managers  and  workers  who  may  become  significant  shareholders;  although, 
in  some  cases,  incumbent  managers  can  be  an  obstacle  to  restructuring.  Possible  methods 
of  resolving  any  debt  overhang  include  selective  debt  write-downs  by  the  government, 
high  inflation,  and,  in  cases  of  insolvency,  legal  bankruptcy  proceedings  for  privatized 
enterprises.  But,  there  are  strong  objections  to  mass  privatization  that  would  distribute 
shares  of  any  given  firm  among  many  individuals  and  thus  so  disperse  control  as  to  leave 
the  existing  management  in  charge.  Whether  or  not  the  authorities  choose  to  break  up 
giant  firms  before  they  are  privatized,  setting  up  competition  policy  can  benefit  not  only 
from  experience  in  the  European  Community,  but  also  from  recent  work  in  industrial 
economics.  34 
The  second  approach  aims  to  attract  high-quality  owners  for  enterprises  at  the  time  of 
privatization  by  implementing  comprehensive  financial  restructuring  before  the  sale  takes 
place,  but  this  is  often  at  the  expense  of  privatization  speed.  The  lead  agents  in  financial 
restructuring  are  either  state  banks  or  a  government  agency.  However,  there  appear  to  be 
limits  to  the  ability  of  these  institutions  to  support  those  aspects  of  restructuring  that 
require  fixed  investment,  and  private  cash  investors  in  enterprises  can  be  difficult  to 
attract.  The  scale  of  the  investment  demand  created  by  new  market  opportunities,  in 
addition,  calls  for  the  strengthening  of  domestic  financial  institutions.  While  domestic 
255 firmcial  institutions  are  vital  to  sustained  growth,  the  internal  cash  flows  of  enterprises  are 
35  likely  to  be  a  significant  source  of  finance  for  fixed  investment  early  in  the  transition. 
Residents  of  the  postcommunist  countries  of  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  have  an 
opportunity,  virtually  unprecedented,  to  create  forms  of  property  ownership  that  are  both 
private  and  pluralistic.  They  are  not  confined  to  the  nineteenth-century  models  of  laissez- 
faire  capitalism  and  state  socialism.  In  the  free  world,  many  varieties  of  capitalism  emerged 
(for  instance,  the  Reaganite/Thatcherite  capitalism  of  the  U.  S.  and  Britain,  the  MITI 
capitalism  of  Japan,  the  central  bank  capitalism  of  Germany),  with  their  differences  being 
nearly  as  important  as  their  common  characteristics.  36  "The  question  is  which  capitalism, 
which  market  economy,  which  private  property  relations  the  postcommunist  world 
wants.  s,  37  It  is  crucial  that  policy-makers  explicitly  acknowledge  that  they  are  making 
deliberate  choices  among  a  wide  array  of  options  that  can  fairly  be  labelled  private  and 
market-oriented. 
HI.  17.  viii.  Mudfiple  Forms  of  Private  Pr2pej:  U  Ownership 
Just  as  there  is  an  array  of  different  forms  of  market  economy,  so  private  ownership  of 
property  can  take  multiple  forms.  "It  is  a  great  mistake  to  assume  private  ownership  of 
property  has  just  one  meaning,  the  classical  liberal  idea  of  unlimited  and  absolute  freedom 
by  individuals  to  use,  enjoy,  or  transfer  their  property  as  they  wish,  or  that  the  general 
commitment  to  a  market  form  of  economic  organization  necessitates  this  form  of  property 
rights.  The  classical  liberal  form  of  individual  ownership  has  probably  never  existed 
anywhere  in  the  world  at  any  time.  08  Most  investment  capital  in  the  U.  S.  is  not  controlled 
by  individuals.  Rather,  it  is  controlled  by  large  financial  institutions,  such  as  pension  funds, 
and  insurance  companies,  which  manage  it  on  behalf  of  thousands  of  individual 
beneficiaries.  The  postcommunist  world,  then,  has  a  historically  unprecedented 
Opportunity  to  create  new  market  modes  of  economic  organization  and  new  forms  of 
private  ownership  of  property  that  avoid  the  weaknesses  of  both  state  socialism  and 
corporate  capitalism.  r1lie  way  to  capitalize  on  this  opportunity  is  to  create  legal  and 
economic  institutions  that  are  designed  to  minimize  three  problems  in  particular: 
256 antidemocratic  processes  of  decision-making,  paternalism  and  passivity,  and  political  and 
economic  domination  or  exclusion  based  on  race,  religion,  ethnic  identity,  or  gender.  39 
The  first  goal  of  this  form  of  economic  transformation  is  genuinely  democratic  processes 
of  decision-making.  "If  the  reinstitution  of  the  market  in  the  place  of  the  command 
economy  is  to  benefit  the  entire  populations  of  the  new  democracies,  and  not  just  the 
already  privileged  classes,  it  must  be  accompanied  by  political  freedom  and  truly 
democratic  processes.  ,  40  It  strives  to  ensure  that  policy  decisions  regarding  investment  of 
private  capital,  labour-management  relations,  and  other  basic  issues  that  directly  affect  the 
material  conditions  of  people's  lives  are  arrived  at  as  democratically  as  possible.  Far  from 
being  incompatible,  economic  transformation  can  in  fact  facilitate  participatory  property 
relations  and  encourage,  through  active  participation,  civic  responsibility.  The  relationship 
between  privatization,  participation,  and  responsibility  depends,  as  some  observers  have 
recognized,  on  what  forms  private  property  relations  concretely  take.  Related  to 
democratization  is  a  second  goal:  forms  of  private  ownership  in  which  individuals  are  as 
active  in  control  of  their  assets  as  is  feasible.  It  is  important  not  to  recreate  a  regime  of 
paternalism  and  passivity,  either  through  state  ownership  or  through  certain  private  modes 
of  ownership.  The  reintroduction  of  property  rights  must  be  accompanied  by  an  extension 
of  democratic  control  if  the  transformation  is  to  cope  successfully  with  the  core  problem 
of  power.  The  question,  as  Fred  Block  has  stated,  is  "not  capitalism  or  socialism,  but  how 
a  society  can  create  economic  institutions  that  give  maximum  scope  to  democratic 
participation.  9A1  A  third  goal  of  economic  transformation  is  to  avoid  illegitimate  forms  of 
exclusion  and  economic  and  social  domination  based  on  gender  and  racial,  religious,  or 
ethnic  identity.  This  means  not  simply  that  laws  prohibiting  discrimination  in  employment, 
housing,  and  other  key  sectors  be  enacted  but  that  the  free  market  not  be  used  as  a 
mechanism  for  perpetuating  economic  domination  and exclUSion.  42 
Realizing  these  three  goals  requires  that  policy-makers  explicitly  articulate  participation, 
democratic  control,  and  social  inclusion  as  values  that  motivate  their  choices  of 
institutional  forms  of  property  relations.  "'Me  new  democracies  were  formed  as  the  result 
of  popular  movements  in  which  participation,  democracy,  and  inclusion  were  dominant 
257 characteristics.  'Me  process  of  privatization  and  democratization  are  not  categorically 
distinct  from  each  other,  but  are  in  fact  closely  intertwined.  The  same  values  that  animated 
the  turn  to  democracy  are  as  relevant  to  the  task  of  privatization.  9A3  The  point  can  be 
made  more  strongly:  it  is  only  through  a  privatized  economy  whose  institutions  are 
participatory,  democratically  governed,  and  socially  inclusive  that  the  ideal  of  democracy 
in  the  political  sphere  can  be  truly  realized.  44AIso,  the  legaI45  as  well  as  the  econoryliC46 
perspectives  are  to  be  designed  carefully  as  we  try  to  formulate  strategies  of  transition. 
These  strategies  could  be  co-ordinated  through  the  central  management  of  economies. 
HI.  17.  ix.  The  Relevance  of  Central  Management  of  Economies 
If  central  planning  of  economies  has  been  discredited  by  the  Soviet  experiment,  central 
management  of  economies  has  not.  In  fact,  a  major  objective  of  economic  transformation 
of  the  Russian  and  other  transitional  economies  is  to  create  fiscal  and  monetary  institutions 
that  will  permit  central  management  of  what  is  expected  to  become  a  predominantly 
private  enterprise  economy.  The  other  main  thrust  is,  of  course,  to  privatize  and  to  create 
the  conditions  under  which  private  enterprise  may  flourish.  Central  management  of 
capitalist  economies  is,  in  fact,  the  main  legacy  of  John  Maynard  Keynes.  The  American 
Keynesian  Abba  Lerner47  introduced  economics  to  the  student  by  presenting  the  economy 
as  an  automobile  that  can  be  steered  down  the  highway  by  means  of  appropriate  fiscal  and 
monetary  adjustments.  Thus,  depression  and  inflation  could  be  prevented  and  a  stable, 
safe,  and  satisfactory  rate  of  growth  could  be  attained  by  good  steering.  According  to 
Lerner,  "The  instrument  that  can  do  this  is  as  readily  available  as  the  steering  wheel  for 
automobiles,  yet  it  has  not  been  installed  [in  the  economy]  and  put  into  operation.  A8  rMS 
is  an  interesting  metaphor  to  be  applied  to  all  transitional  economies.  As  anyone  would  be 
frightened  to  death  if  one  has  to  be  in  an  automobile  in  which  the  steering  wheel  is  as 
loosely  connected  to  the  wheels,  so  also  any  one  concerned  with  the  economy  would  be 
frightened  if  the  steering  wheels  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  are  loosely  connected  to 
the  wheels  of  the  economy. 
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258 Western  economists  conceive  of  an  economy  as  a  set  of  simultaneous  equations  in  n 
variables,  which  require  a  solution  that  solves  for  all  prices  and  quantities  in  the  system 
simultaneously.  It  follows  that  all  prices  and  quantities  in  the  system  are  interdependent, 
which  is  the  primary  reason  that  reform  proposals  call  for  simultaneity  in  the  creation  of 
market  institutions.  We  also  think  of  this  set  of  economy-wide  simultaneous  equations  as 
summing  to  the  aggregate  demand  components  of  Gross  National  Product  (GNP),  that  is, 
to  the  aggregate  final  demand  categories:  consumption,  investment,  government 
expenditures  and  net  exports,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  final  distributive  income  shares, 
Gross  National  Income  (GNI),  on  the  other.  Western  policy  recommendations,  including 
the  shock  therapy  and  other  forms  of  macroeconomic  stabilization,  are  based  upon  these 
concepts-50 
By  following  an  autarkic,  Marxist  policy,  Russia  and  the  other  CIS  states  missed 
developing  a  modem  market  economy.  "The  1990  Shatalin  Plan  to  transfon-n  the  economy 
to  market  principles  in  500  days  was  unacceptable  in  the  end  to  Gorbachev  in  1990 
because  it  meant  abandonment  of  both  the  Union  and  socialist  economic  principles.  "51 
However,  since  Gorbachev's  demise,  all  subsequent  plans  have  been  similar  to  the  Shatalin 
Plan.  They  all  are  teleologically  driven,  that  is,  they  have  been  based  on  the  market 
economy  as  a  goal,  rather  than  being  tailored  to  modify  specific  characteristics  of  the 
existing  economic  system.  All,  also,  have  called  for  a  rapid  transformation  to  a  market 
economy.  "The  first  step  of  shock  treatment  as  being  applied  in  Russia  and  several  of  the 
other  successor  states  under  tutelage  of  the  IMF  and  certain  Western  economic  advisors  is 
a  set  of  short-run  policies  designed  to  create  a  free  market  and  to  achieve  macroeconomic 
stability.  Ideally,  they  should  be  implemented  simultaneousýy.  9952 
111.17.  x.  A  Set  of  Short-Run  Policies 
We  have  outlined  the  basic  components  and  the  key  strategies  that  are  necessary  for  an 
economic  transformation,  especially,  during  the  period  of  transition.  The  success  of  these 
strategies  depends  on  a  number  of  short-run  policies.  Though  we  have  already  analysed  a 
259 few  of  them,  here  we  shall  just  list  them,  following  James  R.  Millar's  analysis,  as  a  set  of 
short-run  policies  and  the  criteria  for  their  successful  implementation. 
1.  liberalizing  prices  to  achieve  rational  relative  prices  and  market-clearing  price  levels., 
to  curtail  aggregate  demand,  make  hoarding  unprofitable,  destroy  the  population's 
financial  assets,  and  undercut  privilege  and  blat. 
2.  Freezing  money  wages  and  income  to  cause  real  wages  and  incomes  to  fall.  This  is 
necessary  to  prevent  a  wage  and  price  spiral  and  to  reduce  real  costs  of  production;  in 
short,  providing  an  anchor  for  the  economy  against  hyperinflation  and  making  the 
economy  more  competitive  internationally. 
3.  Reducing  and  stabilizing  government  expenditures  by  cutting  subsidies  and 
entitlements  and  reducing  defense  spending. 
4.  Restricting  aggregate  demand  by  reducing  deficit  spending  and  raising  taxes  (e.  g.,  a 
VAT  tax). 
5.  Tightening  bank  credit,  controlling  the  money  supply,  and  creating  a  true  central  bank. 
6.  Opening  the  economy  to  the  world  market  by  floating  the  exchange  rate  to  establish 
convertibility,  and  eventually  creating  a  stable  exchange  rate.  It  is  also  necessary  for 
Russia  and  the  other  new  states  to  create  domestic  convertibility  so  that  anyone  within 
Russia  can  buy  any  legal  goods  or  services  for  rubles,  regardless  of  rank,  position,  or 
CitiZenShi  P.  53 
The  criteria  for  successful  implementation  of  these  short-run  policies  include: 
1.  Transforming  the  economy  from  a  sefler's  market  into  a  buyer's  market  thereby  ending 
hoarding,  which  will  occur  when  prices  rise  to  levels  that  no  one  expects  to  be 
exceeded.  Shelves  will  fiff  up  as  hoarding  ends,  and  reservation  prices  will  fall 
sufficiently  for  people,  enterprises,  and  governments  to  begin  to  stop  hoarding. 
2.  Establishing  a  rising  rate  of  unemployment  as  enterprise  rationalize  their  labour  forces 
and  reduce  redundant  labour  supplies. 
260 3.  Stabilizing  wholesale  and  retail  prices  and  money  wages,  opening  the  economy  to  the 
world  market  and  stabilization  of  the  exchange  rate. 
4.  Making  the  ruble  convertible. 
54 
There  is  evidence  of  a  short-term  supply  response  in  Russia,  but  most  of  the  short-term 
criteria  have  not  been  satisfied.  Prices  for  a  large  share  of  consumer  goods  were  liberalized 
in  early  1992.  Some  critical  products,  such  as  bread,  milk,  vodka,  etc.,  remained  under 
strict  price  control,  and  are  difficult  to  find  and  require  queuing;  but  as  a  response,  states 
are  gradually  allowing  these  prices  to  rise.  As  a  result  of  high  prize  of  uncontrolled  goods, 
these  goods  (like  champagne)  have  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  years  in  state  retail 
outlets.  Hoarding  has  ended  for  price  decontrolled  products.  Price  liberalization  has 
, 
therefore,  achieved  some  degree  of  success,  and  most  retail  (and  some  wholesale)  markets 
are  now  true  buyer's  markets.  Stores  are  filled  with  goods  and  private  markets  have 
sprung  up  everywhere  like  mushrooms  because  enterprises,  people,  stores,  cities,  and 
republics  have  stopped  hoarding  and  begun  to  sell  hoarded  goods.  This  is  a  short-run 
effect,  predicted  in  advance.  But  production  has  not  increased  and  output  continues  to  fall. 
"For  shock  therapy  to  succeed,  however,  what  is  needed  is  a  long-run  supply  response, 
that  will  depend  upon  structural  changes  in  the  economy  -  notably  privatization  and 
demonopolization.  "55  The  success  of  these  short-run  strategies  have  to  be  translated  into 
long-term  perspective  as  the  transition  process  takes  momentum.. 
HI.  17.  xi.  The  Long-Term  Reform  Success 
A- 
As  we  have  explained,  the  long-term  process  requires  privatization,  demonopolization 
and  the  creation  of  an  appropriate  infrastructure  for  a  modem  capitalist  system  (e.  g.,  legal 
protection  of  private  property,  business  regulatory  systems,  etc.  ).  This  will  be  more 
difficult  and  will  take  more  time.  This  is  a  cautious  growth  path  that  the  transitional 
economies  are  treading.  Since  the  possibilities  are  open-ended,  things  can  go  wrong  too. 
Following  again  the  analysis  of  James  R.  Nfillar,  we  shall.  list  those  inclusive  fears  with  an 
adaptation  of  a  particular  strategy  during  the  period  of  transition.  What  can  go  wrong  ?  56 
261 1.  price  liberalization  may  be  constrained,  with  the  result  that  hoarding  continues  and 
stores  remain  empty. 
2.  Money  wages  (and  pensions)  may  float  along  with  retail  prices.  It  is  difficult  for  a 
government  to  let  product  prices  rise  to  equilibrium  levels  because  of  the  adverse 
impact  this  has  on  the  distribution  of  income  and  wealth.  Money  wages  must  at  least 
lag,  but  the  pressures  will  be  great  to  let  money  wages  rise,  to  protect  those  on  fixed 
incomes  by  upping  pensions  and  other  benefits,  and  to  maintain  a  broad  social  safety 
net,  all  of  which  will  make  it  hard  to  reduce,  or  even  restrain  the  state  budget.  More 
important,  raising  money  wages  and  incomes  weakens  the  anchor  against 
hyperinflation. 
3.  Budget  deficit  may continue  to  rise. 
4.  The  central  bank  may  fail  to  restrict  credit.  In  reality  there  is  no  true  central  bank  yet  in 
any  member  state  of  the  CIS  to  manage  and  allocate  credit,  and  the  monetary 
authorities  cannot,  in  any  case,  prevent  legislative  spending  from  spiralling  if  the 
elected  legislature  so  chooses. 
5.  Privatization  and  demonopolization  may  stall,  which  thus  far  is  the  case. 
6.  Macroeconomic  stabilization  may  fail.  Convertibility  of  the  ruble  will  require  a  large 
stabilization  fund;  otherwise  like  a  run  on  an  uninsured  bank,  the  fund  will  be 
exhausted  by  insatiable  demand  for  foreign  exchange.  57 
We  may  have  to  add  here,  that  the  conditions  for  the  strategy  of  shock  therapy  to 
succeed,  therefore,  are  quite  stringent  on  economic  grounds  alone.  It  is  assumed  by  the 
theory  that  if  monetary  and  pecuniary  problems  can  be  solved,  production  will  be  restored 
without  central  government  intervention  in  production  decisions.  That  is,  if  one  gets  retail 
and  wholesale  prices  right,  money  wages  right,  the  interest  rate  right,  and  the  exchange 
rate  right,  production  will  take  care  of  itself.  Rational  economic  actors  (enterprise 
managers  and  households)  will,  by  maximizing  profits  and/or  utility,  create  an  efficient  and 
productive  market  economy.  "Thus,  paradoxically,  shock  therapy  puts  as  much  weight 
exclusively  on  pecuniary  variables  as  the  old  command  system  did  on  quantitative 
variables.  This  purely  monetarist  solution  is  just  as  ideologically  driven  and  one-sided  as 
Soviet  Marxism  was.  958  But  the  dynamics  of  transition  strategy  can  assure  a  degree  of 
success. 
The  dynamics  of  implementation  of  the  transition  strategy  involves  five  related,  yet 
distinct,  elements:  sequencing;  stress  (intensity  with  which  a  policy  is  implemented);  speed 
(the  pace  at  which  a  policy  is  implemented);  sectoralism  (the  extent  to  which  the  state 
262 interferes  with  market  forces  to  promote  'winners'  and  suppress  'losers'  at  the  level  of 
sectors,  industries,  and  enterprises);  and  duration  (the  time  it  takes  to  complete  the 
implementation  of  various  policy  measures).  Out  of  these  five  elements,  three  involve  time 
in  one  way  or  another:  sequencing,  speed,  and  duration.  The  other  two  involve 
differentiation  in  force  (stress)  and  focus  (sectoralism).  Appendix  111.17.1.  illuminates  this 
distinction  further.  Alan  Gelb  and  Cheryl  Gray9  explain  a  stylized  phasing  of  various 
reform  measures  with  the  premise  that  the  full  transition  in  a  prototype  CEE/former  Soviet 
Union  economy  will  take  ten  years,  as  is  shown  in  this  Appendix. 
III.  17.  xii.  The  RealiU  of  the  Transitional  Economies 
Most  economists  agree  that  stabilization,  liberalization,  privatization,  and  institutional 
reforms  are  interlocking  (complementary)  wheels  of  the  same  vehicle,  and  therefore  need 
to  move  together.  At  the  same  time  economists  also  agree  that  restructuring  and 
privatization  of  large-scale  enterprises  (and  some  critical  institutional  reforms)  in  the 
economies  of  CEE  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  have  been  much  too  slow,  and  thus  have 
delayed  the  transition  and  raised  the  level  of  misery  by  preventing  price  and  trade 
liberalization  from  generating  a  positive  supply-side  response.  "The  usual  reaction  to  this 
'stabliberahzation-privatization  time  gap'  is  to  advocate  an  acceleration  of  privatization,  if 
necessary  with  'quick  and  dirty'  methods.  ,  60  The  presumption  is  that  intensified  efforts  at 
privatization  will  induce  a  quick  birth  of  a  substantially  privatized  market  economy  where 
strong  and  speedy  "stabliberalization"  measures  will  bear  their  intended  fruits.  "The 
problem  with  this  prescription  is  that  it  ignores  three  aspects  of  the  reality  of  the 
transitional  economies:  privatization  of  large  enterprises  takes  a  long  time;  a  substantial 
Portion  of  these  enterprises  are  not  viable  at  world  prices;  and  the  governments  are  not 
politicaffy  capable  of  liquidating  them  imediately.  iý,  6'  AR  this  add  up  to  a  central 
conundrum  of  the  transition  strategy:  a  "quick  and  dirty"  approach  to  privatization  in  a 
post-command  economy  shocked  by  rapid  and  comprehensive  hberalization  and  strong 
and  ongoing  stabihzation  measures  is  likely  to  yield  dirty,  not  quick  results.  "The  only  way 
out  of  this  conundrum  seems  to  lie  in  following  the  conventional  wisdom:  correct  the 
263 speed  mismatch  problem,  not  by  speeding  up  privatization,  but  by  selectively  slowing 
down  liberalization,  and  to  some  extent  softening  and  redesigning  stabilization.  9.,  62  Here, 
we  shall  not  elaborate  on  how  phased  and  selective  liberalization  and  soft  stabilization  can 
be  co-ordinated  with  inherently  slow  enterprise  reform  and  privatization.  However,  it  is  of 
paramount  importance  at  this  stage  to  understand  the  transition  strategy  of 
macroeconomic  stabilization,  to  which  we  shall  proceed. 
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269 EEN 
TRANSITION  STRATEGY  WITH  AN  EMPHASIS  ON 
MACROECONOMIC  STABILIZATION 
The  economies  in  transition  design  strategies  that  would  lead  them  to  achieve  economic 
stability  and  growth.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  problem  of  how  to 
transform  a  centrally  planned  economy  into  a  market  economy  has  emerged  as  one  of  the 
most  compelling  and  challenging  issues  of  our  time.  The  question  is  salient  because  the 
republics  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  the  nations  of  Eastern  and  Central  Europe  are  in 
the  midst  of  a  transformation  process  that  seeks  to  capture  the  claimed  efficiency 
advantages  of  market  mechanisms  for  their  economies.  It  is  complex  because  a  rapid 
transition  from  socialism  to  a  market  economy  is  historically  unprecedented,  and  requires 
a  fundamental  restructuring  of  a  nation's  economic,  political,  social,  and  legal  institutions, 
as  well  as  its  physical  infrastructure.  '  The  early  literature  on  transition  concentrated  on  the 
issue  of  sequencing,  interpreted  as  the  order  of  priority  between  stabilization, 
liberalization,  privatization  and  restructuring.  In  theory,  each  of  these  reform  components 
reinforces  the  other,  and  therefore  they  should  ideally  be  introduced  simultaneously  in  one 
"big  bang"  reform.  However,  in  practice,  it  has  proved  impossible  to  initiate  a  "big  bang  11 
reform  strategy.  Though  we  cannot  at  this  stage  establish  a  unique  optimal  path  of 
transition,  most  now  argue  that  macroeconomic  stabilization,  if  not  a  necessary  condition 
for  transition,  greatly  facilitates  it.  2  Therefore,  we  shall  analyse  in  this  chapter  the 
transition  strategy  with  an  emphasis  on  macroeconomic  stabilization.  "Stabilization 
concerns  basic  macroeconomic  variables  including  inflation,  balance  of  payments,  debt, 
unemployment  and  output  shocks.  Progress  in  achieving  macroeconomic  stability  will  be 
an  important  determinant  of  achievements  in  the  transition,  but  it  is  very  different  from  the 
transition  itself.  For  example,  an  unstable  macroeconomic  position  will  discourage  private 
investment,  hindering  both  transition  and  development.  One  would  also  expect  setbacks  in 
other  aspects  of  economic  development,  as  the  provision  of  medical  and  educational 
services  may  be  disrupted  by  the  shocks  facing  large  enterprises  that  supplied  many  of 
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the  services.  Such  disruption  would,  of  course,  be  additional  to  the  economic  problems  for 
inclividuals  caused  by  the  dislocation  of  employment.  9.6 
it  has  certainly  been  leamed  from  the  range  of  countries'  experience  that  those  that 
pressed  ahead  more  radically  on  all  four  fronts  have  been  rewarded  not  only  with  relatively 
rapid  movement  towards  a  market  economy  but  also,  in  most  cases,  by  more  modest  falls 
or  earlier  recovery  in  output.  Would  things  have  gone  even  better  if  they  had  gone  even 
faster  with  these  reforms?  The  experience  of  the  transitional  economies  shows  that  faster 
reforms  are  not  always  preferable.  Moreover,  the  improper  sequencing  of  reforms  is  likely 
to  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  stability  of  the  transition  to  a  market  economy. 
"Transformation  strategies  typically  define  the  final  goals  of  reform  and  the  nature, 
sequence,  and  timing  of  reforms  most  likely  to  achieve  the  designated  objectives.  Reform 
objectives  include  stability,  efficiency,  equity,  and  economic  growth,  and  these  objectives 
are  believed  to  be  most  readily  attainable  by  the  establishment  of  a  market  economy.  A  Tbe 
necessary,  although  not  sufficient  conditions  required  to  satisfy  a  stable  transition  to  a 
market  economy  include  monetary  and  fiscal  institutions  that  promote  macroeconomic 
stability,  among  others.  The  following  case  study  follows  the  macroeconomic  stabilization 
policies  adopted  by  Russia  and  the  Baltic  states  during  the  period  of  economic  transition. 
We  shall  begin  with  Russia.  "The  Russian  reforms  now  appear  poised  at  a  critical  juncture, 
one  that  may  well  determine  whether,  and  in  what  form,  the  transformation  to  a  market 
economy  will  proceed.  ,5  We  shall  follow  the  research  paper  by  James  A.  Duran  Jr.,  titled, 
Russian  Fiscal  and  Monetary  Stabilization:  A  Tough  Road  Ahead,  as  we  analyse  the 
Russian  stabilization  policies. 
111.18.  i.  The  Big-Bang  of  Destabilization 
Though  the  various  economic  measures  adopted  during  the  period  of  transition  in  Russia 
were  aimed  at  stabilization,  what  was  truly  experienced  by  millions  of  people  was 
destabilization  of  a  'big  bang'  scale.  The  radical  economic  reform  programme  of  the 
Yeltsin-Gaidar  government  implemented  in  January  1992  was  but  the  latest  stage  in  the 
271 effort  to  shift  from  a  centrally  planned  economy  (CPE)  to  a  market  economy.  Substituting 
macroeconomic  fiscal  and  monetary  instruments  for  the  direct  commands  of  the 
government  in  economic  affairs  was  initiated  in  1988.  As  each  of  the  officially  approved 
reform  plans  for  the  transition  between  systems  have  been  debated  and  partially 
implemented,  the  rigidities  inherent  in  the  CPE  have  twisted  the  outcomes  of  decrees  and 
statutes  in  unforeseen  directions.  "Concepts  basic  to  72  years'  rule  by  Marxist-Leninists 
have  so  permeated  the  minds  of  political  leaders,  managers,  and  the  masses  that  even 
supporters  of  market  reform  have  difficulty  understanding  the  scope  of  change  required. 
Stalin  denied  the  validity  of  Western  'capitalist'  macro-and  microeconomics  for  the  Soviet 
'socialist'  model.  His  deliberate  'classicide'  against  the  private  entrepreneurial  classes  of 
city  and  countryside  prevented  the  development  of  a  strong,  independent  middle  class.  q.,  6 
Thus,  when  macroeconomic  measures  were  finally  introduced  into  the  changing  economic 
system,  they  realized  that  the  creation  of  a  normal  economy  is  a  challenging  task  that  lies 
ahead.  They  also  faced  the  reality  that  the  abandom-nent  of  a  unitary  budget  system  alone 
cannot  guarantee  the  building  of  a  "normal"  society  and  a  market  economy  immediately. 
After  changing  from  a  unitary  state  budget  system  to  a  decentralized  federal  one  in  1991, 
the  central  and  republic  ministries  increased  the  deficit  to  26  percent  of  the  total  budgets. 
(Tbe  earlier  government  had  limited  its  deficits  to  2-3  percent  of  gross  domestic  product 
(GDP).  )  Emission  of  currency  in  1991  reached  twice  the  rate  of  1990.  Partial  reforms 
designed  to  move  to  a  market  economy  had  undermined  the  controls  of  the  centrally 
planned  economy  (CPE).  The  result  was  fiscal  and  monetary  destabilization  of  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  in  1991.  Partially,  this  was  caused  by  the  inherent  characteristics  of  a  unitary 
budget. 
III.  18.  ii.  The  Characteristics  of  a  Unitaa  Budget 
A  Unitary  budget  is  central  to  a  command  economy.  During  the  Five  Year  Plan  (FYP) 
period,  the  annual  plan  setting  the  parameters  for  virtually  every  institution  was  the  centre 
Of  policy  debate  by  top  leaders  and  managers.  Bargaining  to  get  as  much  as  possible  while 
limiting  commitments  was  the  centre  of  politics  on  economic  affairs.  Within  this,  fiscal  and 
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indicators.  The  U.  S.  S.  R.  Ministry  of  Finance  had  as  its  duty  to  calculate  the  numbers  basic 
for  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  State  Budget  to  implement  the  targets  set  by  the  top  authorities.  This 
document  was  a  unitary  one  since  the  budgets  of  lower  levels  of  government  were 
included  within  the  budgets  of  the  next  higher  level.  7  The  U.  S.  S.  R.  State  Bank  (Gosbank)., 
a  department  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  kept  and  monitored  the  accounts  of  all 
enterprises,  industrial  and  agricultural,  and  of  all  budgetary  organizations  on  direct 
government  payroll  to  ensure  observance  of  the  requirements  of  the  plan.  These  accounts 
were  carefully  divided  into  two  circuits.  The  'cash  account'  was  used  primarily  for  wages 
and  salaries.  Since  wages  and  prices  were  set  by  the  government,  control  could  be  kept  on 
the  emission  of  currency  so  that  demand  would  not  unduly  exceed  the  supply  of  consumer 
goods.  The  second  'circuit'  was  the  noncash  account  of  transactions  among  enterprises 
and  between  them  and  the  government.  Should  subsidies  be  needed  to  ensure  resources 
were  available  to  meet  planned  production  levels,  Gosbank  would  provide  them  even  to 
8  loss-making  enterprises.  Since  the  consumer  prices  for  basic  foods  were  kept  below  the 
costs  of  production,  the  state  had  to  pour  huge  subsidies,  by  1990  two-thirds  of  the  total, 
into  agricultural  enterprises  to  cover  the  costs  of  production.  Keeping  loss-making 
enterprises  going  at  the  expense  of  the  state  may  have  maintained  full  employment  and 
produced  impressive  physical  statistics,  but  the  wastage  of  capital  resources  was  immense. 
"For  the  most  part,  budgetary  and  monetary  policy  was  left  to  the  experts  in  the  ministries. 
Prior  to  1989,  the  budget,  a  brief  document,  was  always  passed  after  a  pro  forma  debate 
with  the  inclusion  of  a  few  pre-arranged  amendments.  "9  While  the  unitary  budget  provides 
a  masked  balanced  budget,  the  economic  performance  unmasked  the  imbalance  nature  of  a 
unitary  budget. 
End  of  a  Balanced  Budget  L4.  Ah 
Since  the  introduction  of  a  socialist  command  economic  model,  the  myth  about  a 
balanced  budget  was  very  prevalent.  The  shadow  of  the  budget  crisis  haunted  the  system 
to  its  core.  "During  Mikhail  Gorbachev's  tenure  in  power,  1985-1991,  perestroika, 
273 glasnost,  and  democratization,  broke  the  'cake  of  socialist  custom'  as  developed  during 
the  period  of  authoritarian  Communist  rule.  During  his  first  two  years,  he  sought  to 
,  perfect'  the  planning  mechanism  through  uskorenie,  a  major  campaign  to  raise  the 
machine-building  industry  across-the-board  to  world  standards.  "'O  Uskorenie 
(acceleration)  strategy  failed  at  great  expense;  also  his  antialcohol  campaign  failed.  Profits 
from  foreign  trade  also  dropped  significantly  since  the  price  of  Russia's  key  export,  oil,  fell 
sharply  on  the  world  market.  During  the  second  stage  from  1987  to  1989,  laws  on 
enterprise,  co-operatives,  leasing,  and  individual  enterprise  were  passed  to  give  greater 
autonomy  to  managers  and  to  improve  incentives  in  limited  areas  for  entrepreneurs. 
involved  were  alterations  in  the  tax  laws  that  resulted  in  a  significant  reduction  of 
revenues  from  profits.  With  greater  autonomy,  managers  increased  wages  faster  than  the 
rate  of  growth  of  productivity.  Also  a  source  of  the  growth  of  the  money  supply  was  the 
relaxation  of  administrative  controls  on  the  accounts  of  enterprises.  More  cash  was  issued, 
especially  through  leaseholders  and  co-operatives,  thus  raising  aggregate  demand.  During 
1988,  deficit  spending  reached  about  11  percent  of  GDP.  Budget  imbalance  became  so 
obvious. 
By  mid-1988,  the  authorities  had  come  to  understand  the  necessity  of  dealing  with  the 
budget  crisis.  During  his  presentation  of  the  proposed  1989  unitary  budget  on  October  27, 
1988,  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Minister  of  Finance  shattered  the  myth  that  the  country's  budget  had 
been  balanced  for  decades.  "  This  had  ideological  importance  since  Soviet  leaders  had 
long  pointed  to  their  deficit-free  management  of  national  finances  as  one  proof  of  the 
superiority  of  the  Soviet  socialist  system.  Efforts  to  slow  budgeted  deficit  spending  had 
some  success  in  1989  and  1990.  According  to  the  IMF,  deficit  spending  was  cut  to  9.5 
and  8.5  percent,  respectively.  12  This  was  done  partly  by  reducing  subsidies  to  loss-making 
enterprises,  who  were  supposed  to  become  seff-financing  by  1990.  Also,  sharp  reductions 
were  made  in  budgeted  outlays  on  construction  projects.  The  budget  lines  for  defense 
were  to  be  cut  by  1.5  percent  in  1989,7  percent  in  1990,  and  14.2  percent  in  1991. 
However.,  consumer  subsidies,  especially  for  food,  continued  to  rise  steadily.  On  the 
revenue  side,  two  major  items,  taxes  on  enterprise  profits  and  foreign  trade,  declined  as  a 
Percentage  of  GDP. 
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the  relaxation  of  central  controls.  While  state  credits  to  enterprises  were  diminishing  and 
consumer  credits  were  minute,  currency  was  the  main  form  of  monetary  expansion.  From 
1985  to  1987,  the  annual  increase  in  emission  ranged  from  4.1  to  5.9  percent.  That 
jumped  to  11.8  percent  in  1988,18.4  percent  in  1989,  and  28  percent  in  1990.  As  a  result 
of  the  shortage  of  consumer  goods,  a  very  large  monetary  overhang  of  more  than  R250 
billion  was  held  by  the  population  in  savings  and  cash.  Due  to  this  imbalance,  the  potential 
for  very  rapid  inflation  was  in  place.  13  At  the  same  time,  there  was  no  mechanism  to  avoid 
the  imminent  budgetary  collapse. 
HI.  18.  iv.  Budgetary  Collapse  in  1991 
The  replacement  of  the  unitary  budget  system  by  a  federal  one  in  1991  led  to  a  collapse 
of  the  fiscal  system.  An  IMF  staff  team,  which  reported  in  April,  1992,  concluded:  "The 
overall  fiscal  imbalance  in  the  union  as  a  whole  (i.  e.,  the  sum  of  the  union  and  republican 
deficits)  dramatically  deteriorated  in  1991.  The  overall  deficit  is  estimated  at  rub  482 
billion,  or  26  percent  of  union  GDP.  If  the  impact  of  the  frozen  part  of  the  deposit 
compensation  is  excluded,  the  deficit  is  reduced  to  19  percent  of  GDP,  financed  mostly  by 
domestic  bank  credit,  compared  with  a  deficit  of  the  general  government  budget  of  the 
former  U.  S.  S.  R.  of  rub  85  billion  in  1990,  or  about  8.5  percent  of  GDP.  A  deterioration  of 
this  magnitude  reflects  virtually  unprecedented  loss  of  fiscal  control,  the  counterpart  of 
which  was  the  strengthening  of  inflationary  pressures  and  further  increases  in  undesired 
money  imbalances.  ,  14  A  federal  formula  of  Gorbachev,  "a  strong  centre  and  strong 
Republics"  needed  the  impetus  of  fiscal  corrections.  In  April  1990  a  law  was  enacted  by 
the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Supreme  Soviet  on  basic  principles  that  would  govern  relations  between  the 
centre  and  the  constituent  union  republics  in  which  fiscal  arrangements  were  to  be 
fundamentally  changed.  The  unitary  state  budget  would  be  replaced  by  a  federal  system 
whereby  the  two  levels  developed  their  budgets  independently.  Gorbachev  reiterated  his 
Commitment  to  this  new  system  in  his  Presidential  Guidelines  for  economic  reform  issued 
it,  October  1990.15  Gorbachev  projected  that  1991  would  be  a  transitional  year  during 
275 which  a  new  Treaty  of  Union  would  be  negotiated  with  clauses  providing  for  a  'common 
economic  space'  with  institutions  to  maintain  an  essential  uniformity  in  fiscal,  banking,  and 
monetary  policy.  Especially  crucial  was  Gorbachev's  concession  that  the  'single  channel' 
for  tax  collection  would  continue  to  be  under  the  control  of  the  republiCS.  16  Lack  of 
effective  power  by  the  centre  to  enforce  the  agreement  soon  became  clear.  Republics 
retained  a  higher  proportion  of  shared  revenues  than  agreed,  amounting  to  5.9  percent  of 
GDP.  Most  of  what  was  collected  was  not  forwarded  to  the  centre.  Lower  authorities  also 
changed  expenditure  rules  on  investment,  subsidies,  and  social  welfare  programmes 
without  prior  consent  of  the  centre.  Monetary  reform  to  combat  the  illegal  profits  of  the 
'mafia'  by  demonetizing  large  denomination  bill  undermine  faith  in  currency.  Rumours  of 
further  monetary  reform,  growing  shortages  of  consumer  goods  due  to  production 
breakdowns  and  the  end  of  COMECON,  as  well  as  higher  prices  all  led  to  panic  buying. 
Demand  was  far  outrunning  supply.  Faith  in  money  as  a  store  of  value  was  being 
undermined.  Barter  was  becoming  widespread  at  both  the  enterprise  and  individual  levels. 
Central  revenues  were  so  reduced  on  the  eve  of  the  coup  that  due  to  lack  of  resources  the 
Council  of  Ministers  refused  to  implement  the  increase  in  pensions  and  benefits  for  July  1 
by  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Congress  and  President  Gorbachev.  17  After  the  August  coup  failed,  the 
centre  was  largely  stripped  of  power  in  a  series  of  constitutional  amendments.  The  Council 
of  Presidents,  union  and  republic,  were  to  reach  decision  only  on  the  basis  of  consensus. 
Republics  sharply  reduced  transfers  of  revenue  to  the  centre.  They  unilaterally  took 
jurisdiction  over  all  union  enterprises  on  their  territory  as  the  central  ministries were  being 
dissolved.  The  key  economist  of  the  Committee  for  the  Management  of  the  Economy,  G. 
Yavlinskiy,  devoted  himself  to  negotiating  a  treaty  to  maintain  a  'common  economic 
space.  '  Much  time  was  spent  in  seeking  consensus  on  more  than  20  specialized 
agreements  in  different  economic  sectors.  18  However,  no  deal  could  be  reached  on  co- 
ordinating  fiscal  and  monetary  policy.  The  economy  had  entered  a  deep  recession  with  a 
fall  in  GDP  of  17  percent  in  1991.  '9  Symptoms  of  the  economic  crisis  included  sharp 
reductions  in  output  and  labour  productivity,  inflation,  huge  budget  deficits,  sizeable 
diversions  of  state  resources  into  the  underground  economy,  20  and  a  flight  from  currency 
276 into  costly  barter  transactions.  There  was  not  much  room  left  to  manoeuvre  the  economy 
back  to  normal. 
III.  18.  v.  Liberalization  Process 
While  the  Russian  government  would  have  preferred  to  maintain  the  union,  Yeltsin  and 
his  ministers  understood  that  the  economy  was  degenerating  so  rapidly  that  they  needed  to 
act  decisively  to  keep  the  support  of  the  public.  On  October  24,  Boris  Yeltsin  announced 
that,  if  necessary,  Russia  would  act  alone  in  December.  The  "big-bang"  programme 
designed  by  a  young  group  of  economists  around  Deputy  Premier  Yegor  Gaidar  featured 
two  measures  that  could  be  implemented  rapidly  by  state  action.  On  December  16,  most 
prices  would  be  'liberalized,  '  i.  e.  freed  from  government  control.  In  addition,  an  austere, 
balanced  budget  policy  with  harsh  cuts  was  to  be  implemented  during  1992.  Key 
reformers  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  central  government,  including  Yavlinskiy,  described  the  Russian 
decisions  as  premature  since  the  institutional  infrastructure  for  a  market  economy  was  not 
yet  in  place.  In  November,  1991,  the  central  fiscal  system  collapsed.  With  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
government  virtually  broke 
"21  the  Russian  government  moved  to  take  over  federal 
institutions,  including  the  fiscal  and  banking  systems.  The  budgets  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  the 
Russian  Federation  were  merged  for  the  last  quarter  of  1991  at  an  added  cost  of  R43.5 
billion  for  the  republic.  The  other  republics  refused  to  pay  anything.  22  After  that  point, 
Gorbachev  was  an  "Emperor  without  clothes.  ,  23  Even  the  military  payroll  was  met  by 
Russia.  These  liberalization  measures  loosened  government  control  over  budgets  and 
monetary  emissions,  and  thereby  created  even  greater  macroeconomic  imbalances.  When 
finally  the  Soviet  leaders  were  prepared  to  revitalize  the  moribund  economy  by 
abandoning  central  planning,  and  by  initiating  more  radical  policies  to  effect  a  painful  but 
necessary  transition  to  a  market  economy,  they  found  themselves  in  that  process 
dismantling  the  Soviet  Union  itself. 
HI.  18.  vi.  Implications  of  Termination  of  U.  S.  S.  R 
277 When  viewed  from  the  perspective  of  seventy  years  of  authoritarian  centralized  control 
over  all  facets  of  political  and  economic  activity,  the  scope  and  speed  of  the  recent  reforms 
initiated  in  the  Soviet  Union  are  nothing  less  than  extraordinary.  Most  important  among 
these  was  the  demise  of  U.  S.  S.  R  itself.  After  the  overwhelming  vote  for  independence  in 
the  Ukrainian  referendum  of  December  1,  Yeltsin  and  his  ministers  realized  that  the 
struggle  to  preserve  the  old  union  was  over.  in  order  to  maintain  the  'common  economic 
space'  so  basic  to  the  continued  operation  of  the  interdependent  economies,  the  Belarus, 
Ukrainian,  and  Russian  presidents  at  a  summit  held  in  Minsk  formed  on  December  8  the 
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)  and  terminated  the  existence  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
The  other  republics,  except  for  the  Baltics  and  Georgia,  joined  within  two  weeks. 
Gorbachev  played  no  role  in  these  negotiations.  On  December  25-26,1991,  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
ceased  to  exist  because  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  President,  legislature,  courts,  and  Gosbank  chairman 
abdicated  their  powers.  2A 
The  socio-political  and  economic  plot  of  this  well-knitted  historic  novel,  as  it  unfolded 
during  1990-1991,  shattered  the  realities  of  millions  of  lives  into  a  mere  socialist  dream. 
Apart  from  the  social  and  political  upheaval,  the  economic  front  experienced  the  worst 
catastrophic  fall.  The  overall  outcome  of  this  debacle  was  fiscal  and  monetary 
destabilization.  According  to  the  IMF,  the  overall  central  and  republic  1991  deficit 
reached  19  percent  of  GDP,  but  this  omit  another  7  percent  owed  to  depositors  holding 
frozen  savings  accounts.  Whereas  under  the  unitary  system  only  the  centre  could  run  a 
deficit,  in  1991  several  republics  did  so.  Russia  had  a  deficit  of  11.5  percent,  Ukraine-14 
percent,  and  Kazakhstan-18  percent.  These  three  account  for  about  80  percent  of  the 
former  union's  GDP.  Most  of  the  smaller  republics  kept  their  deficit  below  5  percent  and 
some  even  ran  surpluses.  Emission  of  currency  had  grown  by  106  percent  in  a  single  year 
25  and  broad  money  (M2)  by  77  percent.  The  successor  states  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  had  major 
problems  to  face  as  they  gained  their  new  independence.  Their  presidents  recognized  that 
the  Russian  economy  was  so  dominant  on  the  territory  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  that 
they  would  have  to  pursue  the  same  general  course  of  economic  reform  whether  they  lilwd 
it  or  not.  At  their  request,  implementation  of  price  liberalization  was  delayed  by  Russia  to 
January  2,1992.  Time  was  needed  to  prepare  the  necessary  administrative  measures. 
278 Within  a  short  span  of  years,  political  leaders  have  adopted,  and  large  segments  of  the 
public  have  accepted,  an  entirely  new  agenda  for  their  economic  and  political  future.  The 
fundamental  decision  to  abandon  central  planning  and  replace  it  with  market  mechanisms 
for  organizing  economic  activity  has  been  made,  and  will  be  difficult  to  reverse.  26 
III.  18.  vii.  Gaidar's  Radical  Reform 
On  January  2,1992,  Russia,  the  largest  and  most  influential  member  of  the  newly 
created  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS),  embarked  on  a  closely  observed 
economic  experiment  whose  consequences  are  shaping  the  nation's  political  and  economic 
future.  With  a  view  to  stabilize  the  economy,  fiscal  and  monetary  measures  were 
introduced.  Inheriting  a  severe  crisis,  the  Yeltsin-Gaidar  Russian  government,  in 
consultation  with  IMF  experts,  implemented  two  sets  of  policies  that  could  be  done 
quickly  by  central  government  decrees.  The  first  was  'liberalization'  of  the  economy,  i.  e. 
freeing  prices,  27  the  commodity  markets,  and  foreign  trade  from  most  government 
controls.  The  second  commitment  was  to  strict  fiscal  and  monetary  policies  focusing  on 
virtually  eliminating  the  budget  deficit,  strict  reduction  of  credits  to  enterprises  (the 
economy),  and  stabilization  of  the  exchange  rate.  Commitment  to  carry  out  structural 
reforms  through  privatization,  land  reform,  and  development  of  market  infrastructure 
remained  strong,  but  these  measures  by  their  very  nature  would  take  several  years  to 
realize.  28  Transfer  to  an  efficient  market  system  could  not  occur  without  the  freeing  of 
prices,  a  'big-bang',  so  that  they  would  reflect  relative  scarcity.  Such  action  would  also 
result  in  the  reduction  of  the  heavy  burden  of  subsidies  from  the  state  budget.  The  first 
consequence  of  price  liberalization  was  to  bring  the  previously  suppressed  inflation  into 
the  open  by  permitting  state  prices  to  reflect  the  demand  pressure  exerted  by  the  "ruble 
overhang.  1.,  29  When  the  wage  fund  exceed  total  consumption  expenditures,  consumers 
found  themselves  with  excess  cash  balances  whose  cumulated  sum  formed  the  "ruble 
Overhang.  "  By  May,  1992,  central  regulation  of  95  percent  of  retail  prices  on  consumer 
goods  and  services  by  the  center  had  been  lifted.  Due  to  rigidities  inherited  from  the  CPE, 
consumer  prices  did  not  drop  to  market-clearing  levels  even  though  consumption  dropped 
279 by  more  than  40  percent.  For  the  first  six  months  of  1992,  the  consumers'  cost  of  living 
had  increased  by  approximately  1,000  percent.  30  Since  major  inflation  was  expected,  only 
a  quarterly,  not  an  annual,  budget  was  attempted  for  the  first  months  of  1992.  Price- 
liberalization  facilitated  sharp  cuts  in  producer  and  consumer  subsidies.  31 
Revenue  projections  were  optimistic.  Revisions  of  the  individual  income  and  the 
enterprise  profits  taxes  had  already  been  enacted  to  adapt  the  revenue  system  to  one 
compatible  with  a  market  economy.  A  new  measure  was  to  replace  CPE  turnover  and 
sales  taxes  by  a  Value-Added  Tax  (VAT)  and  by  reforming  export  levies.  IMF  studies 
show  that  it  takes  about  24  months  to  establish  efficient  administration  of  such  a  new  tax. 
Box  taxpayers  and  collectors  have  to  be  trained.  32  The  imposition  of  heavy  export  taxes  as 
well  as  licensing  and  quota  problems  were  to  cause  a  sharp  drop  in  the  level  of  activity 
relating  to  foreign  trade  and  revenues.  33  Emission  of  currency  soon  began  to  present 
dangers.  The  government  has  had  to  expand  the  total  supply  of  currency  by  approximately 
seven  times  in  1992,  from  R263  billion  to  approximately  R1.86  trillion  (due  to  wage  rise, 
34  and  shortages  of  cash).  At  the  heart  of  the  problem  has  been  the  failure  of  enterprises,, 
many  of  them  monopoly  suppliers,  to  reduce  prices  to  market-clearing  levels.  Retail  sales 
dropped  by  more  than  40  percent,  but  prices  continued  to  rise  despite  decreasing  demand. 
Also,  retail  charges  for  various  consumer  goods  radically  differed  from  region  to  region 
within  Russia,  showing  a  poorly  developed,  monopolized  and  regionalized  distribution 
network  that  did  not  operate  on  market  principles.  Price  setting  by  the  center  has  been 
replaced  by  government  authorities  protecting  their  local  markets  or  by  enterprises  and 
distributors  continuing  to  operate  monopolies  at  lower  levels.  35 
280 I11.18.  viii.  Banking  Practices  Undermine  Fiscal  Polic 
The  central  bank  is  yielding  to  enterprise  interests  by  expanding  noncash  credits  to 
accommodate  the  inter-enterprise  arrears  with  newly  created  credit.  Inter-enterprise 
arrears  increased  from  40  billion  rubles  to  more  than  3.2  trillion  rubles  during  1992.  By 
accommodating  interenterprise  debt  the  central  bank  avoids  the  immediate  consequences 
of  enterprise  failures,  but  it  effectively  reinstate  the  "soft  budget"  constraints  demanded  by 
leaders  of  the  enterprises.  The  central  bank  justifies  the  accommodation  of  interenterprise 
debt  as  being  necessary  to  provide  working  capital  to  enterprises.  Without  this  working 
capital,  the  enterprise  sector  could  implode,  leading  to  massive  unemployment  and  a 
radical  collapse  of  output.  The  growth  of  interenterprise  arrears  has  made  it  increasingly 
difficult  to  distinguish  viable  from  nonviable  enterprises  . 
36  Huge  quasi-fiscal  inter- 
enterprise  bank  debt  has  undermined  the  purpose  of  an  austere  budgetary  policy,  denying 
direct  support  to  the  economy.  Under  the  old  Gosbank  clearance  system,  enterprise 
accounts  had  been  credited  when  invoices  were  received.  Unfortunately,  many  managers 
and  bankers  have  continued  to  operate  in  the  same  old  way.  The  banking  system  of  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  had  begun  to  be  reorganized  in  1987-88  into  a  three-tier  reserve  system.  The 
CPE  Gosbank  had  essentially  been  a  monobank  that  performed  various  monetary  and 
control  functions  as  directed  by  Gosplan  and  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  In  1988,  the 
Gosbank's  role  began  to  change  toward  that  of  a  traditional  central  bank  with  duties  for 
supervising  the  banking  system  and  setting  global  parameters.  Also  beginning  in  1988  with 
the  emergence  of  co-operative  banks  and  subsequently  of  joint-stock  commercial  banks, 
the  state  banking  system  began  to  have  competition.  U.  S.  S.  R.  legislation  on  banks  and 
banking  activity  formalized  the  existing  three-tier  system  in  December 
, 
1990.37  Yet  by 
1991,  the  year  the  budgetary  system  was  decentralized,  central  regulation  of  banking  and 
credit  policy  for  the  whole  U.  S.  S.  R.  was  also  fundamentally  undermined.  After  the  coup, 
negotiations  among  the  republics  to  co-ordinate  fiscal,  monetary,  and  credit  policies  have 
repeatedly  broken  down,  a  major  factor  in  destabilizing  the  ruble  zone.  After  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 
Gosbank  was  terminated  at  the  end  of  1991,  the  CBR  began  to  implement  the  radical 
economic  programme  through  the  macroeconomic  levers  it  controlled. 
281 III.  18.  ix.  Moderating  and  DegRening  Reform 
Political  pressures  and  deepening  economic  recession  caused  the  Yeltsin-Gaidar  team  to 
moderate  the  austerity  which  was  basic  to  their  fiscal  policy.  Effort  was  made  to  broaden 
support  by  including  pro-reform  moderates  from  the  managerial  elite  in  the  government  as 
key  actors  in  meeting  critical  immediate  problems  and  preparing  a  second-stage  reform 
programme  to  be  implemented  through  1996.  To  deal  with  the  increasingly  serious 
problem  of  insolvency,  heavy  additional  commitments  were  made  . 
38  Effort  was  made  to 
'deepen'  the  reform  programme  by  broadening  practical  activity  to  develop  the  institutions 
basic  to  a  market  economy.  On  July  3,1992,  Acting  Premier  Gaidar  introduced  a  lengthy 
"Programme  for  Deepening  Economic  Reforms  by  1995-1996.  "  He  made  it  clear  that  the 
budget  would  not  be  the  source  of  salvation  for  weak  enterprises  -  "our  financial  state  is 
hopeless.  ý.,  39  He  asserted  that  major  progress  had  been  made  during  the  first  stage  of 
liberalization  and  fiscal  stabilization  to  deal  with  the  immediate  crisis.  The  second  stage 
would  be  focused  on  building  the  economy  on  the  basis  of  private  property,  i.  e. 
implementing  privatization.  The  third  would  be  focused  on  reconstructing  the  main 
branches  of  the  economy,  attaining  stable  growth  of  3-4  percent  of  GDP,  and  developing  a 
positive  balance  of  trade  by  stepping  up  exports.  Many  decrees  were  issued  to  deal  with 
related  fundamental  reform  issues  and  to  thwart  various  crises.  Loss-making  businesses 
will  be  shut  down  and  undergo  privatization  in  a  form  that  will  develop  owners  with  long- 
term  stakes  in  industry  and  the  power  to  make  managerial  decisions.  The  government 
clearly  recognizes  that  the  population  lacks  the  resources  to  pay  much  into  the  treasury  for 
these  properties.  Privatizing  major  enterprises  will  be  at  best  a  medium-ten-n  programme.  40 
The  latest  development  of  the  reform  effort  is  given  in  Appendix  111.18.1,  where  Michel 
Camdessus,  the  IMF's  managing  director,  praised  Russia's  "bold  and  ambitious  ,  41 
economic  reform  programme,  and  said  he  believed  the  Russian  economy  may  begin  to 
grow  again  during  the  year  1995,  after  four  years  of  steep  decline. 
III-18.  x.  Making  the  Ruble  Internally  Convertible 
282 Another  stabilization  measure  that  was  taken  during  the  period  of  transition  was  making 
the  ruble  internally  convertible.  On  July  2,1992,  the  Russian  government  took  the  risky 
step  of  introducing  limited  internal  convertibility  at  a  floating  unitary  exchange  rate  for  the 
ruble. 
"  (For  details  of  internal  convertibility,  see  Appendix  111.18.2.  )  It  was  a  key  element 
of  a  comprehensive  programme  proposed  in  May  by  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Economic 
Relations  to  restructure  and  liberalize  foreign  trade  over  the  next  eighteen  months  and  also 
43  a  guideline  set  in  consultation  with  IMF 
.  Without  fiscal  and  monetary  discipline  in  place, 
stabilization  of  the  currency's  value  is  very  unlikely.  hfflation  is  approaching  the 
hyperinflationary  level;  the  balance  of  trade  is  seriously  deteriorating.  During  the  second 
half  of  June,  1992,  hard  currency  in  the  central  foreign  exchange  reserves  has  become  so 
short  that  the  CBR  had  to  stop  its  interventions  in  the  auction  market,  the  Moscow 
interbank  Currency  Exchange  (MICE),  aimed  at  bringing  the  value  of  the  ruble  up  toward 
R80  per  dollar.  That  had  cost  an  estimated  $500  million  through  June.  44  Moscow  is  so 
short  of  funds  that  it  has  had  to  negotiate  for  a  moratorium  on  the  payment  both  of 
principal  and of  interest  on  its  international  debt  in  order  to  have  the  cash  flow  to  maintain 
essential  imports.  Moreover,  major  disputes  over  co-ordinating  fiscal,  banking,  credit,  and 
monetary  policies  basic  to  maintaining  a  common  ruble  zone  with  other  CIS  states 
threaten  to  be  more  disruptive  to  commerce  than  was  the  breakdown  of  economic 
relations  with  Eastern  Europe.  In  the  last  week  of  July,  1992,  ruble  stabilized  around 
45  R161.  The  rapidly  accelerating  inflation  has  resulted  in  part  from  the  monetary  expansion 
arising  from  the  maintenance  of  a  ruble  zone  without  adequate  monetary  controls.  Fiscal 
deficits  continue  to  be  financed  by  the  creation  of  cash  and  noncash  components  of  the 
money  supply.  This  monetary  expansion,  and  not  the  reforms  themselves,  has  created  a 
monetary  system  exhibiting  symptoms  of  acute  dysfunction.  The  ruble  is  not  viewed  as  a 
viable  store  of  value,  and  is  rapidly  being  displaced  as  a  medium  of  exchange  by  goods  and 
foreign  currencies.  With  inflation  rampant,  it  became  impossible  to  create  the 
Preconditions  for  establishing  the  ruble  as  a  fully  convertible  currency.  46  As  hyperinflation 
becomes  more  likely,  the  continued  erosion  of  the  ruble's  value,  both  domestically  and 
internationally,  appears  inevitable.  The  macroeconomic  instability  calls  into  question  the 
ability  and  desirability  of  maintaining  a  common  currency  zone  for  the  C.  I.  S.  In  short., 
283 unless  monetary  stability  and  a  functioning  monetary  system  are  rapidly  re-established,  the 
entire  reform  movement  may  be  dealt  a  setback  from  which  it  is  unlikely  to  recover. 
Moreover,  the  monetary  instability  reduces  the  likelihood  that  the  ruble  can  attain  the 
status  of  a  convertible  currency,  and  thereby  denies  the  economy  the  benefits  of 
international  trade  and  competition.  47 
111.18.  xi.  International  Trade 
Action  was  required  to  encourage  international  trade  in  order  to  increase  the  state's  hard 
currency.  During  the  early  years  of  transition  (especially  from  1992  onwards)  capital 
flight,  estimated  at  $5  billion-$20  billion.,  had  occurred  because  the  previous  hard-currency 
and  export  control  system  had  cut  heavily  into  profits  and  encouraged  barter.  Exporters  of 
energy  and  raw  materials,  70  percent  of  the  total  trade,  were  required  to  sell  to  the  CBR 
for  the  foreign  exchange  reserve  40  percent  of  their  foreign  earnings  at  the  commercial 
rate  of  R55  per  dollar,  far  below  the  official  quasi-market  rate.,  which  varied  from  R90  to 
R110  in  1992.  Another  10  percent  had  to  be  surrendered  by  all  exporters  at  the  quasi- 
official  rate  to  support  CBR  intervention  in  the  auctions.  48  The  new  floating  unitary  rate  is 
much  more  attractive  to  those  involved  in  foreign  trade  and  the  proportion  of  hard 
currency  coming  onto  the  market  is  expected  to  be  much  greater  than  in  the  past.  To 
ensure  that  the  government  gets  its  share  of  profits  from  international  trade,  new  measures 
designed  to  centralize  control  of  exports,  have  been  put  in  force.  Export  licensing  of 
"strategic  commodities"  has  been  streamlined  so  as  to  concentrate  control  of  "specially 
registered  foreign  trade  firms,  "  most  of  which  are  state-owned  . 
49Recentralization  of  the 
gold  and  diamond  complex  is  estimated  to  have  cost  R500  million.  Independent 
commercial  firms  are  squeezed  out.  50  However,  requiring  all  to  use  the  unitary  rate  may 
have  a  quite  devastating  impact  on  many  producers  dependent  on  supplies  imported  for 
the  central  reserves  and  heighten  inflation.  Until  July  1,  the  charge  of  purchases  of  these 
goods  and  commodities  by  Russian  enterprises  was  set  at  the  special  rate  of  R5.4  per 
dollar.  "At  current  prices  this  rate  is  estimated  to  represent  a  hidden  subsidy  of  R500 
billion  at  the  cost  of  the  budget.  Charging  the  unitary  ruble  rate  will  significantly  raise  the 
284 costs  of  producers  and,  consequently,  prices.  Half  of  the  food  industry  and  40  percent  of 
fight  industry  will  have  their  costs  increased  four-to  six-fold.  Enterprises  in  most  industrial 
sectors  will  have  to  reduce  sharply  reliance  on  imports.  9`51 
18.  xii.  Deterioration  in  CIS  Economic  Relations 
A  major  threat  to  fiscal  and  monetary  stabilization  is  the  increasing  breakdown  of 
economic  ties  among  the  CIS  states.  Already,  the  loss  of  markets  and  suppliers  in  Eastern 
Europe  since  1990  has  led  to  the  disruption  of  production  due  to  lack  of  key  components. 
A  similar  breakdown  within  the  CIS  would  be  far  more  devastating.  Gorbachev  and  his 
successors  have  all  understood  this  reality.  Since  1990,  many  general  agreements  have 
been  signed  with  provisions  for  central  institutions  strong  enough  to  ensure  co-ordination 
of  fiscal,  banking,  credit,  and  monetary  policy  in  a  "common  economic  space.,,  52  If  Several 
states  sharing  a  common  currency  engage  in  major  deficit-spending  and  large  emissions  of 
cashless  credits,  that  can  have  significant  inflationary  impact  on  others  that  pursue  austere 
policies.  With  economic  resources  shrinking  due  to  the  recession,  all  of  the  member  states 
have  reacted  by  instituting  degrees  of  economic  autarchy  at  the  cost  of  their  immediate 
CIS  neighbours. 
PV 
E,.  amples  of  Russian  policies  that  have  alienated  the  other  Republics  are  numerous. 
Division  of  assets  of  the  former  U.  S.  S.  R.  has  been  on  the  agenda  of  most  of  the  summit 
meetings.  Basically,  the  Russian  Federation  took  over  the  central  banks  in  November 
1991.  While  under  Russian  control,  all  the  hard  currency  of  the  other  republics  and  their 
enterprises  were  spent  servicing  foreign  debts.  After  the  Gosbank  went  broke  in 
December,  these  accounts  were  frozen.  The  new  sovereign  governments  desperately  need 
the  foreign  exchange  to  pay  their  dues  to  international  organizations  such  as  the  IMF  and 
World  Bank  as  well  as  to  stimulate  foreign  trade.  Many  of  their  enterprises  have  been 
seriously  handicapped  in  conducting  businesses  due  to  their  inability  to  draw  funds  frozen 
in  their  accounts.  "The  Russians  acted  unilaterally  on  this  despite  the  obligation  in  basic 
CIS  documents  that  major  decisions  should  only  be  reached  by  consensus.  9.953 
285 i[I.  18.  xiii.  The  Ruble  Zone 
The  other  states  also  blame  the  current  severe  shortage  of  cash  on  unilateral  Russian 
policy  decisions  on  emission  of  currency.  Since  Russia  has  the  only  mint,  its  Central  Bank 
was  able  to  control  its  distribution.  "The  resulting  shortage  of  rubles  in  the  other  states 
was  proportionately  greater  than  in  Russia.  Fearful  of  riots  by  unpaid  workers,  leaders  of 
other  republics  introduced  surrogate  money  in  the  form  of  coupons.  So  great  has  been  the 
shortfall  that  even  local  authorities  within  Russia  did  so.  As  the  situation  continued  to 
worsen,  the  determination  of  the  leaders  of  other  republics  to  control  their  own  national 
money  supply  has  grown  stronger.  qi54  By  June,  Russian  leaders  in  both  the  executive  and 
legislative  branch  reached  the  decision  that  their  Republic  had  to  have  its  own  national 
money.  An  article  in  Commersant,  entitled,  "The  Ruble  Zone:  Rubleless  and  Rudderless", 
55 
provides  the  details  on  the  diversity  of  policies  being  pursued  in  the  other  states. 
Budgetary,  credit,  and  monetary  differences  are  so  great  that  it  would  be  difficult  to 
ensure  co-ordination.  It  makes  little  sense  to  have  a  state  like  TaJikistan  with  its  40- 
percent  deficit  financing  in  the  ruble  zone  when  a  conservative  fiscal  and  monetary  policy 
is  the  goal.  Yeltsin  signed  a  decree  on  June  21,  mandating  that  states  wishing  to  remain 
within  the  ruble  zone  must  co-ordinate  their  fiscal,  credit,  and  monetary  policies  with 
Russia.  56  This  was  a  signal  to  most  republics  to  leave  the  ruble  zone.  Not  to  do  so  would 
mean  losing  the  right  to  control  their  own  fiscal  and  monetary  policy.  The  difficult  task  of 
organizing  a  new,  reliable  settlements  system  among  the  republics  will  for  a  time  severely 
handicap  trade  just  as  it  did  with  Eastern  Europe.  57 
With  a  fall  since  1989  of  30  percent  or  more  in  GDP,  political  pressures  from  the 
populace  and  other  vested  interest  groups  are  threatening  to  undermine  the  political 
stability  gained  by  the  first  popular  election  of  a  Russian  head  of  state.  However,  the 
regime  is  not  yet  nor  about  to  attain  budget  and  monetary  stability.  All  this  could  have 
dramatic  effects  on  the  consumer  cost-of-living  index  as  well  as  on  government 
expenditures  and  revenues.  The  banking  and  credit  system  is  changing,  but  is  far  from 
having  the  capacity  to  provide  the  financial  services  for  a  modem,  large-scale  market 
286 economy.  A  combination  of  Russian  assertiveness  and  its  poor  fiscal  and  economic 
condition  are  major  factors  in  the  progressive  break-up  of  the  common  CIS  economic 
space.  Due  to  an  extraordinary  degree  of  economic  interdependence,  trade  among  the 
states  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  will  continue  to  be  large-scale,  but  all  the  other  republics 
are  reaching  out  to  foreign  partners  who  have  real  money  and  world-level  expertise.  Their 
leaders  recognize  that,  to  be  truly  independent,  they  must  have  the  means  to  control  their 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy.  Thus  the  deterioration  and  disappearance  of  the  ruble  zone  was 
knminent.  58 
HI.  18.  xiv.  Stabilization  and  Recovea 
The  illusion  that  there  is  some  "magic  key"  to  prosperity  is  past.  As  stabilization 
happens,  slight  recovery  begins.  Major  structural  reforms  will  be  under  way  to  build  the 
bases  for  a  competitive  economy  on  the  basis  of  true  market  prices  by  1996.  The  task  that 
the  citizens  of  the  former  Soviet  states  face  in  changing  economic  systems  is  one  that  wilI 
take  decades  to  complete.  "Despite  the  flaws  in  the  reforms  to-date,  the  change  in  the 
approach  by  the  leadership  to  macroeconomic  policy  is  remarkable.  For  the  West,  the 
chaffenge  is  to  find  ways  to  assist  the  process  that  are  prudent  and  effective.  Stabilization 
of  the  Russian  fiscal  and  monetary  system  is  an  essential  condition  for  large-scale  aid  from 
the  West.  However,  aid  for  specific  projects,  humanitarian  purposes,  and  technical 
assistance  is  essential  to  building  a  strong  base  for  what  is  to  the  Russians  a  new  economic 
system  .,, 
59  As  the  process  of  stabilization  and  recovery  takes  root  in  the  economies  of 
transition,  it  is  good  to  look  at  those  economies  who  have  tried  to  develop  monetary  and 
fiscal  institutions  to  cope  up  with  the  growing  demands  of  creating  a  market  economy. 
The  experience  of  the  Baltic  states  is  a  good  guide  in  this  direction. 
Ill.  18.  xv.  The  Baltic  Eaenence 
Iti  our  analysis  we  have  pointed  out  the  four  components  of  transition  as  stabilization., 
liberalization,  privatization  and  restructuring  and  developing  of  institutions.  At  various 
287 stages  we  have  briefly  discussed  the  role  of  liberalization  and  privatization.  In  this  chapter., 
we  are  looking  at  the  stabilization  process  within  the  framework  of  the  Russian-Baltic 
economies.  As  we  enter  into  the  Baltic  experience,  we  are  also  privileged  to  place  in  a 
position  to  understand  the  mechanism  and  working  of  the  fourth  component  of  transition, 
namely,  the  restructuring  and  developing  of  the  institutions;  here,  mainly  fiscal  institutions. 
Financial  instability  has  emerged  as  perhaps  the  most  burdensome  problem  associated  with 
the  transition  from  state  socialism  to  market-oriented  economies  in  Eastern  Europe  and 
the  former  U.  S.  S.  R.  "Because  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  played  only  passive  roles  in  the 
traditional  Soviet-type  economic  systems,  policymakers  in  the  Soviet  successor  states  have 
had  a  particularly  difficult  experience  in  designing  and  implementing  prudent  monetary  and 
fiscal  policies.  ,  60  The  three  Baltic  states  represent  a  special  example  because  they  were 
afforded  a  significant  measure  of  economic  autonomy  from  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  some  two  years 
before  the  fortnal  dissolution  of  the  Soviet  Union.  A  survey  of  the  Baltic  experience  with 
fiscal  policy  in  the  early  stages  of  transition  would  enable  us  to  deal  with  issues  and 
problems  that  are  likely  to  arise  throughout  the  former  Soviet  region. 
A  major  component  of  the  economic  reform  programmes  in  the  Baltic  states  is  the 
development  of  new  fiscal  institutions  and  policies.  Fiscal  policy  was  primarily  used  as  a 
tool  for  the  allocation  of  resources  toward  national  goals.  A  secondary  goal  was  the 
redistribution  of  wealth  from  rich  areas  to  poor  . 
61  Almost  totally  neglected  was  the 
stabilization  aspect  of  fiscal  policy.  All  three  of  these  aspects  of  fiscal  policy  take  on 
heightened  importance  in  market  economies  with  significant  private  sectors.  In  fact,  during 
the  transition  period  from  a  Soviet-type  to  a  market  economy,  fiscal  policy  is  bound  to 
play  an  especially  important  role  that  will  shape  the  outcome  of  other  policy  issues  later.  62 
'Me  experience  of  reform  in  East/Central  European  countries  confirms  this  notion. 
III.  18.  xvi.  The  Creation  of  a  Fiscal  System 
For  the  first  time  in  nearly  half  a  century  the  Baltic  governments  must  manage  their  own 
national  budgets  and  create  fiscal  systems  that  are  both  durable  and  flexible  enough  to  see 
them  through  the  difficult  transitional  stage.  The  development  of  fiscal  policies  and 
288 institutions  in  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  Estonia  from  1989  through  1991  is  reviewed  here.  By 
late  1989,  a  decision  had  been  taken  in  the  Baltic  states  to  design  and  implement  totally 
independent  fiscal  systems.  As  the  Baltic  governments  gradually  took  control  over  their 
republic  budgets,  they  faced  many  policy  problems  and  administrative  tasks  that  previously 
had  been  Moscow's  responsibility.  63  Among  the  most  important  of  these  were: 
1.  Projecting  revenues  and  spending  needs  (As  Moscow's  agents,  Baltic  officials  and 
bureaucrats  were  not,  for  the  most  part,  experienced  in  the  practice  of  financial 
analysis  and  programming.  ). 
2.  Re-establishing  spending  priorities  and  limits  as  well  as  revenue  sources  for  each  level 
of  government  (As  national-level  fiscal  authorities,  the  Baltic  governments  had  to 
establish  a  fiscal  regime  that  promoted  efficiency  within  the  fiscal  federal  system)  - 
3.  Ensuring  that  planned  revenues  were  adequate  to  cover  planned  expenditures 
(Macrostabilization  is  especially  important  in  terms  of  government  credibility.  On  one 
hand,  three  major  all-Union  spending  programmes,  financing  capital  investment., 
subsidizing  non-food  items  -  especially  electricity,  and  subsidizing  food  items 
represented  serious  budgetary  strains.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  already  apparent  in 
1989-90  that  the  Baltic  economies  were  beginning  to  show  signs  of  serious  economic 
downturn  that  would  reduce  output,  profits,  and  hence  tax  remittances.  ) 
4.  Structuring  taxes  so  that  they  were  progressive  (income  elastic)  and  taxed  taxpayers 
with  like  incomes  and  assets  at  the  same  rate  (Meeting  the  tests  for  vertical  and 
horizontal  equity,  respectively.  ) 
5.  Encouraging  economic  development  from  both  domestic  and  foreign  sources  (This 
often  involves  tax  holidays  and  public  investment  in  the  economic  infrastructure,  and 
perhaps  above  all,  stability  in  the  political  and  economic  framework,  including  tax 
legislation.  ). 
6.  Creating  convenient,  transparent,  payment  systems  to  maximize  compliance  (This  is 
very  important  given  the  primitive  administrative  and  tax  collection  systems  in  the 
Baltic  states  and  the  large  black  markets  in  which  incomes  could  be  hidden.  ). 
289 7.  Creating  the  necessary  tax  administration  institutions  (This  has  proved  at  least  as 
important  as  having  the  proper  taxes.  ). 
These  seven  points  are  not  peculiar  to  the  Baltic  states.  The  two  dynamics  that  defined 
the  political-economic  landscape  in  the  Soviet  region  at  the  time  (disintegration  from  the 
central  command  structure  and  radical  economic  reform)  took  their  toll  on  fiscal  policy 
64 
forrnation  throughout  the  U.  S.  S.  R 
. 
111.18.  xvii.  The  Two  Kgj  Issues:  Insulation  and  Transfer 
In  terms  of  economic  disengagement  from  the  Soviet  Union,  Baltic  officials  were 
constantly  testing  the  waters  with  unilateral  declarations  of  authority  and  jurisdiction  over 
policy  and  real  assets  on  their  territories.  The  resolution  of  these  questions  naturally  had  a 
fundamental  impact  on  both  the  size  and  structure  of  the  potential  revenue  base  and  on 
spending  requirements.  Two  key  issues  motivating  Baltic  policies  at  this  time  were:  (1) 
insulating  the  Baltic  economies  from  the  economic  and  financial  chaos  exported  from 
Moscow,  and  (2)  negotiating  acceptable  amounts  of  transfer  funds  from  the  Baltic  budgets 
to  the  all-Union  budget.  These  issues  resolved  into  the  following  considerations.  Battling 
economic  chaos: 
1.  Importing  inflation  and  macro  instability  from  Moscow. 
2.  Financing  economic  activity  in  the  midst  of  a  Union-wide  economic  depression. 
I  Managing  the  various  economic  blockades  and  trade  stoppages  that  occurred  in  1989- 
91. 
4.  Meeting  social  obligations  that  Moscow  either  could  not  or  would  not  fulfil. 
Negotiating  Transfers  to  the  Union  Budget: 
1.  Changing  revenue  and  spending  plans  in  mid-stream. 
2.  Dealing  with  a  situation  in  which  Moscow  insisted  on  shares  of  various  revenue 
sources,  making  it  virtually  impossible  to  negotiate  a  simple  lump  sum  that  would  have 
given  the  Balts  more  freedom  to  determine  spending  and  taxes  internally. 
290 The  on-going  efforts  to  establish  independent  fiscal  systems  in  the  Baltic  states  in  1990 
and  1991  required  a  series  of  budgetary  revisions.  The  inability  to  negotiate  a  satisfactory 
arrangement  with  Moscow  provoked  all  three  Baltic  governments  to  withhold  their 
contributions  to  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  budget  in  1991.65 
111.18.  xviii.  Fiscal  Policv  Formation 
The  Baltic  drives  toward  establishing  market-oriented  systems  have  also  created 
problems  for  fiscal  policy  formation.  The  two  most  important  factors  in  this  regard  are  the 
movement  toward  a  private  economy  and  the  shift  away  from  Soviet-administered  prices 
toward  market-oriented  prices.  The  emergence  of  a  private  economy  brings  several 
challenges  from  the  standpoints  of  economic  development,  economic  stability,  and  the 
breadth  and  depth  of  the  social  safety  net.  First,  encouraging  the  nascent  private  sector 
requires  that  disincentives  to  investment  be  avoided  if  possible.  The  corporate  income  tax 
is  widely  regarded  as  a  drag  on  investment,  but  it  carries  several  deceivingly  seduced 
advantages,  especially  for  newer,  less  established  economies.  One  advantage  of  the 
corporate  tax  is  that  corporations,  as  compared  with  other  taxpayers,  usually  keep  detailed 
financial  records  that  can  be  used  for  audits.  66  There  are  also  fewer  corporations  to  keep 
track  of  than  there  are  personal  income  taxpayers.  67  Finally,  personal  income  taxpayers 
vote,  while  corporations  do  not,  a  nontrivial  issue  in  emerging  democracies.  These  factors 
often  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  corporations  might  tolerate  higher  tax  rates  relative  to 
income  than  personal  income  taxpayers.  Nevertheless,  especially  in  poor  economies  trying 
to  foster  entrepreneurship  and  privatize  state-owned  enterprise,  excessive  corporate 
income  taxes  tend  to  hold  back  growth.  68  As  a  result,  policies  on  corporate  income  taxes 
are  still  in  flux  in  all  three  Baltic  states.  69  While  many  Baltic  officials  charged  with 
developing  tax  policy  recognize  the  importance  of  guaranteeing  low  and  stable  corporate 
tax  rates,  political  concerns  dictate  that  they  play  "the  corporate  tax  card"  very  carefully 
so  as  not  to  create  the  impression  that  business  is  enjoying  tax  benefits  at  the  expense  of 
individuals  or  social  programmes.  The  emergence  of  a  sizeable  private  sector  also  requires 
new  tax  policies  and  administrative  (collection  and  audit)  techniques.  Likewise,  the 
291 emergence  of  a  private  sector  suggests  new  considerations  for  government  spending 
patterns  - 
This  shift  Of  spending  responsibilities  has  obvious  implications  for  revenue 
generation  as  well.  70  Finally,  shifting  to  an  economy  with  a  significant  private  sector  also 
gives  the  Baltic  governments  a  natural  way  to  begin  the  process  of  integration  with 
Western  Europe.  This  process  implies  harmonizing  fiscal  policies  with  Western 
economies,  especially  those  to  which  Balts  become  most  open.  An  important,  though 
problematic,  dimension  of  Europe  92  was  the  fiscal  han-nonization  and  integration.  If  the 
Balts  want  to  be  part  of  this  integration  process,  they  cannot  ignore  the  fiscal  issues,  71 
like  the  introduction  of  VAT.  The  switch  to  free  prices  is  beginning  to  have  several 
consequences  (both  static  and  dynamic)  for  tax  policy,  but  none  of  them  need  be  difficult. 
After  the  initial  price  adjustment,  however,  it  should  be  possible  to  stabilize  tax  revenues 
and  expenditures  in  the  absence  of  outside  shocks.  72 
With  the  Baltic  declarations  of  independence  in  August  1991,  the  complex  issue  of  "who 
owns  whom  and  who  pays  whom"  became  more  immediate  and  practical,  creating 
difficulties  for  the  Baltic  governments.  Theoretically,  all  enterprises  on  Baltic  territory  are 
now  subject  to  the  Baltic  states'  jurisdiction  and  should  pay  taxes  to  their  Baltic 
governments.  A  comparison  of  the  budgets  of  the  three  Baltic  states  is  difficult  because  of 
the  lack  of  symmetry  in  their  budget  formats.  Budget  income  is  easier  to  look  at  than 
expenditures.  Table  Ill.  18.1  outlines  the  different  tax  schemes  of  the  three  Baltic  states  as 
A- 
- 
mey  stood  at  the  end  of  1991. 
Table  1111.18.1 
Tax  Schemes  in  the  Baltic  Countries  in  1991 
Type  of  Tax  Estonia  Latvia  Lithuania 
Corporate  income  70%  State  70%  State  Local  Corps  pay  to 
tax  30%  Local  30%  Local  local  budgets. 
(20%  in  Riga)  Others  pay  80%  to 
State,  20%  to  local 
budgets. 
Personal  income  tax  Local  20%  State  40%  State 
80%  Local  60%  Local 
VMue-added  tax  No 
I 
No  No 
292 Turnover  tax  70%  State  State  State* 
30%  Local 
Excise  tax  State  State  State* 
Social  security  tax  State  State 
Natural  Resource  State  and  Local  25%  State  State 
tax  75%  Local 
Land  tax  Local  (very  small)  Local  Local 
Customs  duties  State  few  and  small  few  and  small 
Vehicle  tax  Local  No  Local 
Capital  tax  In  special  cases  Property  tax  No 
Local 
Activity  license  Off  budget  State  ?  No 
Pollution  tax  Environment  Fund  (Covered  under  State 
natural  resource 
tax.  ) 
Performance  tax  Local  No  (under  No 
discussion) 
Official  filing  tax  Local  No  No 
Enterprise  No  No  State 
registration 
Foreign  investment  No  No  State 
tax 
Oil  products  tax  State  Paid  to  the  State  No 
road  fund.  50% 
slated  for  State 
roads  and 
determined  by  State 
government; 
25%  for  regional 
roads;  and 
25%  for  rural  roads. 
Hard  currency  tax  No  No  State 
Source:  John  E.  Tedstrom:  "Problems  of  Fiscal  Policy  Reform  During  The  Transition:  A 
Baltic  Case  Study"  p.  231;  Documentation  from  Finance  Ministries  of  the  three  Baltic 
states  and  interviews  with  respective  Balt  officials. 
*  The  Lithuanian  budget  does  not  distinguish  between  the  excise  and  the  turnover  tax 
293 An  important  contribution  to  economic  policy  in  the  Baltic  area  would  be  the 
stabilization  of  fiscal  and  monetary  reform  legislation.  The  budgets  of  the  Baltic  states  for 
1991  are  presented  in  Tables  A,  B,  and  C  of  Appendix  111.18.3.  Standardizing  the 
reporting  systems  would  be  a  significant  contribution  both  to  Balts  concerned  with  Baltic 
tax  policy  and  for  outsiders,  as  well  as  contribute  to  Baltic  economic  integration.  73 
IH.  18.  xix.  Considerations  for  the  Future 
Following  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union,  all  of  the  Soviet  successor  states  face  the 
fon-nidable  challenge  of  developing  and  implementing  their  own  economic  reform 
programmes.  Fiscal  policy  reform  constitutes  one  of  the  key  elements  in  those 
programmes.  Using  fiscal  policy  as  a  stabilization  tool  is  new  to  the  Soviet  successor 
states,  but  their  experience  with  runaway  budgets  in  the  last  three  years  of  their  Soviet 
period  and  the  prospect  of  hyperinflation  looming  over  the  entire  ruble  zone  has  generated 
a  good  deal  of  appreciation  on  their  part  for  the  importance  of  a  balanced  budget. 
Unfortunately,  the  experience  of  reforming  East/Central  European  countries  is  not 
encouraging  and  paints  a  picture  of  both  falling  output  that  constricts  the  real  tax  base  and 
rising  social  needs  that  increase  the  requirement  for  spending.  "Two  chief  pressure  points 
for  state  spending  are  likely  to  emerge  in  the  foreseeable  future.  One  is  local  pressures. 
Public  opinion  in  the  Baltic  states  has  already  indicated  the  degree  to  which  Balts  believe 
that  they  deserve  to  have  a  standard  of  living  on  par  with  Scandinavia.  9.974  A  second 
influence  for  public  spending  will  come  from  the  outside.  Aid  and  investment  will  flow  to 
the  former  republics  only  under  certain  conditions. 
IH-18.  xx.  Complicated  Versus  Simple  Taxes 
'Me  basics  of  tax  policy  formation  and  not  the  nuances  should  guide  the  development  of 
new  tax  systems  in  the  Soviet  successor  states.  Taxes  should  be  broad  to  capture  as  many 
types  of  taxable  incomes  as  possible.  Tax  rates  should  be  low  to  encourage  investment, 
increase  productivity,  and  encourage  compliance.  Taxes  should  be  simple  and  transparent 
294 so  that  taxpayers  know  what  they  are  paying  and  why.  Taxes  should  meet  tests  for 
horizontal  and  vertical  equity. 
Experience  in  other  emerging  market  economies  has  shown  that  developing  appropriate 
tax  administration  institutions  and  systems  is  at  least  as  important  as  the  tax  policies 
themselves.  Without  a  comprehensive,  unified  budget,  it  is  impossible  to  execute  a  unified 
fiscal  policy.  Effective  tax  assessment  and  collection  is  essential  to  the  success  of  any 
budget  programme.  Once  a  culture  of  tax  evasion  develops,  it  is  virtually  impossible  to 
overcome.  Many  small  countries  have  neglected  the  problem  of  administrating  tax 
collection  policies  to  guard  against  inflation.  In  high-inflation  economies,  this  can  be  very 
costly  to  the  budget  as  delinquent  taxpayers  pay  the  flat  penalty  in  weaker  currencies.  The 
higher  the  rate  of  inflation,  the  more  the  need  for  inflation-sensitive  penalties.  Another 
concern  for  emerging  or  reforming  economies  is  unemployment.  Finally,  it  is  important 
that  the  various  departments  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  that  are  concerned  with  tax 
administration  have  adequate  communications  with  each  other.  In  the  Baltic  states  this 
may  be  a  particular  challenge  given  both  the  compartmentalism  of  the  economic 
bureaucracy  of  the  Soviet-type  economy  and  the  rapid  pace  at  which  the  Baltic  states  are 
reforming  their  economic  institutions  and  policies.  75 
HI.  18.  xxi.  The  Primaa  Importance  of  Managing  Fiscal  Polipj 
Fiscal  policy  affects  and  is  affected  by  numerous  other  aspects  of  the  overall  reform 
effort,  including  privatization,  price  policy,  and  policy  on  industrial  development  in 
particular  sectors  of  the  economy.  Fiscal  policy  was  always  of  secondary  importance  in  the 
Soviet-type  economies.  In  many  respects,  fiscal  policy  in  the  Soviet  period  was  based  on 
political  considerations  and  tended  to  ignore  economics.  To  the  extent  that  fiscal  policy 
represents  an  essentially  new  field  for  both  government  bureaucrats  and  academic  analysts, 
there  is  a  good  deal  to  learn  before  the  world  can  expect  competent  fiscal  management 
from  the  Baltic  states.  To  date,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  and  Estonia  have  been  careful  not  to 
mismanage  the  transitional  period  and  have  established  a  number  of  the  comerstones  of  a 
full,  independent,  and  effective  fiscal  system,  with  the  help  of  international  and  foreign 
295 organizations  to  develop  efficient  tax  administration  institutions  and  competent  tax 
adminlStration  personnel.  Although  many  obstacles  remain,  there  is  good  reason  for  taking 
an  optimistic  view  of  the  outlook  for  the  Baltic  economies.  76 
The  experience  of  Russia  and  the  Baltic  States  brings  out  the  important  role  of 
macroeconomic  stabilization  as  a  strategy  for  economic  transition  from  a  command 
economy  to  a  market  economy.  But  a  caution  is  to  be  noted.  "A  stabilization  package  in 
the  context  of  inherited  inertial  inflation  and  increasingly  rigid  inflationary  expectations  can 
create  a  vicious  cycle  of  pohcy-performance  gap:  budget  deficit  cuts,  tight  money,  and 
currency  devaluation->  falling  output  (and  employment)  and  higher  inflation--->  "recession- 
induced"  fiscal  deficits  and  "inflation-driven"  loss  of  price  competitiveness  (currency 
revaluation)  -->  additional  budgetary  tightening,  partial  monetization  of  the  deficit,  and 
further  currency  depreciation  -->  deeper  recession  and  higher  inflation  ->  widening  budget 
deficit  and  currency  overvaluation  -->  new  rounds  of  macroeconomic  tightening  and 
currency  devaluation  -->  deeper  economic  contraction  and  higher  inflation  -)  ... 
?,  ý,  77 
Furthermore,  stabilization  measures  produce  additional  inflationary  shocks  in  economies 
of  transition.  In  a  transitional  economy  with  'increasingly  rigid  inflationary  expectations,  ' 
stabilization  measures  running  ahead  of  enterprise  and  other  institutional  (e.  g.,  fiscal, 
financial)  reforms  can  further  destabilize  the  economy  -  add  to  economic  contraction, 
investment  slump,  inflationary  spiral,  and  external  deficits  -  so  that  eventually  even 
stronger  measures  are  necessary.  The  unique  and  complex  conditions  of  Russia  and  other 
successor  states  of  the  Soviet  Union  call  for  significant  modifications  and extensions  of  the 
alternative  strategy,  especially  at  the  stage  of  formulating  concrete  steps  and  implementing 
them.  This  strategy  is  designed  on  'an  imperfectly  co-ordinated  growth-oriented  approach 
where  demand-friendly  stabilization  and  supply-friendly  liberalization  is  encouraged.  978 
Obviously,  capitalism  in  today's  most  advanced  industrialized  countries  took  centuries  to 
develop,  and  even  then  the  state  always  remained  intimately  involved  in  shaping  its 
evolution  and  ensuring  its  survival.  Our  analysis  outlines  the  relevance  of  macroeconomic 
stabilization  as  a  primary  condition  for  the  emergence  of  capitalism.  Once  stabilization  is  in 
place,  the  other  components  of  transition  can  be  implemented  much  easily  and  that  would 
296 enable  the  dynamics  of  market  mechanism  to  interact  freely.  At  this  stage,  the  economies 
in  transition  would  be  applying  economic  growth  models  that  would  bring  about  the 
desired  growth.  The  economies  in  transition  is  a  new  phenomenon  in  the  history  of 
political  economy.  The  transition  is  from  a  socialist  system  to  a  capitalist  system.  This  is  a 
new  vision  of  economic  growth  and  development  and  its  realization  depends  on  a  new 
perspective  of  the  knowledge  sector  of  a  new  growth  model.  We  shall  proceed  to  design  a 
vision-solution  growth  path. 
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THE  VISION-SOLUTION  GROWTH  PATH 
The  foundation  of  the  history  of  the  political  economy  is  based  on  a  vision  -a  vision  of 
the  world  where  allocation  of  resources  ,  production  of  goods  and  services,  and 
distribution  of  wealth  can  be  done  for  the  benefit  of  all  human  beings.  This  vision  often 
contradicts  with  the  reality  in  which  one  finds  himself  or  herself.  While  the  vision  provides 
the  long-term  objective,  various  solutions  have  to  be  designed  to  achieve  this  objective. 
The  economic  history  is full  of  solutions  to  solve  the  economic  problems  and  still  we  find 
ourselves  in  a  world  of  huge  gap  between  the  developed  and  developing  economies;  we 
include  here  the  economies  in  transition  into  the  category  of  developing  economies.  We 
have  tried  capitalist  economic  growth  models.  We  have  also  tried  socialist  growth  models. 
There  were  some  attempts  with  a  mixed  economy  growth  model.  Besides  the  success- 
failure  scenario  of  these  models,  we  need  to  look  a  little  farther.  Of  course,  we  need  all  the 
components  of  these  models.  Without  those  basic  components,  economic  growth  would 
have  never  taken  place  and  any  growth  that  we  have  is  due  to  the  availability  of  those 
basic  components  and  its  intelligent  utilization.  In  our  research  work,  we  have  termed  all 
those  basic  economic  growth  models  in  relation  to  each  of  those  components  as  micro 
knowledge  and  we  have  developed  a  new  knowledge  sector,  namely,  macro  knowledge.  In 
the  following,  we  shall  try  to  integrate  these  macro-micro  knowledge  into  our  vision- 
solution  economic  growth  model. 
Ill. 
The  Vision  Growth  Path 
The  composition  of  place  of  the  former  Soviet  Union  and  other  Eastern  European 
economies  shows  us  the  emergence  of  transitional  economies.  There  is  a  movement  from 
an  embryonic  stage  to  the  stage  of  birth;  from  a  desire  to  be  themselves  to  its  historical 
Wilment.  Along  with  the  vision  of  a  new  sovereign  state,  it  needs  to  develop  a  new 
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I economic  thought;  a  new  economic  thought  that  resonates  the  way  of  thinking  of  the 
people.  Each  transition  economy  adopts  a  strategy  with  the  various  components  of 
transition  to  varying  degrees.  Our  analysis  also  reveals  the  success  and  limitations  of  each 
strategy  and  the  effectiveness  of  the  application  of  each  of  the  components  of  transition. 
Any  growth  strategy  has  to  be  designed  with  a  long-term  vision.  A  vision  provides  a 
spectrum  and  a  perspective. 
We  have  seen  in  the  final  chapter  of  the  section  two,  the  introduction  of  an  ideology 
(Marxist-Leninist)  as  a  micro  knowledge.  The  adherents  of  this  ideology  hoped  that  it 
would  in  course  of  time  replace  the  macro  knowledge.  But,  that  did  not  happen.  Not  only 
macro  knowledge  proved  successful  and  strong,  but  it  dumped  the  micro  knowledge  as  an 
alien  element.  The  experience  of  micro  knowledge  as  an  oppressive  ideological  economic 
system  did  not  fit  into  the  normal  way  of  thinking  of  the  people.  Not  only  it  stagnated 
economic  growth  but  it  deprived  human  growth.  It  denied  human  dignity  and  human  rights 
which  are  the  comer  stone  of  any  economic  success  and  foundations  of  socialist  principles. 
Even  after  the  overthrow  of  this  micro  knowledge  as  an  ideology  and  as  an  economic 
system,  we  note  the  presence  of  the  'old  guards.  '  They  still  adhere  to  the  defunct  micro 
knowledge.  But  it  is  a  false  attachment  to  the  accustomed  micro  knowledge.  Though  it 
has  proved  its  inability  to  provide  any  viable  economic  solution,  'the  system-elite  of  the 
socialist  bourgeois'  class  are  finding  it  difficult  to  part  with  an  economic  system  which 
strengthened  their  position.  The  success  of  macro  knowledge  became  real  due  to  the 
emergence  of  'democrats  and  liberals',  who  represent  the  people.  They  were  able  to 
develop  a  true  detachment  from  the  accustomed  micro  knowledge.  Though  the  clutch  of 
the  micro  knowledge  seemed  so  strong,  it  did  not  have  the  power  to  demoralize  the  macro 
knowledge  on  which  the  way  of  thiiýg  of  all  people  were  built.  That  is  how  the 
democrats  and  liberals  realized  their  hope  of  a  new  vision.  This  vision  is  based  on  the 
longing  of  the  human  person  for  freedom,  democracy,  and  basic  human  rights.  This  vision 
challenged  their  views  of  the  existing  micro  knowledge  as  an  economic  system  which  only 
degrades  the  person  and  stagnates  any  growth  and  development.  This  existential 
realization  of  a  negative  growth  spurred  the  peoples'  movements  in  all  the  oppressed 
economies.  The  liberative  vision  was  provided  by  the  macro  knowledge.  It  is  to  this  macro 
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b knowledge  that  people  unanimously  responded  with  hands  and  feet;  hearts  and  minds.  rrhis 
macro  knowledge  vision  has  to  be  integrated  into  the  visionary  growth  model. 
First  IntMration:  New  Freedom 
The  foremost  experience  of  transitional  economies  is  the  new  fought-gained  freedom.  It 
is  macro  knowledge  that  provided  this  vision  of  freedom  during  the  oppressive  regimes  of 
historical  socialism.  The  concept  of  freedom  as  an  inherent  knowledge  of  all  peoples  and 
nations  is  particularly  alive  in  proletarian  regimes  because  of  its  conspicuous  absence. 
Though  the  proletarian  revolution  was  brought  about  by  this  peoples'  longing  for 
freedom,  during  the  course  of  its  institutionalization,  it  stifled  this  very  longing  to  be  free. 
When  the  concept  of  freedom  becomes  an  institutionalized  mockery  of  the  way  of  thinking 
of  the  people,  people  bear  it  for  a  period  but  not  too  long.  That  is  the  power  of  macro 
knowledge.  Whenever  the  inherent  knowledge  is  stifled,  it  comes  out  with  vengeance  and 
repossesses  itself.  People,  on  the  whole,  begins  to  experience  the  freshness  of  new 
freedom.  This  freedom  is  social,  economic,  political,  religious  and  cultural.  The  political 
expression  of  this  freedom  is  the  emergence  of  democratic  institutions.  This  new  found 
freedom  enables  an  economic  agent  to  grasp  the  economic  vacuum  of  one's  nation  and 
makes  one  feel  the  necessity  of  being  able  to  come  out  of  this  stagnant  state  and  begin  on 
a  new  vision  of  economic  growth. 
Second  Integration:  New  Rights  and  Duties 
With  the  earned  freedom  of  macro  knowledge,  comes  the  new  rights  and  duties  and 
responsibilities.  The  violation  of  human  rights  issues  traumatizes,  anyone  who  dares  to 
look  into  the  historical  socialist  regimes.  The  socialist  economic  growth  path  denied  the 
human  rights  and  ultimately,  human  growth.  (Though  here  we  mention  only  the  experience 
of  historical  socialism,  we  must  not  forget  the  dictatorial  and  other  non-democratic  forms 
of  socio-political  systems  which  constantly  deny  freedom,  democracy,  and  human  rights.  ) 
The  awarding  of  human  rights  to  human  beings  in  the  transitional  economies  is  of  absolute 
305 importance.  Denial  of  human  rights  results  in  deprived  human  conditions  which  stifle  all 
forms  of  human  growth.  'Me  potential  of  human  capital  formation  is  fully  utilized  in  a 
person  with  endowed  human  rights.  Only  this  person  can  consider  the  duties  and 
responsibilities  as  a  citizen.  Slaves  have  no  duty  to  the  state  unless  it  is  imposed  on  them. 
Any  form  of  human  slavery  deprives  human  capital  formation  of  a  nation.  Only  from  a 
truly  dignified  human  being,  the  state  can  expect  a  duty  in  return.  The  macro  knowledge 
vision  of  any  nation  and  people  integrates  well  the  human  dignity  and  human  rights  and 
duties  of  a  citizen.  The  micro  knowledge  which  tries  to  eliminate  this  natural  order  of 
human  dynamics  retards  economic  growth.  The  economic  growth  of  a  nation  depends 
very  much  on  the  acknowledgement  and  endowment  of  human  d4pity  and  human  rights  in 
all  its  varied  dimensions. 
III.  19.  iv.  Third  Integration:  New  Initiatives 
A  nation  which  experiences  freedom  and  people  who  enjoys  their  rights  begin  to  take 
initiatives  as  his/her  duty.  New  initiatives  in  all  forms  of  socio-economic  and  political 
decisions  is  the  first  step  in  this  transitional  stage.  At  this  stage,  the  relevance  of  macro 
knowledge  is  very  crucial.  Old  experience  of  micro  knowledge  could  enable  the  economic 
agent  to  choose  the  new  direction  so  that  his/her  choice  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  macro 
knowledge.  These  initiatives  strengthen  the  take-off  dynamics.  The  dynamics  of  economic 
growth  need  all  forms  of  new  initiatives  for  further  development  especially  to  a  market 
mechanism. 
The  role  of  macro  knowledge  in  the  transitional  stages  of  growth  process  need  to  be 
outlined  clearly.  As  we  have  outlined  the  format  of  macro  knowledge  in  our  earlier 
sections,  it  is  of  great  significance  to  emphasize  its  influence  on  the  economic  behaviour. 
Economic  growth  happens  as  we  integrate  the  elements  of  macro  knowledge  or  it 
collapses  sooner  or  later.  We  cannot  ignore  the  relevance  of  this  inherent  knowledge  in 
our  economic  decisions.  The  new  pillars  of  transitional  economies  must  be  rooted  and 
grounded  on  the  macro  knowledge  of  the  nation,  if  it  has  to  make  the  transition  smoothly 
and  into  a  healthier  global  atmosphere.  In  our  solutionary  growth  model  we  shall  outline 
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world  order. 
As  we  emphasize  the  crucial  role  of  macro  knowledge,  let  us  not  ignore  the  role  of 
micro  knowledge.  The  role  of  micro  knowledge  in  the  transitional  stages  of  growth 
process  is  of  paramount  importance.  If  macro  knowledge  is  the  pillar,  micro  knowledge  is 
the  beam  that  is  going  to  build  the  economic  structure.  Therefore  the  length  and  breadth 
and  weight  and  height  of  applied  micro  knowledge  must  be  in  relation  to  the  foundation  of 
macro  knowledge.  Therefore,  as  we  have  noted  earlier,  macro  and  micro  knowledge  are 
not  competing  genes  in  our  model.  'I'hey  are  not  trying  to  overcome  one  over  the  other. 
Whenever  that  was  the  motive,  the  result  was  stagnation  and  negative  growth  and 
retarded  development.  The  macro  knowledge  of  a  nation  and  the  micro  knowledge  that  is 
developed  within  or  brought  from  outside  ought  to  move  unidirectionally  to  produce 
growth  and  long-term  development.  This  interaction  between  macro  and  micro  knowledge 
during  the  transitional  period  is  to  be  monitored  by  policymakers,  both  of  governmental 
and  non-governmental  entities,  as  they  decide  on  the  priority  issues.  The  priority  issues 
during  the  new  stage  of  development  is  given  in  the  Appendix  111.19.1.  The  integral 
economic  development  of  a  nation  is  to  be  streamlined  by  opting  for  the  new  economic 
thought  for  integral  economic  growth.  We  shall  proceed  to  build  the  new  solution-growth 
economic  model  for  transitional  and  developing  economies. 
1H.  19.  v. 
The  Solution  Growth  Path 
The  vision  of  the  people  of  the  socialist  political  regime  for  a  "common  future"  in  a 
global  village  resulted  in  the  collapse  of  the  socialist  economic  system  and  the  emergence 
of  economies  in  transition.  Their  vision  which  grew  out  of  the  existing  macro  knowledge 
call  for  a  new  understanding  of  an  economic  system  which  would  respect  their  freedom 
and  human  rights.  Any  introduction  of  a  new  micro  knowledge  for  the  promotion  of  the 
welfare  of  the  people  and  for  the  economic  growth  and  development  must  be  based  on 
these  new,  hitherto  unintegrated,  variables.  We  design  the  solutionary  growth  model  by 
integrating  these  new  variables  into  the  model  of  economic  growth.  The  insight  and  the 
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and  Janos  Kornai.  "The  key  point  is  the  methodological  conception  itself,  whereby  we 
njay  introduce  into  macro-models  and  growth  models,  as  appropriate,  unconventional 
latent  variables  for  the  description  and  explanation  of  complex  phenomena,  even  if  it  might 
not  be  possible  to  observe  and  measure  them  directly.  "'  The  economic  modelling  that  we 
undertake  identifies  a  growth  influencing  knowledge  sector  and  we  integrate  into  this 
knowledge  sector  the  hitherto  unintegrated  macro  knowledge  variables,  namely,  freedom., 
democracy  and  human  rights.  We  hope  this  win  also  contribute  to  the  new  attempts  at 
creating  alternate  economic  growth  models. 
111.19.  vi.  The  Premises 
We  divide  the  knowledge  sector  into  two:  macro  knowledge  sector  and  micro 
knowledge.  sector. 
While  macro  knowledge  provides  an  inherent  incentive  for  economic  growth  and 
development,  micro  knowledge  account  for  the  tangible  (measured)  progress.  (In  this 
sense,  following  Romer's  model2,  micro  knowledge  is  endogenous  rather  than 
exogenous.  )  In  an  economic  system,  this  would  mean  that  micro  knowledge  as  well  as 
macro  knowledge  are  endogenous.  (If  we  consider  macro  knowledge  as  exogenous:  This 
is  because  of  the  individuality  of  the  human  person  and  also  because  of  his/her  selfish 
motives.  Rather  than  having  a  collective  endogenity,  then,  we  notice  an  individualistic 
exogenity.  ) 
While  micro  knowledge  is  motivated  by  market  incentives  (following  Romer),  macro 
knowledge  is  not,  because  of  its  inherent  nature.  While  the  development  of  micro 
knowledge  needs  market  incentives,  integration  of  macro  knowledge  into  economic 
policies  does  not  incur  market  incentives. 
While  developing  micro  knowledge  incurs  cost,  the  nature  of  macro  knowledge  renders 
it  costless.  (Following  Romer,  developing  new  and  better  instructions  is  equivalent  to 
incurring  a  fixed  cost.  This  property  is  taken  to  be  the  defining  characteristic  of 
308 technology.  )  3  But  in  our  model,  macro  knowledge  is  not  something  to  be  developed  and 
therefore  it  is  neither  income-incurring  nor  income-generating-public  good.  But  it  controls 
the  minds  and  therefore  the  decisions  of  economic  agents. 
HI.  19.  vii.  Main  Properties 
The  main  characteristic  features  of  the  model  are  the  following: 
We  describe  a  dynamic-macro  system.  The  economy  is  examined  at  the  national 
macro-level. 
With  the  aid  of  the  model  we  shall  describe  both  long-term  and  short-term  processes 
and  shall  examine  their  interactions. 
2.  While  micro  knowledge  determines  the  real  sphere,  macro  knowledge  determines  the 
control  sphere.  In  its  aggregate  form  the  model  describes  the  real  sphere:  production, 
investment,  trade  and  consumption  and  their  success  or  failure  depends  on  the  use  of 
micro  knowledge.  At  the  same  time  it  describes,  exogenously,  the  control  sphere 
which  guides  the  real  sphere.  In  other  words,  the  macro  knowledge  elements  in  the 
model  determines  and  represents  the  behaviour  of  decision-makers. 
3.  In  describing  the  real  sphere  we  apply  several  different  simplifying  assumptions;  the 
growth  of  the  real  sphere  of  any  economic  system  can  be  described  using  this 
particular  block  of  the  model.  In  contrast  to  this,  the  description  of  the  control  sphere 
is  system-specific  and  country-  specific. 
4.  The  analysis  is  less  non-native  but  is  descriptive.  We  shall  try  to  understand  -  to 
describe  and  to  explain  -a  few  properties  of  the  economies  in  transition  as  they 
venture  into  a  new  economic  system.  Economic  policy  is  not  considered  as  something 
existing  outside  the  system  and  controlling  it  from  there  -  listening  to  economists' 
recommendations,  following  the  advice  of  normative  models,  or  personal  judgement. 
Economic  policy  is  an  endogenous  part  of  the  system.  4  The  model  tries  to  reflect  the 
reactions  and  behavioural  regularities  of  the  economic  policy-maker  and  of  the 
planner. 
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ft- 5.  This  is  a  study  in  pure  theory.  On  the  plane  of  pure  theory  a  much  greater  degree  of 
simplification  is  possible  and  necessary  than  that  acceptable  in  a  statistically  based 
econometric  model.  (Actual  analysis  of  the  economic  history  of  the  country  concerned 
would  probably  make  it  clear  that  further  variables  and  equations  need  to  be 
incorporated,  certain  relationships  will  have  to  be  modified,  the  lag  structure  of  the 
model  transformed  and  so  on.  ) 
6.  The  structure  of  the  model  is  suitable  for  representing  endogenously  the  transitions 
from  one  historical  period  to  the  next.  The  transition  to  'ordinary'  or  'normal' 
conditions,  is  possible  only  within  a  stable  institutional  system  and  under  more  or  less 
stable  external  conditions.  ' 
For  the  construction  of  the  model  we  shall  employ  several  assumptions,  in  the  course  of 
the  discussion. 
HI.  19.  viii.  The  Variables  and  Description  of  the  Model 
In  the  following  we  shall  examine  the  model's  variables  and  describe  the  dynamics.  At 
the  present  stage  of  research  it  is  the  model  itsetf  that  should  be  regarded  as  the  main 
result  of  the  work  accomplished  so  far,  much  more  so  than  the  analysis  based  on  it.  We 
shall  try  to  demonstrate  that  'there  exists  a  relatively  simple  formalism,  which  can  be  used 
to  describe  certain  regularities  of  growth,  and  its  self-regulation  in  the  process  of  transition 
to  a  new  free  economy.  '  During  the  period  of  transition,  the  economic  growth  is 
determined  by  the  people  who  prefers  to  opt  for  a  market  to  a  planned  economy.  As  the 
force  of  the  people  changes  an  economic  system,  so  the  new  model  of  economic  growth 
would  focus  on  people-oriented  variables.  The  sequence  is  now  adjusted  to  the  logic  of 
economic  exposition  and  clarification. 
'Me  explanation  of  macro  knowledge  variables  as  economic  variables  is  a  new  attempt. 
So  far,  while  explaining  economic  growth  and  development  models  we  have  just 
concentrated  on  the  basic  economic  variables.  But  a  historical  analysis  of  economic 
development  pattern  of  nations  prove  that  this  approach  does  not  tackle  the  problem. 
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cultural  too.  nerefore  the  new  growth  economic  models  need  to  integrate  these  hitherto 
unintegrated  variables  into  its  framework.  As  we  analyse  the  way  of  thinking  of  a  people 
and  a  nation,  we  will  come  across  various  but  unique  macro  knowledge  variables.  We  shall 
consider  in  our  model  just  three  macro  knowledge  variables  which  have  found  consensus 
across  nations.  They  are  freedom,  democracy  and  human  rights.  nese  variables  have 
been  appropriately  interwoven  into  our  model.  Particularly,  special  preference  has  been 
given  to  the  macro  knowledge  of  freedom  while  modelling  this  new  growth  economic 
thought  for  the  transitional  and  developing  economies. 
III.  19.  ix.  Freedom  as  a  Vital  Component  of  Human  Developmen 
Societies  all  over  the  world  have  struggled  for  centuries  to  build  consensus  through 
systems  of  deliberation  and  negotiation.  Almost  every  country  has  forms  of  community 
decision-making  based  on  dialogue  and  consensus  at  the  local  level.  At  the  national  level, 
however,  political  systems  are  based  more  on  majority  rule.  Almost  half  of  the  world's 
countries  today  have  elected  forms  of  government,  and  many  other  countries  are  moving 
in  this  direction.  Democracy  and  freedom  rely,  however,  on  much  more  than  ballot  box. 
The  expansion  of  democracy  has  been  accompanied  by  a  greater  acknowledgement  of 
human  rights.  Governments  in  every  country  are  surrounded  by  a  host  of  groups  and 
institutions  that  help  build  and  sustain  the  democratic  process.  "Such  groups  can  survive 
even  the  severest  forms  of  political  repression.  Trade  unions  in  Eastern  Europe,  women's 
organizations  in  Latin  America,  students  in  Asia  -  all  have  helped  keep  freedom  alive  and 
played  their  part  in  the  struggle  for  democracy.  They  have  shown  that  freedom  is 
something  not  just  to  be  given  or  taken  -  it  has  to  be  lived.  ý6  The  concept  of  freedom  has 
to  be  concretized,  thus,  through  democracy  by  exercising  political  freedom  and  through 
protection  of  basic  human  rights. 
III.  19.  x.  The  Freedom-Development  Debate 
311 The  link  between  freedom  and  development  is  seldom  in  dispute.  What  is  often  disputed 
is  the  causality  -  whether  more  freedom  leads  to  more  development  or  more  development 
leads  to  more  freedom.  This  might  reflect  the  diversity  of  historical  experience  and  the 
many  policy  options  available.  If  growth  is  seen,  however,  not  an  end  in  itself  but  as  a  part 
of  human  development,  democracy  cannot  be  set  aside.  Thus,  political  freedom  is  an 
essential  element  of  human  development.  Some  scholars  have  argued  that  freedom  is  a 
necessary  condition  to  liberate  the  creative  energies  of  the  people  and  to  pursue  a  path  of 
rapid  economic  development.  "What  is  clear  is  that  the  economically  better-off  countries 
today  (as  measured  by  GDP  or  the  HDI)  also  have  a  large  measure  of  freedom.  v,  7  People 
now  see  freedom  as  an  essential  element  in  human  development,  not  as  an  optional  extra. 
There  exists  a  genuine  desire  across  the  world  for  both  economic  progress  and  political 
freedom.  At  the  national  level,  people  are  becoming  more  educated  and  conscious  of  their 
rights.  At  the  global  level,  human  rights  monitors  and  the  rapidly  expanding  media 
networks  provide  a  steady  flow  of  information  on  human  rights  violations.  Human  cruelty 
can  no  longer  be  hidden  in  dark  and  distant  comers  of  the  planet.  8  This  changing 
international  culture  and  public  awareness  also  affects  international  development  co- 
operation. 
Ul.  19.  xi.  A  System  of  Classification  of  Freedoms 
Societies  clearly  differ  in  their  notions  of  freedom  a  nd  in  how  they  perceive  and  establish 
the  link  between  freedom  and  development.  One  widely  used  distinction  is  that  between 
individual  and  collective  rights.  One  important  difference  concerns  the  emphasis  societies 
may  place  on  the  freedom  of  the  individual  and  that  of  collectives  -  as  the  family,  the  tribe, 
the  community,  or  the  country.  While  some  rights  are  enjoyed  by  every  person 
individually,  others  apply  to  specific  groups  of  people,  such  as  freedom  from  gender, 
ethnic  or  racial  discrimination.  All  individuals  freedoms  need  to  be  interpreted  so  that 
freedom  for  some  does  not  curtail  the  freedom  of  others  or  impair  collective  national 
interests.  Another  forrn  of  classification  of  freedoms  could  be  based  on  economic  and 
social  rights.,  which  were  endorsed  in  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights 
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hk.  - (adopted  in  1948).  'Me  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social,  and  Cultural  Rights 
adopted  in  1966  and  the  Declaration  on  the  Right  to  Development  adopted  in  1986, 
emphasized  both  political  rights  and  economic  and  social  rights.  For  many  people, 
economic  and  social  rights  are  just  as  important  as  political  freedom,  or  more  so.  Political 
democracy  will  always  be  fragile  until  basic  economic  rights  are  guaranteed.  Therefore, 
economic  and  social  rights  should  be  included  in  any  freedom  index.  It  is  certainly  true 
that  any  comprehensive  definition  of  human  freedom  must  include  economic,  social,  and 
political  rights.  The  human  development  index  (HDI)  is  an  attempt  to  measure  economic 
and  social  rights  and  the  extent  to  which  they  are  realized. 
A  new  political  freedom  index  (PFI)  could  look  specifically  at  political  rights.  Many 
international  agreements  have  been  adopted  on  civil  and  political  rights.  Analysing  the 
rights  enshrined  in  these  documents  show  considerable  congruence.  They  can  be  grouped 
into  five  broad  clusters,  reflecting  values  common  to  all  cultures,  all  religions  and  all 
stages  of  development.  They  are  personal  security,  rule  of  law,  freedom  of  expression, 
political  participation,  and  equality  of  opportunity.  10  An  illustrative  checklist  of  indicators 
of  political  freedom  is  given  in  Appendix  HI.  19.2.  These  five  clusters  can  also  be  related  to 
the  main  institutions  of  society  that  protect  -  or  abuse  -  human  rights.  The  legislature 
represents  political  participation;  the  executive  branch  has  a  critical  role  in  equality  of 
opportunity;  the  judiciary  is  responsible  for  rule  of  law  and  the  physical  integrity  of  the 
individual;  and  the  'fourth  estate',  civil  society  and  the  press,  are  important  barometers  of 
freedom  of  expression,  including  freedom  of  association  and  movement.  The  relevance  of 
human  development,  universal  applicability,  and  freedom  from  any  cultural  bias  could  be 
considered  as  the  criteria  while  creating  indicators  of  political  freedom. 
A  tentative  attempt  was  made  by  different  experts  to  construct  a  political  freedom  index. 
The  overall  conclusion  is  that  "political  freedom  and  human  development  seem  to  move  in 
tandem.  ""  This  conclusion  is  also  supported  by  the  following  Table. 
Table  1111.19.1 
Lbie:  Political  Freedom  Index  (PFI)  Aggregates 
Lggregate  Personal  Rule  of  j  Freedom  of  Political  Equality  of  PFI  I 
Participatio  Opportunit 
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bk.  - Security  Law  Expression  n  y 
Human 
developme 
nt  levels 
High  HDI  8.5  8.4  8.4  8.9  7.8  84.1 
Medium  4.8  4.8  4.7  5.0  5.5  49.6 
HDI 
Low  HDI  4.5  4.6  4.9  4.3  5.8  48.2 
Per  Capita 
Income 
Levels 
High  8.7  8.6  8.3  8.7  7.6  83.7 
Income 
Middle  5.8  5.8  6.0  6.3  6.4  60.8 
Income 
Low  4.0  4.2  4.3  3.4  5.5  42.8 
Income 
Political 
Freedom 
Levels 
High  9.0  9.1  9.1  9.5  8.2  89.7 
Political 
Freedom 
Reasonable  5.6  6.1  6.6  6.5  6.3  62.0 
Political 
Freedom 
Modest  3.8  3.3  3.0  2.6  5.2  35.8 
Political 
Freedom 
Low  1.9  1.6  1.3  1.3  3.8  19.9 
Political 
Freedom 
Global 
Profile 
World  6.0  6.0  6.1  6.1  6.4  61.0 
Industrial  9.2  9.2  9.1  9.5  8.1  90.1 
Countries 
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Source:  Human  Development  Report  1992. 
The  Distribution  of  Freedom:  Data  were  collected  for  104  countries  representing  92%  of 
the  world's  population.  Of  these,  about  a  third  had  high  freedom  (a  75%  score  or  above), 
another  third  had  reasonable  freedom  (50-75%),  and  the  remaining  third  modest  to  low 
freedom  (50%  or  less).  But  given  the  current  political  trends  in  the  world,  it  is  clear  that 
an  increasing  number  of  countries  will  be  moving  to  higher  scores. 
The  Link  with  Human  Development:  Political  freedom  and  human  development  do  seem 
to  move  in  tandem.  Countries  with  a  high  HDI  have  an  average  PH  of  84%,  while 
countries  with  a  low  HDI  have  an  average  PFI  of  48%. 
The  Link  with  Levels  of  Income:  There  also  appears  to  be  a  link  between  a  country's  per 
capita  income  and  the  extent  of  its  democratic  freedoms.  For  high-income  countries,  the 
average  PH  is  84%,  for  middle-income  countries  61%,  and  for  low-income  countries 
43%.  But  the  Table  also  shows  that,  as  income  levels  fall,  freedom  does  not  decline 
correspondingly.  Even  poor  nations  can  enjoy  a  high  level  of  political  freedom. 
Progress  to  Date:  Political  participation  (through  elected  legislatures)  and  equality  of 
opportunity  are  the  areas  in  which  the  world  has  progressed  the  most.  Physical  integrity  of 
the  individual,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  area  where  human  rights  abuses  still  occur  most 
frequently.  12 
The  overall  conclusions  that  flow  from  the  Table  and  the  analysis  should  be  treated  with 
great  caution,  since  this  was  only  a  first  step  in  this  direction.  More  research  is  needed  to 
investigate  further  the  interrelationship  of  freedom  and  development;  to  investigate  the 
interrelationship  between  individual  and  collective  rights  as  well  as  that  between  political 
rights  and  economic  and  social  rights.  Appendix  HI.  19.3.  presents  "the  tide  of  freedom"  as 
it  happened  recently,  and  it  brings  out  the  interrelationship  as  well.  It  is  necessary  to 
understand  more  fully  how  development  relates  to  human  rights,  democracy  and  freedom 
and  vice  versa. 
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L 111.19.  xii.  Macro  KnowIfte  of  Freedom 
The  phenomenon  of  the  macro  knowledge  of  freedom  plays  a  central  role  in  our  way  of 
thinking  and  therefore  in  the  formulation  of  this  model.  Although  the  model  analyses  the 
national  economy  at  the  macro-level,  we  must  set  out  from  the  microeconomic 
foundations  in  order  to  deal  with  this  new  economic  growth  variable,  freedom.  We  could 
describe  the  'vocabulary'  freedom  as  a  category  comprising  a  large  group  of  phenomena. 
Freedom  is  a  summary  expression  referring  to  numerous  elementary  presence  or  absence 
of  freedom  events.  Its  measurement  involves  particular  difficulties.  Freedom  is  too 
precious  to  be  reduced  to  a  number.  It  cannot  be  done  by  straightforward  summation, 
since  it  is  obvious  that  we  cannot  directly  add  up  the  indicators  of  events  and  processes 
that  are  qualitatively  totally  different.  Therefore,  if  we  wish  to  represent  freedom 
phenomena  within  a  macromodel,  we  must  use  some  indirect  methods  of  measurement. 
The  first  task  is  to  assemble  a  large  number  of  partial  presence  or  absence  offi-eedom 
indicators.  The  political  freedom  index  is  a  guide  in  this  direction.  We  could  also  assemble 
a  large  number  of  protection  or  abuse  of  human  rights  indicators.  In  the  present  study, 
concerned  with  the  formulation  of  a  theoretical  model,  it  is  sufficient  to  observe  that  'a 
comprehensive  and  regular  observation  of  partial  presence  or  absence  of  freedom 
indicators  is  possible.  '  There  is  no  theoretical  or  methodological  obstacle  to  the 
organization  of  such  observation.  All  partial  presence  or  absence  of  freedom  indicators  are 
measured  in  their  own  units.  Only  two  general  properties  are  stipulated  in  defining  them. 
1.  Higher  values  of  any  partial  absence  of  freedom  indicator  show  more  intensive 
oppression  and  mal-development,  while  lower  values  show  less  intensive  economic 
growth. 
2.  Each  partial  presence  of  freedom  indicator  is  non-negative,  while  the  absence  of 
freedom  indicator  is  always  negative. 
In  a  real  economic  system  the  partial  absence  of  freedom  indicators  are  not,  of  course, 
perfectly  correlated  but  there  are  several  circumstances  that  create  quite  a  strong  positive 
correlation  between  them.  For  instance,  the  absence  of  a  democratic  process  is  positively 
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b correlated  to  the  absence  of  freedom.  The  violation  of  basic  human  rights  is,  again, 
positively  correlated  to  the  absence  of  freedom.  For  all  these  reasons,  it  is  reasonable  to 
expect  that  positive  correlation  between  different  units  of  absence  of  freedom  and  mal- 
development  indicators  should  be  considerable.  If  we  could  detect  this  correlation,  then 
the  economic  policy  could  be  redirected  to  enhance  the  relationship  between  economic 
growth  and  freedom.  We  shall  proceed  to  analyse  the  microeconomic  variables  to 
understand  the  national  economy  at  the  macro-level. 
111.19.  xiii.  Household  Demand  and  Purchases 
The  demand  of  the  household  depends  on  a  number  of  explanatory  factors:  consumer 
prices,  past  and  present  nominal  incomes,  the  accumulated  wealth  of  the  household., 
expectations  concerning  the  future  etc.  13  Let  us  consider  all  these  factors  as  given  and 
constant,  so  that  we  can  express  household  demand  as  a  function  of  a  single  explanatory 
variable,  namely  absence  or  presence  of  freedom.  In  Figure  1,  we  show  the  effect  on  the 
household  demand  and  purchases  as  a  function  of  absence  of  freedom. 
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41  el  z In  Figure  2,  we  show  the  effect  on  the  household  demand  and  purchases  as  a  function 
of  presence  of  freedom.  Let  us  denote  the  demand  of  the  household  sector  by  HD,  and  its 
actual  purchases  by  H.  The  freedom  index  is  denoted  by  Z.  In  a  regime  where  there  is  a 
conspicuous  absence  of  freedom,  the  household  demand  and  purchases  fall  because  of  the 
negativity  approach  to  human  living  due  to  their  denial  of  human  rights  and  this  in  turn 
retards  economic  development.  This  is  the  experience  of  many  under-developed 
economies.  Therefore,  it  is  imperative  for  the  economies  in  transition  to  make  sure  that 
households  experience  a  conspicuous  presence  of  freedom  as  they  go  about  fulfilling  their 
economic  activities.  This  is  crucial  because  of  the  need  to  develop  a  positive  approach  to 
human  living  that  would  in  turn  give  the  oil  necessary  to  ignite  the  engine  of  economic 
growth  mechanism.  During  the  transition  period,  this  indicates  that  the  household  sector 
buys  more  than  normal  if  presence  of  freedom  is  more  intensive  than  normal,  and 
conversely. 
I[I.  19.  xiv.  The  Firms'  Demand  and  Purchases 
In  a  free-market  economic  model,  firms'  budget  constraint  is  hard  and  therefore  bind  its 
purchasing  intention.  Survival  of  the  firm  depends  on  the  rational  decisions  and  choices. 
While  this  is  a  micro  knowledge  understanding  of  a  firm's  working  dynamism,  what  we 
need  to  equally  emphasize  during  the  period  of  transition,  is  the  necessity  of  creating  a 
dynamic  economic  atmosphere  where  macro  knowledge  of  freedom  prevails  for  the 
entrepreneurs  to  engage  in  economic  activities.  As  we  have  shown  in  the  household's 
demand  and  purchases,  we  could  depict  the  firm's  demand  and  purchases  as  a  function  of 
absence  or  presence  of  freedom.  Figure  3  shows  the  effect  on  firm's  demand  and 
purchases  during  a  period  of  absence  of  freedom. 
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A., Similarly,  we  can  show  the  effect  on  firm's  demand  and  purchases  during  a  period  of 
presence  of  freedom,  as  shown  in  Figure  4.  'Me  resulting  situation  can  be  described  as  a 
positive  correlation  between  freedom  of  the  entrepreneurs  and  economic  growth.  The 
firm's  demand  for  current  inputs  for  production  is  rationalized  but  increases  constantly  in 
relation  to  the  prevalence  of  free  economic  atmosphere. 
From  the  theoretical  point  of  view,  there  is  a  remarkable  analogy  with  the  familiar 
properties  of  demand  functions  as  discussed  in  standard  MiCroeConomiCS.  14  We  have  the 
downward-sloping  purchases  functions  H  and  Y  yet  not  as  functions  of  the  purchase  price, 
but  of  a  non-price  variable,  namely,  the  absence  of  freedom.  The  loss  caused  by  the 
prevalence  of  the  absence  of  the  freedom  is  the  'price'  the  buyer  has  to  pay.  But  during 
the  transition  period,  this  effect  can  be  reversed  by  creating  an  atmosphere  of  freedom. 
Then,  we  will  have  an  upward-sloping  purchases  functions  and  the  non-price  variable, 
namely,  the  presence  of  freedom  will  have  a  positive  effect.  The  gain  caused  by  the 
prevalence  of  the  presence  of  freedom  is  the  growth  that  the  economy  would  be 
experiencing.  The  more  intensive  the  absence  of  freedom,  the  higher  this  'price'  for 
development,  therefore,  the  more  the  investor  will  refrain  from  his  original  investing 
intention.  Conversely,  as  the  intensity  of  the  presence  of  freedom  increases,  the  economic 
activity  increases,  and  the  economic  growth  would  show  an  upward  trend. 
1H.  19.  xv.  Production 
In  our  model,  byproduction  we  mean  the  gross  output;  output  produced  to  cover  not 
only  final  consumption,  but  also  the  current  inputs  required  for  production.  During  the 
period  of  transition,  there  is  a  surge  in  the  household  demand  for  consumer  goods  as  well 
as  an  increase  in  the  firms'  demand  for  inputs,  especially  as  the  economies  in  transition 
move  from  a  tight  centrally-command  planned  economy  to  a  free-market  economy. 
'Mough  there  is  a  general  decline  in  the  volume  of  production  of  goods  and  services  in  the 
initial  stages  of  transition,  as  we  have  noticed  in  the  newly  formed  republics  of  former 
Soviet  Union  and  other  East  and  Central  European  economies,  we  notice  that  production 
slowly  picks  up  and  economic  growth  becomes  positive.  This  has  happened  in  those 
323 economies  of  transition  where  stabilization  is  pursued  through  democratic  means.  It  is  the 
macro  knowledge  of  suffering  for  the  newly  won  freedom  that  kept  the  transition  going, 
rather  than  choosing  for  hasty  options.  The  prevalence  of  political-social  and  economic 
freedom  determines  the  production  process.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  both  explanatory  factors, 
final  consumption  and  current  inputs,  are  adversely  affected  in  a  regime  of  production 
decisions  where  a  conspicuous  effect  of  the  absence  of  freedom  prevails.  As  impatient 
buyers  press  the  producer  to  supply  as  much  as  possible  and  as  soon  as  possible  under  a 
shortage  economy  of  the  socialist  system,  the  same  phenomena  could  be  repeated  in  the 
initial  stages  of  transition  if  the  decision-makers  do  not  give  due  weight  to  the  macro 
knowledge  of  basic  needs.  During  this  cumbersome  period,  it  is  important  to  foHow,  on 
the  one  hand  stringent  stabilization  policies  and  on  the  other  hand,  responding  to  the 
discontent  of  the  public  by  turning  the  incompetent  production  apparatus  to  a  competent 
production  path.  In  this  way,  production  grows  as  transition  stabilizes  and  the  result  is 
economic  growth. 
We  can  notice  a  unique  characteristic  in  the  politics  of  the  historical  socialist  regime, 
where,  the  politicians  press  the  party-supporters  to  eliminate  the  enemies  as  many  as 
possible  and  as  soon  as  possible.  This  instilled  fear  that  existed  from  top  to  bottom  of  this 
economic  system  crippled  the  people  and  their  economic  growth  psychologically.  During 
the  period  of  transition  a  macro  knowledge  of  reconciliation  is  to  be  introduced  to  replace 
this  fear-complex  which  stifles  any  human  growth  (as  is  done  in  the  new  South  Africa).  15 
As  the  absence  of  freedom  coincides  with  the  violation  of  human  rights,  the  presence  of 
freedom  must  not  only  endows  people  with  human  rights  but  enables  them  to  regain  the 
lost  self-confidence.  Though  this  is  a  political  process,  the  economies  in  transition  need  to 
undertake  this  in  order  to  put  the  production  process  in  the  hands  of  a  confident  nation. 
The  social  anarchy  that  we  notice  in  many  transitional,  developing  and  developed 
countries  is  to  be  tackled  by  pursuing  the  macro  knowledge  of  reconciliation  between 
peoples  of  the  various  social  strata  of  the  population  and  between  genders;  this  is 
imperative  because  of  the  nature  of  the  social  anarchy  which  leads  to  the  destruction  of  the 
whole  production  process. 
324 111.19.  xvi.  Investment 
The  analysis  of  investment  is  of  prime  importance  in  any  discussion  on  economic  growth 
models  and  is  considered  as  the  'core'  of  the  model.  "It  may  not  be  exaggerating  to  say 
that  all  macro-theories  that  neglect  a  genuine  investigation  of  investment  effectively  turn 
their  back  on  the  most  important  question.  ,  16  Investment  is  a  dynamic  process.  The 
implementation  of  a  project  goes  on  for  years  and,  therefore,  a  micro-level  investment 
decision  entails  long-term  obligations.  This  is  why  it  is  indispensable  -  even  at  the  cost  of 
some  increased  complexity  in  the  model's  structure  -  that  we  should  try  to  represent  the 
lags  that  characterize  the  investment  processes  and  the  associated  production  processes. 
This  is  particularly  important  in  examining  the  growth  problems  of  the  economies  in 
transition  since,  as  is  well  known,  the  protracted  implementation  of  investment  projects 
would  be  quite  frequent.  17 
The  existing  capitalist  models  of  economic  growth  where  investment  plays  a  crucial  role 
have  been  explained  in  the  first  section  of  our  study.  We  have  also  analysed  the  socialist 
economic  growth  models  where  investment  is  considered  as  almost  the  only  pillar 
necessary  for  development.  Both  of  the  economic  systems  considered  the  role  of 
investment  as  crucial.  Yet  by  following  these  models  we  could  not  bring  about  a  better 
world.  During  the  period  of  transition,  the  economies  in  transition,  would  be  following  a 
capitalist-market  oriented  growth  economic  model.  As  we  have  explained  in  section  one, 
these  models  involve  the  introduction  of  a  micro  knowledge  model  which  is  based  on 
physical  capital,  human  labour,  technological  progress,  human  capital  and  research  and 
development.  We  have  been  trying  to  develop  the  knowledge  sector  that  resulted  out  of 
R&D.  The  existing  R&D  mostly  concentrates  on  developing  the  micro  knowledge  sector. 
Our  attempt  here  is  to  show  the  existence  of  the  macro  knowledge  sector  as  a  priori  to 
micro  knowledge  sector  and  we  try  to  synthesize  both  these  parallel  sectors  in  our  model 
of  economic  growth.  As  is  already  pointed  out  and  still  not  irrelevant  for  countries  in 
transition  that,  huge  investment  is  needed  for  capital  formation  and  technology 
development.  At  the  same  time,  recent  research  studies  have  shown  that  an  equally  huge 
325 investment  is  needed  for  the  formation  of  human  capital.  It  is  the  formation  and  availability 
of  human  capital  that  is  going  to  transform  the  countries  in  transition  as  well  as  developing 
and  developed  economies.  We  accept  the  new  economic  growth  theories  as  has  been 
explained  in  section  one.  Here,  we  shall  not  further  elucidate  those  elements  of  growth 
economics.  What  we  shall  explain  in  relation  with  investment  is  the  relevance  of  macro 
knowledge  variables. 
Economies  in  transition  look  for  investment  from  internal  and  external  sources.  Capital 
flight  from  potential  internal  investors  and  investment  into  transitional  economies  from 
external  investors  remain  as  a  paradox  in  the  history  of  economic  growth  discussion.  18 
While  capital  flight  has  been  huge,  the  external  investment  remained  at  a  very  low  level  in 
the  transitional  economies.  As  we  have  seen  the  positive  or  negative  correlation  between 
the  household-firm  demand  function  to  the  prevalence  of  the  macro  knowledge  of 
freedom,  we  could  also  examine  the  phenomenon  of  investment  within  the  background  of 
the  macro  knowledge  of  freedom.  Investment  increases  as  the  presence  of  freedom 
intensifies  and  decreases  as  the  absence  of  freedom  strengthens.  As  the  stabilization 
process  deepens,  capital  flight  reverses  into  a  form  of  re-investment.  Foreign  direct 
investment  strengthens  as  the  presence  of  freedom  is  concretised  through  democratic 
institutions.  International  assistance  flows  smoothly  as  the  human  rights  record  is 
straightened.  On  the  whole,  a  general  normal-ordinary  prevalence  of  freedom  is  necessary 
for  healthy  growth  of  investment  and  thereby  economic  growth  and  development. 
[In  a  sense,  our  model  does  not  contain  or  explain  the  normal  variables  or  elements  of 
economic  theory,  like  the  aggregate  capital,  fixed  and  current  assets,  (and  within  the  latter 
between  input  and  output  stocks).  As  regards  fixed  capital,  it  is  represented  by  the  well- 
known  'vintage'  model.  We  do  not  aggregate  fixed  capital  of  different  vintages,  but  treat 
each  vintage  seperately.  '9  We  assume  that  investments  are  only  made  by  agents  of  market 
economy  and  are  exclusively  for  productive  purposes.  All  investments  from  other  sources 
or  for  other  purposes  are  disregarded.  When  we  consider  a  single  vintage,  we  note  that  the 
expenditure  on  each  project  has  its  own  particular  dynamics;  one  lasts  longer,  the  other 
326 one  a  shorter  time;  in  one  much  expenditure  is  incurred  at  the  beginning,  in  another  in  the 
middle  of  the  gestation  period,  and  so  on.  '01 
III.  19.  xvii.  Investing  in  Human  CaDital 
We  shall  make  a  few  notes  on  the  importance  of  investing  in  human  capital.  As  has  been 
discussed  already,  new  research  studies  have  shown  that  any  economic  growth  depends 
directly  on  the  formation  of  human  capital  and  its  availability.  Development  of  technology 
and  skilled  labour  result  directly  from  investing  in  human  beings.  Therefore,  investing  in 
human  capital  formation  could  be  considered  as  a  dynamic  investment  which  generates 
various  forms  of  micro  knowledge.  At  the  same  time  it  is  important  to  note  that  human 
beings  are  not  just  a  means  to  an  end.  They  are  an  end  in  themselves.  This  teleological 
vision  of  a  human  person  takes  precedence  over  the  mere  objective  of  economic 
development.  Therefore,  while  framing  strategies  for  the  formation  of  human  capital,  it 
should  be  done  within  the  framework  of  the  macro  knowledge  of  freedom,  democracy  and 
human  rights.  While  investing  in  human  person  enables  one  to  grow  and  develop  his/her 
potential,  it  must  be  done  in  an  atmosphere  of  freedom.  Coercive  methods  of  human 
capital  formation  not  only  retards  the  economic  growth  but  retards  the  dignity  of  the 
human  person  and  thereby  result  in  human  rights  violation.  During  the  process  of 
transition  new  educational  and  R&D  policies  must  be  framed  so  that  the  new  generation 
may  begin  experiencing  the  prevalence  of  freedom  in  and  out  of  the  class  rooms.  This  free 
thinking  atmosphere  is  perennial  to  the  strategies  of  human  capital  formation  for  economic 
growth. 
We  assume  that  technical  progress  is  positively  correlated  with  the  human  capital 
formation.  While  technical  progress  implies  a  constant  rate  of  progress,  it  is  the 
development  of  human  capital  that  determines  change  in  the  employment  and  productivity 
possihilities  latent  in  the  techniques  introduced  by  successive  vintages.  In  reality,  the 
technical  parameters  are  not  independent  of  each  other.  They  grow  together  as  human 
capital  formation  increases.  Their  interrelations  are  treated  in  detail  in  theories  of 
Production  and  growth.  However,  we  do  not  deal  with  these  interrelationships  here.  21  We 
327 wish,  with  the  aid  of  our  model,  to  focus  attention  primarily  on  the  development  of  the 
volume  of  investment.  As  the  human  capital  formation  takes  momentum,  the  volume  of 
investment  increases  in  a  free  market  economy.  22  (ref.  Barro)  This  is  because  of  the 
endogenous  nature  of  investment  in  a  free  market  structure  and  the  control  that  the 
prevalence  of  human  capital  can  exert  on  the  volume  of  investment.  The  deepening  of 
human  capital  formation,  technological  progress  and  investment,  during  the  period  of 
transition,  must  happen  within  the  prevalence  of  macro  knowledge  of  freedom  if  it  is  to 
play  a  role  in  the  progress  of  people  oriented  development. 
The  simple  structure  given  above  seems  adequate  for  the  present  theoretical  analysis,  for 
it  makes  clear  our  main  point  about  the  solutionary  growth  path  where  a  causal  direction 
is  described  in  the  framework  of  macro  knowledge  to  explain  the  necessity  of  integrating 
these  new  variables  for  economic  growth  and  development.  The  inter-relations  of  the 
traditional  economic  variables  and  the  new  macro  knowledge  variables  are  appropriately 
interwoven  into  our  model.  Definitely,  there  would  be  many  signal-reactions  as  we 
process  this  model  into  the  transition-growth  path.  We  could  analyse  the  'signal-reaction' 
that  would  emulate  out  of  this  model  by  following  a  mechanism  of  feedback.  If  we  are 
able  to  read  the  signal-reactions,  we  could  feed  it  back  into  the  model  so  that  the  model 
could  be  corrected  in  case  of  necessity  by  a  feedback  praxis  approach.  Let  us  describe  the 
feedback  mechanism. 
IR.  19.  xviii.  Necessitv  of  Feedback  Mechanism 
We  shaH  explain.  the  feedback  mechanism  within  the  framework  of  the  consumption 
function,  investment  function,  and  macro  knowledge  function.  When  we  consider  the 
feedback  to  understand  the  consumption  function,  we  notice  the  following.  In  formulating 
economic  policy,  it  must  be  taken  into  account  that  the  population  expects  its 
consumption  to  rise,  now  and  in  the  future,  at  the  customary  rate.  Accordingly,  the  first 
feedback  reflects  the  behaviour  of  the  central  economic  policy-makers  and  planners.  "If 
the  growth  of  consumption  remains  below  its  usual  rate,  the  scale  of  investment  will  be 
reduced  so  as  to  leave  more  of  the  national  income  for  consumption.  If,  on  the  other  hand., 
328 the  population  'lives  too  well',  or  the  growth  of  consumption  has  accelerated  unusually, 
larger  volumes  of  investments  can  be  started,  since  it  is  considered  justified  to  divert  some 
of  the  resources  devoted  to  household  consumption.  ,  23  It  can  be  verified  empirically  that 
this  kind  of  feedback  exists,  though  not  necessarily  in  the  very  simple  form  that  appears  in 
the  model.  T.  Bauer  calls  this  kind  of  reaction  'a  cycle  symmetrical  with  consumption.  '24 
When  we  consider  the  feedback  to  understand  the  investment  function,  we  notice  the 
following.  The  second  feedback  influences  upper-,  medium-,  and  lower-level  decision- 
makers  alike.  It  involves  an  understanding  of  the  investment  commitment.  "If  economic 
managers  feel  they  have  over-committed  themselves  in  the  past,  they  will  now  hold  back 
new  investment  starts.  q125  Above-normal  shortage  intensity  therefore  induces  the  decision- 
makers  to  restrain  new  investment  starts.  It  is  good  to  recall  here  the  characteristics  of  the 
socialist  system  that  we  have  discussed  in  section  two  of  our  study,  and  inquire  whether 
socialist  managers  applied  this  feedback  understanding  into  their  economic  decisions. 
When  we  consider  the  existence  of  an  insatiable  demand  for  investment  goods  in  the 
socialist  economies,  the  system-specific  characteristics  -  like  the  expansion  drive,  and  the 
concomitant  investment  hunger,  and  the  lack  of  self-imposed  limit,  etc.,  -  could  be 
explained  because  of  the  insensitivity  to  signal-reactions  and  the  inability  to  feed  it  back 
into  the  socialist  economic  system.  In  this  socialist  scenario,  as  we  have  seen,  the  volume 
of  investment  does  not  depend  on  the  financial  state  of  the  firm's  sector,  its  present  and 
future  profits,  accumulated  or  additional  savings,  the  condition  of  the  state  budget,  or  any 
expected  constraints  on  sales.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  omit  these  factors  from  a  growth 
model  of  a  capitalist  economy.  The  decision-makers  and  the  policy  implementers  of  the 
transition  economies  could  apply  this  feedback  mechanism  of  the  investment  function  as 
they  make  investment  decisions  for  economic  growth.  26 
When  we  consider  thefeedback  to  understand  the  macro  knowledge  function,  we  notice 
the  following.  The  third  feedback  is  based  on  the  macro  knowledge  variables,  namely 
freedom,  democracy  and  human  rights.  "The  positive  experience  of  existential  freedom,  - 
by  upholding  democratic  institutions,  and  by  respecting  basic  human  rights  and  by 
providing  basic  needs  of  the  people  -  determines  further  growth.  "  The  negative  experience 
329 of  freedom  is  detrimental  to  any  growth.  'Me  integral  economic  development  is  directly 
related  with  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  macro  knowledge  variables.  The  household 
demand,  firms'  demand,  consumption  and  investment  functions  etc.  react  positively  to  the 
prevalence  of  macro  knowledge  variables.  As  the  macro  knowledge  variables  are 
intensified,  the  economic  growth  takes  an  upturn,  especially  in  economies  which  follow  a 
transitional  process. 
The  economies  in  transition  as  well  as  developing  and  developed  countries  must  be 
sensitive  to  the  signal  reactions  of  the  market  as  well  as  of  the  people.  Responding  to 
these  signal  reactions,  after  careful  analysis  of  each  issue,  is  important  especially  in  the 
period  of  transition.  Since  this  is  a  period  of  lot  of  experiments  in  socio-economic  and 
political  restructuring,  this  period  is  more  vulnerable  than  in  any  other  situation.  The 
feedback  mechanism  enables  the  decision  makers  to  respond  to  the  signal  reactions.  What 
should  be  fed  back  into  the  system,  how  it  should  be  done  etc.  are  to  be  decided  on  the 
basis  of  macro  knowledge  variables. 
HI.  19.  xix.  EmplqjýMent 
The  fixed  capital  created  by  investment  vintage  starts  and  contributes  and  ends  and  this 
could  be  considered  as  the  economic  life  of  a  fixed  capital.  27  In  this  environment  labour 
demand  is  determined  by  the  job-creating  effect  of  the  various  investment  vintages, 
summing  over  the  vintages  in  operation  in  a  particular  year.  During  the  'extensive  growth 
period',  as  we  have  explained  in  the  historical  socialist  regime,  the  labour  supply-reserve 
could  be  considered  practically  unlimited.  Accordingly  actual  employment,  coincides  with 
labour  demand.  Also  as  we  have  discussed,  the  'intensive  growth  period'  experiences  the 
exhaustion  of  labour  reserves.  "It  is  a  characteristic  of  the  extensive  period  that  while  the 
market  for  products  is  a  'sellers'  market'  with  chronic  shortage,  the  market  for  labour  is  a 
'buyers'  market'  with  substantial  labour  reserves.  ý.  928 
The  economies  in  transition  experienced  a  general  decline  in  labour  demand  immediately 
after  the  collapse  of  the  planned  regime.  Appendix  Ill.  19.4  gives  details  about  the 
330 problems  related  with  labour  demand;  also  it  provides  the  number  of  official  total 
employment  and  total  unemployment  in  the  transition  countries.  This  is  mainly  due  to  the 
structural  adjustment  that  these  economies  in  transition  were  forced  to  undertake  to 
transform  their  economies  to  a  market  economy.  This  is  also  due  to  the  failure  of  the 
micro  knowledge  legacy  of  an  economic  system,  where  forced  employment  and  irrational 
payment  scheme  kept  a  full  employment  model.  In  the  new  atmosphere  of  freedom,  people 
choose  to  exercise  their  human  rights  by  demanding  the  right  wages  and  right  atmosphere 
of  employment.  Transitional  economies  though  fail  initially  to  provide  all  these  new 
demands,  at  least  were  able  to  provide  a  free  atmosphere  for  the  new  economic  system 
that  would  enable  to  address  these  demands  in  a  more  rational  way.  As  investment 
environment  is  created  through  opting  for  the  macro  knowledge  of  freedom,  employment 
opportunities  too  would  rise  in  this  same  manner. 
111.19.  xx.  Real  Waizes  and  Household  Savines 
The  household  does  not  react  separately  to  nominal  incomes  and  the  consumer  price 
level.  Its  decisions  about  spending  and  saving  depend  exclusively  on  their  joint  effect;  that 
is,  on  real  wages.  (We  disregard  other  types  of  incomes  because  we  assume  that  during 
the  early  transition  period  the  generation  of  other  fon-ns  of  incomes  remain  insignificant.  ) 
The  normal  value  of  real  wage  fund  equals  the  initial  real  wage  rate  (i.  e.,  the  yearly  total 
real  wage  per  employee)  multiplied  by  the  growth  factor  of  the  normal  real  wage  fund: 
The  per  capita  normal  wage  fund  multiplied  by  employment  determines  the  normal  real 
wage  fund.  29 
In  the  control  of  the  real  wage  fund  central  policy  on  living  standards  and  the  pressure 
on  real  wages  exerted  by  employees  both  have  some  effect.  The  actual  real  wage  fund  may 
deviate  from  its  normal  value  as  a  consequence  of  a  feedback  mechanism.  The  logic  of  the 
feedback  is  then  as  follows:  if  in  the  previous  year  actual  household  consumption  lagged 
behind  its  normal  value,  the  present  year's  real  wages  would  rise  at  a  higher  rate.  The 
complement  of  the  normal  spending  ratio  of  the  household  is  the  normal  household 
savings  ratio.  In  a  socialist  planned  economy,  this  already  includes  a  certain  amount  of 
331 forced  saving  caused  by  shortage,  since  some  forced  saving  occurs  even  at  the  normal 
level  of  shortage.  "Household  savings  depend  on  the  normal  wage  rate  and  its  growth  rate 
(these  are  exogenous  parameters);  in  addition,  savings  depend  on  the  adjustment  of  real 
wages  determined  by  the  difference  between  actual  and  of  normal  consumption  paths,  on 
employment,  and  finally,  on  shortage  intensity.  ý.  t  30  Accumulated  savings  influence 
household  demand  and  purchases.  But  as  we  have  seen  in  our  analysis  that  the  socialist 
model  is  motivated  by  investment  at  the  expense  of  consumption  and  saving.  Above  all, 
wages  played  only  a  passive  role. 
In  our  model,  we  place  wages  and  household  savings  as  playing  a  crucial  role.  ne 
economies  in  transition  need  to  develop  financial  institutions  which  would  stabilize  the 
economy  in  general  and  would  help  mobilize  savings  of  the  household  for  economic 
reconstruction.  This  is  possible  again  within  the  framework  of  well-knit  democratic 
institutions  where  free  movement  of  stocks  and  assets  is  possible,  as  in  a  market  economy. 
Savings  is  the  key  player  in  the  transition  period  because  of  the  nature  of  the  household 
consumption  at  this  stage.  31 
HI.  19.  xxi.  Input-QuIput  Relations 
Let  us  examine  the  relation  of  input-output  in  our  model.  If  we  had  been  content  merely 
to  use  the  standard  macro-equation,  Y=C+I  (national  income  is  equal  to  consumption  plus 
investment),  with  investment  treated  as  exogenous,  the  model  would  certainly  be  much 
simpler.  But  then  it  could  hardly  be  used  satisfactorily  as  a  description  of  the  internal 
motion  and  regulation  of  economy,  or  for  analysing  interrelations  between  short-and  long- 
term  changes.  Nor  would  it  be  suitable  for  demonstrating  the  specific  inertia  of  the 
investment  process,  resulting  from  its  characteristic  reaction  lags.  32  In  our  analysis  of  the 
relation  between  input-output,  the  production/labour  ratio  could  be  termed  as  technical 
productivfty.  The  deten-nination  of  technical  productivity  depends  not  just  on  the 
availability  of  labour  and  technology,  but  as  we  notice  in  the  economies  of  transition,  it  is 
very  much  related  with  the  incentives  that  are  provided  in  a  free  market  economy.  The 
feedback  mechanism  enables  us  to  correct  this  measure  of  technical  productivity;  for 
332 instance,  according  to  whether  the  actual  demand  for  goods  and  services  is  stronger  or 
weaker  than  normal.  In  a  planned  socialist  economy,  if  it  is  stronger,  productivity  declines 
because  of  the  frequent  disturbances  in  materials  and  spare-parts  supply,  technological 
improvisations  entailed  by  forced  substitutions,  etc.  This  need  not  be  the  case  in  a 
transitional  economy  where  market  forces  play  a  crucial  role.  If  the  demand  for  goods  and 
services  is  stronger,  productivity  increases  in  a  capitalist  economy  because  of  its  ability  to 
respond  to  the  signal  reactions  in  the  market  and  its  willingness  to  feed  it  back  into  the 
economic  system.  In  this  scenario,  the  technical  productivity  adjusted  to  allow  for  the  real 
effects  on  demand  could  be  called  as  above-standard  productivity.  We  recall  the  fact  that 
standard  productivity,  multiplied  by  actual  employment,  determines  normal  production.  33 
HI.  19.  xxii.  Stocks 
It  is  useful  to  explain  here  the  importance  of  distinguishing  between  output  and  input 
stocks.  This  is  not  a  distinction  related  to  the  physical  properties  of  the  product,  but  it  is 
concerned  with  who  disposes  of  the  stock:  whoever  produced  it  as  an  output,  or  someone 
else  wanting  to  use  it  as  an  input.  As  one  of  the  properties  of  the  model,  we  want  the 
'interactions  between  stock  and  flow  variables  to  be  displayed  consistently  in  the  model.  934 
Therefore,  in  contrast  to  many  other  models,  we  strictly  separate  production  and  sales  on 
the  output  side,  and  purchases  and  use  (productive  consumption)  on  the  input  side.  This 
separation  in  terms  of  flow  variables  is  reflected  in  the  stock  variables,  by  their  separation 
into  two  different  stocks:  the  output  stock  is  inserted  between  production  and  sales,  and 
input  stocks  come  between  purchases  and  productive  consumption.  Although  in  practice 
this  separation  is  not  always  easy  to  make,  experience  suggests  that  it  is  not  impossible.  35 
Output  stocks  and  input  stocks  play  different  roles  in  the  signal  system  of  the  economy. 
'Me  control  of  production  responds  to  output  stocks,  while  the  control  of  purchases 
responds  to  input  stocks.  In  different  socio-economic  systems  we  can  observe 
fundamentally  different  regularities  in  the  ratios  of  output  and  input  stocks.  In  the  socialist 
eCOnomy  we  note  that  conditions  of  'suction'  prevail:  'pulling  out'  the  output  stock  from 
the  warehouses  of  the  producer-seller.  36  Under  conditions  of  'suction'  output  stocks  are 
333 usually  no  more  than  the  minimum  quantity  implied  by  the  time  necessary  to  complete 
transactions,  plus  a  barely  saleable  frozen  stock.  As  opposed  to  this,  input  stocks  are  large 
as  a  consequence  of  the  hoarding  tendency  stimulated  by  shortage  and  other 
characteristics  of  the  socialist  economic  system.  In  a  capitalist  economy  (on  average  over 
the  cycle)  the  proportions  tend  to  be  different.  The  system  is  demand-constrained,  and  this 
may  lead  to  the  expansion  of  output  stocks.  At  the  same  time,  material  purchases  and  the 
supply  of  other  inputs  are  quite  smooth;  therefore,  it  is  not  usually  necessary  to  hoard 
input  stocks.  (The  capitalist  firm  may  try  to  hoard  input  stocks  if  it  expects  a  rise  in  input 
prices.  )  'The  above  propositions  are  supported  by  empirical  data,  but  they  can  also  be 
confirmed  by  deduction  from  the  behavioural.  regularities,  that  assert  themselves  in  the  two 
different  mechanisms.  Appendix  111.19.5  shows  that  the  share  of  output  stocks  in  total 
stocks  is  two  or  three  times  larger  in  capitalist  countries  than  in  socialist  countries.  TIlis  is 
a  guide  to  the  transitional  economies.,  as  they  try  to  integrate  the  macro  knowledge 
variables.  The  economies  in  transition,  as  they  follow  market  mechanisms,  would  have  to 
follow  the  capitalist  economy  approach  to  stocks. 
The  characteristic  element  of  competition  is  introduced  into  the  model.  During  the 
period  of  transition,  as  the  household's  and  firm's  demand  and  purchases  are  subjected  to 
the  mechanisms  of  the  market,  it  is  natural  to  notice  the  emerging  competition  among  the 
households  and  firms  for  goods  and  services.  Here,  we  must  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that 
an  explicit  'rationing  scheme'  is  not  built  into  our  model.  (During  the  transition  period, 
though,  there  exists  a  rationing  scheme).  The  share  of  consumption  is  greatly  influenced 
by  the  two  main  distributional  parameters  in  the  model:  the  initial  real  wage  rate  and  the 
normal  growth  factor  of  the  real  wage  fund 
. 
37The  share  of  accumulation  is  affected  by  a 
series  of  parameters:  the  normal  growth  factors  of  the  investment  volume  and  of  the 
investment  commitment,  stock  norms,  etc.  Aside  from  the  effect  of  these  parameters  the 
"various  feedback  mechanisms  functioning  in  the  model  ensure  that  the  allocations  cannot 
deviate  persistently  from  its  normal  proportions.  ,  38  If  too  much  output  is  allocated  to  one 
area  in  some  year,  feedbacks  ensure  that  in  the  following  year  less  should  be  allocated 
there,  and  more  to  other  areas.  This  kind  of  autonomous  movement,  including  internal 
control  mechanisms,  takes  place  in  our  model.  (We  note  that  our  macromodel  can  only 
334 illustrate  the  extremely  complicated  reality  in  a  very  simplified  way.  )  However,  in 
connection  with  'autonomous  movement'  and  'internal  control',  we  must  be  beware  of  a 
,  decentralized'  and  one-sided  interpretation  of  these  concepts.  In  constructing  the  model 
we  consider  the  economic  policy-maker,  the  planner,  and  the  central  manager  as 
endogenous  parts  of  the  system.  Thus  the  behavioural.  regularities  and  feedback 
mechanisms  described  in  the  model  represent  the  combined  reactions  of  all  the  levels 
participating  in  multi-level  control  . 
39  The  above  analysis  enables  the  economies  in 
transition  to  introduce  their  own  'autonomous  movement'  and  'internal  control'  that 
would  fit  with  the  new  principles  of  market  mechanism.  Following  the  macro  knowledge 
dimension  of  our  model,  it  would  be  appropriate  to  introduce  the  various  forms  of  micro 
knowledge  as  an  autonomous  movement  based  on  the  macro  knowledge  variables  of 
internal  control,  that  would  lead  the  economy  into  a  growth  path. 
BI.  19.  xxiii.  The  Conditions  for  the  Existence  of  a  Growth  Path 
We  have  reached  the  end  of  the  description  and  interpretation  of  the  model.  The  micro 
knowledge  and  macro  knowledge  variables  have  been  interwoven  into  the  transition 
growth  path.  What  we  want  to  show  now  is  that  "the  system  is  able  to  move  along  a 
feasible  path  and  to  grow.  "  This  is  possible  if  the  following  conditions  are  met.  (Since  we 
do  not  follow  an  econometric  model,  these  conditions  are  to  be  understood  theoretically. 
In  mathematical  form  the  model  would  be  a  set  of  non-homogeneous  difference 
equations.  )  The  system  follows  a  feasible  path,  if  each  of  its  variables  assumes  a  non- 
negative  value  for  each  year  t  ýý  1.  This  can  be  shown  by  considering  a  system  that  follows 
the  Harrod-Neumann  path  40  (the  N-H  path),  if  each  of  its  reproducible  stock  and  flow 
variables  grows  at  a  uniform  and  constant  rate,  (that  is:  volume  of  investment  vintage, 
production,  firms'  purchases,  household  purchases,  output  stocks  and  input  stocks)  and 
where  the  general  growth  factor  is  >  1.  (The  system  follows  a  normal  path  if  the  actual 
value  of  each  control  variable  equals  its  normal  value.  )  The  name  Harrod-Neumann  path 
derives  from  the  fact  that  it  was  Harrod  for  aggregate  models,  and  von  Neumann  for 
disaggregated  ones,  who  developed  the  pioneering  models  whose  most  characteristic 
335 common  feature  is  growth  at  a  constant  rate.  As  production  and  capital  in  Harrod's 
model,  and  as  the  production  of  all  sectors  in  von  Neumann's  model  grow  at  a  uniform 
and  constant  rate,  so,  in  the  framework  of  the  present  model,  all  production,  investment, 
trading  and  stock  variables  grow  at  a  uniform  and  constant  rate,  when  the  system  moves 
along  the  Harrod-Neumann  path.  The  following  proposition  can  be  made.  "Given  the 
assumptions  of  our  model  there  exists  a  feasible  normal  path  and  the  normal  path  is 
necessarily  a  Harrod-Neumann  path.  "  It  is  the  speciji"c  propeny  of  our  model  that  its 
normal  path  is  an  H-N  path.  The  underlying  economic  assumption  is  as  follows:  "We  wish 
to  use  our  model  to  describe  a  system  in  which  a  uniform  rate  of  expansion  of  investment 
activity,  and  thereby  economic  growth,  is  regarded  as  normal  during  the  period  of 
transition  from  a  socialist  economic  system  to  a  capitalist  economic  system.  Ultimately, 
this  is  possible,  if  and  only  if,  the  economies  in  transition  opt  to  integrate  micro  knowledge 
and  macro  knowledge  variables.  It  is  especially  the  macro  knowledge  variables  of 
freedom,  democracy,  and  human-rights  which  would  lead  the  many  other  normal  variables 
in  this  growth  model  (and,  under  certain  conditions,  all  of  its  reproducible  stock  and  flow 
variables)  along  the  Harrod-Neumann  path.  "  As  we  have  shown  in  our  model,  the  uniform 
and  constant  growth  of  the  economy  depends  on  the  positive  presence  of  macro 
knowledge  variables.  Even  if  the  other  micro  knowledge  variables  deviate  in  the  initial 
stage  of  transition  from  the  growth  path,  (as  we  have  noticed  in  our  earlier  analysis)  as  the 
intensity  of  the  macro  knowledge  variables  is  felt,  a  convergence  path  emerges  and 
ultimately  becomes  a  H-N  path.  41 
Another  condition,  in  the  language  of  our  model,  expresses  the  fact  that  'technical 
progress  is  Harrod-neutral.  142  This  means  that  a  unit  of  investment  creates  fewer  jobs  from 
vintage  to  vintage,  and  this  is  compensated  by  the  fact  that  productivity  is  higher  for  each 
newly  created  job  than  for  the  jobs  created  by  earlier  vintages  due  to  the  increasing 
intensity  and  prevalence  of  the  presence  of  macro  knowledge  variables.  Therefore,  as  the 
transition  dynamics  takes  momentum.,  the  incremental  'output-capital  ratio'  is  constant.  In 
other  words,  the  ratio  of  the  output-increment  which  can  be  produced  by  the  investment 
vintage,  to  the  estimated  investment  expenditure  required  to  complete  the  investment 
vintage  is  constant  over  time.  Harrod-neutrality  also  indicates  that  technical  progress  has  a 
336 ,  labour-  augmenting'  character.  On  the  normal  path  the  growth  of  the  reproducible  stock 
and  flow  variables  (general  growth  factor)  is  equal  to  the  product  of  the  growth  factor  of 
the  non-reproducible  resource  (that  is  of  the  employed  population),  and  that  of 
prodUCtiVity. 
43  Another  condition  that  we  should  note  is  that  the  growth  factor  of  the 
non-nal  real  wage  rate  must  be  equal  to  the  growth  factor  of  vintage  productivity.  This  is 
necessary  in  order  that  along  the  normal  path  total  household  consumption  should  grow  in 
accordance  with  the  general  growth  f  actor.  44  These  conditions  support  our  proposition  of 
the  existence  of  a  feasible  normal  path  which  has  Harrod-Neumann  properties.  At  the 
same  time  we  note  that  macro  knowledge  variables  as  control  process  determine  these 
movements. 
Another  characteristic  of  the  nature  of  the  model  is  that  macro-variables  represent 
collections  of  millions  of  microsignals.  45  In  recent  years  it  has  become  increasingly  clear  to 
theoretical  economists  that  non-price  signals  play  an  important  role  in  economic  systems. 
In  the  present  model,  we  have  been  trying  to  take  a  step  forward  by  formalizing,  in  the 
framework  of  a  macro-model,  the  generation  of  non-price  signals  and  their  'feedback'  as 
part  of  the  decision  control  process.  In  this  sense,  within  the  scope  of  our  model,  the 
46  terms,  'normal  path'  and  'non-Walrasian  long  term  equilibrium'  are  synonyms.  (It  has  to 
be  recognized  that  value-judgements  are  bound  to  be  associated  with  the  concept  of 
equilibrium:  equilibrium  is  'good  9,  disequilibrium.  'bad'  in  the  eyes  of  most  people,  within 
or  outside  the  profession.  On  the  other  hand,  the  terms  'normal  state'  or  'normal  path' 
seem  to  be  free  of  any  valuejudgement;  that  is,  neutral.  )  Given  the  non-Walrasian 
character  of  the  system,  it  is  appropriate  to  comment  on  Malinvaud's  diagram. 
337 Figure  111.19.5 
Malinvaud's  Diaffram 
The  Variables  and  Equations 
jump  from 
or,  e  regime 
to  another 
negative  positive 
excess  derrvand  4  excess 
-  excess  supply  0  demand 
Walresian 
state 
One  macrovariable:  aggregate  excess  demand 
slack 
Malinvaud*s 
'buyers' 
market 
normal  State  of  a 
shortage  economy 
o  shortage 
MalLnvaud's 
I  sel(ers, 
market' 
Two  macrovariables:  shortage  and  slack 
338 it  is  an  intellectually  attractive  experiment  to  present  different  regimes,  on  the  same 
diagram,  as  different  points  in  a  given  co-ordinate  system,  or  as  definite  regions  of  the  co- 
ordinate  plane.  Maavaud  identifies  in  his  diagrams  points  or  areas  corresponding  to 
Walrasian  equilibrium,  Keynesian  and  'classical'  unemployment,  etc.  47  In  this  scenario, 
when  we  consider  a  socialist  system  we  notice  the  following.  "A  semi-monetized  economy 
in  which  prices  and  money  do  not  genuinely  influence  the  macrovariables  of  production, 
investment,  and  employment  cannot  properly  be  described  in  terms  of  its  money  being 
stable  or  inflated,  or  price  increases  being  repressed  or  pennitted.  "48  The  main 
characteristic  features  of  this  system,  as  we  have  summarized  earlier  in  our  study  - 
chronic  shortage,  strong  expansion  drive,  quantity  drive,  unrestrainable  investment  spirit  - 
can  be  observed  when  the  price  level  is  stable.  But  they  would  also  persist  if  the  price  level 
began  to  change  and  a  slow  or  accelerating  inflation  evolved.  Since  our  model  does  not 
follow  this  line  of  thought,  we  cannot  apply  Malinvaud's  approach.  Therefore,  we  have 
fortnulated  other  behavioural  regularities,  other  signal  systems,  and  other  feedback 
mechanisms.  The  present  study  does  not  attempt  to  judge,  whether  the  model  of  Barro, 
Grossman  and  Malinvaud  offers  an  appropriate  way  of  distinguishing  between  alternative 
states  of  a  capitalist  economy,  that  is,  for  developing  a  typology  of  capitalist  'regimes' 
differing  from  each  other  in  certain  essential  features.  It  seems  certain,  however,  that  the 
description  of  a  socialist  economy  can  hardly  be  pressed  into  the  same  theoretical 
framework.  49  Since  we  concern  ourselves  with  transition  growth  path,  we  shall  try  to 
understand  the  mechanism  of  the  control  and  stability  of  our  system  in  order  to  establish  a 
feasible  normal  path. 
III-19.  xxiv.  Control  and  Stabili 
...  We  advance  the  proposition  that  a  feasible  normal  path  exists  in  our  system.  Yet  the 
structure  of  the  model  allows  the  system  to  move  along  other  paths.  'Whether  or  not  the 
system  follows  the  normal  path  depends  on  the  control  process.  '  The  model  can  be 
reformulated  according  to  the  standard  terminology  of  mathematical  control  theory,  but 
here  we  Emit  ourselves  to  the  descriptive  model  that  we  develop.  "Controllability  means 
339 that  whatever  state  the  system  is  in,  there  is  a  path  for  the  control  variables  which  drives 
the  system  to  any  assigned  feasible  state  within  a  finite  time  period.  "50  Such  an  assigned 
state  could  be  an  appropriate  point  along  the  normal  path.  In  this  case  controllability 
means  that,  if  the  system  departs  from  its  normal  path,  a  suitable  choice  of  the  control 
variables  can  help  to  drive  it  back  to  the  normal  path  within  a  finite  period.  The  macro 
knowledge  variables  push  it  into  the  normal  path. 
We  shall  make  an  endogenous  description  of  the  control.  A  considerable  volume  of 
literature  on  growth  theory  deals  with  the  question  of  control,  yet  in  most  cases  the 
analysis  is  conducted  'outside  the  model.  '51  Therefore,  these  are  not  'fed  back'  into  the 
model:  they  do  not  act  as  feed  back  signals.  The  present  model  tries  to  take  a  step  forward 
in  this  respect.  As  it  evolves  over  time,  the  system  itself  generates  signals  which,  'fed 
back'  into  the  same  system,  will  influence  its  subsequent  development.  If  it  has  any  merits, 
it  is  rather  the  undertaking  itself:  to  build  a  growth  model  with  endogenous  control  of  real 
process;  and  in  such  a  way  as  to  model  the  interactions  between  long  and  short-term 
52  control.  The  desirability  of  intensifying  research  along  these  lines  has  encouraged  our 
present  attempt.  The  division  of  the  knowledge  sector  into  micro  and  macro  knowledge 
sectors  and  integrating  the  variables  of  both  these  sectors  into  an  endogenous  model  of 
economic  growth  has  been  our  main  objective.  While  micro  knowledge  variables  have 
been  traditionally  developed  and  endogenized  into  the  growth  models,  macro  knowledge 
sector  remained  an  'outsider'.  Though  recently  there  has  been  an  openness  and  attempt  at 
speaking  about  the  macro  knowledge  variables  of  freedom,  democracy,  human  rights,  etc. 
in  the  economic  development  discussions,  no  model  has  been  developed  yet  along  these 
lines.  Our  attempt  at  endogenizing  the  micro  and  macro  knowledge  variables  into 
economic  growth  models  would  encourage  further  research  into  this  area. 
340 111.19.  xxv.  IControl 
by  Norms 
rMe  macro  knowledge  variables  could  be  considered  as  norms  that  control  the  dynamism 
of  an  economic  growth  model,  especially  in  the  period  of  transition.  In  this  sense  ,  our 
model  presents  a  specific  form  of  control,  which  we  call  control  by  norms.  "Studying  the 
norms  gives  us  a  profound  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  system.  If  we  really  know  what  is 
regarded  as  'normal'  in  a  system,  we  know  quite  a  lot  about  that  systeM.  "53  In  our  analysis 
of  the  historical  socialism  we  have  come  across  various  norms  that  control  its  economic 
system.  Generally  speaking,  those  norms  were  anti-macro  knowledge  socialist  principles 
our  analysis  of  the  macro  knowledge  variables  helps  us  to  understand  this  phenomenon  as 
an  'insider.  '  Norms  are  fixed  by  habit,  convention,  tacit  or  legally  supported  social 
acceptance,  or  conformiy.  54  In  this  sense,  they  are  cultural  and  conventional  and  part  of 
macro  knowledge.  They  tend  to  perpetuate  themselves,  and  the  longer  they  are  valid,  the 
more  deeply  rooted  they  become;  the  inertia  of  society  then  ensures  their  effectiveness 
over  an  extended  period.  This  has  been  the  core  problem  with  the  developmental 
economics  thinking.  The  economists  were  developing  model  after  model  based  on  the 
variables  of  micro  knowledge  designs.  Even  when  the  various  applied  micro  knowledge 
designs  were  discarded  or  pronounced  ineffective,  by  the  macro  knowledge  standards, 
they  continued  in  the  same  path.  Here,  macro  knowledge  encounters  pseudo-macro 
knowledge  through  the  medium  of  micro  knowledge. 
Our  working  hypothesis  is  as  follows:  'in  a  given  historical  period  social  norms  are 
unchanged  over  time.  '55  Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  are,  in  the  mathematical 
sense,  uniquely  defined.  If  they  appear  in  the  model  as  uniquely  determined  constants,  this 
is  only  for  the  convenience  of  model  construction.  In  practice,  we  ought  to  formalize  them 
rather  as  intervals  or  as  means  of  probability  distributions.  Norms  are  not  fixed  for  ever, 
and  sometimes  they  can  change  rather  dramatically.  This  is  what  we  experience  in  the 
emergence  of  transitional  economies  particularly.  If  that  happens,  it  indicates  a  transition 
to  a  qualitatively  different  period,  or,  to  another  'regime.  '  The  logic  can  also  be  reversed: 
the  constancy  of  the  most  important  norms  can  be  regarded  as  a  basic  criterion  for 
periodizing  history  for  constructing  the  typology  of  different  'regimes.  '  This  is  an 
341 important  task  all  economies  should  undertake  irrespective  of  the  level  of  economic 
growth  and  development.  This  praxis  approach  would  allow  economies  to  see  for 
themselves  past-present  and  future  trends  in  their  own  history  of  economic  development. 
Based  on  this  experience  they  would  know  the  macro  knowledge  variables  that  promoted 
their  economic  growth  and  those  variables  that  retarded  the  process  of  development.  They 
will  know  what  to  keep  and  what  to  reject  for  the  purpose  of  integral  growth  and 
development.  But  for  J.  Kornai,  "In  this  approach  to  social  phenomena,  we  do  'not  ask' 
what  is  useful,  what  is  desirable,  or  what  is  optimal.  We  merely  enquire  about  what  exists. 
What  is  normal,  'regular',  and  'natural'  about  this  system?  This  is  the  typical  way  of 
formulating  a  question  in  a  descriptive-explanatory  theory.  966  This  existential  approach  of 
economic  theorizing  must  be  complemented  by  a  readiness  to  reject  concretely  those 
norms  that  do  not  enhance  the  process  of  growth  and  development.  This  is  what  we  have 
witnessed  in  the  collapse  of  socialist  regimes.  The  economies  in  transition  are  designing  a 
new  norm  based  on  the  macro  knowledge  systems  of  each  nation  and  this  is  an  ongoing 
process  which  policyrnakers  must  be  aware  while  formulating  policies  for  national 
development. 
One  of  the  attractions  of  this  approach  is  that  it  suggests  obvious  possibilities  for  testing 
the  theory  empirically.  Norms  can  be  recognized,  first  of  all  by  observing  the  means  and 
trends  exhibited  by  time  series  and  cross-section  data  on  various  recurrent  phenomena  or 
on  phenomena  occurring  in  a  number  of  different  places.  Of  course,  not  all  mean  values 
should  be  regarded  as  norms.  "A  mean  is  justifiably  treated  as  a  norm  only  if  there  exists 
some  control  mechanism  that  drives  the  actual  value  of  the  variable  toward  its  normal 
value.  ,  57  This  idea  introduces  us  to  the  subject  of  the  stability  of  control  that  would  be 
introduced  by  the  policyrnakers.  The  model  presents  the  joint  outcomes  of  decision 
processes  taking  place  at  all  the  upper  and  lower  levels  of  control,  and  does  not  separate 
the  influence  of  the  democratically  elected  central  government  from  that  of  lower-level 
decision  makers.  During  the  transitional  stage  this  form  of  stability  must  be  achieved  at  all 
levels  by  the  co-ordinating  effort  of  legislative  as  well  as  executive  measures.  As  for  the 
resulting  joint  effect  itself,  the  model  describes  it  in  a  deterministic  framework.  The 
control  process  responds  to  the  impulses  affecting  it  by  applying  certain  'rules  of  the 
342 game.  '  Reality,  of  course,  is  much  more  complicated  than  that.  First,  the  effect  exerted  by 
the  new  central  governments  of  economies  in  transition  do  not  directly  merge  with  the 
other  components  of  control  immediately;  but  their  role  is  exceedingly  important  and 
responsible.  Secondly,  neither  the  centre,  nor  the  lower-level  decision-makers  are  mere 
executors  of  given  rules,  since  they  all  have  some  scope  for  choice.  As  the  scope  for 
choice  increases,  the  macro  knowledge  variables  of  freedom,  democracy  and  human  rights 
play  a  crucial  role  in  determining  policies  for  economic  growth  and  development.  While 
this  control  mechanism  could  assist,  it  could  also  inhibit  the  process  of  economic  growth  if 
there  exists  any  conflicting  interests.  58  The  formulation  of  our  model  could  be  used  for  an 
examination  of  certain  features  of  behaviour  in  the  fields  of  economic  policy  and  planning. 
During  the  transitional  stage  it  would  be  appropriate  to  follow  a  praxis  approach  of 
observing,  analysing  and  applying  the  macro  knowledge  variables  of  each  nation  to  its 
chosen  dynamic  models  of  economic  growth  path. 
HI.  19.  xxvi.  Examination  of  Stabili 
An  examination  of  stability  is  suitable  to  understand  the  movement  of  an  unstable 
economic  growth  path  to  a  stable  economic  growth  path  or  to  understand  the  process  of 
converging  to  the  equilibrium  path.  Although  the  concept  is  borrowed  from  the 
mathematician's  vocabulary,  stability  in  this  sense  is  also  of  great  importance  for 
theoretical  economics.  In  the  framework  of  the  model  "an  examination  of  stability  answers 
the  following  question:  do  the  control  rules  and  the  behavioural  regularities  formulated  in 
the  model  guarantee  that  the  system,  having  once  departed  from  the  normal  path,  will 
eventually  return  to  it  or  approach  it?  If  the  answer  is  negative,  it  is  doubtful  whether  there 
is  any  sense  at  all  in  talking  about  norms,  normal  values,  or  a  non-nal  path.  If  the  answer  is 
positive,  and  the  system  is  stable  in  a  wider  or  narrower  sense,  the  use  of  these  categories 
is  both  sensible  and  justified.  Then  can  we  say  that  the  norms  are  asserted.  The  actual  path 
is  close  to  the  normal  path,  fluctuates  around  it  and  cannot  completely  break  away  from 
969  As  we  have  noted  in  our  analysis,  that  the  socialist  economies  swayed  away  from  the 
equilibrium  path  notably  because  of  the  inability  to  integrate  into  their  economic  system 
343 the  macro  knowledge  variables.  If  we  already  have  some  understanding  of  stability 
conditions,  it  is  also  useful  for  us  to  know  what  can  cause  'instability.  '  For  example,  what 
constellations  of  parameters  lead  the  system,  once  it  leaves  the  normal  path,  never  to 
return  to  it?  The  economies  in  transition  could  converge  to  a  stable  economic  path  as  the 
stability  conditions  grow  deeper  into  its  new  systems  of  transformation  in  the  socio- 
political  and  economic  regularities. 
After  these  introductory  remarks,  let  us  now  examine  the  stability  of  our  own  model. 
The  difficulty  of  making  precise  statements  about  the  stability  of  'imperfectly  behaved' 
multivariable  dynamic  systems  is  well  known.  "  What  interests  us  is  precisely  the  effect  of 
feedback.  Feedback  is  said  to  improve  control  if  it  is  operative.  With  the  introduction  of 
suitable  feedback  this  type  of  stability  remains  and  'convergence  is  accelerated.  '  If,  for 
example,  something  causes  the  system  to  depart  from  its  normal  path,  it  will  return  to  it 
more  quickly  with  feedback  than  without  it.  The  stability  properties  of  the  model  are 
worth  further  study,  with  both  analytical  and  simulation  methods.  In  any  case,  nothing  can 
be  said  that  prevents  us  from  using  the  model.  The  concepts  of  'norm'  and  'normality'  can 
be  interpreted  within  the  framework  of  the  model,  since  the  control  mechanisms  built  into 
it  are  -  at  least  for  suitable  parameter  values  -  able  to  keep  the  motion  of  the  system  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  its  own  norMS.  61  For  the  economies  in  transition,  this  means  that  the 
feedback  parameters  must  be  based  on  the  macro  knowledge  variables  which  constitute 
the  framing  of  a  workable  norm. 
HI.  19.  xxvii.  Remark  on  Methodolpjgy 
We  shall  make  an  additional  remark  on  methodology.  In  economic  applications  of 
mathematical  control  theory  the  following  fine  of  thought  is  usually  pursued:  "The 
description  of  a  real  sphere  is  given.  Furthermore,  the  sets  of  economic  policy  targets  and 
instruments  are  also  given.  The  question  is  then  to  determine  the  control  rules  that  best 
serve  the  given  economic  policy  objectives.  The  control  equations  of  the  model  are  not 
specified  in  advance,  but  their  determination  is  exactly  the  'result'  of  the  research.  9ý62 
Accordingly,  it  is  unnecessary  to  ask  whether  the  control  has  such  desirable  properties  as 
stability,  rapid  convergence  etc.  Of  course  it  has,  since  the  researcher  was  seeking  a 
344 control  for  which  he  postulated  in  advance  that  it  should  have  these  properties.  This  is  the 
normative  approach  to  the  modelling  of  economic  control.  Yet  we  wish  to  develop  a 
descriptive  approach,  in  which  the  corresponding  train  of  thought  goes  as  follows:  We 
observe  in  reality  and  seek  to  describe  in  the  model  not  only  the  real  sphere  but  also  the 
control  sphere.  The  model  of  the  latter  must  reflect-in  more  or  less  detail-  the  way  in 
which  control  takes  place  in  reality.  What  are  the  decision  rules,  and  how  and  to  what 
signals  do  the  decision-makers  react?  The  composition  of  place  that  we  have  designed  in 
the  beginning  of  this  section  could  be  described  as  a  real  sphere  while  the  control  sphere 
would  be  the  macro  knowledge  variables.  63 
Thus,  during  the  period  of  transition,  we  could  build  into  the  model  some  equations 
reflecting  to  some  degree  the  empirically  observable  control  mechanism,  and  then  ask  how 
the  system  functions  and  study  its  stability  properties.  We  do  not  put  the  rabbit  in  the  top 
hat  beforehand  just  to  be  able  to  pull  it  out  triumphantly  afterwards.  We  do  not  construct 
a  control  block  knowing  in  advance  that  it  could  ensure  stability.  But  what  we  would  like 
to  do  is  to  describe  the  existential  economic  reality  and  then  introduce  the  macro 
knowledge  variables  as  a  control  system  that  would  bring  about  the  stabilization  and  that 
would  put  the  economy  into  the  path  of  economic  development.  In  the  circumstances, 
therefore,  our  stability  results  must  be  considered  all  the  more  valuable. 
Finally,  the  most  important  property  of  the  model  is  the  way  in  which  it  describes  the 
economies  in  transition.  What  happens  in  the  system  depends  on  the  economic 
management.  The  philosophy  of  the  present  model  enables  a  new  venture  into  economic 
management.  The  operation  of  the  economic  systems  of  the  republics  of  former  Soviet 
Union,  Eastern  and  Central  European  countries,  reveals  some  characteristic  regularities. 
They  are  democratically  elected  governments  and  therefore  represents  the  public 
aspirations  for  a  better  economic  management.  'Mere  is  a  general  consensus  among  these 
people  about  the  need  of  a  market  economy.  This  new  awareness  is  built  upon  the  macro 
knowledge  system  of  each  nation.  Therefore,  at  each  level  of  decision-making  "the 
behaviour  of  the  decision-maker  is  in  a  certain  sense  'regular':  definite  impulses  and 
signals  lead  to  definite  consequences.  9-,  64  At  the  time  of  the  collapse  of  the  socialist  regime, 
345 the  decision-maker  was  the  people  and  their  collective  will.  During  the  period  of  transition 
it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  newly  elected  governments  to  bring  about  the  necessary 
transformation.  In  this  sense,  the  governments  are  not  lifeless  screws  in  a  piece  of 
machinery.  They  have  a  choice  and  a  responsibility.  The  economies  in  transition  would 
succeed  or  collapse  according  to  the  fulfilment  of  their  choice  and  responsibility. 
Therefore,  the  economic  policy  and  planning  operate  on  an  economy-wide  basis  and  exert 
extremely  strong  social  effects  particularly  during  the  period  of  transition. 
That  is  why  two  different  approaches  are  necessary  in  economics:  the  normative  and  the 
descriptive.  Normative  models  have  a  say  in  economic  policy  and  in  the  determination  of 
national  economic  plans  before  definite  decisions  are  made.  'Mey  help  to  reveal  the 
alternatives  for  choice  and  to  forecast  the  consequences  of  decisions.  On  the  other  hand, 
for  the  descriptive-explanatory  theory  a  series  of  past  decisions  is  already  available:  by 
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analysing  these,  it  tries  to  discover  whether  they  exhibit  any  common  regularities.  What 
our  model  has  to  offer  in  this  respect  is  only  partially  satisfactory.  We  need  to  develop  an 
in-depth  transitional  analysis  to  see  a  better  description.  What  is  really  important  is 
actually  to  undertake  the  task  of  describing,  with  a  formalized  theoretical  model,  the 
internal  regularities  in  the  growth  of  a  transitional  economy  under  the  guidance  of  the 
macro  knowledge  system.  This  would  result  in  the  integration  of  micro  and  macro 
knowledge  sectors  in  the  process  of  economic  growth  and  development. 
1H.  19.  xxviii.  Comparative  Perspectives 
Here,  we  shall  clarify  clearly  the  perspective  that  our  model  develops.  Our  objective  is  to 
develop  a  complementary  model  that  would  enhance  the  growth  models  that  we  have 
designed  in  section  one  of  our  study.  Therefore,  our  perspective  does  not  deviate  from  the 
relevant  determinants  of  economic  growth;  rather  we  stress  the  need  to  have  a  strong 
physical  capital  accumulation,  technological  progress,  human  capital  formation.  Our  model 
has  no  reason  to  compete  with  other  models  which  have  proposed  these  determinants  of 
economic  growth.  Our  model  differs  only  when  regimes  opt  to  accumulate  the  ingredients 
of  economic  growth  at  the  expense  of  democratic  principles  based  on  the  macro 
346 knowledge  of  freedom  and  human  rights.  A  comparative  perspective  based  on  a  general 
scenario  of  economic  growth  may  be  useful. 
The  description  of  our  vision-solution  growth  model  challenges  the  prevailing 
perception  of  alternative  options  of  development.  Often  while  raising  the  eye-brows, 
politicians  debate  the  issue  of  freedom;  economists  the  issue  of  economic  growth  and 
development.  While  some  critiques  opt  for  development  under  any  form  of  political 
structure,  others  abhor  it.  Anti-critiques  of  these  proponents  suggest  freedom  first, 
followed  by  economic  growth.  66  As  our  model  suggests,  what  we  need  is  a  closely  knit 
parallel  structure.  It  is  neither  thesis-anti-thesis  or  critique-anti-critique  scenario. 
Somehow,  a  few  economists  have  developed  the  view,  either  under  pressure  or  as  a 
beneficiary  of  the  system,  that  under  military-dictatorial  regimes  and  distorted  political 
structures,  economic  growth  is  possible.  And  they  point  to  East-Asian  tigers  or  dragons  as 
67  examples.  This  is  a  distorted  understanding  of  the  Asian  development  strategies.  This  is 
an  unacceptable  legitimization  of  oppressive  regimes.  If  such  political  structures  were  so 
benevolent,  how  is  it  that  people  rejected  such  structures  and  their  leaders.  If  we  want  to 
understand  the  Asian  development  strategies,  it  would  be  better  to  look  into  their  cultural 
legacies,  rather  than  branding  the  regimes  with  a  narrow  rode'  of  measurement  and 
upholding  it  as  victorious.  As  social  scientists,  economists  and  other  academicians  have  a 
duty  to  correct  these  mistaken  acceptance  of  such  regimes  as  an  excuse  for  promoting 
development.  As  we  have  seen  in  our  analysis  of  former  Soviet  Union,  East  and  Central 
European  states,  merely  judging  economic  performance  on  the  basis  of  published  data 
would  not  bring  out  the  negative  social  cost  of  publicized  success  stories.  Should  we 
continue  to  promote  such  regimes  as  models  of  economic  growth  and  development? 
Lessons  from  history  point  to  the  opposite.  Intolerable  human  suffering  and  environmental 
catastrophes  that  we  have  had  during  this  century  under  these  wrong  regimes  cannot  be 
supported  even  in  the  name  of  economic  development.  The  question  is:  developmentfor 
whom?  If  it  is  for  people  and  human  good,  it  is  time  that  we  firmly  design  models  that 
would  engage  in  a  form  of  dialogue  between  development  and  freedom,  democracy  and 
human  rights.  This  is  the  new  path  suggested  by  the  United  Nations  Development 
Organizations  and  other  non-governmental  grass-root,  and  international  organizations 
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The  new  philosophy  of  political  economy  is  based  on  these  macro  knowledge 
determinants  of  growth  economics.  Eastern  Europe  has  opted  to  be  on  this  growth  path. 
"If  Eastern  Europe  successfully  negotiates  development,  willingly  accepting  the  necessary 
austerity  that  the  process  calls  for,  without  recourse  to  authoritarianism,  then  the 
implications  for  the  rest  of  the  globe  will  be  enormous.  Knowledge  that  economic  success 
and  political  liberty  can  together  grow  from  the  otherwise  unhappy  condition  of 
underdevelopment  will  be  greeted  with  great  acclaim.  ,  68  We  have  followed  in  our  research 
this  new  direction  of  the  political  economy.  This  new  direction  has  to  be  strengthened  by 
the  following  internalization  strategy  of  development. 
]JI.  19.  xxix.  Primaix-SecondaCy-Tertiarl  Growth  Path 
Our  solutionary  growth  path  has  attempted  to  integrate  micro  knowledge  sector  and 
macro  knowledge  sector  into  the  general  framework  of  a  knowledge  sector  as  a 
component  of  economic  growth.  While  various  forms  of  micro  knowledge  have  been 
developed  by  economists  concerned  with  the  theory  of  growth,  there  was  really  no 
attempt  made  on  the  macro  knowledge  sector.  We  design  the  solutionary  growth  path  by 
giving  particular  attention  to  the  macro  knowledge  sector.  Throughout  our  study  we  have 
noticed  the  almighty  power  of  macro  knowledge.  Therefore  we  could  consider  the  macro 
knowledge  variables  of  freedom,  democracy  and  human  rights  as  primary  solutions  in  our 
solutionary  growth  path.  Any  people-oriented  development  path  has  to  be  treaded  on 
these  new  crucial  variables.  As  the  economy  is  set  on  the  primary  solutionary  path,  there 
emerges  the  secondary  solutionary  path.  The  role  of  privatization,  stabilization, 
liberalization,  and  legalization  are  to  be  concretized  through  the  implementation  of  land 
reform,  investment  initiatives,  provision  of  employment  opportunities,  etc.  Once  the 
economy  is  set  on  the  secondary  solutionary  path,  there  emerges  the  need  for  tertiary 
solutionary  path  as  a  supportive  system  to  the  primary  and  secondary  paths.  The  role  of 
conscientization  process,  empowering  mechanism,  and  welfare  dynamics  could  be 
considered  as  tertiary  solutions  at  this  stage  of  development.  We  cannot  explain  here  these 
dynamics  in  detail.  The  conscientization  process  could  be  described  as  an  immersive 
educative  dynamics  whereby  people  become  more  and  more  aware  of  their  rights  and 
348 responsibilities  as  a  citizen;  this  in  itself  could  be  described  as  a  mechanism  of 
empowerment.  Welfare  dynamics  need  to  be  designed  according  to  the  fulfilment  of 
people's  duties  and  responsibilities.  The  primary,  secondary  and  tertiary  solutions  just 
described  could  be  expanded  and  interpreted  according  to  the  demands  of  the  economies 
in  transition  and  the  various  stages  of  development  of  developing  countries. 
The  new  model  of  solutionary  growth  path  that  we  have  developed  enables  us  to 
understand  the  process  of  economic  development  from  one's  own  culture.  There  is  no 
imperialist  or  colonialist  or  utopian  ideological  approach.  (The  economic  theories  of  Adam 
Smith,  Ricardo,  Malthus,  Marx  and  Keynes,  while  on  the  one  hand  enlightened  the 
interrelations  and  complexities  of  economic  dynamism,  on  the  other  hand  they  have  helped 
to  justify  the  creation  of  a  culture  of  colonization  and  enslavement  and  exploitation  of  the 
many,  of  the  human  and  non-human  resources,  for  the  economic  advantage  of  the  very 
few.  )  The  process  of  understanding  the  dynamism  of  applied  economic  and  non-economic 
variables  must  happen,  if  integral  development  is  the  objective  of  a  nation.  Though  we 
have  placed  enormous  emphasis  in  our  model  on  macro  knowledge  variables,  a  word  of 
caution  is  necessary.  Our  development  efforts  would  be  futile  if  the  macro  knowledge 
sector  is  not  sufficiently  supported  by  the  introduction  of  micro  knowledge  sector.  The 
economies  in  transition  in  their  early  stage  though  lag  in  investing  in  R&D,  they  must  give 
a  special  consideration  in  developing  R&D  particularly  in  the  key  sectors  of  production. 
The  role  of  R&D  is  crucial  not  only  for  developing  various  forms  of  micro  knowledge  but 
it  helps  tremendously  to  strengthen  the  macro  knowledge  variables.  The  knowledge  sector 
of  every  nation  is  composed  of  micro  and  macro  knowledge  sectors.  The  understanding  of 
the  macro  knowledge  sector  and  the  development  of  micro  knowledge  sector  as  the  new 
engines  of  economic  growth  would  determine  the  further  pace  of  the  development  of 
nations. 
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CONCLUSION 
Q.  i.  THE  GLOBAL  GROWTH  PATH 
Our  survey  of  economic  growth  models,  with  a  view  to  understand  the  prospects  and 
policies,  projections  and  analysis,  is  necessitated  by  the  demand  of  having  a  comprehensive 
review  of  world  economic  developments  since  the  collapse  of  historical  socialism.  Our 
surveillance  of  economies  in  transition  as  part  of  a  global  economic  system  is  based  on  the 
experiences  of  nations  that  followed  either  market  economy  models  or  planned  economy 
models.  The  analysis  has  benefited  from  the  research  works  of  so  many  scholars  of  both 
capitalist  and  socialist  convictions  and  of  their  critiques.  The  vision-solution  growth  model 
that  we  have  developed  is  rooted  and  grounded  on  the  historical  experiences  of  peoples 
and  nations.  As  the  economic  gap  between  peoples  and  nations  widens  on  a  global  scale, 
the  prospects  of  human  development  looks  bleak  and  gloom  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  the 
1994  Human  Development  Report.  "Behind  the  blaring  headlines  of  the  world's  many 
conflicts  and  emergencies,  there  lies  a  silent  crisis  -a  crisis  of  underdevelopment,  of  global 
poverty,  of  ever-mounting  population  pressures,  of  thoughtless  degradation  of 
environment.  This  is  not  a  crisis  that  will  respond  to  emergency  relief.  It  requires  a  long, 
quiet  process  of  sustainable  human  development.  Sustainable  human  development  is 
development  that  not  only  generates  economic  growth  but  distributes  its  benefits 
equitably;  that  regenerates  the  environment  rather  than  destroying  it;  that  empowers 
people  rather  than  marginalizing  them.  It  is  development  that  gives  priority  to  the  poor, 
enlarging  their  choices  and  opportunities  and  providing  for  their  participation  in  decisions 
that  affect  their  lives.  It  is  development  that  is  pro-people,  pro-women,  pro-jobs  and  pro- 
nature.  "'  Ilere  is  an  urgent  need  today  to  establish  a  more  integrated,  effective  and 
efficient  development  system  to  promote  the  world-wide  movement  towards  sustainable 
human  development.  It  is  this  vision  that  resulted  in  the  formulation  of  our  model  that 
354 
h would  enable  economies  in  transition  to  restructure  and  strengthen  their  transformation 
goal  and  formulate  their  own  operational  development  strategies. 
our  objective  of  modelling  a  new  economic  growth  thought  for  developing  economies 
with  particular  reference  to  economies  in  transition,  is  based  on  the  conviction  that  the 
global  crisis  that  we  face  today  is  not  merely  economic  but  it  is  socio-political  and  religio- 
cultural.  We  cannot  address  the  economic  development  issues  just  by  having  an  economic 
policy  whitepaper.  As  a  social  science,  economics,  has  to  integrate  other  areas  of  human 
development  process,  if  it  is  to  have  a  lasting  development  impact.  An  alienated  and 
isolated  approach  to  economic  development  issues,  though  promote  the  welfare  of  a  few, 
leaves  a  large  majority  of  a  global  village  underdeveloped.  Industrial,  developing  and 
transition  economies  of  a  global  economic  system  need  to  cooperate  to  strengthen  the 
global  expansion  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  report  of  the  forty-third  meeting  of  the 
Interim  Committee  of  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the  IMF.  The  following  points  of  the 
"Declaration  on  Cooperation  to  Strengthen  the  Global  Expansion"  of  IMF  are  relevant  to 
explain  the  global  growth  path.  The  immediate  prospects  for  economic  growth  in  the 
world  economy  are  better  than  they  have  been  at  any  time  in  this  decade.  But  serious 
policy  challenges  remain.  For  the  industrial  countries  the  most  important  are  to  sustain 
economic  growth,  reduce  unemployment.,  and  prevent  a  resurgence  of  inflation.  Growth  in 
the  developing  countries  (and  in  particular,  in  the  poorest  countries)  must  be  maintained 
and  extended.  The  economies  in  transition  must  be  integrated  into  the  international 
economy  and  set  firmly  on  the  path  of  sustainable  growth.  If  the  signatories  of  the 
Uruguay  Round  trade  agreements  abide  by  their  commitments,  it  would  enhance  world 
economic  prospects  by  deepening  global  economic  integration.  The  recent  success  of 
many  developing  economies  illustrates  once  again  the  validity  of  a  strategy  based  on 
steadfast  implementation  of  strong  programmes  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  and 
structural  reform.  The  impressive  turnaround  in  several  economies  in  transition  also  attests 
to  the  benefits  of  macroeconomic  discipline  and  structural  reforms.  As  we  have  noted  in 
our  analysis,  experience  has  demonstrated  the  central  importance  of  early  fiscal  reform  and 
firm  monetary  discipline  in  the  early  stages  of  the  transformation  process  to  achieve 
financial  stability.  This  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  institution  building,  price  and  external 
355 sector  liberalization,  enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization,  and  financial  sector  reform. 
Social  safety  nets  that  are  well  targeted  and  cost  efficient  are  also  necessary,  to  alleviate 
the  adverse  impact  of  higher  open  unemployment.  '  The  improved  economic  outlook  is  a 
sign  of  the  recovery  of  world  activity  and  trade.  Overall,  world  output  is  projected  to 
expand  by  3.5  percent  in  1995,  twice  as  rapidly  as  in  1990-93.  Progress  in  the 
implementation  of  policies  consistent  with  the  strategy  for  sustained  global  expansion  has 
helped  to  strengthen  conditions  for  a  revival  of  world  activity. 
While  the  world  economic  activity  is  designed  according  to  the  capitalist-socialist 
systems  based  on  certain  forms  of  ideologies,  it  is  relevant  to  inquire  into  the  missing  link 
of  development.  Neither  capitalism  nor  socialism  were  able  to  bring  about  an  equitable 
global  village.  The  emergence  of  economies  in  transition  and  their  desire  to  be  on  the 
capitalist  path  called  into  question  the  viability  of  historical  socialism.  The  experience  of 
industrial  economies  shows  that  capitalist  mode  of  allocation,  production  and  distribution 
better  address  the  need  of  the  people.  More  and  more  developing  economies  and  new- 
born  economies  in  transition  place  themselves  in  this  capitalist  path  of  growth.  This  would 
mean  that  the  capitalist  market  economic  mechanism  would  force  these  economies  to 
adopt  economic  growth  models  that  resonates  the  theoretical  growth  path  that  we  have 
followed  in  the  first  section  and  would  abandon  the  applied  growth  models  that  we  have 
discussed  in  the  second  section  of  our  investigation.  This  would  also  mean  a  deeper 
understanding  of  the  knowledge  sector  that  we  have  identified  in  our  research.  The  new 
global  growth  path  of  all  economies  would  have  to  be  based  on  this  dual  knowledge 
sectors  of  micro  knowledge  and  macro  knowledge.  While  the  development  of  various 
forms  of  micro  knowledge  is  having  a  greater  impact  on  the  research  intensive  sector  of 
growth  strategies,  it  is  of  paramount  importance  that  we  turn  our  attention  equally  to  the 
development  and  integration  of  macro  knowledge  variables  into  the  growth  models  of  our 
new  times.  Our  attempt  at  identifying  macro  knowledge  variables  of  freedom,  democracy 
and  human  rights  and  their  integration  into  a  vision-solution  growth  model  is  a  step 
towards  this  new  direction.  The  intensity  of  the  presence  of  freedom,  practice  of 
democracy  and  experience  of  human  rights  would  enhance  the  economic  growth  and 
therefore  permanent  development.  Our  desire  for  further  economic  growth  must  be  based 
356 on  a  vision  of  a  common  future  that  would  enhance  the  human  development  of  all  peoples 
in  our  planet. 
NOTES 
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Awm&iLLL. 
cators  of  Economic  Development  Based  on  the  1994  UNDP 
&ep-ort 
The  PeoPle 
Economy  Population  (000)  1993  Growth  rate  M  p.  a.  )  Life  expectancy  at 
1985-93  birth  (years)  1992 
Afghanistan  22,143  2.5  43 
Albania  3,421  1.8  73 
Algeria  26,882  2.6  67 
American  Samoa  53 
Andorra  63  4.6 
Angola  10,020  3.0  46 
Antigua  and  Barbuda  67  0.7  74 
Argentina  33,483  1.2  71 
Armenian/h  3,731  1.4  70 
Aruba  67  0.4 
Australia  17,707  1.5  77 
Austria  7,937  0.7  77 
Azerbaij  an/h  7,435  1.4  71 
Bahamas,  The  266  1.8  72 
Bahrain  544  3.1  70 
Bangladesh  116,702  2.2  55 
Barbados  260  0.3  75 
Belarus/h  10,319  0.4  71 
Belgium  10,061  0.3  76 
Belize  205  2.6  69 
Benin  5,194  3.2  51 
Bermuda  62  1.3 
Bhutan  1,532  2.2  48 
Bolivia  7,064  2.3  59 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  4,383  0.1  71 
Botswana  1,402  3.4  68 
Brazil  156,406  1.9  66 
358 Brunei  281  3.2  74 
Bulgaria  8,459 
-0.8  71 
Burkina  Faso  9,830  2.8  48 
Burundi  5,974  2.9  48 
Cambodia  9,633  3.2  51 
Cameroon  12,611  3.0  56 
Canada  27,815  1.3  78 
Cape  Verde  398  2.6  68 
Caymen  Islands  30 
Central  African  Republic  3,249  2.7  47 
Chad  6,131  2.5  47 
Channel  Islands  144  1.0  77 
Chile  13,813  1.6  72 
China  1,175,359  1.4  69 
Colombia  35,682  69 
Comoros  528  3.7  56 
Congo  2,508  3.3  51 
Costa  Rica  3,267  2.7  76 
Cote  Ovoire  13,358  3.8  56 
Croatia  4,788  0.4  73 
Cuba  10,896  1.0  76 
Cyprus  726  1.1  77 
Czech  Republic  10,323  0.0  72 
Denmark  5,191  0.2  75 
Djibouti  572  4.9  49 
Dominica  72  -0.3  72 
Dominican  Republic  7,447  1.9  68 
Ecuador  11,258  2.4  67 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  55,745  2.3  62 
El  Salvador  5,479  1.8  66 
Equatorial  Guinea  447  2.3  48 
Eritrea/i 
Estonia/h  1,546  0.1  70 
Ethiopia/i  53,297  3.0  49 
Faeroe  islands  48 
Fiji  759  0.9  72 
Finland  5,072  0.4  75 
France  57,650  0.6  77 
359 French  Guiana  133 
French  Polynesia  213  2.7  68 
Gabon  1,235  2.7  54 
Gambia,  The  1,019  3.7  45 
Georgia/h  5,456  0.4  72 
Germany/i  80,769  0.6  76 
Ghana  16,261  3.2  56 
Gibraltar  32 
Greece  10,376  0.5  77 
Greenland  57 
Grenada  91  -0.1  71 
Guadeloupe  405  1.7  74 
Guam  142  2.0  72 
Guatemala  10,021  2.9  65 
Guinea  6,269  2.9  44 
Guinea-Bissau  1,043  2.1  39 
Guyana  812  0.3  65 
Haiti  9,839  1.9  55 
Honduras  5,581  3.0  66 
Hong  Kong/k  5,865  0.9  78 
Hungary  10,280  -0.5  69 
Iceland  264  1.2  78 
India  900,543  2.1  61 
Indonesia  187,151  1.8  60 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  61,422  3.6  65 
Iraq  19,755  3.2  64 
Ireland  3,569  0.0  75 
Isle  of  Man  71 
Israel  5,281  2.9  76 
Italy  57,840  0.2  77 
Jamaica  2,415  0.8  74 
Japan  124,845  0.4  79 
Jordan/I  4,102  5.9  70 
Kazakhstan/h  17,169  1.0  68 
Kenya  25,376  3.0  59 
Kiribati  76  2.0  58 
Korea,  Dem.  Rep.  23,051  1.9  71 
Korea,  Rep.  44,056  1.0  71 
360 Kuwait  1,461 
-2.9  75 
Kyrgyz  Republic/h  4ý512  1.6  66 
Lao  PDR  4,511  2.9  51 
Latvia/h  2,588 
-0.1  69 
Lebanon  3,855  2.3  66 
Lesotho  1,899  2.6  60 
Liberia  2,373  0.9  53 
Libya  5,039  3.6  63 
Lithuania/h  3,747  0.7  71 
Luxembourg  397  1.0  76 
Macao  391  3.2  73 
Macedonia,  FYR/m  2,191  1.0  72 
Madagascar  12,728  3.1  51 
Malawi  9,303  3.3  44 
Malaysia  19,032  2.4  71 
Maldives  236  3.3  62 
Mali  9,234  2.8  48 
Malta  362  0.7  76 
Marshall  Islands  53  3.9 
Martinique  369  1.0  76 
Mauritania  2,137  2.7  48 
Mauritius  1,111  1.1  70 
Mayotte  98 
Mexico  86,712  1.8  70 
Micronesia,  Fed.  Sts.  110  2.4  63 
Moldova/h  4ý356  0.5  68 
Mongolia  2,372  2.8  64 
Morocco  26,721  2.4  63 
Mozambique  16,916  2.6  44 
Myanmar  44,704  2.2  60 
Namibia  1,565  3.0  59 
Nepal  20,390  2.6  54 
Netherlands  15,277  0.7  77 
Netherlands  Antilles  196  0.9  77 
New  Caledonia  177  2.0  70 
New  Zealand  3,462  0.8  76 
Nicaragua  3,985  2.6  67 
Niger  8,440  3.2  46 
361 Nigeria  104,893  2.9  52 
Northern  Mariana  Is.  53 
Norway  4,310  0.5  77 
Oman  1,719  3.9  70 
Pakistan  122,829  3.1  59 
Panama  2,563  2.0  73 
Papua  New  Guinea  4,148  2.3  56 
Paraguay  4,651  2.9  67 
Peru  22,801  2.1  65 
Philippines  65,77,5  2.3  65 
Poland  38,446  0.4  70 
Portugal  9,848  -0.6  74 
Puerto  Rico  3,608  0.8  74 
Qatar  520  5.3  71 
Reunion  620  1.5  74 
Romania  22,761  0.0  70 
Russian  Federation/h  148,537  0.4  69 
Rwanda  7,490  2.9  46 
San  Marino  24 
St.  Kitts  and  Nevis  41  -0.4  68 
St.  Lucia  158  1.8  70 
St.  Vincent  110  0.9  71 
Sao  Tome  and  Principe  125  2.4  68 
Saudi  Arabia  17Y392  4.4  69 
Senegal  8,054  3.0  49 
Seychelles  70  0.9  71 
Sierra  Leone  4,468  2.6  43 
Singapore  2,867  1.9  75 
Slovak  Republic  5,345  0.4  71 
Slovenia  1,993  0.6  73 
Solomon  Islands  346  2.9  62 
Somalia  8,543  3.1  49 
South  Africa  40,677  2.4  63 
Spain  39,125  0.2  77 
SriLanka  17,622  1.3  72 
Sudan  27,255  2.8  52 
Suriname  405  0.0  69 
Swaziland  888  3.8  57 
362 
k Sweden  8,712  0.6  78 
Switzerland  6,977  1.0  78 
Syrian  Arab  Republic  13,394  3.3  67 
TaJikistan/h  5,684  2.8  69 
Tanzania/n  26,743  3.0  51 
Thailand  58,824  1.6  69 
Togo  4,026  3.6  55 
Tonga  93  -0.3  68 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  1,282  1.3  71 
Tunisia  8,609  2.1  68 
Turkey  59,461  2.1  67 
Turkmenistan/h  3,949  2.5  66 
Uganda  18,026  3.2  43 
Ukraine/h  52,141  0.3  70 
United  Arab  Emirates  1,723  3.2  72 
United  Kingdom  58,040  0.3  76 
United  States  258,063  0.9  77 
Uruguay  3,147  0.6  72 
Uzbekistan/h  21,969  2.4  69 
Vanuatu  161  2.8  63 
Venezuela  20,780  2.5  70 
Viet  Nam  70,881  2.4  67 
Virgin  Islands  (U.  S.  )  99  -1.1  75 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  1,769  3.8  67 
Western  Samoa  163  0.5  65 
Yemen,  Rep.  13,436  4.4  53 
Yugoslavia,  Fed.  Rep.  10,675  0.8  72 
Zaire  40,997  3.3  52 
Zambia  8,527  3.1  48 
Zimbabwe  10,638  3.1  60 
The  Economy 
Economy  GNP/a  (millions  of  US$/a  1992  US$/a  1993  GNP  pE 
US$)  1993  Real  grc 
M198 
Af  zhanistan  c 
L7-- 
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I Albania  1,167  340 
Algeria  44,347  1,850  1ý650 
American  Samoa 
Andorra  f 
Angola  9 
Antigua  and  Barbuda  425  6,100  6,390 
Argentina  244,013  6,170  7,290 
Armenian/h  2y471  870  660 
Aruba 
Australia  309,967  17,730  17,510 
Austria  183,530  22,790  23,120 
Azerbaijan/h  5,424  880  730 
Bahamas,  The  3,059  11,670  11,500 
Bahrain  4,283  7,940  7,870 
Bangladesh  25,882  220  220 
Barbados  1,620  6,210  6,240 
Belarus/h  29,290  3,210  2,840 
Belgium  213,435  21,360  21,210 
Belize  499  2,380  2,440 
Benin  2,189  410  420 
Bermuda  f 
Bhutan  253  170  170 
Bolivia  5,472  750  770 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  c 
Botswana  3,630  2,450  2,590 
Brazil  471,978  2,810  3,020 
Brunei  f 
Bulgaria  9,773  1,410  1)160 
Burkina  Faso  2,928  310  300 
Burundi  1,102  210  180 
Cambodia  c 
Cameroon  9,663  830  770 
Canada  574,884  21,070  20,670 
Cape  Verde  347  840  870 
Caymen  Islands  f 
Central  African  Republic  1,263  410  390 
Chad  1,249  220  200 
Channel  Islands  f 
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i Chile  42,454  2,780  3,070  6.1 
China  581,109  480  490  6.5 
Colombia  50,119  1,350  1,400  2.3 
Comoros  272  530  520  -2.2 
Congo  2,318  1,110  920  -1.9 
Costa  Rica  7,041  2,010  2,160  2.6 
Cote  Ovoire  8,397  680  630  -5.2 
Croatia  9 
Cuba  9 
Cyprus  7,539  10,300  10,380  5.2 
Czech  Republic  28,192  2,590  2,730  -2.0 
Denmark  137,610  26,310  26,510  1.1 
Djibouti  448  780 
Dominica  193  2,570  2,680  4.8 
Dominican  Republic  8,039  1,070  1,080  0.3 
Ecuador  13,217  1,100  1'  170  0.8 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  36,679  650  660  0.7 
El  Salvador  7,233  1,200  1,320  1.2 
Equatorial  Guinea  161  340  360  1.5 
Eritrea/i  c 
Estonia/h  4,703  3,170  3,040  -5.2 
Ethiopia/i  110  100  -1.8 
Faeroe  Islands  f 
Fiji  1,626  2,050  2,140  2.5 
Finland  96,220  22,690  18,970  -0.3 
France  1,289,235  22,630  22,360  1.8 
French  Guiana  e 
French  Polynesia  f 
Gabon  5,004  4,220  4,050  -1.7 
Gambia,  The  372  370  360  1.0 
Georgia/h  3,071  1,020  560  -16.4 
Germany/j  1,902,995  23,360  23,560  1.9 
Ghana  7,036  460  430  1.3 
Gibraltar  e 
Greece  76,698  7,390  7,390  1.3 
Greenland  f 
Grenada  219  2,350  2,410  4.1 
Guadeloupe  e 
365 
I Guam  e 
Guatemala  11,092  1,000  lPlIO  0.8 
Guinea  3,170  490  510  1.3 
Guinea-Bissau  233  220  220  1.6 
Guyana  285  320  350  0.6 
Haiti  c  -3.4 
Honduras  3,220  570  580  0.0 
Hong  Kong/k  104,731  15,710  17,860  5.3 
Hungary  34,254  3,190  3,330  0.0 
Iceland  6,236  24,300  23,620  0.1 
India  262,810  310  290  3.0 
Indonesia  136,991  680  730  4.8 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  2,230  -0.7 
Iraq  9 
Ireland  44,906  12,850  12,580  4.8 
Isle  of  Man  0  e 
Israel  72,662  13,460  13,760  2.3 
Italy  1,134,980  20,790  19,620  1.9 
Jamaica  3,362  1,390  1,390  3.1 
Japan  3,926,668  28,690  31,450  3.6 
Jordan/I  4,893  1,130  1P190  -5.9 
Kazakhstan/h  26,490  1,880  1,540  -4.6 
Kenya  6p743  330  270  0.3 
Kiribati  54  710  710  -1.3 
Korea,  Dem.  Rep.  9 
Korea,  Rep.  338,062  7,220  1,670  8.1 
Kuwait  34,120  18,380  23,350  0.8 
Kyrgyz  Republic/h  3,752  1,020  830  -2.1 
Lao  PDR  1,295  260  290  2.1 
Latvia/h  5,257  2,610  2,030  -4.5 
Lebanon  9 
Lesotho  1,254  610  660  0.8 
Liberia  c 
Libya  e 
Lithuania/h  4,891  1,710  1,310  -6.4 
Luxembourg  14,233  35,800  35,850  2.7 
Macao  e 
Macedonia,  FYR/m  1,709  780 
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I Madagascar  3,039  230  240 
Malawi  2,034  230  220 
Malaysia  60,061  2,830  3,160 
Maldives  194  700  820 
Mali  2,744  310  300 
Malta  e 
Marshall  Islands  9 
Martinique  e 
Mauritania  1,087  540  510 
mauritius  3,309  2,800  2,980 
Mayotte  e 
Mexico  324,951  3,510  3,750 
Micronesia,  Fed.  Sts.  9 
Moldova/h  5,160  1,450  1,180 
Mongolia  943  400 
Morocco  27,645  1,050  1,030 
Mozambique  1,375  70  80 
Myanmar  C 
Namibia  2,594  1,670  lY660 
Nepal  3,174  170  160 
Netherlands  316,404  20,850  20,710 
Netherlands  Antilles  e 
New  Caledonia  e 
New  Zealand  44,674  12,660  12,900 
Nicaragua  1,421  350  360 
Niger  2,313  290  270 
Nigeria  32,988  330  310 
Northern  Mariana  is.  9 
Norway  113,527  26,280  26,340 
Oman  9,631  6,380  5,600 
Pakistan  53,250  420  430 
Panama  6,621  2,470  2,580 
Papua  New  Guinea  4,637  990  1,120 
Paraguay  6,995  1,410  1,500 
Peru  34,030  1,350  1,490 
Philippines  54,609  790  830 
Poland  87,315  1,950  2,270 
Portugal  77,749  7,510  7,890 
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h Puerto  Rico  25,817  6,700  7,020  1.8 
Qatar  7,871  15,760  15,140  -0.7 
Reunion  e 
Romania  25,427  1,170  11120  -6.5 
Russian  Federation/h  348,413  2,820  2,350  -5.0 
Rwanda  1,499  250  200  -3.5 
San  Marino  f 
St.  Kitts  and  Nevis  185  4,120  4,470  5.2 
St.  Lucia  480  2,900  3,040  4.3 
St.  Vincent  233  2,040  2,130  4.6 
Sao  Tome  and  Principe  41  370  330  -1.8 
Saudi  Arabia  7,780  -0.9 
Senegal  5,867  780  730  -0.3 
Seychelles  444  5,750  6,370  4.0 
Sierra  Leone  647  160  140  -0.6 
Singapore  55,372  16,970  19,310  6.1 
Slovak  Republic  10,145  2,040  1,900  -2.6 
Slovenia  12,566  6,700  6,310 
Solomon  Islands  261  720  750  2.5 
Somalia  c  -2.3 
South  Africa  118,057  2,830  2,900  -1.5 
Spain  533,986  14,230  13,650  3.1 
Sri  Lanka  10,658  560  600  2.6 
Sudan  c  -0.2 
Suriname  488  1,280  1,210  2.2 
Swaziland  933  1,080  1,050  3.8 
Sweden  216,294  27,500  24,830  0.1 
Switzerland  254,066  36,730  36,410  0.7 
Syrian  Arab  Republic  9  -2.1 
Tajikistan/h  2,686  600  470  -7.8 
Tanzania/n  2,521  100  100  1.4 
Thailand  120,235  1,840  2,040  8.4 
Togo  1,325  400  330  -3.4 
Tonga  150  1,510  1,610  1.5 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  4,776  3,990  3,730  -2.7 
Tunisia  15,332  1,760  1,780  2.2 
Turkey  126,330  2,030  2,120  3.0 
Turkmenistan/h  1,380  -1.6 
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i Uganda  3,486  180  190  1.9 
Ukraine/h  99,677  2,360  1,910  -3.9 
United  Arab  Emirates  38,720  22,640  22,470  0.5 
United  Kingdom  1,042,700  18,110  17,970  1.3 
United  States  6,387,686  23,830  24,750  1.2 
Uruguay  12,314  3,470  3,910  3.0 
Uzbekistan/h  21,100  1,000  960  -1.6 
Vanuatu  198  1,230  1,230  0.2 
Venezuela  58,916  2,920  2,840  1.0 
Viet  Nam  11,997  170  4.8 
Virgin  Islands  (U.  S.  )  f 
West  Bank  and  Gaza  9 
Western  Samoa  159  960  980  -0.1 
Yemen,  Rep.  c 
Yugoslavia,  Fed.  Rep.  9  - 
Zaire  C  -0.8 
Zambia  3,152  370  370  1.8 
Zimbabwe  5,756  580  540  -1.1 
GNP  per  capita,  1993  Number  of  GNP  (US$000,000)  Population  GNP  per 
economies  1993  (000,000)  1993  capita,  (US$) 
1993 
LOW  59  1,165,000  3,094  380 
Lower-middle  69  1,635,000  1,099  1,490 
Upper-middle  42  2,153,000  498  4,320 
High  39  19,304,000  834  23,150 
World  209  24,257,000  5,525  4,390 
GNP  per  capita  growth  Number 
rate,  1985-93  economies 
Less  than  0% 
0%-0.9% 
1.0%-1.9% 
2.0%-2.9% 
3.0%  or  more 
No  data 
63 
24 
30 
16 
31 
45 
of  GNP  (US$000,000)  Population  GNP  per 
1993  (000,000)  1993  capita,  (US$) 
1993 
1,862,000  995  1,870 
1,757,000  328  5,360 
12,803,000  1,048  12,220 
890,000  112  7,950 
6,711,000  2,853  2,350 
233,000  189  1,230 
369 Share  of  investment  in  Number  of  GNP  (US$000,000)  Population 
GDP,  1985-93  economies  1993  (000,000)  1993 
Less  than  15%  28  131,000  336 
15%-19%  48  11,566,000  1,149 
20%-24%  36  5,280,000  793 
25%-29%  26  1,559,000  1,293 
30%  or  more  28  5,429,000  1,785 
No  data  43  291,000  167 
Population  growth  rate,  Number  of  GNP  (US$000,000)  Population 
1985-93  economies  1993  (000,000)  1993 
More  than  3%  37  518,000  437 
2.2%-3.0%  57  737,000  976 
1.5%-2.1%  26  1,962,000  1,571 
1.0%-1.4%  20  2,321,000  1,372 
Less  than  1%  58  18,664,000  1,129 
No  data  11  55,000  40 
GNP  per 
capita,  (US$) 
1993 
390 
10,060 
6,650 
1,210 
3,040 
1,740 
GNP  per 
capita,  (US$) 
1,180 
750 
1,250 
1,690 
16,530 
1,390 
Life  expectancy  from  Number  of  GNP  (US$000,000)  Population  GNP  per 
birth,  1992  economies  1993  (000,000)  1993  capita,  (US$) 
1993 
Less  than  55  37  142,000  495  290 
55-64  29  814,000  1,628  500 
65-69  41  2,269,000  2,050  1,110 
70-72  40  1,520,000  462  3,290 
72  or  more  48  19,503,000  886  22,000 
No  data  14  8,000  4  1,900 
Source:  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report,  1994. 
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A  Production  Possibility  Curve 
A  Production  Possibdity  Curve 
Good  Y 
M1 
M 
,  77/ 
Good  X rMe  Figure  shows  all  the  possible  combinations  of  two  goods  which  can  be  produced 
at  any  one  time,  given  existing  resources.  If  all  resources  are  devoted  to  producing  good 
X,  then  ON  can  be  produced.  If,  however,  all  resources  are  used  to  produce  good  Y, 
then  OM  units  can  be  produced.  If  a  combination  of  X  and  Y  is  desired,  then  all  possible 
combinations  are  shown  by  the  line  MN  which  is  drawn  convex  to  the  origin.  This  line 
shows  both  factor  combination  and  factor  substitution.  It  shows  how  a  country's 
factors  of  production  can  be  combined  in  different  ways  in  order  to  vary  the  pattern  of 
output.  It  also  shows  how  factors  can  be  substituted  for  each  other  in  order  to  produce 
less  of  one  good  and  more  of  another.  Foe  example,  suppose  good  Y  represents  'tanks' 
and  good  X  represents  'tractors'.  The  PPC  can  now  be  used  to  give  some  interesting 
insights  into  the  'peace  dividend'  resulting  from  the  end  of  the  cold  war  and  the 
switching  of  war  industries  into  peaceful  uses.  Producing  half  as  many  tanks  will  not 
necessarily  double  the  amount  of  tractors.  In  the  language  of  economics,  we  can  say  this 
is  because  the  factors  of  production  are  not  'perfectly  mobile',  or  that  one  factor  is  not  a 
'perfect  substitute'  for  another.  In  other  words,  tank  factories,  machines  designed  for 
tank  production,  and  people  trained  to  build  tanks,  cannot  be  instantly  switched  to 
tractor  production:  factories  will  need  reorganizing,  machines  will  need  redesigning, 
modification  or  even  rebuilding,  and  workers  will  need  to  be  retrained.  Thus  the  law  of 
'diminishing  returns'  operates  as  factors  are  switched  from  one  use  to  another,  and  the 
output  of  tractors  rises  less  than  proportionately  to  the  falling  output  of  tanks. 
The  PPC  represents  a  'frontier'  or  'boundary'  in  the  sense  that  given  the  current 
availability  of  resources  and  technical  knowledge,  a  country  cannot  produce  on  a  point 
to  the  right  of  the  PPC.  The  PPC  is  therefore  a  'short-run'  diagram:  in  the  long  run  the 
productive  capacity  of  a  country  can  be  increased,  thus  shifting  the  PPC  to  the  right.  It 
is  often  assumed  that  the  natural  tendency  is for  the  PPC  of  any  country  to  shift  in  this 
way,  but  there  are  circumstances  when  it  could  shift  to  the  left--where  a  country  is  laid 
waste  by  warfare,  disease  or  natural  disasters,  for  instance. 
The  PPC  can  also  be  used  to  examine  the  output  of  more  than  two  goods.  The  vertical 
axis  could,  for  instance,  represent  'all  capital  goods'  and  the  horizontal  axis  could 
represent  'all  consumption  goods'.  The  PPC  then  becomes  a  useful  tool  for  exammmg 
the  opportunity  cost  of  investment;  that  is,  the  sacrifice  necessary  for  a  country's 
citizens  to  be  willing  to  invest.  A  greater  expenditure  on  capital  goods  involves  the 
sacrifice  of  present  consumption,  and  depends  on  people  being  willing  to  wait  for 
consumption  goods.  The  extent  to  which  people  are  willing  to  make  this  sacrifice 
depends  on  what  sociologists  call  'deferred  gratification  patterns'  or  what  economists 
call  people's  'time  preferences'.  Do  people  prefer  consumption  immediately,  or  would 
they  prefer  consumption  at  a  higher  level  tomorrow?  Some  bars  of  chocolate  now,  or 
more  bars  of  chocolate  in  the  future?  If  the  promise  of  'chocolate  tomorrow'  is 
convincing  enough,  then  people  might  be  willing  to  invest  in  chocolate-making 
machinery  now  in  order  to  enjoy  a  higher  rate  of  consumption  later.  It  could  be  argued 
that  this  is  what  has  enabled  planned  economies  such  as  the  former  Soviet  Union  to 
industrialize  so  rapidly  in  the  twentieth  century.  Power  stations,  railways,  hospitals  and 
nuclear  weapons  were  built  at  the  expense  of  chocolate  bars,  denim  jeans,  hamburgers 
and  conditioning  shampoo.  It  could  further  be  argued  that  the  recent  move  towards  a 
market  economy  results  partly  from  the  strain  of  the  central  planners  attempting  to 
impose  time  preferences  which  were  not  always  shared  by  the  mass  of  the  population.  A 
movement  from  point  A  to  point  B  on  the  PPC  diagram  would  represent  actual 
economic  growth;  a  shift  of  the  PPC  to  MIN,  would  represent  potential  growth,  but 
372 would  not  represent  actual  growth  unless  the  combination  goods  being  produced  moved 
from  B  to  C 
Source:  Charles  Smith,  Economic  Developmen4  Growth  And  We6(are,  (1994),  pp.  5-8) 
373 Appendix  1.2.2 
Indiecators  of  economic  develot)ment 
Population 
(mid-1997) 
millions 
GNP 
per  cap 
(1987) 
USS 
&-Ile 
PPP-adj,  expect- 
GDP  ancy 
per  cap.  at  birih 
(1987)  (1987) 
US$  years 
Aduk 
literacy 
rate 
(1985) 
percent 
Huffum 
Dev. 
Index 
scale 
0-1 
High-birome  ftvmomfes 
Switzerland  6.5  21.330  15.403  77  99  0.966 
United  States  243.8  18,530  17,615  76  %  0.  %I 
Norway  4ý2  17.190  15,940  77  99  0.983 
United  Arab  Emirates  1.5  15,830  12,19  1  71  60  0,792 
Japan  122.1  15.760  0.135  78  909  0.9% 
Sweden  9A  15,550  13,790  77  99  0.997 
Canada  25.9  15,160  16.375  77  99  0.903 
Denmark  5.1  14,930  15,119  76  99  0.971 
Kuwait  1.9  14.610  13.843  73  70  0.839 
Finland  4.9  14.470  12,795  75  99  OW 
Gcrmany,  '  Fed.  Rep.  61.2  14.400  14.730  75  OW 
France  55-6  12,790  13,  %[  76  0.974 
Austria  7.6  11.980  12,386  74  0.  %1 
Netherlands  14,7  11.960  12,661  77  0,984 
Belgium  9,9  11,480  13,140  75  99  0,966 
Australia  16.2  l('100  11,782  76  99  0.978 
United  Kingdom  56.9  10,420  12,270  76  99  0.910 
Italy  57.4  10.350  10.682  76  97  0.966 
Hong  Kong  5.6  8,070  13,906  76  as  0.936 
Singapore  2.6  7.940  12.790  73  86  0.8" 
New  Zealand  3.3  7,750  10.541  75  99  0,  %6 
1  srael  4.4  6,800  9,182  76  95  0.957 
Saudi  Arabia  12.6  6,200  9.320  64  55  0.702 
Ireland  3.6  6.120  8.566  74  99  0.  %l 
Spain  381  6,010  9.999  77  95  0.965 
Afiddle-income  economies 
Oman  1.3  5,810  7,750  57  30  0-535 
Libya  4.1  5,460  7,250  62  66  0.719 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  1.2  4,210  3,664  71  96  0.885 
Greece  10.0  4.020  5,500  76  93  0149 
Venezuela  183  3,230  4.306  70  87  0.861 
Port  ugal  10.2  2.830  5.597  74  85  0.899 
Gabon  1.1  2,700  2,068  52  62  0-525 
South  Korea  42A  2,690  4,832  70  95  0,903 
Algeria  23.1  2,680  2.633  63  50  0.609 
Yugoslavia  23.4  2.480  5,000  72  92  0.913 
Argentina  31.1  2,390  4.647  71  96  0.910 
Panama  2.3  2.240  4.  OD9  72  89  0.893 
Hungary  10.6  2,240  4,500  7(  99  0.915 
Uruguay  3.0  2.190  5,063  71  95  0.916 
Brazil  141.4  2.020  4.307  65  78  0,794 
Poland  37.7  1,930  4,000  72  98  0.910 
South  Africa  33.1  1,890  4,  "  1  61  70  0,731 
Mexico  81.9  1,830  4,624  69  90  0.976 
Malaysia  16.5  1,810  3.949  70  74  0-8W 
Syrian  Arab  Rep.  11.2  1.640  3.250  66  60  0.691 
Costa  Rica  2.6  1.610  3,760  75  93  0.916 
Jordan  3.8  1ý560  3,161  67  75  0,752 
Mauritius  1.0  1.490  2.617  69  83  0.789 
Peru  201  1,470  3,129  63  85  0.753 
Chile  12.5  1.310  4.962  72  98  0.931 
Colombia  29.5  1.240  3.524  65  Be  0.901 
Turkey  52.6  1,210  3,781  65  74  0.751 
Tunisia  7.6  1,180  2,741  66  55  0.657 
Botswana  1.1  1,050  2,496  59  71  0.646 
Ecuador  9.9  1.040  2,687  66  83  0.758 
Paraguay  3.9  990  2.603  67  B8  0.794 
Cameroon  10.9  970  1.381  52  61  0.474 
Guatemala  RA  950  1,957  63  55  0.59.1 
Jamaica  2.4  940  2,506  74  82  Oý824 
Congo,  Peoplc*s  Rep.  2.0  870  756  49  63  0.395 
El  Salvador  4ý9  860  1,733  64  72  0.651 
Thailand  53.6  850  2,576  66  91  0.783 
Nicaragua  3.5  830  2,209  64  88  0.743 
Honduras  4.7  810  1,119  65  59  0.563 
Ivory  Coast  11.1  740  1,123  53  42  0.393 
Dominican  Rep,  6.7  730  1,750  67  78  0.699 
Papua  New  Guinea  3.7  700  1.843  55  45  0,471 
Egypt  50.1  680  1,357  62  45  0.501 
Morocco  23.3  610  1,761  62  34  0.489 
Yemen  Arab  Rep.  9-5  590  1.250  52  25  0.328 
Philippines  58.4  590  1,979  64  86  0,714 
Zimbabwe  9.0  580  1.184  59  74  0.576 
Bolivia  6.7  580  1.390  54  75  0.549 
Senegal  7.0  520  1,068  47  28  0.274 
Albania'  3.1  2,000  72  85  0.790 
Bulgaria*  Wo  4.750  72  93  0.918 
Cuba'  10.3  2,500  74  96  0.877 
Czechoslovakia*  15.6  7.750  72  98  0931 
Iran  47.0  3.300  66  51  0.660 
Iraq  17.1  2,400  65  89  0ý759 
Lebanon  2.8  2.250  68  78  0.733 
Mongolia  2.0  2.000  64  90  0.737 
North  Korea*  21.4  2,000  70  90  0.789 
Romania  22.9  3,000  -;  1  96  0.863 
USSR$  283.1  6,000  70  99  0.920 
Low-income  economies 
Liberia  2.3  450  %9  55  35  0.333 
Indonesia  171.4  450  1,660  57  74  0.591 
Mauritania  1.9  440  W  47  t7  0.206 
Yemen,  PDR  2.3  4?  0  1  (M  ltý  Al  A  140 
Sri  Lanka  16.4  400  2,053  71  87  0.789 
Ghana  13.6  390  481  55  54  0.360 
Nigeria  106.6  370  668  51  43  0.322 
Lesotho  1.6  370  1,595  57  73  0,590 
Haiti  6.1  360  775  55  38  0.356 
Pakistan  102.5  350  1.585  59  30  0.423 
Sudan  23.1  330  750  51  23  0.255 
Kenya  22.1  330  794  59  60  0.481 
Central  African  Rep.  2.7  330  591  46  41  0.258 
Benin  4.3  310  665  47  27  0.224 
Sierra  Leone  3.8  300  490  42  30  0.150 
Rwanda  6.4  300  571  49  47  0.304 
India  797-5  300  1,053  59  43  0.439 
Togo  3.2  290  670  54  41  0.337 
Somalia  5.7  290  1.000  46  12  0-20D 
China  1,068.5  290  2.124  70  69  0.716 
Uganda  15-7  260  511  52  50  0.354 
NiW  6.9  260  452  45  14  0.116 
Zambia  7.2  2SO  717  54  76  0.481 
Burundi  5.0  250  450  so  35  0.235 
Mali  7,8  210  543  45  17  0.143 
Madagascar  10.9  210  634  54  68  0.440 
Burkina  Faso  8.3  190  500  49  14  0.150 
Tanzania  23.9  [so  405  54  75  0.413 
Mozambique  14.6  170  500  47  39  0.239 
Laos  3.8  170  1,000  49  94  0.306 
Nepal  17.6  160  722  52  26  0.273 
Malawi  7.9  160  476  48  42  0.250 
Bangladesh  106.1  160  883  52  33  0.319 
Zaire  32.6  ISO  220  53  62  0.294 
Chad  5.3  150  400  46  26  0.157 
Bhutan  1.3  150  700  49  25  0.236 
Ethiopia  44.8  130  454  42  66  0-282 
Afghanistan  15.2  1.000  42  24  0-212 
Angola'  9-2  1.000  45  41  0.304 
Burma  39.3  752  61  79  0.561 
Guinea  6.5  500  43  29  0.162 
Kampuchea,  Dem.  7.7  1,000  49  75  0.471 
Namibia*  1.7  1.500  56  30  0.404 
Vietnam  65.  D  I 
ý000 
62  80  0.608 
Notes:  PPP-adj  ý  converted  into  US$  by  purchasing  power  parties  rather  than  by  official 
exchange  rates.  *=  not  listed  in  the  World  Bank  source  (for  the  non-markct  economies 
GNP  comparisons  are  especially  difficult  and  my  classification  is  approximatc)ý  other 
entries  with  ..  are  listed  but  reliable  GNP  per  capita  data  are  unavailable  (classification  by 
group  is  by  the  World  Bank);  ',  German  data  are  for  the  pre-unification  Federal  Republic. 
Sources:  col.  I  United  Nations,  Demiograp*ic  Yearbook  1987,  pp.  193_7ý  Col.  2  World 
Bank,  World  Development  Report  1989,  pp.  164-5.  cots  3-6  United  Nations  Develop- 
ment  Programme.  Human  Development  Report  1990. TABLE  5.3 
HDI  ranking  for  developing  countries 
GNP  per  GNP  per 
GNP  capita  rank  GNP  capita  rank 
HDI  HDI  per  capita  minus  HDI  HDI  HDI  per  capita  minus  HDI 
value  rank  rank  ranka  value  rank  rank  rank, 
Barbados  0.894  20  34  14  Morocco  0.549  ill  101  -10 
Hong  Kong  0.875  24  22  -2  El  Salvador  0.543  112  97  -15 
Cyprus  0.873  26  30  4  Bolivia  0.530  113  119  6 
Korea,  Rep.  of  0.859  32  36  4  Gabon  0.525  114  42  -72 
Uruguay  0.859  33  53  20  Honduras  0.524  115  123  8 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.855  35  46  11  Viet  Nam  0.514  116  150  34 
Bahamas  0.854  36  26  -10  Swaziland  0.513  117  96  -21 
Argentina  0.853  37  43  6  Maldives  0.511  118  132  14 
Chile  Oý848  38  66  28  Vanuatu  0.489  119  93  -26 
Costa  Rica  0.848  39  75  36  Lesotho  0.476  120  124  4 
Singapore  0.836  43  21  -22  Zimbabwe  0.474  121  118  -3 
Brunei  Darussalann  0.829  44  29  -15  Cape  Verde  0.474  122  112  -10 
Venezuela  0.820  46  55  9  Congo  0.461  123  100  -23 
Panama  0.816  47  70  23  Cameroon  0.447  124  ill  -13 
Colombia  0.813  50  91  41  Kenya  0.434  125  146  21 
Kuwait  0.809  51  28  -23  Solomon  Islands  0.434  126  115  -11 
Mexico  0.804  52  51  -1  Namibia  0.425  127  84  -43 
Thailand  0.798  54  82  28  Sio  Tom&  and  Principe  0,409  128  138  10 
Antigua  and  Barbuda  0.796  55  40  -15  Papua  New  Guinea  0.408  129  108  -21 
Qatar  0.795  56  20  -36  Myanmar  0.406  130  149  19 
Malaysia  0.794  57  61  4  Madagascar  0.396  131  162  31 
Bahrain  0.791  58  33  -25  Pakistan  0,393  132  140  8 
Fiji  0.787  59  74  15  Lao  People's  Dem.  Rep.  0.385  133  157  24 
Mauritius  0.778  60  65  5  Ghana  0.382  134  133  -1 
United  Arab  Emirates  0.771  62  10  -52  India  0.382  135  147  12 
Brazil  0.756  63  52  -11  Me  d'lvoire  0.370  136  117  -19 
Dominica  0.749  64  62  -2  Haiti  0.354  137  141  4 
Jamaica  0.749  65  87  22  Zambia  0.352  138  134  -4 
Saudi  Arabia  0.742  67  31  -36  Nigeria  0.348  139  145  6 
Turkey  0.739  68  78  10  Zaire  0.341  140  160  20 
Saint  Vincent  0.732  69  77  8  Comoros  0.331  141  131  -10 
Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis  0.730  70  47  -23  Yemen  0.323  142  126  -16 
Syrian  Arab  Rep.  0,727  73  94  21  Senegal  0.322  143  114  -29 
Ecuador  0.718  74  102  28  Li  beria  0317  144  130  -14 
Saint  Lucia  0.709  77  57  -20  Togo  0.311  145  136  -9 
Grenada  0.707  78  67  -11  Bangladesh  0.309  146  159  13 
Libyan  Ajab  Jamahiiriya  0.703  79  41  -38  Cambodia  0.307  147  164  17 
Tunisia  Oý690  81  85  4  Tanzania,  U.  Rep.  of  0.306  148  170  22 
Seychelles  Oý685  83  39  -44  Nepal  0.289  149  166  17 
Paraguay  0.679  84  90  6  Equatorial  Guinea  0.276  150  154  4 
Suriname  0.677  85  48  -37  Sudan  0.276  151  137  -14 
Iran,  151amic  Rep.  of  0.672  86  64  -22  Burundi  0.276  152  158  6 
Botswana  0.670  87  58  -29  Rwanda  0.274  153  152  -1 
Belize  0.666  88  69  -19  Uganda  0.272  154  168  14 
Cuba  0.666  89  110  21  Angola  0.271  155  120  -35 
Sri  Lanka  0.665  90  128  38  Benin  0.261  156  142  -14 
Oman  0.654  92  38  -54  Malawi  0.260  157  156  -1 
South  Africa  0.650  93  60  -33  Mauritania  0.254  158  127  -31 
China  0.644  94  143  49  Mozambique  0.252  159  173  14 
Peru  0.642  95  98  3  Central  African  Rep.  0.249  160  135  -25 
Dominican  Rep.  0.638  96  107  11  Ethiopia  0.249  161  171  10 
Jordan  0.628  98  99  1  Bhutan  0.247  162  165  3 
Philippines  0.621  99  113  14  Djibouti  0.226  163  125  -38 
Iraq  0.614  100  59  -41  Guinea-Bissau  0.224  164  167  3 
Korea,  Dem.  Rep.  of  0.609  101  109  8  Somalia  0.217  165  172  7 
Mongolia  0.607  102  103  1  Gambia  0.215  166  144  -22 
Lebanon  0.600  103  83  -20  Mali  0.214  167  155  -12 
Samoa  0.596  104  105  1  Chad  0.212  168  161  -7 
Indonesia  0.586  105  121  16  Niger  0.209  169  148  -21 
Nicaragua  0.583  106  139  33  Sierra  Leone  0.209  170  163  -7 
Guyana  0.580  107  151  44  Afghanistan  0.208  171  169  -2 
Guatemala  0.564  108  106  -2  Burkina  Faso  0.203  172  153  -19 
Algeria  0.553  109  72  -37  Guinea  0.191  173  129  -44 
Egypt  0.551  110  122  12 
a.  A  positive  figure  shows  that  the  HDI  rank  is better  than  the  GNP  per  capita  rank,  a  negative  the  opposite Top  performers 
TOP  ten  Absolute  Top  ten  Absolute  Top  ten  Absolute  Top  ten  Absolute 
performers  increase  in  performers  increase  in  performers  increase  in  performers  increase  in 
1960-70  HDI  value  1970-80  HDI  value  1980-92  HDI  value  1960-92  HDI  value 
Japan  0.19 
Spain  0.184 
Hong  Kong  0.176 
Syrian  Arab  0.239 
Rep. 
Malaysia  0.216 
Malta  0.187 
Botswana  0.256  Malaysia  0.463 
Singapore  0.163  Brazil  0.166 
Cyprus  0.154  Tunisia  0.159 
Greece  0.15  Algeria  0.153 
Barbados  0.146  Portugal  0.148 
Malaysia  0.141  Jordan  0.148 
Jamaica  0.132  Korea,  Rep.  0.143 
Of 
Portugal  0.128  Hungary  0.133 
HDI  values  by  region,  1960-92 
Thailand  0.247 
Korea,  Rep.  0.196 
Of 
Tunisia  0.191 
Egypt  0.191 
Turkey  0.19 
Iran,  Islamic  0.175 
Rep.  of 
China  0.169 
Indonesia  0.168 
Morocco  0.166 
Botswana  0.463 
Korea,  Rep.  0.462 
Of 
Tunisia  0.432 
Thailand  0.424 
Syrian  Arab  0.408 
Rep. 
Turkey  0.406 
China  0.396 
Portugal  0.378 
Iran,  Islamic  0.366 
Rep.  of 
1960  1970  1980  1992  Absolute  increase 
in  HDI  value 
1960-92 
All  developing  countries  0.26  0.347  0.428  0.541  0.281 
Least  developed  countries  0.165  0.209  0.251  0.307  0.142 
Industrial*  0.799  0.859  0.889  0.918  0.119 
World  0.392  0.46  0.519  0.605  0.213 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.2  0.255  0.306  0.357  0.156 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  0.277  0.363  0.480+  0.631  0.354 
South  Asia  0.202  0.248  0.29  0.376  0.174 
South  Asia  excl.  India  0.188  0.231  0.27  0.358  0.17 
East  Asia  0.255  0.379  0.484+  0.653  0.397 
East  Asia  excl.  China  0.416+  0.547  0.686>  0.861  0.446 
South-East  Asia  and  Oceania  0.284  0.373  0.469  0.613  0.329 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  0.467+  0.568  0.682  0.757  0.29 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  0.504  0.586  0.654  0.735  0.231 
excl.  Mexico  and  Brazil 
, 375 TABLE  5,6 
Top  perform  ers  in  human  development,  1960-92 
Top  ten  Absolute  Top  ten  Absolute  Top  ten  Absolute  Top  ten  Absolute 
performers  increase  performers  increase  performers  increase  performers  increase 
1960-70  in  HDI  value  1970-80  in  HDI  value  1980-92  in  HDI  value  1960-92  in  HDI  value 
Japan 
0.190  Syrian  Arab  Rep.  0.239  Botswana  0.256  Malaysia  0463 
Spain  0.184  Malaysia  0.216  Thailand  0.247  Botswana  0463 
Hong  Kong  0.176  Matta  0.187  Korea,  Rep.  of  0.193  Korea,  Rep.  of  0.462 
Singapore  0.163  Brazil  0.166  Tunisia  0.191  Tunisia  0.432 
Cyprus  0,154  Tunisia  0.159  Egypt  0.191  Thailand  0.424 
Greece  0.150  Algeria  0.153  Turkey  0.190  Syrian  Arab  Rep.  0.408 
Barbados  0.146  Portugal  0.148  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  of  0.175  Turkey  0,406 
Malaysia  0.141  Jordan  0.148  China  0.169  China  0.396 
Jamaica  0.132  Korea,  Rep.  of  0.143  Indonesia  0.168  Portugal  0-378 
Portugal  0.128  Hungary  0.133  Morocco  0,166  Iran,  Islamic  Rep,  of  0.366 
Top  ten  performers  in  human  development,  1960-92 
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7.3 ANNEX  TAM  A5.2 
Sow  industrial  countries  rank  an  human  development  indicators 
Real  GDP  GNP 
Population  Mean  News-  per  per 
Life  per  Maternal  years  of  Overall  Tertiary  paper  Televi-  capita  capita 
HDI  expectancy  doctor  mortality  schooling  enrolment  enrolment  arculation  sions  (PPP$)  (US$) 
1992  1992  1990  1988  1992  1991  1990  1990  1990  1991  1991 
1  Canada  1  6  17  9  2  1  2  19  2  5  8 
2  Switzerland  2  2  25  6  7  10  21  6  19  2  1 
3  Japan  3  1  24  23  15  11  20  2  3  4  2 
4  Sweden  4  3  10  9  9  20  is  4  10  10  3 
5  Norway  5  9  20  2  3  7  5  1  14  11  4 
6  France  6  11  8  16  4  5  6  20  18  6  10 
7  Australia  7  10  16  5  5  17  11  16  8  14  15 
8  USA  a  17  15  16  1  2  1  16  1  1  7 
9  Netherlands  9  6  13  18  12  17  10  13  7  13  13 
10  United  Kingdom  10  13  27  14  6  15  19  a  13  is  16 
11  Germany  11  16  10  13  8  11  8  9  4  3  8 
12  Austria  12  15  2  14  10  25  12  11  9  8  11 
13  Wgium  13  14  4  2  11  9  7  14  11  9  12 
15  Denmark  14  20  12  2  13  7  13  10  5  7  6 
16  Finland  15  18  13  21  14  3  3  3  6  16  5 
18  New  Zealand  16  19  22  24  16  5  4  12  12  17  18 
19  Israel  17  12  8  6  17  11  14  is  23  18  19 
21  Ireland  18  21  25  1  20  11  18  22  22  20  20 
22  Italy  19  8  1  6  22  15  17  25  15  12  14 
23  Spain  20  4  3  9  26  4  9  26  20  19  17 
25  Greece 
ki 
21 
22 
5 
24 
22 
4 
9 
18 
25 
19 
15 
21 
22 
25 
23 
5 
25 
16 
22 
23 
21 
24 
27  Czechoslova  a 
31  Hungary  23  27  7  25  18  25  26  18  17  24  23 
42  Portugal  24  22  18  18  27  23  23  28  27 
4 
21 
25 
22 
25 
48  Bulgaria  25  25  6  26  24  21  16  7  2 
49  Poland  26  26  18  21  21  17  24  24  21  26  26 
72  Romania  27  28  21 
28 
28 
27 
23 
28 
28 
23 
27 
28 
21 
27 
25 
28 
27 
27 
28 
27 
76  Albania  28  23 
Note-  Twenty-eight  indusiial  countries  have  been  given  ranks  that  reflect  their  c  omparative  performance  in  the  selected  aspects  of  human  cleveicipmeni  illustrated  in  this 
i 
table.  To  make  the  rdnks  co  mparaMe  across  indicalom  counims  ha  ve  been  ranýed  only  i(they  have  estimate  s  for  all  the  in  clirator5  Co  untries  with  equal  perf  n  ormance 
an  indicator  are  given  the  same  rank. 
now  aeveioping  countries  rank  on  human  development  indicators  (continued) 
Real  GDP  GNP 
Daily  Mean  per  per 
Life  Access  to  Inf  ant  calorie  Child  Adult  years  of  capita  capita 
HDI  expectancy  safewater  mortality  supply  malnutrition  literaq  sftoling  Radios  (PPPS)  (US$) 
1992  1992  1988-91  1992  1988-90  1990  1992  1992  1990  1991  1991 
133  Lao  People's  Dem,  Rep.  61  75  81  69  34  78  61  50  63  55  so 
134  Ghana  62  58  61  56  79  65  52  44  26  75  63 
135  India  63  52  67  64  43  96  71  56  74  68  72 
136  C6te  Ovoire  64  70  40  65  22  29  60  66  57  58  48 
137  Haiti  65  57  78  62  70  60  61  69  86  76  69 
138  Zambia  66  90  70  59  82  64  40  52  74  72  59 
139  Nigeria  67  67  66  68  77  80  66  75  51  62  70 
140  Zaire  68  71  85  66  64  75  42  72  71  95  80 
142  Yernen  69  68  40  77  76  67  76  82  93  61  55 
143  Senegal  70  76  73  55  69  49  79  82  65  56  47 
144  Liberia  71  62  59  89  63  51  75  61  35  78  57 
145  Togo  72  63  51  60  61  46  72  73  43  82  62 
146  Bangladesh  73  66  77  78  71  97  82  64  as  67  80 
147  Cambodia  74  74  80  81  67  82  81  65  65  64  87 
148  Tanzania,  U.  Rep.  of  75  73  64  73  80  59  61  63  93  91  95 
149  Nepal  76  65  75  71  46  95  92  62  93  69  88 
151  Sudan  77  72  74  71  88  77  91  87  30  66  63 
152  Burundi  78  77  52  76  86  70  66  89  82  89  83 
153  Rwanda  79  83  45  79  91  72  65  79  82  85  78 
154  Uganda  80  96  95  74  87  62  68  76  65  70  91 
155  Angola  81  89  84  88  92  79  74  74  82  73  91 
156  Benin  82  87  58  63  51  56  95  88  72  59  67 
157  Malawi  83  92  62  93  83  56  73  68  38  79  79 
158  Mauritania  94  80  40  82  37  40  85  89  57  74  56 
159  Mozambique  85  83  91  95  94  94  87  70  86  77  97 
160  Central  African  Rep.  86  81  96  75  93  73  78  78  78  88  66 
161  Ethiopia  87  85  89  84  96  88  69  77  48  97  93 
162  Bhutan  88  79  87  90  55  83  77  93  97  90  88 
164  Guinea-Bissau  89  94  79  92  65  54  80  89  88  81  88 
165  Somalia  90  85  49  94  90  86  93  93  88  so  95 
167  Mali  91  91  76  96  39  53  84  89  88  94  77 
168  Chad  92  82  97  84  97  71  88  93  34  96  83 
169  Niger  93  88  55  87  62  93  90  96  82  92  73 
170  Sierra  Leone  94  97  67  94  84  63  96  82  38  71  93 
171  Afghanistan  95  94  93  97  95  89  89  82  65  84  93 
172  Burkina  Faso  96  78  38  82  68  68  97  96  93  86  76 
173  Guinea  97  93  46  91  58  58  94  82  98  93  60 
Note.  Ninety-seven  developing  countries  have  been  given  ranks  that  reflect  their  comparative  performance  in  the  selected  aspects  of  human  development  illustrated  in 
this  table  To  make  the  ranks  comparable  across  indicators,  countries  have  been  ranked  only  it  they  have  estimates  for  all  the  indicators.  CountriesvAh  e"I  perkwrv%ar&e 
in  an  indicator  are  given  the  same  rank 
, T76 Awmdi&ý 
The  1[juman  Develol2ment  Index  and  Some  Other  Indicators. 
Selected  Countries,  1992  (Rank  out  of  160  countries) 
Rank  mil  ).  /  160  A  verage 
,  ountriev  annual  Life 
I  dull  inflation  expeclaric 
*v  Illerac%,  rate  at  birth 
GNP  pc  Rank  on  Rank  on  rate  /9w  1980-W)  1990 
Country  HDI  (us  S)  HDI  GNP  PC  HDI  (;,  *v  P  P(  (I/r)  lyears) 
Japan  0.981  25  430  1  1  1  3  9911  Ls  78,6 
UK  0.962  16  100  2  3  10  11  99.0  5's  7ý  7 
Germany  0.955  22  320  3  2  12  10  991)  2,7  75.2 
Rep.  of  Korea  0,871  5  400  -1  h  1-1  Q  1*3  5A  70.1 
Singapore  0,848  11  160  5  4  40  M.  ()  1.7  74.0 
Brazil  0,739  2  680  7  sq  54  XI 
ý1 
284  3  65.6 
Saudi  Arabia  0.687  7  050  7  67  33  61-4  --t  2  64  5 
Thailand  0.685  1  420  9  ?  )y  79  91.0  1.4  66  1 
Sn  Lanka  0.651  470  9  11)  76  120  Sh,  4  11.1  70,9 
China  0.612  370  11)  11  74  1  U)  73  3  5.9  70.1 
Cameroon  0.313  960  11  9  119  89  54.1  56  51.7 
Tanzania  0268  tio  12  14  126  ISK  ISSO  -15 
8  514.0 
Uganda  0.192  220  13  13  131  141  48.  A  107  0  52.0 
Sierra  Lcone  0.062  240  14  12  119  1.45  20  7  %1  42.0 
SouRcF  UNDP.  Human  Developmew  Reporf.  1992 
HDI  values  by  region,  1960-92 
Absolute 
increase  in 
HDI  value 
1960  1970  1980  1992  1960-92 
All  developing  countries  0.260  0.347  0.428  0.541  0.281 
Least  developed  countries  0.165  0.209  0.251  0.307  0.142 
Inclustriala  0.799  0.859  0.889  0.918  0.119 
World  0.392  0.460  0.519  0.605  0.213 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0200  0.255  0306  0.357  0.156 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  0.277  0.363  Oý480+  0.631  0.354 
South  Asia  0.202  0.248  0.290  0.376  0.174 
South  Asia  excl.  India  0.188  0.231  0.270  0.358  0.170 
East  Asia  0.255  0.379  0.484+  0,653  0.397 
East  Asia  excl.  China  0.416+  0.547  0.686>  0.861  0.446 
South-East  Asia  and  Oceania  0.284  0.373  0.469+  0.613  0.329 
Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  0.467+  0.568  Oý682  0.757  0.290 
excl.  Mexico  and  Brazil  0.504  0.586  0.654  0.735  0.231 
+  Region  moving  from  low  to  medium  human  development. 
>  Region  moving  firom  medium  to  high  human  development. 
a.  Excluding  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union. 
uistribution  of  countries  by  human  development  group,  1960-92 
1960  1970  1980  1992 
High  human  development  16  23  30  40 
Medium  human  development  22  26  28  32 
Low  human  development  76  65  56  42 
Total  114  114  114  114 
377 Main  HDI  Rankings,  1993 
overall  Top  Ranked  Countries  Top  Developing  Countries 
1.  Japan  1-  Barbados 
2.  Canada  2.  Hong  Kong 
3.  Norway  3.  Cyprus 
4.  Switzerland  4.  Uruguay 
5.  Sweden  5.  Trinidad  and  Tobago 
6.  United  States  6.  Bahamas 
7.  Australia  7.  S-Korea 
7.  France  8  Chile 
9.  Netherlands  9.  Costa  Rica 
10.  Britain  10.  Singapore 
11.  Iceland  11.  Brunei 
12.  Germany  12.  Argentian 
13.  Denmark  13.  Venezuela 
14.  Finland  14.  Dominica 
15.  Austria  15.  Kuwait 
16.  Belgium  16.  Mexico 
17.  New  Zealand  17.  Qatar 
18.  Luxembourg  18.  Mauritius 
19.  Israel  19.  Malaysia 
Source:  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report,  1993. 
HDI  ranking  for 
HDI  value  HDI  rank  GNP  per  ca:.  *ta  GNP  per  capita  rank 
rank  minus  HDI  rank* 
Canada  0.932  1  11  10 
Switzerland  0.931  2  1  -1 
Japan  0.929  3  3  0 
Sweden  0.928  4  4  0 
Norway  0.928  5  5  0 
France  0.927  6  13  7 
Australia  0.926  7  18  11 
USA  0.925  8  9  1 
Netherlands  0.923  9  16  7 
United  Kingdom  0.919  10  19  9 
Germany  0.918  11  12  1 
Austria  0.917  12  14  2 
Belgium  0.916  13  15  2 
Iceland  0.914  14  8  -6 
Denmark  0.912  15  7  -8 
378 
i Finland  0.911  16  6 
-10 
Luxembourg  0.908  17  2 
-15 
New  Zealand  0.907  18  24  6 
Israel  0.9  19  25  6 
Ireland  0.892  21  27  6 
Italy  0.891  22  17  -5 
Spain  0.888  23  23  0 
Greece  0.874  25  35  10 
Czechoslavakia  0.872  27  56  29 
Hungary  0.863  31  55  24 
Malta  0.843  41  32  -9 
Portugal  0.838  42  38  -4 
Bulgaria  0.815  48  76  28 
Poland  0.815  49  79  30 
Romania  0.729  72  89  17 
Albania  0.714  76  86  10 
Successor  states  of 
Lithuania  0.868  28  63  35 
Estonia  0.867  29  43  14 
Latvia  0.865  30  47  17 
Russian  Fed.  0.858  34  48  14 
Belarus  0.847  40  49  9 
Ukraine  0.823  45  68  23 
Armenia  0.801  53  73  20 
Kazakhstan  0.774  61  71  10 
Georgia  0.747  66  80  14 
Azerbaijan  0.73  71  92  21 
Moldova,  Rep.  of  0.714  75  81  6 
Turkmenistan  0.697  80  88  8 
Kyrgyzstan  0.689  82  95  13 
Uzbekistan  0.664  91  104  13 
Tajikistan  0.629  97  116  19 
Source:  UNDP,  Human  Development  Report,  1994 
APPENDIX  11.8.1 
Models:  The  task  is  to  generalize  the  experience  of  the  socialist  countries.  Like  so  many 
other  scientific  works,  it  employs  models  for  the  purpose  of  generalization.  IThe  word 
69  model"  must  be  understood  here  in  a  wider  sense.  Economists  of  today  are  inclined  to 
reserve  this  technical  term  of  the  philosophy  of  science  exclusively  for  models  expressed 
in  the  language  of  mathematics.  While  a  mathematical  formalization  is  one  possible  way 
of  creating  a  model,  it  is  certainly  not  the  only  one,  and  it  has  both  advantages  and 
drawbacks.  There  is  a  trade-off  between  accuracy  and  rigor,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
wealth  of  the  description  of  reality,  on  the  other.  'Verbal'  models  ("ideal-types"  or 
6t  prototypes"),  provides  richer  descriptions  and  analyses  closer  to  real  life,  because  it  is 
able  to  build  on  the  reader's  association  of  ideas.  It  makes  it  simpler  to  make  the 
frequent  change  between  the  various  levels  of  abstraction  and  the  various  combinations 
of  simplifying  assumptions.  I  (In  J.  Kornai,  1992.  ) 
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'COUNTRIES.  1987 aThe  year  of  attaining  power  in  armed  uprisings  has  been  defined  either  by  the  year  the  uprising  began 
(e.  g.,  Soviet  Union,  1917)  or  the  year  of  its  victory  (e.  g.,  Yugoslavia,  1945;  North  Vietnam,  1954).  In 
the  case  of  the  Eastern  European  systems  formed  in  a  peaceful  way  it  has  been  defined  by  the  year  of  the 
fusion  of  Communist  and  Social  Democratic  parties. 
b  Countries  are  referred  to  by  the  names  that  reflect  their  geographical  position,  not  by  their  official 
names.  For  instance,  the  country  officially  called  the  Democratic  People's  Republic  of  Korea  is  referred 
to  as  North  Korea;  the  Gen-nan  Democratic  Republic,  as  East  Gen-nany;  and  so  on. 
'Figure  for  1987. 
d  Rural  population. 
'Certain  countries  (e.  g.,  Burma,  Cape  Verde,  Guinea,  Madagascar,  Sao  Tome,  and  Seychells)  are 
borderline  cases  and  are  not  included  in  the  table.  It  is  difficult  to  say  whether  or  not  they  could  have 
been  counted  as  socialist  countries  in  1987  according  to  the  criterion  applied  by  J.  Kornai,  in  his 
research. 
APPENDIX  11.9.3. 
Extensive  and  Intensive  Methods 
Let  us  now  examine  the  relations  between  the  production  factors  and  output  in  the 
growth  process.  There  is  a  vast  amount  of  general  theoretical  writing  on  this  field. 
Several  important  attempts  have  been  made  to  clarify  the  extent  to  which  methods  of 
analysis  devised  for  the  capitalist  system,  primarily  aggregate  production  functions  and 
the  growth  models  based  upon  them,  can  be  applied  to  the  socialist  system.  The  greatest 
difficulty  is  caused  by  the  lack  of  data,  or  the  unreliability  of  them. 
Let  us  list  the  factor-output  relationships  under  two  main  groups.  The  first  group 
contains  the  effects  caused  by  the  growth  of  some  factor.  For  instance,  the  stock  of 
capital  or  the  total  labour  expended  on  production  grows,  and  that  causes  output  to 
grow  proportionally.  The  second  group  covers  the  effects  caused  by  the  growth  of  the 
productivity  of  some  factor.  For  instance,  more  efficient  use  is  made  of  capital  or  labour, 
and  that  causes  output  to  grow.  "This  distinction  and  the  accompanying  terminology  are 
quite  widespread  among  Western  writers,  but  writers  in  the  socialist  countries  prefer  to 
use  another  pair  of  expressions,  distinguishing  between  'extensive'  and  'intensive' 
methods.  The  two  pairs  of  expressions  are  synonymous:  factor  growth  equals  extensive 
methods,  and  factor-productivity  growth  corresponds  to  intensive  methods.  "  In  what 
follows,  the  "Eastern"  terminology  is  usually  adopted.  Strict  dividing  lines  between 
various  extensive  or  intensive  methods  can  only  be  drawn  in  the  framework  of  abstract 
analysis.  In  practice,  they  normally  appear  together. 
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Source:  JKornai  (1992,  pp.  6-7),  based  on  the  following  sources:  Columns  4-5:  World  Development 
Report  (1988,  pp.  221-23)  and  Kozponti  Statisztikai  Hivatal  (Central  Statistical  Office,  Budapest) 
(1989,  pp.  9,14-15).  Coloumn  6:  R.  Summers  and  A.  Heston  (1988,  Tables  3  and  4).  Coloumn  7:  G. 
Balo  and  1.  Lipovecz,  eds.  (1987). Dominance  of  Extensive  Methods  The 
The  dominance  of  extensive  methods  is  explained  primarily  by  the  fact  that  the 
socialist  system  usually  comes  to  power  in  backward,  slow-growing  countries  that  make 
poor  use  of  their  resources  from  the  extensive  point  of  view.  Therefore,  there  are 
numerous  opportunities  for  extending  the  utilization  of  them. 
1.  Growth  in  the  number  of  employed:  The  number  of  people  employed  quickly  grows. 
The  two  phenomena  combined,  namely,  a  high  investment  ratio  plus  a  constant,  fast 
growth  of  employment,  are  the  two  main  factors  explaining  the  high  growth  rate  under 
the  classical  system,  especially  in  the  first  one  or  two  decades. 
2.  More  shifts  and  lengthening  of  working  hours:  Although  the  volume  of  investment  is 
huge,  fixed  capital  is  comparatively  scarcer  than  manpower,  which  is  abundantly 
available  for  a  while.  The  lengthening  of  working  hours  can  also  be  one  of  the  factors 
that  help  to  speed  up  the  rate  of  growth.  3  After  a  time,  the  reserve  of  labour  runs  out. 
When  this  happens,  it  becomes  the  most  important  factor  behind  the  deceleration  of 
growth.  (The  formulation,  that  when  the  reserve  of  labour  is  exhausted,  the  "period  of 
extensive  growth"  ends  and  the  "intensive  period"  begins,  is  now  considered  as 
inaccurate.  ) 
3.  Growth  in  the  area  fan-ned:  Hitherto  uncultivated  areas  can  be  turned  to  farmland. 
This  potential  likewise  runs  out  after  a  while. 
4.  Wider  exploitation  of  mineral  wealth:  extensive  expansion  in  the  use  of  mineral 
wealth;  but  the  potential  eventually  runs  out. 
The  situation  that  results  resembles  war-time  conditions  under  other  systems.  Even  in 
peace-time,  classical  socialism  has  a  'mobilization  economy'.  A  "war-consciousness"  is 
instilled  constantly  by  the  official  ideology:  building  the  economy  is  a  battle  against 
backwardness  and  enemies  without  and  within,  from  which  no  one  and  nothing  can 
withdraw.  The  struggle  demands  mobilization  of  all  able-bodied  men  and  all  material 
resources. 
The  Discussion  of  Intensive  Methods 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  discussion  of  various  intensive  methods,  with  the  advance 
comment  that  they  appear  in  combination  with  each  other  in  the  practice  of  forced 
growth. 
1.  Intensity  of  labour:  Socialists  before  and  after  the  revolution  believe  that  workers 
freed  from  the  rule  of  capitalism  wiH  work  far  more  willingly,  industriously,  and 
intensively  than  the  hired  wage-earners  of  capitalism.  There  are  signs  of  this,  at  least,  in 
the  revolutionary-transitional  period  of  socialist  rule.  But  in  many  people  this  initial 
enthusiasm  gives  way  to  apathy  and  an  expectation  that  they  will  have  to  work  only  as 
much  as  they  are  paid  for.  At  this  point  effective  operation  of  the  material  and  moral 
incentives  designed  to  prompt  the  workers  to  more  intensive  work  and  discipline 
becomes  the  deciding  factor.  There  are  many  serious  problem  with  this.  The  system  does 
not  find  sufficiently  effective  incentive  schemes. 
2.  Technical  progress:  Considerable  technical  progress  takes  place  under  the  classical 
socialist  system.  Thorough  examinations  have  shown  that  although  technical 
development  really  takes  place,  its  contribution  to  growth  is  rather  modest.  Even  this 
moderate  progress  slows  down  in  the  later  stages  of  the  classical  system.  New 
382 Vý,  %,  +,  e),  ohnologies  and  products  introduced  in  the  capitalist  countries  are  taken  over,  imitated, 
usually  after  a  long  delay. 
I  Development  of  manpower  skills:  Although  part  of  technical  progress  in  a  sense, 
rnanpower  development  is  worth  considering  as  a  separate  point.  It  is  typical  under 
forced  growth  that  production,  primarily  industry,  absorbs  large  masses  of  unskilled, 
inexperienced  labour.  Although  ultimately,  in  the  longer  term,  skill  increases,  the 
qualitative  development  of  manpower  lags  much  behind  the  fast-growing  demand  for  it 
in  production. 
4.  organizational  improvement:  the  more  organized  and  disciplined  the  production  and 
product  flow  to  users  are,  the  less  time  is  lost  in  this  way.  Under  classical  socialism,  the 
standard  of  management  and  the  internal  organization  of  production  are  backward.  So 
this  is  an  intensive  method  that  contributes  little  to  production  growth. 
5.  Quantity  at  the  expense  of  quality:  The  capitalist  property  forms  and  market  co- 
ordination  provide  a  strong  incentive  to  improve  quality.  As  Schumpeter's  theory  points 
out,  entrepreneurs  are  in  a  winning  position  if  they  can  capture  the  market  with  a  new, 
better,  and  more  modem  product.  The  quality  improvement  is  provided  by  internal 
incentives  on  a  micro  level,  not  by  central  measures.  These  inner  motive  forces  are 
absent  from  the  classical  socialist  system.  Everyffiffig  pushes  an  economic  leader  toward 
quantity  in  this  quantity-quality  trade-off.  Both  the  plan  and  direct,  bureaucratic  control 
place  the  quantitative  instructions  at  the  fore:  quantity  is  measured,  where  possible,  in 
physical  indices  or  aggregate,  crudely  weighted  indices  of  volume  with  no  capacity  to 
reflect  finer  distinctions.  Improvement  of  quality  is  customarily  mentioned  in  official 
statements,  but  bureaucratic  co-ordination  is  neither  able  nor  very  eager  to  enforce  it. 
CerWnly,  quantitative  growth  at  quality's  expense  is  among  the  intensive  methods  that 
contribute  greatly  to  the  high  rate  of  growth  that  features  in  the  official  statistics. 
6.  Overintensive  use  of  service  capacity:  More  residents  are  squeezed  into  a  housing 
area,  more  patients  into  a  hospital  ward,  and  more  students  into  a  classroom  than  is 
desirable  for  a  good  standard  of  provision.  The  development  of  transportation  and 
telecommunications  is  badly  neglected,  which  means  that  the  trains  and  roads  are 
overcrowded,  and  there  are  too  few  telephone  lines.  As  just  one  example  to  illustrate  the 
overintensive  use  of  capacity,  the  following  table  shows  the  load  on  the  railroad  systems 
of  certain  socialist  and  certain  capitalist  countries.  The  difference  is  remarkable.  The 
overburdening  of  transportation  and  service  capacities,  coupled  with  the  perpetuation  or 
enhancement  of  congestion,  allows  the  economic  leadership  to  provide  investments  and 
other  resources  to  the  service  sector  as  meagrely  as  possible  and  to  allocate  investment 
funds  to  sectors  with  a  high  priority. 
Table.  111.9.3.  A 
Overloading  of  the  Railroad  Systems:  Intemational  Comparison,  1979 
Freight  Traffic  Densities 
(millions  of  ton-kms  per  km) 
383 Source:  J.  Kornai  (1992,  p.  185),  compiled  by  G.  Kwon  on  the  basis  of  United  Nations  (1981,  tables  6, 
8B). 
Note:  The  index  means  the  volume  of  freight  carried  per  total  length  of  railroad  lines  measured  in  km. 
The  volume  of  freight  is  measured  in  units  of  I  ton  carried  a  distance  of  I  km. 
To  sum  up,  under  conditioný 
complemented  by  intensive  met 
general  qualitative  conclusion  is 
Kornai.  1992,  pp.  180-86). 
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;  of  forced  growth,  extensive  methods  predominate, 
hods,  which  have  sometimes  han-nful  effects.  This 
supported  by  numerous  econometric  analyses.  (In.  I 
Icies.  Fluctuations  in  Growth  Phenomenon  of  C 
The  following  are  the  three  kinds  of  fluctuation: 
1.  "Calendar"  pulsation.  This  is  connected  most  directly  with  the  annual  plans.  Since 
there  is  a  strong  material  and  moral  incentive  to  fulfill  the  quantitative  targets  of  the 
annual  plan,  the  pace  of  work  speeds  up  toward  the  end  of  the  year.  The  following  Table 
gives  figures  for  the  end-of-year  spurt,  when  production  is  speeded  up  irrespective  of 
cost,  human  exhaustion,  and  the  decline  of  quality.  At  the  start  of  the  following  year, 
performance  suddenly  dives  again. 
Table  III.  9.4.  A 
End-of-Year  Spurt:  Intemational  ComparisOn  Table 
Country  December  Production  as  a  Proportion 
(Years  of  Observation)  of  Average  Monthly  Production  a  in 
Following  year  (percent) 
384 Capitalist  countries 
Source:  J  Rosto  wski  and  P.  Auerbach  (1986,  pp.  297,301). 
Note:  The  data  refer  to  manufacturing. 
'Average  for  months  1  -11  of  the  following  year. 
2.  Endogenous  investment  fluctuation:  This  is  more  pronounced  in  the  smaller  Eastern 
European  countries,  in  China,  and  in  Cuba  in  certain  periods.  The  following  Table  and 
the  Figure  show  a  conspicuously  high  degree  of  fluctuation  in  investment. 
Table  11.9.4.  B. 
Fluctuation  of  Total  Investment  in  Fixed  Assets  in  China 
Year  Annual  Rate  of  Change  (percent)  Year  Annual  Rate  of  Change  (percent) 
1951  106.9  1969  62.9 
1952  85.7  1970  49.1 
1953  110.3  1971  13.4 
1954  12.1  1972  -1.1 
1955  2.5  1973  6.1 
1956  52.8  1974  5.7 
1957  -6.0  1975  17.6 
1958  84.5  1976  -3.9 
1959 
-  - 
31.9  1977  4.6 
T  960 
- 
13.2  1978  22.0 
T961 
-62.5  1979  4.6 
1962  -44.1  1980  6.7 
1963  33.7  1981  -10. 
1964  42.2  1982  26.6 
1965  30.7  1983  12.6 
1966  17.5  1984  24.5 
385 -- 
1967  -26.3  1985  41.8 
1968  -19.3  1986  12.2 
Source:  J  Komai  (1992,  p.  190),  calculated  on  the  basis  of  of  the  following  sources:  1950-82:  H.  Chang 
(1984,  p.  1287);  1983-86:  Statistical  Bureau,  Peoples's  Republic  of  China  (1987,  p.  60). 
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387 The  following  Table  offers  an  international  comparison  of  variation  coefficients  that  is 
used  as  a  measure  of  fluctuation  around  the  long-term  average  growth  rate. 
TABLE  11.9.4.  C 
Fluctuation  of  Investment:  Intemational  Comparison,  1960-89 
Coefficient  of  Variation  of  Annual 
Average  Growth  Rate  of  Investment  (percent) 
Source:  J.  Komai  (1992,  p.  191),  calculation  by  P.  Mihalyi,  based  on  data  from  the  United  Nations 
Economic  Commission  for  Europe,  Common  Data  Bank. 
Note:  The  coefficient  of  variation  is  the  ratio  of  standard  deviation  and  the  mean.  Western  figures  are 
based  on  data  expressed  at  constant  1985  prices  and  U.  S.  dollar  exchange  rates.  Eastern  data  are 
calculated  at  constant  prices  of  various  years. 
'Mere  are  successive  stages  of  sudden  braking,  slowdown  and  stagnation,  cautious 
revival,  and  unbridled  expansion,  after  which  the  braking  and  a  similar  succession  of 
phases  return.  Then  the  cycle  recommences,  repeating  itself  constantly.  At  first  sight, 
there  are  marked  similarities  between  the  cyclical  fluctuations  of  the  capitalist  and 
socialist  systems,  but  more  careful  examination  reveals  profound  differences.  In 
capitalist  economies  the  slowdown  and  contraction  is  usually  connected  with  the 
inadequacy  of  demand.  Production  has  expanded  too  fast  for  the  present  and  the 
predicted  future  demand.  Business  prospects  become  uncertain.  The  economic  decision 
makers,  when  they  realize  this,  suddenly  slow  down.  This  braking  is  a  decentralized 
Process;  no  one  "above"  gives  an  order.  The  panic  spreads  horizontally,  on  the  market. 
In  socialist  economies,  however,  the  process  is  centralized.  The  brake  is  applied  by 
central  control,  and  the  instruction  to  decelerate  passes  vertically  down  the  levels  of  the 
hierarchy.  Inadequate  demand  is  not  among  the  factors  that  provoke  it.  On  the  contrary, 
the  leaders  deciding  to  apply  the  brake  sense  an  inadequacy  of  resources  available  to  the 
accelerated  process  of  growth.  71lie  entire  cycle  takes  place  amid  conditions  of  rush, 
388 expansion  drives  investment  hunger,  investment  tension,  and  chronic  shortage.  These 
mark  the  conduct  of  decision  makers  at  all  levels  in  the  bureaucracy.  They  would  like  to 
invest  as  much  and  as  fast  as  possible;  meanwhile,  they  meet  constraints  at  the  peak  of 
the  cycle  that  rule  out  further  acceleration.  One  might  put  it  like  this:  the  top  leaders 
receive  signals  notifying  them  of  the  obstacles  to  further  acceleration. 
Three  groups  of  signals  can  be  identified.  "First,  imports  and  indebtedness  cannot 
increase  limitlessly.  In  many  cases,  particularly  in  the  smaller  countries  of  Eastern 
Europe,  they  have  proved  to  be  effective  limits  to  further  acceleration.  Second,  the 
investment  tension  becomes  intolerable.  Economic  and  technical  leaders,  feel  that  ever 
more  common  interruptions,  delivery  problems,  and  delays  are  unbearable.  Third,  the 
expansion  of  investment  cuts  deeply  into  personal  consumption,  exceeding  the  public's 
tolerance  limits.  Discontent  grows,  becoming  audible,  and  endangers  the  power  of  the 
ruling  elite.  ýý  12  Then  the  panic  is  strongest  and  the  braking  most  drastic. 
3.  Changes  in  political  line:  A  change  in  the  political  power  relations  or  the  stance  taken 
by  the  leader  can  lead  to  sudden,  dramatic  turns  even  during  the  same  person's  period  in 
power.  Examples  include  the  transition  from  War  Communism  to  the  NEP  under  Lenin, 
from  slow  development  of  co-operatives  to  swift  and  aggressive  collectivization  under 
Stalin,  from  the  liberal  policy  of  "letting  a  hundred  flowers  bloom"  to  the  "Great  Leap 
Forward"  under  Mao.  In  other  cases  the  sharp  change  comes  when  an  old  leader  dies 
and  his  successor  takes  a  new  policy  course.  Whatever  the  case,  these  sudden  changes 
of  line  have  far-reaching  effects  on  the  economy,  producing  great  swings  in  a  whole 
range  of  indices. 
The  various  kinds  of  fluctuation  just  described  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  One  thing 
can  certainly  be  said:  socialist  planning  has  belied  the  hope  that  it  would  produce  smooth 
growth  free  of  the  fluctuations,  standstills,  and  setbacks  of  capitalism.  Although  the 
fluctuations  under  socialism  are  induced  by  different  mechanisms  and  have  different 
consequences  than  those  under  capitalism,  wave  motions  exist  and  cause  damage  of  a 
great  many  kinds.  (In  J.  Kornai,  1992,  pp.  186-193). 
APPENDIX  11.14.5 
Measurement  of  Agygrggate  Quiput 
The  official  statistics  of  the  socialist  countries  contain  numerous  distortions.  These  are 
not  merely  caused  by  inaccuracies  of  measurement;  they  are  tendentious  in  seeking  to 
present  a  more  favourable  result  than  the  true  one.  The  concern  here  is  primarily  with 
the  main  factors  distorting  the  aggregate  indices  of  output  measured  by  value.  The 
difficulties  are  surveyed  in  the  following  Table,  which  gives  the  calculations  for  the  total 
output  of  several  socialist  countries. 
Table  111.14.5.  A 
Official  and  Altemative  Estimates  of  Growth 
International  Comparison 
1961-70  1971-80  1981-85  1986  1987  1988  1989 
Bulgaria 
NMP  (official)  7.7  7.0  3.7  5.3  4.7  2.4  -2.0 
[_GDP  I  -1  6.8  3.4  4.2  6.0  2.6  -1.9 
389 (extended 
official)  5.8  2.8  0.8  4.9  -0.9  2.0 
GNP 
(alternative) 
China 
NMP  (official)  4.0  5.8  10.0  7.7  10.2  11.1  3.5 
GDP  (official)  -  5.5  10.1  8.3  11.0  10.9  3.6 
GNP  -  5.8  9.2  7.8  9.4  11.2  - 
(alternative) 
Czechoslovaki 
a 
NMP  (official)  4.4  4.7  1.8  1.8  2.7  2.6  1.2 
GDP  4.7  1.7  3.2  2.7  2.2  1.2 
(extended 
official)  2.9  2.8  1.2  2.1  1.0  1.4  - 
GNP 
(alternative) 
East  Germany 
NMP  (official)  4.3  4.8  4.5  4.3  3.6  2.8  2.0 
GDP  4.8  4.3  3.9  3.3  3.1  2.3 
(extended 
official)  3.1  2.8  1.9  2.2  1.1  1.1  - 
GNP 
(alternative) 
Hungary 
NMP  (official)  5.4  4.6  1.2  0.9  4.1  -0.5  -1.6 
GDP  (official)  5.3  4.7  1.8  1.5  4.1  -0.1  0.2 
GNP  3.4  2.6  0.7  2.2  1.1  1.1  - 
(alternative) 
Poland 
NMP  (official)  8.4  5.4  -0.8  5.2  2.0  4.8  0.1 
GDP  5.3  0.1  4.2  2.0  4.1  -1.0 
(extended 
official)  4.2  3.6  0.6  2.7  -1.7  2.1  - 
GNP 
(alternative) 
Romania 
NMP  (official)  8.4  9.4  3  . 
0a  3  . 
0a  0.7 
a 
-2.0'  -7.9' 
GDP  9.1  3.2  2.3  0.9  -0.5  -5.8 
(extended 
official)  5.2  5.3  -0.1  2.9  -0.9  -1.5 
GNP 
(alternative) 
Soviet  Union 
NMP  (official)  6.9  5.0  3.2  2.3  1.6  4.4  2.4 
GNP  (official)  7.6 
b  5.5  3.7  3.3  2.9  5.5  3.0 
GNP  4.9  2.6  1.9  4.0  1.3  1.5  - 
(alternative) 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
Source:  J  Konwi  (1992,  pp.  194-195),  compiled  by  J.  Arvay,  based  on  P.  Marer  et  al.  (199  1). 
Note:  Official  data  originate  from  the  statistical  yearbooks  of  the  given  country  or  from  reports 
submitted  by  national  authorities  to  the  World  Bank.  Extended  Official  estimates  were  made  by 
consultants  to  the  World  Bank,  taking  into  account  the  level  and  growth  rate  of  official  NMP  and  the 
relation  between  NMP  and  GDP  in  periods  where  such  data  were  available  for  a  given  country  or  the 
390 ratio  in  other  countries.  Therefore,  any  distortions  embedded  in  official  growth  rates  are  included  in  the 
extended  GDP  growth  rates,  too.  Alternative  estimates  are  from  Central  Intelligence  Agency  (1989). 
These  estimates  in  most  cases  use  officially  published  physical  quantity  indicators  that  are  then 
weighted  by  factor  costs  or  ad  usted  factor  costs  of  the  products.  The  CIA  volume  is  based  on  several  i 
sources,  including  the  data  of  T.  Alton  and  his  associates  in  the  Research  Project  on  National  Income  in 
East  Central  Europe. 
11  in  Romania  the  national  accounts  data  for  1980-89  are  the  considerably  revived  figures  published  in 
1990. 
b  1966-70. 
Row  1  contains  the  official  statistics,  and  the  other  rows  alternative  estimates.  It  is  enough  to  point 
out  one  common  characteristic:  all  the  alternative  estimates  show  a  lower  rate  of  growth  than  the 
official  figures.  Numerous  quantitative  examinations  will  have  to  be  re-examined  in  light  of  the  new, 
more  accurate  data.  (In  J.  Kornai,  1992,  pp.  193-197). 
Aggendix  111.15.1 
NATO  Sumynit  (London.  5-6  July  1990) 
'NATO  declares  formal  end  to  the  Cold  War.  '  Main  NATO  decisions  are  the  following. 
Peace  declaration:  'fhe  Warsaw  Pact  states  are  invited  to  sign  a  joint  declaration  with 
NATO  committing  them  to  non-aggression. 
Gorbachev  invitation:  President  Gorbachev  and  other  East  European  leaders  are  invited 
to  address  the  North  Atlantic  Council. 
Conventional  forces:  CFE  (Conventional  Forces  in  Europe)  negotiations  to  be 
intensified.  When  the  treaty  is  signed,  NATO  will  give  a  commitment  on  troop  levels  in 
united  Gen-nany  and  seek  a  new  agreement  on  further  cuts. 
Nuclear  strategy:  NATO  to  make  nuclear  arms  'weapons  of  last  resort'  -  moving  away 
from  the  'flexible  response'  doctrine.  NATO  to  withdraw  all  US  nuclear  shells  from 
Europe  if  the  USSR  reciprocates. 
Stronger  CSCE:  New  CSCE  institutions  are  to  include:  a  secretariat,  a  body  to  monitor 
elections,  a  conflict  prevention  centre  and  an  Assembly  of  Europe.  (From  The  Times,  7 
July  1990). 
Appendix  111.15.2 
The  Warsaw  Pact.  1935 
(Signatory  States:  Albania,  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia,  GDR,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania, 
USSR) 
Key  Statements  including  the  following:  The  Contracting  Parties, 
Reaffirming  their  desire  to  create  a  system  of  collective  security  in  Europe  based  on  the 
participation  of  all  European  states,  irrespective  of  their  social  and  political  structure, 
whereby  the  said  States  may  be  enabled  to  combine  their  efforts  in  the  interests  of 
ensuring  peace  in  Europe; 
Taking  into  consideration,  at  the  same  time,  the  situation  that  has  come  about  in  Europe 
as  a  result  of  the  ratification  of  the  Paris  Agreements,  which  provide  for  the  constitution 
of  a  new  military  group  in  the  form  of  a  'West  European  Union',  with  the  participation 
391 of  a  remilitarized  West  Germany  and  its  inclusion  in  the  North  Atlantic  bloc,  thereby 
increasing  the  danger  of  a  new  war  and  creating  a  threat  to  the  national  security  of 
peace-loving  States: 
Being  convinced  that  in  these  circumstances  the  peace-loving  States  of  Europe  must 
take  the  necessary  steps  to  safeguard  their  security  and  to  promote  the  maintenance  of 
peace  in  Europe; 
Being  guided  by  the  purposes  and  principles  of  the  Charter  of  the  United  Nations;  In  the 
interests  of  the  further  strengthening  and  development  of  friendship,  co-operation  and 
mutual  assistance  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  respect  for  the  independence  and 
sovereignty  of  States  and  of  non-intervention  in  their  domestic  affairs;  11  various 
Articles  have  been  drawn  ...  In  the  event  of  the  establishment  of  a  system  of  collective 
security  in  Europe  and  the  conclusion  for  that  purpose  of  a  General  European  Treaty 
concerning  collective  security,  a  goal  which  the  Contracting  Parties  shall  steadfastly 
strive  to  achieve,  the  present  Treaty  shall  cease  to  have  effect  as  from  the  date  on  which 
the  General  European  Treaty  comes  into  force. 
(Source:  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  pp.  265-266). 
Appendix  111.15.3 
The  Helsinki  Conference  on  Securill  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  WSCE).  1973- 
75 
This  conference  was  originally  proposed  by  Soviets.  No  general  peace  conference  had 
ever  taken  place  following  World  War  11,  and  the  Soviet  Union  saw  such  an  assembly  as 
a  means  to  consolidate,  or  'legitimize',  the  favourable  strategic  position  it  had  attained 
in  Europe  as  a  result  of  the  war.  The  advent  of  detente,  coming  on  the  heels  of  Brandt's 
Ostpolitik,  made  the  atmosphere  favourable  to  such  talks.  Preliminary  negotiations 
began  in  1972.  Eventually  on  3  July  1973  the  representatives  of  35  nations  (all  the 
European  states  -  except  Albania  -  with  the  USA  and  Canada)  sat  down  for  talks  in  the 
Finnish  capital.  Far  from  being  a  speedy  'summit'  though,  the  talks  dragged  on  and  on. 
The  Final  Helsinki  Document  was  not  signed  until  1  August  1975. 
While  the  Soviet  Union  wanted  the  Conference  to  concentrate  on  security  matters,  and 
was  prepared  for  some  general  statements  on  economic  and  cultural  co-operation,  the 
West  wanted  a  broader  overall  programme  for  the  improvement  of  pan-European 
relations.  Western  nations  felt  that  for  real  detente  to  be  achieved,  the  rights  of 
individuals  would  have  to  be  secured.  This  meant: 
1.  A  minimum  consensus  on  the  development  of  human  rights. 
2.  Liberalization  as  regards  exchanges  of  people  and  ideas. 
The  Soviet  side  was  hostile  to  the  thrust  of  Western.  moves.  The  Western.  emphasis  upon 
the  freedom  of  the  individual  in  relation  to  the  state  contrasted  with  the  notion  that  had 
developed  in  state  socialist  societies  that  such  freedoms  as  the  individual  possessed  were 
inextricably  linked  -  and  even  conditional  upon  the  individual's  duties  and  obligations  to 
state  and  community.  Eventually,  however,  Soviet  resistance  to  discussion  on  human 
rights  was  overcome  by  Western  persistence.  There  was  agreement  to  consider 
humanitarian  and  cultural  questions  on  the  conference  agenda  as  a  separate  item.  The 
Swiss  delegation  had  proposed  the  idea  of  dividing  the  agenda  into  three  'baskets':  the 
392 first  dealing  with  questions  relating  to  Security  in  Europe;  the  second  dealing  with  co- 
operation  in  the  field  of  economis,  of  science  and  technology  and  of  the  environment; 
and  the  third  dealing  with  human  rights  (co-operation  in  humanitarian  and  other  fields). 
The  Soviets  were  forced  to  recognize  that  the  security  and  stability  they  so  earnestly 
desired  could  not  be  guaranteed  by  weapons  on  inter-governmental  treaties  alone.  It  was 
dependent  also  upon  their  willingness  to  take  the  aspirations  of  individual  citizens  into 
account.  Further  the  Western  nations  made  clear  that  they  were  not  prepared  to  talk 
about  peace  and  security  without  reference  to  human  rights.  -The 
Soviet  Union  adopted 
the  principles  of  the  Final  Act  (Helsinki  Accord)  into  its  1976  Constitution,  thereby 
strengthening  their  universal  validity  regarding  standards  of  international  conduct. 
Fimlly,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  the  Final  Act  establihed  a  basis  for  continuing 
dialogue  on  the  matters  dealt  with.  It  initiated  a  process  for  seeking  information  and 
exchanging  views  on  the  issues  raised  by  the  conference,  as  well  as  monitoring 
compliance.  Subsequently,  Helsinki  'follow-up'  conferences  [such  as  those  at  Belgrade 
(1977),  Madrid  (1979),  Stockholm  (1984-5),  and  Vienna  (1986)]  were  held  to  review 
the  working  of  the  agreement. 
[Sources:  Conference  on  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe,  Final  Act,  HMSO 
Cmnd.  6198;  V.  Mastny,  Helsinki  Human  Rights  and  European  Security:  Anaýysis  and 
Documentation,  Duke  University  Press,  Durham,  1986;  T.  Buergethal  (ed),  Human 
Rights,  International  Law  and  the  Helsinki  Accord,  Al-lanheld,  Osman,  New  Jersey, 
1977;  in  'The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  London,  1990.1 
CSCE  Paris  Summit  (19  November  1990) 
A  joint  declaration  was  issued  by  the  member  states  of  NATO  and  the  Warsaw  Pact. 
The  signatories  stated: 
That  they  no  longer  regarded  themselves  as  adversaries  and  would  seek  ffiendly 
relations  with  each  other. 
That,  mindful  of  the  obligations  under  the  UN  Charter  and  their  commitment  to  the 
Helsinki  Final  Act,  they  would  refrain  the  use  of  force  against  the  territorial  integrity  or 
the  political  independence  of  any  state. 
That  the  security  of  each  state  was  linked  to  the  security  of  all  participating  in  the 
Conference. 
That  each  state  had  the  right  to  be  a  party  to  a  treaty  of  alliance. 
That  they  approved  the  intensification  of  political  and  military  contacts  to  promote 
understanding  and  confidence. 
That  they  were  determined  to  agree  to  disarmament  agreements  and  welcomed  the  new 
negotiations  between  the  US  and  the  USSR  and  the  reduction  of  short-range  nuclear 
forces. 
That  they  would  work  with  other  CSCE  states  to  enable  the  body  to  make  an  even 
greater  contribution  to  security  and  stability  in  Europe. 
[Source:  Adapted  from  The  Independent,  20  November  1990,  in  The  Times  Guide  to 
Eastern  Europe.  ] 
ADDendix  111.15.4 
393 The  Pentagonale  Initiative:  Poficl  Document  (Venice.  Aygust  1990) 
Reasons  for  the  establishment  of  the  Pentagonale  Initiative. 
The  Pentagonale  Initiative  is  a  new  form  of  co-operation  for  promoting  joint  efforts9 
taking  into  consideration  the  emergence  of  a  new  era  in  Europe.  It  is  a  follow-up  to  the 
former  quadrilateral  co-operation  established  in  Budapest  on  10  and  11  November  1989 
between  Italyq  Austria,  Yugoslavia  and  Hungary.  It  assumed  the  pentagonal  form  in 
Vienna  on  20  May  with  the  accession  of  Czechoslovakia.  The  co-operation  takes  into 
account  the  following: 
The  established  tradition  of  co-operation  between  the  five  countries  and  their  mutual 
bilateral  co-operation. 
The  major  changes  which  have  occured  in  East-West  relations. 
The  revolutionary  changes  that  took  place  recently  in  the  Central  and  East  European 
countries. 
The  Pentagonale  Initiative  is  a  contribution  towards  creating  security  and  stability  for 
the  change-over  from  the  old  to  new  order,  particularly  by  pursuing  various 
objectives  ... 
The  Pentagonale  Initiative  is  a  component  of  a  much  broader  European 
architecture.  In  this  context,  the  five  participating  countries  recognize  the  essential  role 
of  CSCE  in  setting  up  a  lasting  order  of  peace,  security,  justice  and  co-operation  in 
Europe  and  they  attach  special  importance  to  the  activity  of  the  European  Community 
and  other  European  organizations.  The  Pentagonale  Initiative  therefore  represents  a 
level  of  co-operation  which  will  be  helpful  in  bringing  those  member  countries  not  yet 
participating  in  -  or  candidates  to  -  the  EC,  closer  to  the  European  Community 
... 
The 
Pentagonale  Initiative  has  no  rigid  institutional  structures,  and  is  designed  to  be  flexible 
and  pragmatic.  'Me  various  projects  can  be  carried  out  by  all  or  by  some  of  the 
participants  ... 
The  Pentagonale  Initiative  also  foresees  a  regular  exchange  of  views 
between  the  five  member  states  on  matters  of  a  political  nature  and  of  common  interest. 
Wherever  possible,  joint  initiatives  will  be  carried  out  within  the  latitude  permitted  by 
the  international  obligations  of  each  member  state  in  this  respect. 
(Source:  The  Times  Guide  to  Eastern  Europe,  London,  1990,  pp.  275-276.  ) 
Appendix  111.16.1 
NElestones  in  Economic  PoligX  and  Performance  during  the  Gorbachev  Era. 
9  March  1985:  Mikhail  Gorbachev  becomes  General  Secretary,  makes  economic 
revitalization  a  top  priority 
Gorbachev  outlines  initial  strategy:  short-run  reliance  on  human  factor  to  improve 
productivity  and  weed  out  incompetents;  in  longer  term,  counts  on  organizational 
changes  and  modernization  of  industrial  base. 
Gorabachev  presses  antialcohol.  campaign,  cleans  house  in  Council  of  Ministers  and 
Central  Committee  economic  departments. 
November  1985:  Draft  guidelines  for  1986-90  plan  feature  acceleration  in  industrial 
and  agricultural  growth,  give  special  prominence  to  machinery  sector  as  prime 
394 mover  in  modernization  campaign;  plan  depends  on  unrealistic  assumptions  about 
conservation  and  productivity. 
February  1986:  At  Communist  Party  congress,  Gorbachev  proclaims  "reasonable 
sufficiency"  guideline  for  defense  programs. 
Leadership  reorganizes  foreign  trade  apparatus,  establishes  guidelines  for  setting  up 
joint  ventures  between  Soviet  enterprises  and  foreign  partners. 
Leaders  criticize  failure  to  improve  quality  of  output,  set  up  system  of  state  quality 
inspection. 
Glasnost  and  democratization  in  economy  encounter  government  and  party 
resistance. 
Investment  surges  while  per  capita  consumption  stagnates. 
State  budget  deficit  begins  to  climb. 
June  1987:  Supreme  Soviet  and  Central  Committee  approve,  guidelines  for  "new 
economic  mechanism"  to  include  enterprise  self-financing,  narrower  scope  of  state 
plans,  price  and  wage  revisions,  greater  freedom  to  engage  in  international  trade. 
October  1987:  Ryzhkov  sets  out  program  for  expanding  defense  industry 
involvement  in  civil  production 
"  Plan  reflects  new  emphasis  on  consumer. 
"  New  quality  control  program  disrupts  industry. 
"  Investment  program  falls  far  behind  beacuse  of  confusion  in  construction  and 
machinery  shortages. 
"  State  budget  deficit  continues  to  climb. 
"  January  1988:  Broad  implementation  of  reforms  approved  in  1987  begins. 
"  Fall  1988:  Gorbachev  raises  1989  targets  for  production  of  consumer  goods, 
announces  cuts  in  defense  outlays  and  state  investment,  takes  defense  sector  with 
greatly  increased  support  for  civilian  economy,  stretches  out  reform  process. 
"  State  budget  deficit  continues  to  climb. 
"  January  1989:  Implementation  of  1987  reforms  expands  to  entire  economy, 
contributes  to  disruption  of  traditional  supply  relationships. 
October  1989:  Abalkin  reform  program  calls  for  gradual  transition  from  state  to 
other  forms  of  ownership,  development  of  market-oriented  financial  system. 
December  1989:  Supreme  Soviet  approves  Ryzhkov  reform  and  stabilization 
program  -  watering  down  of  Abalkin  program. 
Economy  sputters  as  production  of  energy  and  basic  materials  falls;  transportation 
and  distribution  problems,  exacerbated  by  strikes  and  ethnic  tensions,  interfere  with 
supplies. 
Investment  program  stalls  as  unfinished  construction  rises. 
*  Spending  on  defense  declines,  led  by  cuts  in  weapons  procurement. 
395 Open  and  repressed  inflation  evident;  shortages  intensify,  leading  to  rationing  in 
many  localities. 
International  financial  position  deteriorates  as  U.  S.  S.  R.  borrows  to  pay  for  increased 
imports  of  consumer  goods  and  industrial  equipment 
August  1990:  Shatlin  reform  program  calls  for  market  determination  of  output  and 
prices,  increase  in  republic  authority  over  economic  policy  and  reforms. 
October  1990:  Gorbachev  reform  program  is  adopted,  providing  for  gradual 
elimination  of  state  controls  over  output  and  prices,  sale  or  transfer  of  property  to 
owners  other  than  state,  eventual  convertibility  of  ruble  to  hard  currency. 
"  Central  and  republic  governments  at  logger-heads  over  wide  range  of  economic 
issues,  including  reforms. 
"  Regional  autarky  disrupts  economic  ties. 
"  Soviet  economy  passes  from  stagnation  to  decline. 
"  investment  and  defense  spending  continue  to  fall. 
"  Inflation  accelerates,  shoppers  sweep  stroe  shelves  clean,  shortages  of  energy  and 
industrial  materials  worsen,  barter  proliferates. 
Source:  The  Former  Soviet  Union  in  Transition,  pp.  31-33.  ] 
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397 Source:  Alan  Gelb  and  Cheryl  Gray,  "The  Transformation  of  Economies  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe:  Issues,  Progress  and  Prospects,  11  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Paper,  no.  17,  Washington,  D. 
C.,  1991;  See  also  Stanley  Fischer  and  Alan  Gelb,  "The  Pý-ocess  of  Socialist  Economic 
Transformation,  "  Journal  of  Economic  Perspectives,  vol.  5,  no.  4,199  1,  pp.  10  1-  104. 
ADDendLx  111.18.1 
Russian  Reforms  since  1992 
The  following  report  of  The  Times  April  13,1995  shows  further  the  effects  of 
deepening  reforms:  Three  times  since  1992,  Russia  has  obtained  loans  from  the 
international  Monetary  Fund  to  support  macro-economic  reforms  and  to  stabilize  the 
rouble.  Each  time  the  Russian  Government  has  failed  to  live  up  to  its  solemn  promises  of 
monetary  discipline,  reduced  budgetary  deficits  and  economic  liberalization.  This  week 
the  IMF  board  approved  a  further  $6.8  billion  standby  loan  to  see  Russia  through  the 
1995  budget  year.  In  terms  of  the  Russian  economy,  even  $6.8  billion  is  small,  sufficient 
to  cover  only  about  a  third  of  its  projected  budget  deficit  (and  about  equal  to  the 
military  bill  for  the  Chechenia  operation).  Economists  argue  with  reason  that  Russia 
could  finance  the  entire  budget  itself,  if  it  liberalised  its  oil  and  gas  industries  and  taxed 
them  at  close  to  world  levels:  Gazpron,  the  gas  monopoly  is  scandalously  protected  on 
both  counts.  Russia  still  pays  vast  subsidies  -  accounting  half  this  year's  planned 
spending  -  to  state-owned  industrial,  mining  and  agricultural  monopolies;  and  far  too 
little  of  that  money  goes  into  overhauling  them.  Privatization  of  Russia's  collective 
farms  is  almost  completely  stalled  and  uneconomic  mines  stay  mi  production  without 
paying  their  miners.  But  the  need  for  such  reforms  is  precisely  what  justifies  the  IMF's 
decision.  The  loan,  and  the  monitoring  that  accompanies  it  will  give  Russia's  small  band 
of  genuine  reformers  much-needed  leverage.  Mr.  Yeltsin;  s  eagerness  to  close  the  IMF 
deal  has  already  yielded  some  results.  Under  a  law  passed  in  January,  it  is  illegal  for  the 
government  to  finance  the  deficit  by  printing  money.  The  same  month  the  Central  Bank, 
put  under  much  firmer  management  following  last  October's  rouble  crisis,  actually  cut 
the  money  supply.  Under  a  new  decree,  any  overshooting  of  spending  targets  must  be 
approved  by  President,  Government  and  Parliament.  That  will  fend  off  demands  for 
additional  state  subsidies.  Provided  Russian  targets  mean  something  this  time,  the  worst 
could  just  be  over.  Russia's  economy  may  at  last  have  stopped  declining,  and  the 
country  could  even  move  into  modest  growth  by  late  summer.  Falling  inflation  and  rising 
tax  revenues  would  make  it  politically  easier  for  the  government  to  live  up  to  its 
promises  of  further  structural  reforms.  That  would  release  up  to  $2  billion  more  in 
World  Bank  finance,  and  coax  back  some  of  the  $24  billion  officially  estimated  to  be 
salted  away  in  Western.  accounts  by  Russian  investors  and  enterprises.  The  first  $1 
billion  will  be  paid  to  Russia  this  month,  followed  by  $500  million  on  a  monthly  basis. 
Nfichel  Camdessus,  the  IMF's  managing  director,  praised  Russia's  "bold  and  ambitious" 
economic  reform  programme,  and  said  he  believed  the  Russian  economy  may  begin  to 
grow  again  this  year,  after  four  years  of  steep  decline. 
Three  strokes  of  economic  bad  news  in  Russia:  The  rouble  slipped  below  5,000  to  the 
dollar  for  the  first  time,  the  Finance  Minister  admitted  that  revenues  are  $1.4  billion 
short  for  the  first  quarter  of  this  year,  and  thousands  of  Russian  miners  and  workers  in 
Siberia  and  the  Far  East  staged  a  one-day  strike  to  demand  the  release  of  government 
credits  so  that  their  long-delayed  wages  can  be  paid. 
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Under  the  Communist  system,  foreign  trade  was  actually  controlled  by  state-owned, 
sectoral.  foreign  trade  organizations  (FTOs)  which  arranged  trade,  including  negotiating 
terms,  pricing  and  the  handling  of  foreign  currency,  for  deals  predetermined  by  the  plan. 
Local  money  in  centrally  planned  economies  (CPEs)  was  not  even  'goods  convertible'  in 
the  internal  economy.  This  system  had  to  change  with  the  demise  of  socialist  economic 
system  and  during  the  period  of  the  systemic  change,  the  administrative  barriers  to  trade 
fell.  As  transitional  economies  (TEs)  wish  to  integrate  themselves  as  quickly  and  as  fully 
as  possible  into  the  global  economy,  special  attention  must  be  paid  to  the  external 
economy.  Openness  to  the  world  economy  helps  to  provide  a  system  of  relative  prices 
and  much  needed  competition  for  domestic  producers.  Thus  the  movement  towards 
convertibility  is  one  of  the  high  priority  issues  in  the  early  transition  process.  However,  it 
is  not  possible,  and  not  even  desirable  to  move  directly  to  full  convertibility  in  TEs.  A 
process  of  convergence  between  domestic  and  global  prices  must  first  take  place,  and 
this  is  bound  to  be  gradual. 
Internal  or  domestic  convertibility  is  a  term  which  has  been  used  during  the  first  years 
of  transition  to  explain  the  first  stage  of  TEs'  external  economic  reform.  It  simply  means 
that  duly  registered  resident  economic  agents  can  obtain  foreign  exchange  (convertible 
currency  =  CC)  at  the  prevailing  exchange  rate  of  merchandise  and  related  transactions 
by  using  local  money  (LM).  In  turn,  all  agents  without  exception  must  surrender  all  CC 
earnings  to  the  proper  authorities  -  in  practice  to  the  local  banking  system  -  at  the 
prevailing  exchange  rate.  This  rate  may  be  fixed  or  floating,  but  the  point  is  that  virtually 
the  entire  supply  of  CC  is  available  for  transaction  purposes  at  a  rate  determined  by  the 
local  monetary  authorities.  The  system  can  be  visualised  by  the  following  diagram: 
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Table  111.18.3.  A 
00  Latvian  National  Budget  for  1991 
(Thousands  of  Rubles) 
Budget  Item  National  Budget  Percent  of  National  Budget 
Income 
Corporate  Income  tax  411,608  14.19 
Turnover  tax  1,111,456  38.31 
Excise  tax  715,500  2,4.67 
Personal  Income  tax  241,081  8.31 
Land  tax  22,265  0.77 
Property  tax  66,682  2.30 
Road  tax  211,000  7.27 
Fines  for  late  payment  of  taxes  52,083  1.80 
Fees  for  using  natural  and  labour  resources  16,300  0.56 
Fees  and  other  non  tax  income 
Total 
52,874 
2,900,849 
100.00 
Grants  and  Subsidies  to  local  budgets  517,563  17.84 
Expenditures 
State  capital  investment  379,130  11.70 
Financing  national  economy  754,744  23.29 
Social  cultural  measures  684,018  21.11 
Science  72,430  2.24 
Financing  state  bureaucracy  223,794  6.91 
Other  expenditures  1,126,319  34.76 
Total 
LLL  I 
3,240,435 
I 
100.00 
Proble  of  Fiscal  Policy  Reform  Du  ng  e  Tran  ition:  A  Baltic  Ce  Source:  John  E.  Tedstrom:  ",  M  ri  Th  s  as 
Study"  p.  232;  Documentation  from  Finance  Ministries  of  the  three  Baltic  states  and  interviews  with 
respective  Balt  officials. 
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Table  111.18.3.  B 
ithuanian  Budget  for  1991 
(Thousands  of  Rubles) 
401 Budget  Itern  State  Percent  of 
State  budget 
Local  %  Local 
budgets 
National  Percent  Of 
National 
budget 
Income 
Corporate 
income 
605,000  10.70  255,000  17.18  860,000  12.05 
Excise 
(turnover) 
3,800,000  67.23  0  0.00  3,800,000  53.25 
Personal 
income 
479,893  8.49  719,817  48.51  1,199,710  16.81 
Land  tax  0  0.00  347,249  23.40  347,249  4.87 
Vehicle  tax  0  0.00  5,500  0.37  5,500  0.08 
State  filing  tax  0  0.00  101,870  6.86  101,870  1.43 
Customs 
duties 
3,000  0.05  0  0.00  3,000  0.04 
Fees  for  using 
state  property 
376,000  6.65  0  0.00  376,000  5.27 
Other  13POOO  0.23  54,494  3.67  67,494  0.95 
Special  fund 
of  financial 
resources 
375,600  6.64  0  0.00  375,600  5.26 
Total  5,652,493  100.00  1,483,930  100.00  7,136,423  100.00 
Subsidies  from 
state  budget 
712,297 
Expenditures 
Education  399,857  8.09  725,617  33.04  1,125,474  15.77 
Culture  121,579  2.46  50,149  2.28  171,728  2.41 
Health  care  308,292  6.24  442,320  20.14  750,612  10.52 
Sports  6,500  0.13  1,940  0.09  8,440  0.12 
Social  Security  297,770  6.03  322,040  14.66  619,810  8.69 
Science  257,261  5.21  0  0.00  257,261  3.60 
State  archives  3,578  0.07  0  0.00  3,578  0.05 
Road 
maintenance 
and  repair 
76,000  1.54  0  0.00  76,000  1.06 
National 
economy 
1,805,763  36.55  224,551  10.22  2,030,314  28.45 
Ecological 
maintenance 
95,379  1.93  0  0.00  95,379  1.34 
State 
government 
and 
bureaucracy 
72,264  1.46  42,096  1.92  114,360  1.60 
402 Legalorgans  19,434  0.39  0  0.00  19,434  0.27 
Internal  195,665  3.96  0  0.00  195,665  2.74 
organs 
State-wide  534,769  10.82  0  0.00  534,769  7.49 
programs 
Payments  to  350,624  7.10  0  0.00  350,624  4.91 
enterprises 
Other  72,338  1.46  73,218  3.33  145,556  2.04 
expenditures 
Capital  320,900  6.50  314,296  14.31  635,196  8.90 
investment 
Housing  2,223  0.04  0  0.00  2,223  0.03 
projects 
Total  4,940,196  100.00  2,196,227  100.00  7,136,423  100.00 
Source:  John  E.  Tedstrom:  "Problems  of  Fiscal  Policy  Reform  During  The  Transition:  A  Baltic  Case 
Study"p.  233;  Documentation  fi-om  Finance  Ministries  of  the  three  Baltic  states  and  interviews  with 
respective  Balt  officials. 
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Table  111.18.3.  C 
Estonian  State  Bujget  and  Budget  Supplements  for  1991 
(Rubles) 
Income  Source  12/20/90: 
Original  State 
Budget 
9/5/91: 
Budget 
Supplements 
Total  Percentage  Share 
Turnover  tax  640,000,000  +307,313,00 
0 
947,313,000  34.9 
Excise  tax  605,800,000  -9,200,000  596,000,000  22.0 
Corporate  income  tax  167,300,000  +632,700,00 
0 
800,000,000  29.4 
Natural  resource  19,670,000  19,670,000  0.7 
Oil  products  tax  173,500,000  173,500,000  6.4 
Customs  duties  10,000,000  10,000,000  ý0.4 
Other  11,100,000  +158,900,00 
0 
700,000,000  6.3 
Total  1,627,370,00 
0 
2,717,083,00 
0 
Transfer  to  local  budgets  228,300,000  +72,100,000 
Budget  surplus  to  local  budgets  +128,900,00 
0 
Source:  John  E  Tedstrom:  "Problems  of  Fiscal  Policy  Reform  During  The  Transition:  A  Baltic  Case 
Study"p.  234;  Documentation  from  Finance  Ministries  of  the  three  Baltic  states  and  interviews  with 
respective  Balt  ofji-cials. 
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List  of  Priority  Issues  during  the  Transition  Stage  of  Development 
We  only  list  here  the  priority  issues  during  the  new  stage  of  development. 
"  The  problem  of  people  and  culture  and  integral  leaming 
"  The  problem  of  production  and  technology  and  self-sufficiency 
"  The  problem  of  scarce-resources  and  utilization  and  sustainable  growth 
"  The  problem  of  real  investment  and  firms  and  employment  opportunities 
"  The  problem  of  real  wages  and  prices  and  inflationary  tendencies 
"  The  problem  of  comparative  advantage  and  internal  and  intemational.  trade 
"  The  problem  of  currency  and  financial  institutions  and  exchange  rate  mechanism 
"  The  problem  of  ecology  and  environment  and  space 
"  The  problem  of  defence  and  nuclear  capability  and  super  powers 
"  The  problem  of  basic  needs  and  human  dignity  and  human  rights 
"  The  problem  of  economic  integration  into  global  market 
"  The  problem  of  new  world  order 
"  The  problem  of  privatization  and  land  reforms 
"  The  problem  of  democratic-market  oriented  legal  system 
"  The  problem  of  conscientization  and  empowerment  mechanism 
"  The  problem  of  welfare  dynamics 
The  problem  of  R&D  and  patent  rights 
"  The  problem  of  foreign  aid  and  ODA 
"  The  problem  of  transitional  stage  to  permanent  growth] 
Appendix  H1.19.2. 
An  Illustrative  Checklist  of  indicators  of  Political  Freedom 
1.  Personal  Security 
a.  Arbitrary  arrest  and  detention:  Are  there  arrests  without  a  warrant  or  probable  cause; 
detention  without  prompt  hearing  before  a  court  or  other  independent  body; 
unreasonably  long  detentions  before  trial  or  conviction;  arrests  and  detentions  of  people 
for  their  political  beliefs?  Is  there  any  incommunicado  detention? 
b.  Torture  or  cruel  treatment  or  punishment:  Are  there  acts  of  torture  (mental  or 
physical)?  Is  there  cruel,  unusual  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment?  Are  there 
inhumane  prison  conditions?  Does  police  brutality  exists? 
c.  Arbitrary  killing:  Are  there  any  executions  without  due  process  of  law  by  the  police, 
security  forces  or  state  officials?  Are  there  any  killings  by  non-governmental  forces  with 
404 government  acquiescence  or  compliance?  Are  there  killings,  either  of  civilians  or  of 
captured  or  wounded  combatants,  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  war? 
d.  Disappearances:  Are  persons  abducted  and  held  in  unacknowledged  detention  by 
order  of,  or  with  the  complicity  of  the  State  or  opposition  forces,  without  their  family  or 
friends  having  any  knowledge  of  where  they  are  and  how  they  are  faring?  Do  family 
members  have  effective  judicial  or  administrative  mechanisms  of  determining 
whereabouts  and  status  of  abducted  persons? 
2.  Rule  of  Law 
a.  Fair  and  Public  Hearings:  Are  there  fair  and  public  hearings  in  the  determination  of  all 
criminal  charges?  Is  every  person  charged  with  an  offence  tried  without  undue  delay, 
and  with  adequate  time  and  facilities  for  the  preparation  of  his  or  her  defence? 
b.  Competent,  Independent  and  Impartial  Tribunal:  Is  the  judiciary  free  of  outside 
pressure  or  influence?  Is  there  corruption  in  the  judiciary?  Is  the  procedure  for  selecting 
judges  an  open  one  in  which  opinions  outside  the  executive  can  be  heard?  Do  judges 
have  security  of  tenure? 
c.  Legal  Counsel:  Does  everyone  have  the  right  to  capable  and  independent  defence 
counsel  in  the  determination  of  any  criminal  charge  against  him  or  her?  Does  everyone 
have  the  right  to  have  legal  assistance  assigned  to  him  or  her  in  any  case  where  the 
interests  of  justice  so  require,  and  without  payment  by  the  defendant  if  he  or  she  lacks 
the  necessary  means?  Is  there  a  right  to  consult  with  counsel  immediately  on  arrest, 
before  interrogation  begins? 
d.  Review  of  Conviction:  Does  everyone  convicted  of  a  crime  have  the  right  to  have  his 
or  her  conviction  and  sentence  reviewed  by  an  independent  judicial  tribunal? 
e.  Failure  to  Prosecute:  Do  state  prosecutions  also  prosecute  government  officials,  or 
members  of  pro-government  forces,  who  violate  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  other 
persons? 
3.  Freedom  of  Expression 
a.  Restrictions  in  Law  and  Practice:  Is  freedom  of  expression  a  constitutionally  or  legally 
protected  right?  Are  there  legal  restrictions  on  freedom  of  opinion  and  expression  other 
than  what  is  necessary  to  protect  the  rights  of  others?  Is  there  prosecution  of  journalists 
or  others  for  infringement  of  such  laws?  Are  the  punishments  prescribed  severe  in 
proportion  to  the  offence? 
b.  Media  Censorship:  Is  there  direct  censorship  of  any  of  the  media?  Is  there  indirect 
censorship  by  such  means  as  withdrawal  of  government  advertising  revenue,  licensing 
laws,  or  restrictions  on  the  supply  of  materials?  Are  there  threats  to,  or  harassment  of, 
publishers,  editors  or  journalists?  Is  there  destruction  of  media  outlets  by  State  or  non- 
State  forces?  Has  the  government  shut  down  any  newspapers  on  the  grounds  of  their 
legitimately  expressed  views? 
c.  Media  Ownership:  Is  the  media  (particularly  TV  and  radio)  wholly  or  partly  owned  by 
the  government?  If  so,  do  the  media  tend  to  reflect  or  favour  government  policy?  IS 
independent  ownership  of  the  media  permitted? 
d.  Freedom  of  Speech:  Is  there  any  censorship  of  mail,  phone-tapping  or  government 
surveillance?  Are  there  any  restrictions  on  freedom  of  speech?  Are  there  government 
405 controls  on  book  publishing  or  the  arts,  other  than  to  safeguard  public  morality  or  in  the 
legitimate  interests  of  national  security  or  public  order? 
4.  Political  Participation 
a.  Political  participation:  Is  there  freedom  of  association  and  assembly?  Are  multiple 
parties  allowed  in  law  and  in  practice?  Is  there  violence  against,  or  harassment  of, 
political  opponents? 
b.  Free  and  Fair  Elections:  Is  there  a  universal  adult  franchise?  Are  there  procedural 
irregularities  by  government,  such  as  the  exclusion  or  intimidation  of  voters,  the  rigging 
of  votes,  or  violence  against  candidates  or  opponents  of  government?  Do  the  voting 
procedures  permit  political  parties  and  independent  observers  to  monitor  balloting  and 
vote  counting? 
C.  Continuity  of  the  Democratic  System:  Are  free  elections  a  recent  introduction  or  a 
long-standing  tradition?  What  are  the  prospects  of  a  democratic  system  continuing?  Do 
elections  occur  at  reasonably  regular  intervals? 
d.  Community  and  Local  Decision-Making:  Are  political  decision-making  powers 
decentralized?  How  much  public  participation  is  allowed  in  local  bodies  and  at  the 
community  level? 
5.  Equality  of  Opportunity 
a.  Legal  Guarantees:  Are  there  constitutional  or  statutory  guarantees  of  equality, 
regardless  of  gender,  race,  colour,  descent,  tribe,  religion  or  national  or  ethnic  origin? 
b.  Violence  against,  or  harassment  of,  particular  groups:  Does  the  State  always 
prosecute  those  responsible  for  violence  or  harassment  (State  or  non-State)  against 
particular  groups? 
c.  Political  Participation:  Are  any  groups  excluded  from,  or  hindered  from,  participation 
in  voting  or  government?  Does  the  State  support  or  condone  this,  or  does  it  make 
serious  efforts  to  combat  it? 
d.  Economic  Participation:  Are  there  inequalities  in  pay  and  employment  as  a  result  of 
discrimination?  Are  there  discriminatory  restrictions  on  economic  participation?  Does 
the  State  support  or  condone  discrimination,  or  does  it  make  serious  efforts  to  ensure 
equal  treatment? 
Source:  Human  Development  Report  1992,  UNDP,  Oxford  Universiýy  Press,  p.  A 
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The  Tide  of  Freedom 
Transitions  from  autocratic  to  democratically  elected  political  systems  have  come  in 
waves  over  the  past  decade.  The  first  was  swept  through  Latin  America.  It  began  in 
Peru  in  1980  with  the  completion  of  a  transition  to  an  elected  government  after  12  years 
of  military  rule.  In  the  following  years,  South  America's  military  regimes  fell  one  by  one: 
Argentina  in  1983,  Brazil  and  Uruguay  in  1985,  Chile  in  1988  and  Paraguay  in  1989. 
There  have  been  more  than  180  coups  in  157  years  in  Bolivia,  but  democratic,  civilian 
rule  was  restored  (only)  in  1982. 
406 Haiti  is  undergoing  the  region's  most  painful  transition.  Violence  and  coups  have 
plagued  the  country  since  the  Duvalier  regime  was  ousted  in  a  1986  military  coup.  The 
latest  setback  occurred  in  December  when  Jean-Bertrand  Aristide,  Haiti's  first 
democratically  elected  president,  was  overthrown  and  forced  into  exile.  (By  American 
intervention,  Aristide  has  been  reinstated  as  the  president  in  1995). 
The  fall  of  Berlin  Wall  in  1989  heralded  a  wave  of  transitions  in  the  (Central)  and 
Eastern  European  countries  and  what  was  the  Soviet  Union.  Radical  political  changes 
begun  in  Poland  in  1988  were  consolidated.  Other  countries  followed:  Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia,  German  Democratic  Republic,  Hungary  and  Romania  either  began  or 
completed  transitions  to  democratic  rule  in  1990.  In  1991,  Albania  held  its  first 
multiparty  elections  in  68  years.  That  same  year,  the  republics  of  the  former  Soviet 
Union  experienced  rapid  political  change  towards  democracy. 
There  was  little  political  change  in  post-independence  Africa  until  the  late  1980s,  but 
since  then  the  transformations  have  been  dramatic.  Elections  were  held  in  Namibia  in 
1989  and  the  new  government  guided  the  country  into  independence  in  1990.  In  1991, 
multiparty  elections  were  held  in  Benin,  Cape  Verde,  Sao  Tome  and  Principe,  and 
Zambia.  The  military  government  in  Nigeria  has  committed  itself  to  transfer  rule  to 
civilians  through  elections  in  1992. 
Many  other  African  countries  also  moved  towards  ending  single-party  systems:  Angola, 
Burkina  Faso,  Congo,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Niger  and  Tanzania.  And 
opposition  forces  in  such  other  countries  as  Cameroon,  Madagascar  and  Zaire  are 
pressing  for  political  change. 
Political  change  has  transformed  many  countries  in  Asia  over  the  past  several  years  as 
well.  In  1985,  Filipinos  poured  into  the  streets  to  overthrow  the  Marcos  government 
and,  shortly  thereafter,  held  a  democratic  presidential  election.  In  1990,  Mongolians 
ratified  a  new  constitution  that  established  a  multiparty  system. 
During  1991,  Nepal  held  its  first  democratic  elections  in  30  years.  Hong  Kong  took  its 
first  steps  towards  democracy  with  direct  elections  to  its  legislature,  and  Samoa  held  its 
first  elections  with  universal  adult  suffrage.  Pakistan  and  Bangladesh  switched  from 
martial  law  regimes,  to  elected  parliamentary  systems.  Warring  factions  in  Cambodia 
signed  a  peace  accord,  and  an  international  efforts  is  under  way  to  help  smooth  the 
transition  to  a  multiparty  system. 
In  the  Middle  East.,  election  fever  gripped  Jordan  at  the  end  of  the  decade,  and  in  1991  a 
national  charter  legalized  a  multiparty  system.  Algeria's  democratic  transition  is  still 
incomplete.  Multiparty  elections  are  scheduled  for  November  1992  in  Yemen. 
Close  to  a  third  of  humankind  still  lives  in  countries  that  place  restrictions  on  political 
freedom  and  participation.  But  the  world  today  is  a  much  freer  place  than  it  was  three 
decades  ago. 
[Human  Development  Report  1994  cites  Afghanistan,  Angola,  Haiti,  Iraq,  Mozambique, 
Myanmar,  Sudan  and  Zaire  as  countries  in  crisis.  I 
Source:  Human  Development  Report  1992,  UNDP,  Oxford  Universiýy  Press,  p.  28;  Also  see,  Human 
Development  Report  1994,  UNDP,  Oxford  Universitp  Press,  P.  41ff. 
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Labour  Markets 
One  of  the  results  of  the  reforms  in  the  transition  process  was  a  contraction  in 
employment.  Between  1990  and  1992,  employment  declined  continuously  in  all 
transition  economies.  In  1993,  the  rate  of  decline  in  employment  slowed  in  most  east  European  countries  (as  shown  in  the  table),  but  it  was  still  significant,  with  the  falls 
ranging  from  3  to  7  per  cent,  with  the  exception  of  Poland  and  Slovakia  where  the 
decline  in  employment  was  relatively  small.  In  the  CIS  countries,  where  the  transition 
process  started  later  and  has  been  much  slower,  the  decline  in  employment  was  again 
rather  modest  in  1993,  as  in  previous  years,  with  a  weighted  average  fall  of  2  per  cent. 
The  contraction  in  employment  accelerated  somewhat  in  the  Baltic  states  in  1993, 
reaching  nearly  5  per  cent  for  the  region  as  a  whole.  The  cumulative  decline  in 
employment  over  the  period  1990-1993  was  much  more  moderate  in  the  CIS  countries 
and  the  Baltic  states  -  nearly  6  and  9  per  cent  respectively  -  than  the  16  per  cent  in 
Eastern  Europe,  in  spite  of  the  much  greater  reduction  in  output  in  the  former  two 
groups.  There  was  no  significant  improvement  in  the  labour  markets  of  the  majority  of 
the  transition  economies  in  the  first  half  of  1994.  In  eastern  Europe,  despite  the 
economic  upturn  in  several  countries,  the  level  of  employment  continued  to  fall  in  the 
first  half  of  1994,  albeit  at  rates  which  moderated  somewhat  over  the  two  quarters.  The 
level  of  unemployment  reached  a  peak  by  the  end  of  the  first  quarter  of  1994  and 
declined  slightly  thereafter.  However,  unemployment  rates  in  most  countries  continued 
to  be  very  high.  Significant  labour  market  slack  and  the  high  and  increasing  incidence  of 
long-term  unemployment  suggests  that  even  a  strong  recovery  in  eastern  Europe  could 
not  be  expected  to  reduce  unemployment  to  tolerable  levels  in  the  foreseeable  future  - 
(In 
most  of  these  countries,  more  than  40  per  cent  of  the  unemployed  had  been  out  of  work 
for  at  least  12  months  at  mid-1994,  in  spite  of  their  short  history  of  open 
unemployment.  )  In  the  CIS  countries,  the  rise  in  unemployment  gained  momentum  in 
the  first  half  of  1994,  even  though  official  unemployment  rates  still  remain  extremely  low 
(not  exceeding  2  per  cent  on  average)  both  compared  with  the  countries  of  eastern 
Europe  and  vis-a-vis  the  very  steep  falls  in  output.  The  low  open  unemployment  in  these 
countries  can  be  only  partly  explained  by  the  shortcomings  of  the  official  unemployment 
statistics.  Among  other  major  reasons  are  the  behaviour  of  enterprises  and  the  economic 
policies  pursued  by  the  majority  of  governments,  which  have  tried  to  avoid  large-scale 
lay-offs,  given  the  probable  social  and  political  implications  of  mass  unemployment. 
Transition  Countries:  Total  Employment.  1990-1994 
(Annual  average  percentage  change 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994' 
Q1 
1994 
Q11 
1990- 
1993 
b 
Albania  -0.7  -5.8  -16.6  -6.8  -27.3 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  -2.9 
Bulgaria  -6.1  -13.0  -8.1  -6.0  -29.5 
Croatia  -3.9  -7.1  -10.2  -3.7  -4.0  -3.5  -22.8 
Czech  Republic  -0.9  -5.5  -2.6  -2.6  -5.4  -4.6  -11.1 
Hungaryc  -3.1  9.6  9.3  -5.9  -3.0  -2.6 
408 Poland  -4.0  -5.9  -4.2  -0.6  -1.6  -1.2  -14.0 
Romania  -1.0  -0.5  -3.0  -3.8  -8.1 
Slovakia  -2.6  -7.0  -7.5  1  -0.4  -0.8  -16.6 
Slovenia  -3.9  -7.8  -6.6  -3.0  -2.6  -2.0  -19.7 
The  FYR  of  Macedonia  -1.5  -3.0  -4.6  -5.5  -6.7  -13.8 
Yugoslavia(FR)  -3.0  -3.0  -3.4  -5.2  -4.7  -4.1  -13.9 
Eastern  Europeý  -2.9  -5.6  -5.3  -3.0  -15.8 
CETE-4  -3.2  -6.5  -5.1  -1.9  -15.7 
SETE-8  -2.5  -4.3  -5.5  -4.5  -15.8 
Armenia  1.9  2.6  -5.6  -3.0  -1.4  -2.1  -4.4 
Azerbaijan  -0.3  4.0  -5.4  -1.2  -2.9  -3.0  -3.1 
Belarus  -1.0  -2.5  -2.6  -1.3  -2.0  -1.9  -7.2 
Georgia  3.7  -10.1  -21.2  -2.2  1  **  -28.1 
Kazakhstan  1.3  -0.9  -1.8  -5.8  -6.4  -6.7  -7.2 
Kyrgyzstan  2.8  -1.0  6.1  -8.4  -6.0  -1.0  -1.1 
Moldova  -1.0  -0.1  -1.0  -1.0  -0.5  -0.5  -2.9 
Russian  Federation  -0.4  -2.0  -2.0  -1.8  -1.3  -1.3  -6.0 
Tajikistan  3.1  1.7  -3.1  -3.0  -2.7  -2.6  -1.5 
Turkmenistan  2.8  1.9  0.1  4.4  1.9  9.5 
Ukraine  -0.6  -1.2  -4.0  -2.3  -7.8 
Uzbekistan  4.2  4.8  -0.6  -0.7  -0.7  -0.5  7.8 
cis  0.1  -1.2  -2.7  -2.1  -5.7 
Estonia'  -2.1  0.4  -14.7  -4.0  -19.5 
Latvia  0.1  -0.8  -3.7  -5.9  -4.5  -3.2  -10.1 
Lithuania  -2.6  2.4  -2.2  -4.2  -2.9  -2.2  -6.6 
Baltic  States  -1.6  0.9  -5.2  -4.7  -10.3 
Total  Transition  Countriesd 
1  -0.7  -2.4 
1 
-3.4  1  -2.4  1  -8.6 
Source:  National  Statistics,  in  UN's  Economic  Bulletin  for  Europe,  vol.  46,1994,  pp.  41-42. 
'  Percentage  change  over  the  same  period  of  preceding  year. 
b  Cumulative  change  over  the  period. 
'  End  of  year. 
d  Excluding  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
'  Since  1992  data  refer  to  end  of  year. 
Unemplo3ane  :  'I'he  available  statistics  suggest  that  unemployment  in  eastern  Europe 
appears  to  have  reached  a  peak  in  early  1994  at  about  7.5  million  people,  as  is  shown  in 
the  following  table.  In  spite  of  the  continued  sharp  downward  trend  in  output  in  the  CIS 
countires,  official  unemployment  remains  very  low.  From  1.2  million  at  the  end  of  1993, 
409 the  number  of  registered  unemployed  has  risen  to  1.9  million  in  August  1994,  with 
unemployment  rates  varyiyng  between  0.3  and  2  per  cent,  except  in  Armenia  where  the 
rate  reached  nearly  7  per  cent.  In  the  Baltic  states,  registered  unemployment  was  rather 
stable  during  the  first  eight  months  of  1994.  Unemployment  rates,  although  increasing 
slightly,  still  remained  very  low  when  steep  falls  in  output  are  taken  into  consideration. 
These  low  registered  unemployment  rates,  both  in  the  Baltic  states  and  in  the  CIS 
countries,  indicates  that  substantial  employment  restructuring  still  lies  ahead. 
Transition  Countries:  UnemplQyment  1992-1994 
(Thousands  and  per  cent  of  labour  force,  end  of  period) 
Une  mplo  ment  (tho  usa  nds)  Une  MPI  oyme  (per  cent 
y  nt 
19  94  19  94  19  94  19  94 
1992  1993  Marc  June  July  Augu  1992  1993  Marc  June  July  Augu 
h  st  h  st 
Alba  394  301  267  261  24.2  19.5  17.3  17.0 
nia 
Bosni 
a  and 
Herz 
egovi 
na 
Bulg  577  626  615  509  514  497  15.6  16.4  16.1  13.3  13.4  13.0 
aria 
Croat  261  243  246  235  237  233  17.8  16.9  17.4  16.9  17.1  17.4 
ia 
Czec  135  185  184  160  165  104  2.6  3.5  3.5  3.1  3.2  3.2 
h 
Repu 
blic 
Hung  663  632  611  550  556  551  12.3  12.1  12.2  11.0  11.1  11.0 
ary 
Polan  2509  2890  2951  2933  2982  2965  13.6  16.4a  16.7  16.6  16.9  16.8 
d 
I 
Rom  929  1165  1291  1213  1206  1182  8.2  10.4  11.5  10.8  10.7  10.5 
ania 
Slova  260  368  370  360  370  367  10.4  14.4  14.8  14.4  14.8  14.6 
kia 
Slove  118  137  131  123  126  125  13.4  15.5  14.8  14.1  14.4  14.3 
nia 
1 
The  173  177  181  185  186  188  26.8  30.3  30.8  31.2  31.4  31.6 
FYR 
Of 
Mace 
donia 
b 
Yugo  749  718  706  720  726  732  22.8  24.0  23.9  24.3  24.5  24.7 
slavi  I 
410 a(FR) 
b 
Easte  6769  7442  7553  7248  7328  7263  12.4  14.0  14.3  13.7  13.9  13.8 
m 
Euro 
pe  c 
CET  3567  4075  4117  4003  4074  4047  11.3  13.3  13.5  13.2  13.4  13.4 
E-4 
SET  3202  3368  3436  3245  3254  3217  14.0  15.0  15.3  14.5  14.5  14.4 
E-8 
Affne  56  103  107  112  113  113  3.5  6.2  6.6  6.8  6.9  6.9 
nia 
Azer  6  20  21  22  23  23  0.2  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 
baija 
n 
Belar  24  66  82  88  90  97  0.5  1.3  1.7  1.8  1.8  2.0 
us 
Geor  19  40  1.0  2.0 
gia 
Kaza  34  41  48  52  54  56  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.8 
khsta 
n 
Kyrg  2  3  4  7  8  9  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.5 
yzsta 
n 
Mold  15  14  17  17  18  19  0.7  0.7  1.0  1.0  1.1  0.9 
ova 
Russi  577  836  1083  1260  1324  1392  0.8  1.1  1.4  1.7  1.8  1.9 
an 
Feder 
ation 
Tajik  7  22  27  28  28  28  0.3  1.1  1.4  1.7  1.5  1.5 
istan 
Turk 
meni 
stan 
Ukrai  71  84  99  93  92  92  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 
ne  I 
Uzbe  9  13  19  19  19  19  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3 
kista 
n 
CIS  819  1240  1558  1754  1826  1908  0.6  1.0  1.1  1.4  1.4  1.5 
Eston  15  16  20  18  17  15  1.9  2.6  3.6  3.3  3.2  2.9 
iaý 
Latvi  31  77  87  86  86  83  2.1  5.8  6.5  6.4  6.4  6.3 
a 
L 
411 Lithu 
ania' 
21  30  29  60  58  60  1.0  1.6  1.5  3.2  3.1  3.2 
Balti  67  123  135  164  161  158  1.5  3.2  3.6  4.4  4.3  4.3 
c 
State 
s 
Total  7655  8805  9246  9166  9314  9330  4.1  4.8  4.8  5.0  5.1  5.1 
Tran 
sition 
Coun 
tries 
Source:  National  statistical  publications  and  direct  communications  to  UN/ECE  secretariat,  in  UN's 
Economic  Bulletin  for  Europe,  vol.  46,1994,  pp.  42-46. 
'  Since  December  1993  a  new  labour  force  estimates  has  been  used  to  calculate  the  unemployment  rate. 
The  unemployment  rate  for  December  1993,  based  on  previous  labour  force  data,  was  15.7  per  cent. 
b  Labour  force  includes  onlu  the  social  sector  in  agriculture  and  excludes  private  shop  owners. 
Therefore,  unemployment  rates  are  biased  upwards. 
'  Excluding  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina. 
d  Data  cover  only  the  number  of  unemployed  receiving  benefits. 
'  Since  June  1994  a  new  system  of  reporting  the  number  of  registered  unemployed  was  introduced. 
Why  is  official  unemployment  so  low  in  the  CIS  countries?  The  exceptionally  low 
official  unemployment  figures  in  the  CIS  countries,  both  relative  to  the  fall  of  output  and 
to  other  transition  countries,  can  be  explained  basically  by  two  sets  of  reasons.  The  first 
is  of  a  technical  nature  and  relates  to  general  deficiencies  of  the  registered 
unemployment  statistics,  including  a  system  of  registration  which  is  rather  complicated 
and  sometimes  confusing,  insufficiently  developed  employment  services  networks, 
especially  in  rural  areas,  and  low  levels  of  unemployment  benefit  which  do  not  create 
incentives  to  register.  As  a  result,  many  of  the  jobless  prefer  to  look  for  work 
independently,  rather  than  through  the  intermediation  of  labour  offices.  The  second  set 
of  reasons  for  low  unemployment  rates  in  the  CIS  countries  relates  to  a  combination  of 
the  specific  economic  policy  stance  adopted  by  the  governments  of  these  countries  and 
of  a  distorted  structure  of  incentives  in  state  owned  or  newly  privatized  enterprises. 
According  to  the  report  of  Economic  Commission  for  Europe  (1994),  economic  growth 
is  likely  to  strengthen  in  eastern  Europe  and  inflation  will  continue  to  fall,  but 
unemployment  will  remain  high.  No  major  changes  can  be  expected  on  the  labour 
markets,  with  employment  levels  likely  to  stabilize  in  1995  and  unemployment  rates 
remaining  high.  While  economic  growth  will  absorb  some  proportion  of  job-seekers, 
especially  through  the  creation  of  new  job  opportunities  in  the  private  sector,  the  inflow 
of  newly  unemployed  people  is  likely  to  continue  unabated  because  of  the  continued 
labour  shedding  by  state  enterprises,  due  to  restructuring,  and  the  outflow  of  manpower 
from  agriculture.  As  a  result,  the  rate  of  turnover  of  the  unemployed  seems  to  have 
settled  at  a  very  low  level  in  transition  countires,  and  a  large  pool  of  permanently  jobless 
people  is  likely  to  become  a  distinct  feature  of  these  economies  for  quite  a  long  time. 
High  and  persistent  unemployment  will  remain  one  of  the  most  important  and  difficult 
policy  challenges  in  the  transition  countries  over  the  medium  term.  There  is  no 
immediate  solution  to  this  problem;  given  its  magnitude  and  the  scarcity  of  budgetary 
funds,  the  appropriate  policy  should  employ  a  combination  of  measures,  including  public 
412 works  programmes,  decisions  aimed  at  improving  labour  mobility  across  regions 
(housing)  and  sectors  (trafi-ting),  and  incentives  for  entrepreneurs  to  create  new  j  obs. 
Appendix  111.19.5 
Composition  of  Stocks  (international  comparison) 
Country  Date  Share  of  output  stocks  in  total  stocks  (percentages) 
GDR  1963  15.4 
Hungary  1976  11.9 
Poland  1975  17.0 
Austria  1976  32.1 
Canada  1970  31.3 
Japan  1975  53.2 
Sweden  1977  38.2 
C- Suurce:  A.  Chikan  and  M.  Nagy,  "Adelekok  a  keszletnovekedes  es  keszletstruktura  kapcsolatanak 
kerdesehez,  "  [Data  concerning  the  relationship  between  growth  and  the  structure  of  stocks], 
manuscript,  Budapest,  1979,  in  J.  Kornai,  "Growth,  Shortage  and  Efficiency,  "  Basil  Blackwell,  Oxford, 
1982. 
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